K. Erickson v. StateK. Erickson v. State
¶1 Appellant Kenneth Erickson (Erickson) appeals from the denial of his motion to modify his criminal judgment “as to financial obligations,” in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Hill County. We affirm in part, reversе in part, and remand for further proceedings, addressing the following issue:
Did the District Court err by denying Erickson‘s motion to modify his criminal judgment?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
¶2 In April 2011, Erickson and Gene Johnson (Johnson) were involved in an altercation, which ended when Erickson struck Johnson in the face, causing Johnson to fall to the pavement and hit his head. Johnson sustained a serious injury that required significant medical treatment. In February 2013, a jury found Erickson guilty of criminal endangerment, a felony in violation of
¶3 At the sentencing hearing in April of 2013, the State sought significant restitution for the cost of Johnson‘s medical care and lost wages, while Erickson argued that the case involved liability issues that were more appropriately addressed in civil litigation, which Johnson had already initiated.2 Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas (BCBS) filed a lien against Johnson‘s suit, as it had paid medical benefits for his injuries. The District Court determined, under
Defendant shall pay $324,215.31 restitution, plus a 10% administrative fee of $32,421.53,3 for a total of $356,636.84 by money order or cashiеr‘s check to the Department of Corrections, Collection Unit, P.O. Box 201360, Helena, MT, 59620, for property disbursement as follows:
Priority 1: Gene Johnson $ 39,842.87 Priority 2: Crime Victim Compensation Program $ 4,737.08 Priority 3: Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas $ 279,635.36 (Emphasis in original.)
¶4 In August 2013, Johnson signed a release of his claims against Erickson in the civil litigation in consideration of a payment to him of $310,000. This payment was funded by $300,000 contributed by Mountain West Farm Bureau under Erickson‘s home owner‘s insurance, and a $10,000 contribution from Erickson. The release purported to satisfy Erickson‘s restitution obligation under the criminal judgment:
[Johnson] acknowledges that the payments called for in this Release constitute full and compete satisfaction of all restitution payments owed by [Erickson] pursuant to the [the criminal judgment], which ordered restitution payments to both [BCBS and Johnson]. This acknowledgement of satisfaction does not extend to the [others owed restitution]. It is the intent of the signatories [Johnson and Erickson] that to the extent allowаble by law, all restitution payments owed under any Court Orders entered in [the criminal case] to date or to be entered in the future . . . shall be deemed satisfied to the extent allowable by law.4
In consideration of a payment of $103,333.33 from Johnson, BCBS released its lien against Johnson‘s lawsuit. The lien release included the following language:
[BCBS] further specifically agrees that by accepting this payment it is acknowledging that [Erickson] has fully and finally satisfied the obligation to pay restitution as [ordered in the criminal judgment].
Notably, the amount paid to BCBS was $176,302.03 less than the restitution Erickson was ordered to pay BCBS in the criminal Judgment. After making payment to BCBS and satisfying attorney fees, Johnson received a direct payment of $103,333.33. Apparently, Erickson also paid the $4,737.08 he owed in restitution under the criminal judgment to the Crime Victim Compensation Program.
¶5 Thereafter, in April 2015, Erickson filеd a “Motion to Amend Judgment Regarding Financial Obligations” within the criminal action, requesting that the District Court waive the restitution administrative fee in light of the promptness of the settlement and, based on the civil releases, find that the restitution condition had been satisfied as to Johnson and BCBS. The State responded that the District Court was without authority to amend a criminal judgment, and that the requirements of
¶6 The District Court scheduled a hearing and invited Johnson to be heard. The hearing was conducted on July 13, 2015, but no transcript has been provided. According to the minute entry, the Court ordered the statutory administrative fee to be paid, and indicated it would entertain a renewed motion to address the civil settlement once the fee had been paid. Apparently, Erickson paid the $32,421.53 administrative fee.
¶7 In April 2016, Erickson filed a motion to dismiss, citing
¶9 The District Court conducted another hearing in July 2016. Johnson was in attendance, but declined to speak after both sides stipulated that he suffered ongoing injures. Argument was offered regarding case law from foreign jurisdictions, but the requirements of
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 This Court reviews a district court‘s decision to grant or deny a post-trial motion in a criminal case for abuse of discretion. State v. Passmore, 2014 MT 249, ¶ 12, 376 Mont. 334, 334 P.3d 378 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶11 Did the District Court err by denying Erickson‘s motion to modify his criminal judgment?
¶12 Erickson argues the District Court‘s finding that Johnson accepted “less than the full restitution amount ordered by the Court” is contrary to the record, which demonstrates that Johnson recеived a direct payment of $103,333.33 in the civil settlement, an amount greater than the $39,842.87 in criminal restitution Johnson was ordered to receive. Erickson further argues that, because the Crime Victims Compensation Fund has been paid, the statutory ten percent restitution fee has been paid, and the other two victims signed releases in the civil litigation acknowledging that Erickson has satisfied his criminal restitution obligation to them, the District Court erred by failing to modify the criminal judgment “to reflect the satisfaction in full of all restitution ordered.” The State answers that there is no authority for modifiсation of a criminal judgment and that Erickson simply has not made a case for relief under
¶13 Restitution is a “fundamental component of Montana‘s laws for the punishment of crime,” Passmore, ¶ 19, and district courts must, as part of a criminal sentence, “require an offender to make full restitution to any victim who has sustained pecuniary loss,”
¶14 “An order to pay restitution constitutes a judgment rendered in favor оf the state, and following a default in the payments of restitution . . . the sentencing court may order the restitution to be collected by any method authorized for the enforcement of other judgments.”
¶15 Notably, there is no similar provision requiring a criminal restitution obligation to be offset by a victim‘s civil recovery. We have often held that, “[o]nce a valid sentencе has been pronounced, the court imposing that sentence has no jurisdiction to modify it, except as provided by statute.” State v. Fertterer, 260 Mont. 397, 400-01, 860 P.2d 151, 154 (1993) (collecting cases). Consequently, there is no authority that entitles Erickson, as a matter of law, to the specific relief he persistently pursued in this proceeding—a modification of his criminal judgment to reflect the settlement he entered in the civil litigation, or a “satisfaction” of that judgment. The District Court noted that “a general release from civil liability does not release Erickson from the conditions imposed in his criminal sentenсe,” which is correct even if, as here, the civil settlement purports to release the defendant from a restitution obligation under the criminal judgment.6
¶16 However, the Legislature has authorized a sentencing court to discretionarily “adjust or waive unpaid restitution,” in certain circumstances:
An offender may at any time petition the sentencing court to adjust or otherwise waive payment of any part of any ordered restitution or amount to be paid pursuant to 46-18-241(2)(a) [the administrative fees]. The court shall schedule a hearing and give a victim to whom restitution wаs ordered notice of the hearing date, place, and time and inform the victim that the victim will have an opportunity to be heard. If the court finds that the circumstances upon which it based the imposition of restitution, amount of the victim‘s pecuniary loss, or method or time of pаyment no longer exist or that it otherwise would be unjust to require payment as imposed, the court may adjust or waive unpaid restitution or the amount to be paid pursuant to 46-18-241(2)(a) [the administrative fees] or modify the time or method of making restitution. The court may extend the restitution schedule.
¶17 Though referencing the statute, Erickson did not specifically request the District Court to grant relief under one or more of the four conditions of
¶18 We affirm the District Court‘s denial of Erickson‘s request for modification or satisfaction
¶19 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON