K.W. appeals a disposition order that withheld adjudication and placed him on indefinite probation for carrying a concealed weapon. He pleaded no contest after the trial court denied his dispositive motion to suppress evidence. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). The police
The arresting officer received a dispatch on April 24, 2004, at 1:17 a.m., that a man with a gun was walking with a group of approximately five juveniles behind an Eckerd on Mandalay Avenue in Clear-water, Florida. Reportedly, the man was wearing a gray tee shirt and had a silver handgun in his waistband. An anonymous tipster alerted the police to these facts.
The officer arrived at the scene within two minutes of receiving the dispatch. He saw a group of six juveniles, including K.W., walking away from the Eckerd parking lot toward a parking lot in a nearby shopping plaza. A beach bar and a pizzeria were open across 'the street. As the officer approached them, the juveniles turned and started walking away from him. The officer ordered them to stop. They stopped and obeyed the officer’s instructions to face away from him, lock their fingers over their heads, and drop to their knees. The officer saw no weapons. Apart from the anonymous tip, the officer had no reason to believe that the juveniles were engaged in criminal activity.
The officer did not ask for consent to search the juveniles. He and other officers who arrived on the scene patted them down, one by one, looking for a gun. K.W., who was wearing a black tee shirt, was the third juvenile they patted down. The officer felt the exposed hilt of a knife in KW.’s waistband and arrested him. The officers found no gun on any of the juveniles.
In reviewing the order denying the motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by competent, substantial evidence; we review the trial court’s application of the law to those factual findings de novo. See Connor v. State,
K.W. argues that Florida v. J.L.,
The trial court granted J.L.’s motion to suppress the gun as evidence. Id. The Third District reversed, State v. J.L.,
Information from an anonymous tipster is not per se unreliable. Indeed, such information can provide a reasonable suspicion for a stop if it is “suitably corroborated” by “specific indicia of reliability,” such as “the correct forecast of a subject’s ‘not easily predicted’ movements.” Id. at 269-70,
In contrast, the tipster who alerted the police to K.W.’s activities provided no predictive information that would have allowed them to test the reliability of the information. At most, the tip served to identify K.W. and place him at a particular location. As in J.L., this limited information provided by the tipster was insufficient to justify KW.’s detention.
An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.
J.L.,
The State relies heavily on Campuzano v. State,
The State’s argument that the “totality of the circumstances” provided a reasonable suspicion that K.W. was armed is equally unconvincing. In considering the totality of the circumstances, “[t]he reliability of [an anonymous] tip is evaluated, among other considerations, on its degree of specificity, the extent of corroboration of predicted future conduct, and the significance of the informant’s predictions.” Marsdin v. State,
The trial court ruled that KW.’s detention and patdown were justified because the tipster’s information provided reasonable suspicion that K.W. was armed. Based on the record before us, this was an incorrect application of the law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to discharge K.W.
