*1 judgment Division is Appellate reversed judgment of trial court from barring proponent serving executrix is reinstated.
For reversal and reinstatement —Chief Justice Hughes, Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford, and Justices Schreiber and Handler —6. —
For None. affirmance KACZMAREK, JR.,
WALTER A. CHARGING PARTY-APPEL LANT, AUTHORITY, v. NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE NEW UNION, JERSEY TURNPIKE EMPLOYEES’ LOCAL IFPTE, AFL-CIO, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS, AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS OF COMMISSION JERSEY, THE STATE OF NEW RESPONDENT.
Argued January 23, August 7, 1978 Decided 1978. *4 Mr. Ronald J. Nelson argued the cause for appellant Nelson, Craner and Mr. Nelson and (Messrs. attorneys; Ms. A. Elizabeth Truly, brief). on the
Mr. Victor J. Parsonnet cause for argued respon IFPTE, dent New AFL- Jersey Turnpike Employees’ Union, Parsonnet, CIO Parsonnet and (Messrs. Dugan, attorneys).
Mr. M. Reilly Bernard cause for argued respondent Jersey New Turnpike Authority.
Mr. H. Lehmann Sidney in lieu of submitted statement a brief on behalf of the Public Com Relations Employment mission.
The opinion of the court was delivered by J. Relations The Public Employer-Employee
Handler, Act, N. J. S. A. 34:13A-1 et an unfair seq., requires that practice be filed with Public Rela- Employment charge tions Commission within months al- six after the (PERC), leged practice occurred unless the charging party “* * * -was from prevented such S. A. J. filing charge.” 34:13A-5.4(c). The filed unfair appellant practices charges beyond the period of statutory limitations. The pre- .issue sented is whether under the circumstances of this case is appellant entitled to be relieved bar to statutory allow the adjudication of his claims.
I 23, 1973, On October serious very multi-vehicle accident occurred on the New Jersey Turnpike. appellant, Walter Kaezmarek, Jr., his assigned by employer, New to assist in Jersey Turnpike Authority, the cleanup opera- tions. A and one-half year later, the appellant was ques- tioned the New Jersey State Police a certain concerning truckload of that had been whiskey involved accident.
The appellant testified that several of his fellow employees had off carried cases from whiskey site to dumping division headquarters. The State Police, however, found no evidence to corroborate appellant’s testimony.
Thereafter, on July 1975, the Turnpike Authority notified the appellant that: your As against a result malicious and unfounded accusations your employees, employment Jersey
fellow with Turnpike the New * * Authority hereby is terminated *. *5 Jersey concerning Your to the statements State Police fellow New employees thoroughly been reviewed and found to be baseless. hav.e disruption Depart- your a As has been to the result actions there unnecessary your anguish and
ment co-workers. the through was unsuccessfully processed discharge under agreement collective available the grievance apparatus Jersey exclusive New by plaintiff’s representative, Turnpike AEL-CIO Union, 194, IEPTE, Employees’ Local (Union). Board, refused to however,
The Union Executive take the letter, matter to arbitration. In notification Septem- dated its 10, 1975, explained the Union’s business that: manager ber * * * essence, agreed Turnpike [with [Executive] in the board your against employees, having Authority] that accusations fellow addition, disruptive unfounded, force. In were of the work been pursue your improper your attorney’s suggested that letter defense proven, alleged against investigation, which, if [sic] would acts reopen your guilt. question fellow-workers’ action, discharge Union’s deemed As result agreement. binding” bargaining under “final and attorney, his thereafter, through appellant, Immediately forum which through appropriate to ascertain the attempted for employer wrong- remedies his against his pursue legal duty its breaching Union for him and the fully discharging discriminatorily, and arbitrarily, by fair representation arbitration. Ap- the matter to faith submit refusing bad of PEEO informed employees that certain maintains pellant bis have jurisdiction did not that the Commission attorney on charge. Accordingly, union over an unfair representation in the commenced suit appellant Superior December Division, Law redress from Court, seeking County, Middlesex both his by employer committed allegedly the wrongs statute, PEEC Presumably on ground Union. N. J. A. 34:13A-5.4(c), jurisdiction had exclusive lack of juris- defendants included practice charges, answers to com- affirmative defense their diction an plaint. *6 9,
On to dismiss the April 1976 defendants moved on complaint jurisdictional grounds. Appellant, realizing that his dismissal, Law Division was vulnerable to complaint filed, 13, 1976, on promptly April an unfair practice charge however, with This, PERC. was nine after nearly months the alleged his and seven wrongful discharge by employer months and three days after the unfair alleged representation e., claim arose when (i. the union to submit the refused matter to on arbitration September On 1975).1 April 1976 the court defendant’s motion the granted and dismissed for complaint of lack 0-n jurisdiction. June 1976 ap filed pellant a of notice appeal the Division Appellate unfair notwithstanding the practice then charge pending be fore PERC. Thereafter, before of resolution PERC any the the proceedings, Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, for ostensibly “lack prosecution.”2
The Turnpike then filed a Authority summary judgment motion with PERC based on the six-month limitation J. A. 8. period which 34:13A-5.4(c), provides that no * * “* unfair practice complaint issued, shall be upon based any practice occurring more than six months prior to charge unless the filing person aggrieved thereby prevented was from such On filing charge.” September 22, the, operative latter 1PERC chose this as the date time when cause action accrued. filing appeal, appellant stay Appel- his 2After moved for a of the ground pursuing late Division action on the he that was then relief Turnpike Authority by filing before PERO. The reacted a motion granted prose to dismiss. It was this motion which was for “lack of appear appeal stay or, alternatively, would cution.” It that of the hav,a prejudice appropriate a dismissal without would been the dis position by Appellate pendency Division in view of the of the necessarily jurisdiction case, which included PERO the issues of by Appellate the statute limitations. The dismissal Division questionable under these circumstances seems and should not be judicata given grounds respect bar on the effect of a res with the, jurisdiction limitations, by urged issues of and statute de fendants. PERC motion and dismissed granted respondent’s was not
complaint. appellant PERC concluded from filing within of the statute “prevented” the meaning It reasoned that timely the Commission. charge before even misinformed PERC staff assuming by appellant members, nevertheless, the appropriate he was forwarded forms PERC’s director and a of PERC’s copy executive rules. that, law, filing PERC further as a matter of held the statu- complaint in the Law Division did toll tory six-months limitation.
On Hovember 4, 1976 filed a notice of appeal appellant from the PERC His decision with the Division. Appellate position on was that doctrine of appeal equitable tolling the statute of limitations should be to avoid hard- applied *7 and ship injustice. argued that PERC has alternatively He no jurisdiction unfair over or if it representation claims, does, its jurisdiction is concurrent. Division,
On 1977 the in an April Appellate unpublished “PERC opinion, found that dismissed properly appellant’s on the filed of The complaint ground that it out time.” court found thus to decide “unnecessary” jurisdictional it question, issue, event, that in additionally implying any had been foreclosed failure to by appellant’s prosecute earlier from Law appeal Division action. certification, a for petition
The filed appellant relying whether on the as to the six-months limita- solely question tolled. Certification was tion should be period granted.
N. J. 16 (1977).
II Act”, “Hew Relations Jersey Employer-Employee The &S “the seq. N. J. S. A. 34:13A-1 is (hereinafter Act”), scheme to serve the legislative promulgated comprehensive of the State or by prevention best interests people N. S. A. settlement labor J. 34:13A-2. disputes. prompt aim, inter for a Re Employment The “Public provides, Act Commission”, lations N. J. S. A. 34:13A-5.2, -whichis given ** * “exclusive power from prevent anyone in engaging unfair any J. S. A. practice”, 34:13A-5.4(c), as enu in N. J. S. A. merated 34:13A-5.4(a) (unfair practices J.N. employers) 34:13A-5.4(b) (unfair practices employee A person organizations). an aggrieved by unfair practice is authorized file a with “charge” PERC, where PERC upon must commence the appropriate administrative proceedings to resolve the controversy.
This statutory entertain and authority adjudicate un fair practices was conferred PERC as upon result of the earlier conclusion Cty. Pk. Burlington Evergreen Mental v. Hosp. Cooper, N. J. 579 law, first (1970) that enacted, did not empower PERC unfair process practices complaints. Galloway Ed. v. Galloway See Bd. Twp. Twp. Assoc. J. The Sec'ys, Ed. 78 N. n. (1978). statute which authority conferred PERC the upon process unfair practices period claims also six-months imposed within which such claims must be It the invoca brought. is tion of this limitations to statutory bar claim appellant’s PERC which has on generated the issue appeal. for a limitation on reasons actions statutory whether in
must be examined issue this confronting should relaxed to statutory permit ease the late period claim. It is practices filing acknowledged gen that the behind statutes of erally purpose limitation primary *8 of compel exercise a of action within a right is to the reason able time so the has a fair opposing party opportunity defend, Union Auth. v. City Housing Commonwealth Co., N. 335 330, Trust 25 J. another is to stimulate (1957); of action and diligently their causes litigants pursue Votalor, Farrell v. claims. of stale the prevent litigation 111, N. J. 62 115 Corp., (1973). See Div. Chemetron of R., 424, v. N. Y. Cent. R. 380 U. Burnett S. generally 4, & L. 1050, 941, Ct. 1053 n. 13 Ed. 2d 4, & n. 85 S. 428 and prompt 4 (1965). filing expeditious 945 & n.
338 in volatile are the especially important of processing charges preserv In relations. addition field of employer-employee sta record, celerity administrative of the the immediacy ing 1424, Lodge Local relationships, bilizes existing bargaining B., 419, 411, L. 362 U. v. N. R. S. Assoc. Machinists Int’l and in 832, Ed. 822, 828, (1960) 4 L. 2d S. Ct. II Hear or of labor disputes. hibits festering the aggravation Re the New Public ings Employer-Employee Jersey before 1974, lations c. at 42X 124) Commission Study (April (L.
30, Dorf). Moreover, Gerald L. a 1975) (Statement stagnant of limitation acts to weed out and period possibly Additionally, or claims. circum frivolous changing vexatious stances an following controversy add employer-employee dimensional remediation and complexity adjudication to the of unfair render practices; the of time serve to may passage many meritorious resolution. proper claims “moot” without Galloway Bd. v. Assoc. Twp. Ed. Galloway Twp. Cf. Sec’ys, supra. Thus, Ed. N. J. in period six-months 34-:13A-5.4.(c) serves may which important policies lightly disregarded. it reasoning, the same would be derelict for
By and strictly uncritically statutory period apply Court.to conscientiously limitations without circum considering stances of the individual case assessing Legislature’s time limitation as related to objective prescribing R., Burnett v. N. Y. Cent. R. supra, claim. particular 944; 85 S. Ed. 2d at White S. at Ct. at L. U. Bd., Violent Crimes J. Comp. (1978).
v. some is design, significance In probing legislative period six-months that the to the circumstance attributed un over grant jurisdictional with the limitation was enacted However, right the juxtaposition practices. fair of limi period with the six-months unfair practices process creating is statutory provision right same tation in thereby the Legislature whether not alone dispositive or condition the it- right qualify that the limitation tended
339
R.,
self. Burnett v. N. Y. Cent. R.
380 U.
supra,
S. at 427
2,n.
2,
In White v. Violent Crimes Comp. this supra, Court discussed extensively distinction between a statute of limitations which is “remedial” and which one a imposes 368, “substantive” or 76 N. J. “jurisdictional” prerequisite, at 374-379: the former only affects to enforce right remedy and not the substantive itself whereas latter right inheres in the and is right said to “extinguish underlying as well right bar the Id. at 374. A remedy.” limitation contained in a statute new creating right a was generally a considered condition to the existence of precedent the right e., itself, i. if not met by the charging party, party’s Studivant, complaint would fail. United States v. 529 F. 2d 673 Cir. (3 1976); Son, Marshall v. M. Brewster George & Inc., 37 N. J. 181 176, (1962). Nevertheless, federal cases which have the similar interpreted provision National Act, Labor Relations 29 U. S. C. within (now 160(b) § National Labor Act, Relations Management 29 U. C. § et 141 have found the seq.) period six-months be a simple statute of limitations and a jurisdictional prerequisite. 264, e. N. L. R.
See, g., B. v. Local Laborers' Int'l Union of America, North 529 2dF. 778 Cir. (8 1976); Shumate v. B., F. L. R. 452 1971); 2d 717 (4 Cir. A. H. Belo Corp. B.,
v. N. L. R. F. 2d 959 (5 Cir. cert. 1969), den. 396 U. S. S. Ct. L. Ed. 2d 498 (1970); N. L. Inc.,
R. B. v. Bakery, Silver F. 2d 37 Cir. 1965). (1 See also Lullo v. Int'l Assoc. Fire Local Fighters, J.N. A., N. L. R. (1970) (the where pertinent, is in structive as to the interpretations our own In statute). White
any event, in we eschewed such “mechanistic” ap for more proaches flexible legislative-purpose test. White Bd., v. Violent Crimes 76 N. Comp. supra, J. at 378-379.
In instant case, the Legislature, by its very choice expression, evinced purpose permit equitable con siderations to be to bear. brought It did not couch the period of limitations in terms aof flat and absolute bar but instead
340 the action shall be of that the limitation stated expressly within filing from is “prevented” if the charging party tolled term 34:13A-5.4(c). N. J. S. A. the period. six-months factors be that in connote may ordinary “prevent” parlance from him have disabled yond complainant the control of the fact the that Nevertheless, the a timely complaint. filing there can he that fashion recognized in this Legislature has situa an individual’s personal out of arising circumstances in time in charge him his may bringing tion which impede into all relevant a inquiry broader intent to invite bespeaks the fairness of imposing the upon considerations bearing R., Cent. R. Burnett v. N. Y. limitations. statute of Cf. at L. Ed. 2d Ct. at 13 429, 85 S. 380 U. S. at supra, whether, under for decision becomes 946. The question are case, the considerations equitable of this circumstances been having “pre should be regarded such that appellant with timely PERC in fashion. charges vented” from his filing from within the filing An to he employee, “prevented” J. S. need not 34:13A-5.4(c)), statute (N. terms beyond factors that are his totally fettered only by have been case, a Burnett v. distinctly Indeed in analogous control. R.,
N. Y. R. Court of the United supra, Supreme Cent. of limitations are primarily observed that States “[s]tatutes defendants,” and that fairness to assure designed “[t]his with respect right recovery'under policy repose” et Liability Act, U. S. C. the Federal Employers’ § “a where has not “outweighed” plaintiff would seq., slept has been but, rather, from prevented asserting on his rights at Ct. 428-429, 1054-1055, S. at 380 U. them.” 945-946. The Court such L. Ed. 2d found prevention at where petitioner
interested, statutory tioner was * * [*] file an PELA action in process did period not but asserting his was made sleep solely in on his because state court of upon cause of action. rights he federal respondent felt but competent courts, brought * *(cid:127) his notifying [*] not because Petitioner, state, an action within the jurisdiction. action him that he then, was was Service failed peti- suf- dis- upon policy Respondent repose could have relied fieient. petitioner statute, in was embodied the limitation for it aware that ap- respondent actively pursuing remedy; fact, EELA his peared specially on dismissal the Ohio court to file motion for grounds improper venue. at Ct. at [330 U. S. 85 S. L. Ed. 2d 946]. at also, his rights.”
Here no time on appellant “slept He filed within three months Superior his Court suit arbitrate, Union’s refusal the date which PERO deter *11 mined be the time the point of when action accrued. As Goldlawr, noted by the United Court in Inc. Supreme States Heiman, 463, 467, 913, 916, v. 369 U. S. 8 L. Ed. S. Ct.
39, 42 a itself shows (1962), filing “[t]he [of lawsuit] the proper on the the which stat diligence part plaintiff of of utes limitation were to insure.” addition, intended In the record no reveals of bad faith or suggestion purposeful delay or harassment on his in suit the part instituting in Superior Court of instead Indeed, PERC. decision very may have been prompted aby between misunderstanding appel lant’s and attorney PERC staff members to whether or as not PERC would assert jurisdiction over the Once charges.
he discovered that his Law Division suit might dismissed appellant acted again promptly by the immediately filing PERC action. Moreover, he his sought by clarify rights appealing the dismissal of the Law Division action and then staying the a appeal pending determination PERC. Ante by n. at 335 2.
Furthermore, respondents Union Turnpike Authority have not shown that were in they way any prejudiced by ap late for had pellant’s filing they timely notice of the sub stance of appellant’s against them result of the charges as action, see, e. R. L. Superior g., Court Mulliken v. City of N. J. Englewood, and indeed (1971), readily per ceived the in j'urisdictional flaw that suit its dis securing missal.
Given the remedial of Act, the con purpose statute the in templates, the case, context this a reasonable error on the of an part employee to the forum within which proper to adjudicate his claim; when the law this is so especially underlying in party’s claim For example, was untested.
Goger v.
Co.,
H. K. Porter
With deal judicial then no decisions were Union, there against statute, claims. The such over jurisdiction with PERC’s ing unex new and relatively complaint, filing at the fed under the suits representation Previously plored. as within the competence recognized had been eral scheme Co., 40 N. J. v. Fruit United Donnelly e. g., courts, see, v. Teamsters Local *12 L. Co. P. T. Const. 61 (1963); J. 66 N. 97 (1974), aff’d 1974), Div. 104
N. J. Super. (Law Division decision Appellate contemporaneous and indeed as any question raise to failed new statute under the unfair practices over jurisdiction exercise right courts’ Ed., Bd. 142 N. J. Woodbridge Twp. v. Belen claims. den. 72 N. J. 458 (1976). certif. Div.), (App. 486
Super. Assoc., Local v. Mont Benev. 53 Patrolman’s until was not It was a firm indication clair, J. 130 there (1976), N. 70 initially brought practices charges unfair court that by our even be could transferred PERO. system court the State 34:13A-5.4, which jurisdic confers J. S. N. Moreover, PERO, does not list practices expressly unfair over tion as unfair cir practice. an Under these representation
343 cumstancss the of the unfair misfiling representation charge may be viewed as an mistake.3 understandable in a court an action
Ordinarily, the commencement of toll which not subject lacks matter will jurisdiction of the Actions the statute 54 C. Limitations of limitations. J. S. rule 247 at the general 270. A federal court exception
§ J. stated in Ellis F. 100 Supp. (D. v. Lynch, : 1952) juris- The commencement of an action in a which lacks court subject diction of the matter will toll if the statute limitations authority
the court has the law under the to transfer the action to competent jurisdiction. 117, Pitcairn, court Herb v. U. S. 65 S. 89 L. Ct. Ed. 789 and 325 U. S. Ct. L. 1483. Ed. 102], [Id. Force, States, Covington v. Compare Dep’t United Air 303 F. 1145, 1148 Supp. (N. D. Miss. of an 1969) (filing action in a court which had neither jurisdiction of the ac- tion, nor the to transfer power court, the action to the proper did not operate to toll the statute of limitations).
Under our rules and the judicial interpretations thereof, the Law Division had power to transfer the case to an administrative agency. B. -.13-4 states in pertinent that: part * * * any jurisdiction subject if court is without of the matter of *' * n *, shall, action initiative, an it on motion or its own order the * * * proper court, any, action transferred to the if in the State. proceeded upon shall then originally action if it had been
commenced that court. noted, 3As the Law Division found that had PERO au exclusive
thority representation over unfair claims. doWe find it neces sary point to address this issue. We out that the nature and extent exclusivity jurisdiction yet adjudi of PERC’s has not been See, g., Galloway Twp. Galloway Twp. cated. e. Bd. Ed. v. Ed. ; (1978) Assoc., Reg. 78 N. J. Red Bank Ed. Assoc. v. Red Bank *13 Reg. High Ed., (1978). 78 N. J. School Bd. expressly the rule not the courts Although give power does tribunal, transfer a case to an administrative two recent Assoc., cases found such exist. Patrolman’s Benev. power to Montclair, Local 53 v. 136; N. J. Patrolman’s supra, Assoc., Elizabeth, Benev. Local v. 146 N. J. City Super. re been Indeed, Div. this rule has (App. 1976). court cently amended to specifically power include * * or transfer ad court case to either the proper “* * * action ministrative agency” and such transfer upon
shall com then be proceeded originally had been if it upon menced in emphasized). that or agency” (amendment court B. September 1:13-4 (approved 1978; effective July 1978). his filed case
Here the appellant originally he did that Law ascertained Division. Once the trial judge have trans he should have matter subject jurisdiction, this Under circumstances ferred the case to PEEC. timely been
case, have had so would he done the charge Law Division’s The brought before the tribunal. proper ap preserve and thus to transfer the case PEEC failure circum mitigating another pellant’s timely filing constitutes claim. stances to be appellant’s weighed sustaining of this circumstances Thus, particular under J. S. in N. contained limitations case, the statute of to the charges bar constitute does not 34:13A-5.4(c) Assoc., Local v. Benev. Patrolman’s herein. Compare with Montclair, remain lodged charges Those should supra. Bespon in normal course. be allowed proceed
PEEC and additional defenses dents, any are free to assert course, which are available them. Division is reversed and of the Appellate judgment for not inconsistent to PEEC proceedings
case is remanded with opinion. this majority repre- An exclusive J., concurring.
Pashman, is, sentative of unit virtue public employees
345 to fairly status, responsibility with a fiduciary charged This of fair of those represent employees. duty the interests in of codification representation subject statutory was the Act), Act the Relations (the original Employer-Employee L. 8. A. Court 1968, 303, c. N. J. 34:13A-5.3. This recog the the of exclusive nized between interrelationship principle of fair majority representation duty representation and the Lullo v. Intern. Ass’n Fire N. Fighters, 55 J. 409 (1970), where we a majority noted that representative * * * perform lawfully perform neglect fully cannot or to refuse complete good duty, inseparable and in faith from the which is represent
power representation, of exclusive the entire member- ship employees in the unit. [55 429] N. J. at 190, 903, See also S. Ct. 171, Vaca v. U. S. 87 Sipes, 386 Co., L. 17 Ed. 2d v. United Fruit 40 Donnelly 842 (1967); Ed., N. J. Belen v. Bd. 142 61 (1963); Woodbridge Tp. J. N. J. 72 N. certif. Super. Div.), 490-491 den. (App. Em see Summers, The Individual (1976); generally What
ployee’s Rights Agreement: Under the Collective Pa. L. Rev. 251 Eair U. Constitutes Representation?
(1977).
In Burlington Cty. Court’s decision response this Evergreen Park v. 56 N. J. 579 Ment. Hosp. Cooper, (1970), L. c. granting Legislature enacted § Public juris Relations Commission exclusive Employment diction to unfair therein practices as adjudicate remedy notes, As N. defined. J. S. 34:13A-5.4. Court J.
S. A.
does not
list a breach of the
expressly
34:13A-5.4(b)
of fair
duty
as an unfair
on
representation
practice
the part
of an
it is
sub
employee organization, although
arguably
sumed in N. J. S.
A. 34:13A-5.4(b)
(1).
private-sector
Act,
counterpart
provision
8(b)(l),(A)
§
Act,
U.
Uational Labor Relations
S. C.
158(b)
§
has
held
(1)(A),
encompass
been
violations of the duty
Co.,
of fair
Miranda Fuel
representation.
However, the United States Court has Supreme emphatically rejected the Relations contention that National Labor Board’s assertion of jurisdiction representation over claims employee preempts private suits victimized S.U. against Sipes, supra, union. Vaca v. offending 176-188, breach Ct. 903. 87 S. Suits alleging preempted duty of fair held representation were *15 jurisdic exclusive by Board’s the National Labor Relations refused tion over The Court unfair labor Id. practices. NLRA
construe unfair labor of the practice provisions ” * n * jurisdiction oust arbi- the. Courts of their to curb traditional trary statutory representative. employee’s conduct the individual [Id., 913.] Ct. at to the question view respect
We have with no intimated unfair over jurisdiction vel non of PERC’s exclusivity that is unneces- issue claims, as resolution representation Hence, need not sary to the we appeal. this disposition Vaca rationale in consider Court’s Supreme whether the question be would to the proper approach exclusivity fact in New Jersey. labor relations public employment that the of the fair antedated duty representation existence PERC’s over with the jurisdiction combined practices un- fact that did enumerate an Legislature explicitly not fair in N. J. S. for unfair practice repre- 34:13A-5.4(b) sentation did intend not might suggest Legislature PERC’s role in breach remedying majority representative’s However, of the of fair to be exclusive. duty representation resolution of must an important question this await ap- case. propriate future
Our of this disposition should appeal in any way as an implicit ruling approval construed see ante at Division, Law that PERC’s jurisdiction of un- is fair claims representation preemptive.
Pashman, J., concurring the result. For Hughes, reversal and Justice remandment —Chief and Justices Sullivan, Clieeoed, Pashman, Scheeibee Coneobd—-7. Judge Handler
For affirmance —Hone. VORNADO, INC., THE STATE OF A OF CORPORATION PLAINTIFF-REPONDENT-CROSS-APPELLANT, DELAWARE, AL., GUYS, ET TWO T/A F. HY . WILLIAM v LAND, OF NEW ATTORNEY GENERAL OF STATE THE JERSEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND CITY OF HACKENSACK, KEARNY AND MENSWEAR TOWN OF JERSEY, INC., DEFENDANTS-AP RETAILERS OF NEW PELLANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS, OF AND BOROUGH LODI, GARFIELD, BER OF OF NORTH CITY TOWNSHIP VINELAND, DEFENDANTS. GEN AND CITY OF
Argued April July 18, 1978. 1978 Decided