This appeal by the State Tax Commission from a decree of the Oregon Tax Court,
■The material facts as stated in appellant’s brief and accepted by respondent are simple." The plaintiff is a California corporation, primarily engaged in manufaсturing and processing materials into finished products for the purposes of sale. It has no manufacturing or processing plants in the state of Oregon. It doеs have warehouses and a sales staff in Oregon. Plaintiff sells in Oregon only those goods which were manu *376 factored or processed by its own facilities outsidе of Oregon. Because plaintiff conducts a unitary operation it is required to file a corporation excise tax return in Oregon, apportiоning a certain percentage of its total income to Oregon according to a three-factor formula.
For the years 1957 through 1963 the plaintiff offset against its corporation excise taxes payable to Oregon an amount equal to its personal property taxes paid (but not excеeding one-third of the excise tax) pursuant to the provisions of OES 317.070 (2), which prior to its amendment in 1965 allowed such offset to “each corporation * * * which is primarily engaged in manufacturing, processing or assembling materials into finished products for purposes of sale * * Prior to 1965, plaintiff’s returns were audited by the cоmmission and the “manufacturer’s offset” was allowed. After this court decided Guy F. Atkinson Company v. State Tax Commission, supra, the defendant re-audited the plaintiff’s tax returns for the above years and billed plaintiff for additional taxes in the exact amount of the manufacturer’s offset previously allowed by the commission, plus statutory interest.
In 1957 OES 317.070 (2) (a) was amended by Oregon LaAvs 1957, oh 709, to read as follows:
“(2) (a) Each corporation subject to subsection (1) of this section which is primarily engaged in manufacturing, procеssing or assembling materials into finished products for purposes of sale is entitled to an offset against the tax imposed by subsection (1) of this section.”
From 1957 until 1965 the сommission interpreted the foregoing statute to allow the manufacturer’s offset to corporations such as plaintiff, engaged primarily in manufacturing regardless of where such manufacturing Avas conducted. That administrative interpretation
*377
was consonant with the clear language of the statute and,.if construction of the statute is necessary, is entitled to great weight.
Allen v. Multnomah County,
In 1965 this court in Guy F. Atkinson Company v. State Tax Commission, supra, decided that the Atkinson company which overall was engaged primarily in construction but in Oregon was engaged primarily in manufacturing, was also entitled to the manufacturer’s offset. After Atkinson the commission reversed its administrative construction and ruled that only corporations primarily engaged in Oregon in manufacturing were entitled to the manufacturer’s offset. It thereafter billed plaintiff for additional taxes for the years 1957 through 1963 equal to the manufacturer’s offset which it had previously allowed.
The rationale of the decision in Atkinson is contained in the following paragraph of the opinion:
“The offset is a tax preference limited to corporatiоns engaged in particular types of business. The obvious object in such a preference is to stimulate the types of business in which those granted the prefеrence are engaged. It would be unreasonable to assume the Oregon legislature was giving a tax preference for the purpose of stimulating such business activity outside the state. This results in little wealth to the citizens of Oregon or taxes to the state. We believe that, when read in context, the language usеd shows an intention by the legislature to determine the eligibility to the offset by the corporation’s activity in Oregon and not elsewhere.” [footnote omitted]239 Or at 592 .
It is not necessary to consider now whether Atkinson was correctly decided or whether the phrase “and not elsewhere” contained in the last sentence quoted above was obiter dictum. It is sufficient to point out *378 that the legislature, which was in session when Atkinson was decided, immediаtely renounced the intention imputed to it by this court by providing explicitly that the benefit of the manufacturer’s offset should not be determined “by the corporаtion’s activity in Oregon and not elsewhere.”
The 1965 legislative session amended ORS 317.070 (2) (a), by ch 544, Oregon Laws 1965, to read as quoted below, with the matter in brackets deleted and the matter in italics added:
“(2) (a) Each corporation subject to subsection (1) of this section which is -[-paBMaaly-j- engaged in this state or elsewhere in manufacturing, procеssing or assembling materials into 'finished products for purposes of sale is entitled to an offset of certain personal property taxes against thе tax imposed ,by subsection (1) of this section.”
It will be noted that as amended the statute allowed the offset to all manufacturing corporations, including thosе, like the Atkinson company, engaged in manufacturing in Oregon, and those, like plaintiff, engaged in manufacturing elsewhere.
It is a well established rule in Oregon that “an amendment to an act may be resorted to for the discovery of the legislative intent in the enactment amended.”.
Roy L. Houck & Sons v. Tax Com.,
We are mindful that the legislature made the 1965 amendment retroactive only to January 1, 1965, and that the committee on taxation of the House of Rеpresentatives took a neutral attitude with regard to the retrospective application of the 1965 amendment. ① In spite of these circumstanсes, the fact remains that by the 1965 amendment the legislature renounced any intention to confine the manufacturer’s offset only to corporations еngaged in manufacturing in Oregon. We, therefore, hold that under the pre-1965 version of ORS 317.070 (2) (a) plaintiff and other corporations “primarily engaged in manufacturing, рrocessing or assembling materials into finished products for purposes of sale” were entitled to the manufacturer’s offset even though their activities in Oregon did not include manufacturing.
*380 Since we hold that plaintiff was entitled to the manufacturer’s offset, we do not reach the other questions raised in the briefs.
The decree of the tax court is affirmed.
Notes
“It was the unanimous feeling of the committee, and the clerk was instructed to enter in the minutes with respect to House Bills 1704 [dealing with the personal property tax offset] and 1854, that the effective dates provided in the bills as amended are not intended to indicate any interpretation by the committee as to the lеgislative intent embodied in the 1957 amendments to ORS 317.070- or as to the legislative intent embodied in ORS 314.405 and 314.410 as enacted in .1957 and subsequently amended.
“The committee feels thаt any pending or prospective controversies concerning either the statute of limitations upon additional assessments or the applicаtion of the personal property tax offset to certain businesses, particularly as such controversies may arise out of the recent Supreme Court decision in the Guy F. Atkinson case, should be settled upon the ultimate legal interpretation of the statutory language as it existed for the tax years involved in such controversies. Such interpretation may or may not be in accordance with the revised language incorporated in House Bills 1704 and 1854 as amended.”