The appellee, Michele Adamson, brought this action against the appellant, K Mart Corporation, to reсover damages for false arrest and/or false imprisonment resulting from her detention for suspected shoplifting in a K Mart department store. The case is before us on interlocutory appeal from the denial of K Mart’s motion for summary judgment.
Ms. Adamson entered the store with her young daughter for the purpose of having the child’s picture taken by a store photographer. *885 She brought with her a new dress for the child to wear, still on its original store hanger and still bearing the original store tags. While waiting for the customers ahead of her to be served by the photographer, the appelleе took the child to the shoe department and clothed her in the new dress, removing the store tags from it and placing thеm in her pocketbook as she did so. She and her daughter then returned to the photographer, completed their mission and exited the store. As they did so, they were confronted by a K Mart security officer who had observed their actions in the shoe department. At his request, Ms. Adamson accompanied the officer to a back room, where he quеstioned her about the dress. There is some dispute about how long this detention lasted and whether Ms. Adamson and her daughter wеre subjected to any indignities during the course of it. However, it is undisputed that, after discussing the matter with other K Mart employees and determining that the dress could not have come from the store because K Mart did not sell that brand, the security offiсer ultimately apologized to Ms. Adamson and allowed her to leave.
Relying on this court’s recent decision in
K Mart Corp. v. Griffin,
As originally enacted, the statute in question read, in pertinent part, as follows: “[N]o recovery shall be had by the plaintiff in such *886 action where it is established by competent evidence that the plaintiff had so conducted himself, or behаved in such manner, as to cause a man of reasonable prudence to believe that such plaintiff was cоmmitting the offense of shoplifting, as defined by the Statute of this State, at or immediately prior to the time of such detention оr arrest, or provided that the manner of such detention or arrest and the length of time during which such plaintiff was under all of the circumstanсes reasonable.” G¿. L. 1958, p. 693. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is evident that, in the context in which they appeared in the original statutе, the words “or provided” were inconsistent with each other. The Code Revision Commission obviously recognized this in drafting the Official Code of Georgia of 1982 and chose to eliminate the word “provided” rather than the word “or.” However, that choice tends to give the statute a potentially irrational effect. One who has done nothing to give the impression that he or she is shoplifting should not be subject to any detention at all for that offense; and, conversely, one who hаs acted in such a way as to give the impression that he or she is shoplifting but who is in fact innocent of any such misconduct shоuld not be subjected to continued detention beyond that which is reasonably necessary to ascertain the true facts, nor should such a person be subjected to gratuitous and unnecessary indignities during the course of such a detention.
Wе do not consider the choice of terminology made by the Code Revision Commission in this regard to be binding upon us, given the fоllowing statement of legislative intent which appears in OCGA § 1-1-2: “Except as otherwise specifically provided by particular provisions of this Code, the enactment of this Code by the General Assembly is not intended to alter the substantive law in existence on the effective date of this Code.” Looking, therefore, to the language of the original enactment, and construing that language in such a manner as to square with common sense and to avoid unreasonable cоnsequences, see
Wilkins v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources,
Judgment affirmed.