MATTER OF KAI HING HUI
In Deportation Proceedings
A-20019215
Decided by Board April 7, 1975
April 7, 1975
(As corrected by amendatory order of May 2, 1975)
15 I. & N. Dec. 288
CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant visitor—remained longer than permitted.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
Jack Wong Sing, Esquire
Chow and Sing
550 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94111
ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Irving A. Appleman
Appellate Trial Attorney
Stuart Shelby
Trial Attorney
This is an appeal by the Service from a decision of an immigration judge dated December 12, 1972 granting the respondent‘s application for status as a permanent resident under
The respondent is a 43-year-old native of China who last entered the United States on June 14, 1970 with a nonimmigrant alien Mexican border crossing card which had been issued to him in 1967 upon his application which was based on a false identity. The respondent had entered Mexico in 1948, when he was 18 years of age, with a false Mexican passport obtained for him by his father. At the deportation hearing, the respondent conceded his alienage and deportability as an overstayed visitor.
The respondent‘s naturalized United States citizen sister petitioned to have him classified as a fifth preference alien on August 14, 1970. The petition was granted on January 2, 1971. The respondent‘s application
The alien renewed his application for
On appeal the Service contends (1) that the respondent is excludable as one who has procured a visa or other documentation, or entry into the United States by wilfully misrepresenting a material fact within the meaning of
The sole issue before us is whether the respondent‘s misrepresentations of his identity, date of birth, nationality, and place of birth in obtaining a nonresident alien Mexican border crossing card is material within
In Matter of S— and B—C—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 448-449 (A.G. 1961), the Attorney General, in discussing whether a misrepresentation is material, stated:
The test of materiality which in my judgment will best effectuate the objectives of the Act is the following: A misrepresentation made in connection with an application for visa or other documents, or with entry into the United States, is material if either (1) the alien is excludable on the true facts, or (2) the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien‘s eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded. . . .
In applying for the nonresident alien Mexican border crossing card the respondent certified that his name was Fernando Chee Acevedo, that his date of birth was May 1, 1929, and that he was born in Chihuahua, Mexico. The “true” facts are that the respondent‘s name is Kai Hing Hui and that he was born on December 14, 1930 in China. As a citizen of China he was ineligible for a nonresident alien Mexican border crossing card, use of which is limited to Mexican nationals (
The immigration judge concluded that intent to deceive was a necessary prerequisite to a finding of deportability under
In the present case, the respondent misrepresented his identity, place of birth, nationality, and date of birth. He did so in order to obtain a benefit to which he was not otherwise entitled—entry into the United States with a nonresident alien Mexican border crossing card, use of which is restricted to citizens of Mexico. The respondent knew that he was not Fernando Chee Acevedo and in claiming to be that person he was making a claim to gain the border crossing card which would not have been issued to him on the “true” facts.
Our review of the record, as well as contentions raised on appeal, satisfies us (1) that the respondent procured a visa or other documentation by fraud, or by wilfully misrepresenting a material fact; and (2) that the respondent has not established his admissibility.
After consideration of the evidence of this record, we conclude that the respondent obtained his visa by wilful misrepresentation of material facts and is ineligible for adjustment of status on the basis of his inadmissibility under
ORDER: The Service appeal is sustained.
Further order: The immigration judge‘s order of December 12, 1972 is withdrawn.
Further order: In lieu of an order of deportation, the respondent is granted voluntary departure within 30 days from the date of this decision, or any extension beyond that date as is granted by the district director and under such conditions as he shall direct.
Further order: If the respondent fails to depart voluntarily when and as required, the privilege of voluntary departure shall be withdrawn without further notice or proceedings, and the respondent shall be deported to Mexico, if that country agrees to accept him, and if Mexico refuses to accept him, then the respondent will be deported to the Republic of China on Taiwan.
Irving A. Appleman, Board Member, abstained from consideration of this case.
