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K-2 Corporation v. Salomon S.A. And Salomon/north America, Inc.
191 F.3d 1356
Fed. Cir.
1999
Check Treatment

*1 prices unwilling market of commer- effective date. That OPM was catalog lished or to quantities cial substantial negotiate items sold to of the modified that public.” PCA contends general provision is irrelevant. could have PCA “mar- community rated contracts were its accept refused to the new terms of the that fall under this price” ket contracts Indeed, appear contract. it does not that however, OPM, announced in exception. plan jeopardized its 1991 would have been that FAR 52.215- Register the Federal so; it had done the contract is automati- apply 5.9—would when a con- 23—section cally pro- renewed unless written notice is or “provid[es] pricing defective cost tractor days prior January vided 60 to 1 of the If the data on which the initial data.... § year. contract See 48 C.F.R. 1652.249- defective, found rate was converted is 70(a) (1990). board, therefore, The was provides remedy for the Govern- clause holding agreed correct PCA (1987). Fed.Reg. ment.” 52 PCA is the modified section 5.9 would be effective knowledge published charged with the January is entitled to OPM regulations; by it is therefore bound pursuant interest to that clause. interpretation of OPM’s section 5.9. See Merrill, Crop Corp. Federal Ins. v. Conclusion 380, 384-85, U.S. 68 S.Ct. 92 L.Ed. Accordingly, the decision of the Armed (1947); States, Montilla v. United 198 Ct. Appeals Board Services of Contract is af- (1972).

Cl. 985-86 firmed. board, crediting the OPM Office of PCA, Inspector audit of found General’s AFFIRMED claim ... does not concern “OPM’s rating ‘methodology,’ furnishing but to ” OPM of ‘inaccurate data.’ We will not factual

disturb the board’s determination fraudulent,

“unless the decision is or arbi- trary, capricious, or grossly or so errone- CORPORATION, Plaintiff- faith, necessarily imply ous as to bad or Appellant, supported by ... substantial evi- 609(b) (1994). § dence.” 41 U.S.C. PCA presents finding no evidence that such a SALOMON S.A. and Salomon/North Thus, warranted here. its submission of America, Inc., Defendants- pricing implicates defective data the inter- Appellees. 5.9(e)(1). payment est mandate of section No. 98-1552. argues that PCA even OPM’s con apply struction of section 5.9 does not Appeals, United States Court of the 1991 contract. Section 1.4 states Federal Circuit. modifications like section 5.9 “will not be Sept. 1999. year effective until the second contract following year regulation which the Rehearing Rehearing En Banc or amendment ... promulgated; unless Denied Nov. 1999. agrees Carrier to an earlier [t]he date.” At agreed issue here is whether PCA 1,1991 January effective date. that it

PCA asserts is not bound regulation

modified because OPM did not May

send notification until 1991 and de- nego-

clared the amendment was “not However,

tiable.” signed PCA contract, thereby agreeing to

amended its *3 Gardner,

Paul L. Chrintensen O’Connor PLLC, Seattle, Johnson & Kindness Washington, argued plaintiff-appellant. for him R. With on the brief were James Uhlir D. and Lawrence Graham. Obion, Lipman, Spivak,

Steven E. McClelland, Neustadt, P.C., Maier & Arlington, Virginia, argued for defendants- appellees. him on the brief was With James J. Kulbaski. RADER, CLEVENGER,

Before and GAJARSA, Judges. Circuit Opinion by for court filed correctly interpreted Circuit district court the rel- evant claim Judge Dissenting opinion properly CLEVENGER. deter- mined that doctrine of Judge filed Circuit RADER. could not used be to reach the accused

CLEVENGER, Judge. Circuit device, we affirm. K-2 Corporation appeals summary . 1—1 judgment noninfringement granted favor of Salomon S.A. Salomon/North 0> America, Inc., by the United States Dis (“K-2”) K-2 Corporation is the owner of trict Court for the Western District of 5,437,466 reexamined U.S. Patent No. Washington. Corp. See K-2 v. Salomon (“the patent”), ’466 August issued *4 S.A., 1032110, USPQ2d 1998 WL 1054 entitled “In-Line Roller Skate.” The ’466 (W.D.Wash.1998). court, The district after patent generally directed to an in-line construing disputed claim terms in K- soft, pliable skate that has a inner “bootie” 2’s reexamined United States Patent No. or “shoe” surrounded certain areas 5,437,466, determined that no reasonable plastic molded or straps affixed to the base jury product— could find the accused arrangement skate. This allows the Salomon’s model “TR” in-line skat e —in wearer’s foot to breathe and offers sub- fringed literally asserted either stantially lighter skate while retaining equivalents. or under the doctrine of structural stiffness required perfor- for id. at 1057. Because we conclude the mance. *5 non-rigid 'portion being per-

Claims and 6 of the ’466 are said shoe Rep- in only manently portion claims at issue this case. to said base affixed major resentative claim 1 recites five at least said toe area and said heel area components, substantially preventing claimed as set forth in brief for movement therebetween at in a key form limitation under- least below with plane, horizontal wherein at least a lined: portion non-rigid portion of said shoe 1. In an having in-line roller skate continuously extends from said base upper portion shoe and a lower portion top to at least of said portion frame ... a non-rigid shoe support ankle cuff. portion adapted to receive and sub- parties Claims 5 and 6 contain what the stantially enclose the entire foot of respect with agree equivalent language support posi- ... the skater means key to the limitation: adjacent tioned selected areas ... 5. non-rigid portion pro- for said shoe viding support non-rigid portion being per- to aid the skater in said shoe maintaining manently in-line roller interconnected with said said skate substantially position portion vertical base at least at said toe area substantially portion, ... and a base ... and said heel area for preventing movement therebetween at that includes a soft inner bootie surround- plane least in a horizontal ... (“the by ed rigid plastic structure TR skate”). The TR skate’s inner bootie is 6. ... lower, rigid portion fastened to the non-[rigid] upper portion being said by skate the use of rivets non-removably rigid screw in to said affixed adjacent base both said heel and toe the toe area and a removable hex-head portions substantially said base screw the heel area. parties agree for preventing movement therebetween at dispositive issue this case is plane least in a horizontal ... whether the use of a removable screw in the heel area of the TR skate can meet the Salomon North Amer- S.A. Salomon “Salomon”) (collectively, ica affixed” make and sell limitation found in skate, TR, designated an in-line as model claims and 6 of patent. the ’466

Salomon’s TR Skate: Bootie/Base Attachment Detail

B “permanently of affixed” could encompass not the removable screw used In April K-2 sued Salomon for in the heel area of the TR skate. K-2 See infringement patent. of the ’466 On cross- S.A., Corp. v. Salomon 1998 WL summary judgment, motions for the dis- (W.D.Wash.1998). USPQ2d rejected trict court arguments K-2’s that The court TR determined because the disputed “permanently affixed” claim missing skate was an element of the ’466 limitation synon- should be construed to be claims, not, “affixed,” “secured,” it ymous with could as a matter of “firmly or held,” law, and instead literally infringe held that the those claims. id. See present limitations are TR of the claim held that the court also district law, device, not, literally in- either or a matter of accused as could

skate of equivalent. the doctrine See Renishaw fringe under substantial estoppel. history Azioni, prosecution Marposs per of Società because PLC v. The court 1243, 1247-48, USPQ2d at 1057. concluded See id. during claims the relevant amending (Fed. Mills, Cir.1998); v. General Inc. to add the and examination prosecution Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 978, 981, 41 103 F.3d limitation and the affixed” (Fed.Cir.1997); Young fastening, K-2 locations of and toe Inc., heel Prods., Q3 Special v. Mfg. Dental Co. in-line skates coverage of relinquished had 1137, 1141, 112 F.3d permanently have a bootie did not (Fed.Cir.1997). Cybor Corp. See also See heel and toe. at both the affixed Inc., Technologies, v. FAS noted the rele- further id. The court (Fed.Cir. 1454, USPQ2d 1172-73 that K- history suggested prosecution vant 1998) (en banc). prior art claim to avoid amended aspects relevant of the ac- Because the 5,331,752 to reference, No. Patent U.S. operation are cused structure and device’s that, reference”), (“the Johnson Johnson case, undisputed question in this in which the boo- an in-line skate discloses in- literally TR whether Salomon’s skate the toe and and affixed at tie is removable of the ’466 fringes asserted claims court con- id. The district See mid-foot. those interpretation on the patent turns of such relinquishment K-2’s cluded Alternatives, claims. Athletic Inc. it now as- subject prevented matter Inc., Mfg., Prince that the heel screw Salomon’s serting (Fed.Cir.1996) “perma- to the equivalent TR was skate (“Where, here, parties do dis- as of the ’466 affixed” limitation nently ac- regarding facts pute relevant Summary judgment nonin- claims. disagree over product cused but [claim granted favor Salo- fringement was in- question of literal interpretation], id. mon. See to con- fringement collapses one claim decision, vesting this appeals that summary and is thus amenable struction pursuant jurisdiction with court judgment.”). 1295(a)(1)(1994). § U.S.C. course, begin, with We *7 II Renishaw, the claims. See language of 1248, 1120; USPQ2d at 158 F.3d at 48 summary judg grant the review We Int’l, Abtox, Corp., v. Exitron 122 F.3d Conroy v. Reebok de novo. See Inc. ment 1373, (Fed. Ltd., 1570, 1575, USPQ2d 1023, 1545, 1019, USPQ2d 29 14 F.3d 43 1548 (Fed.Cir.1994). so, we must Cir.1997); In doing 1377 Re Bell Communications summary judgment is keep in mind that search, v. Vitalink Communications Inc. only genuine if there is no appropriate 615, 619-20, USPQ2d 34 Corp., 55 F.3d fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. of material issue (Fed.Cir.1995). 1816, general The 1819 56(c). end, draw all the court must To this in claim are be rule is terms the that in favor factual inferences reasonable ordinary and accustomed given their Liberty nonmovant. See Anderson the Assoc., meaning. See Johnson Worldwide 255, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 477 U.S. Lobby, 985, 989, 50 Corp., v. Zebco F.3d Inc. 175 (1986). 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (Fed.Cir.1999); USPQ2d 1610 Reni shaw, USPQ2d at 158 F.3d at 48 analysis is a two- infringement An Prods., 1121; Inc. v. Trac York Central in the court first deter process which step Ctr., Family Farm & 99 F.3d tor law, mines, correct claim a matter of the as (Fed.Cir. USPQ2d 40 1622 properly compares and then scope, 1996). is, ordinary and That accus device to claim to the accused construed fact, disputed of a claim term determine, meaning all tomed a matter of whether as one, presumed language is to be correct see converts meaning “perma Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 50 nently Johnson affixed” to mean “affixed to prevent subject at to the following. in movement at least a plane.” horizontal First, meaning clearly a different and de accept We cannot reading this of the liberately set forth in the intrinsic materi is, claim. The functional language description prose als' —the written or the course, an additional limitation id.-, history cution control. See In See, e.g., claim. Wright Medical —will Technolo Paulsen, re 31 gy, Inc. v. Corp., Osteonics F.3d USPQ2d 1671, (Fed.Cir.1994); Intel 1443-44, (Fed.Cir. USPQ2d 1837, licall, Phonometrics, Inc., Inc. v. 1997) (functional language analyzed as a 1384, 1387-88, USPQ2d 1383, limitation). claim This limitation requires (Fed.Cir.1992); Siegler, Lear Inc. v. Aero that the attachment between the bootie 881, 888-89, quip Corp., 733 F.2d 221 prevent[ the base “substantially ]” (Fed.Cir.1984). USPQ Second, if (and movement of the presumably, bootie ordinary meaning and accustomed bootie) the user’s foot when inserted a disputed deprive term would the claim words, in a plane. horizontal In other clarity, then further reference be must functional language requires that the at cases, made to the intrinsic —or in some prevent tachment the bootie from sliding prop extrinsic —evidence to ascertain the base; top around on it demands Worldwide, er meaning. See Johnson rigidity structural in the horizontal dimen 990, USPQ2d at F.3d at 1610-11. In sion to the connection between bootie case, either a party wishing to alter the also, and the It correctly base. as K-2 meaning of a clear claim term must over notes, may accomplished be with an at presumption ordinary come the easily removable, tachment is or at and accustomed meaning proper is the least something permanent. less than But one, demonstrating why such an altera it is language fully undeniable this is Worldwide, tion required. See Johnson permanent consistent with a attachment as 989-90, at 1610. is, well. That language functional tells

Here the critical claim language is us something about the structural require parties affixed.” agree The ments of the attachment between the boo- language the relevant in claims 5 and base; all, speaks tie and the it not at equivalent, dispute and there is no however, about whether that attachment is meaning about the of “affixed” in this con permanent, something perma less than Thus, text. our analysis begins with the nent, or entirely only removable. The an ordinary and accustomed meaning of the course, question, swer is the phrase term in the “permanently” “perma specific claim limitation that the bootie be nently affixed.” and accus “permanently affixed” to the base. phrase, tomed of this as the dis reads the way functional noted, K-2, trict court see effectively expunge that would the term *8 encompass does not affixation via “permanently” from the claim language. is, removable screw. That the Corp. Perkin-Elmer Westinghouse Cf. meaning and accustomed of “permanently Corp., Elec. 822 F.2d 1533 n. affixed” in requires this context that the (Fed.Cir.1987) 1325 n. 8 fastening be unremovable. (“[S]pecific claim limitations be can[not] ignored insignificant as or in immaterial primary argument K-2’s is that the determining A infringement.”). more nat functional in language following the claim ural construction reads the two clauses as prevent this limitation —“for substantially complementary, that recognizing “perma ing movement at in therebetween least a nently requires affixed” plane” horizontal unremovable meaning the —dictates attachment, is, “permanently sug language affixed.” That K-2 while the functional gests that the requires prevent inclusion of this functional that the attachment slid- specific the terms Renishaw, indeed free to define F.3d at See, e.g.,

ing. (“The (Fed.Cir.1998) invention, this his or her USPQ2d at used to describe true to the claim stays clarity, that de- construction be done with reasonable must with naturally aligns most language and liberateness, Hoganas, 9 precision.”); description of the invention patent’s (find- the 951, USPQ2d at at 1938-39 be, end, construc- the correct in the will unsup- proposed definition ing patentee’s tion.”). prosecution specification in or ported the passages in cited provides history). no reason Nowhere the claim itself While the accustomed ordinary and applicant squarely to alter the the describe to us does affixed,” K-2 meaning “permanently (i.e., “perma- the connection the nature of (and does) the intrinsic argue may affixed”) In- pending in claims. nently the forth an alternate clearly sets evidence stead, on the relevant focuses v. Wilde- Beachcombers definition. prior in the art Johnson the connection Wood, Inc., Products, 31 F.3d Creative (“detachable”) advantages and the skate (Fed. 1154, 1158, USPQ2d “permanently affixed” provided said, Cir.1994) (“As repeatedly a have we we K-2 therefore asks that connection. lexicographer own patentee can be his applicant the distinctions the infer definition, to the provided patentee’s in boot between the “detachable” draws the conventional def it differs from extent af- “permanently art and the prior inition, specifica forth in the clearly set required by the claims fixed” connection tion.”); AB v. Dresser Indus Hoganas explication of an a clear unac- constitute tries, Inc., “perma- of the term customed definition (Fed.Cir.1993) (“Although a decline, however, adopt a nently.” We lexicographer, as his own patentee can be so proffered unaccustomed with said, repeatedly the words of have we in the intrinsic record. See support little ordinary meaning, their given will be claim Paulsen, In re the inventor used appears unless it (“The specification mere- (internal quotations differently” them ly general in a fashion describes certain omitted).). points to particular, In K-2 in a capabilities desirable features and sup in arguments made amendments description, how- computer. This portable prior over art port patentability ever, establishing specialized from far There, applicant stat Johnson skate. computer].”). definition [of “perma of the that the addition term ed distinguish the claims nently” served to sure, prosecution history To be boot disclosed the “detachable” applicant indicates that intended argued applicant further Johnson. the claims to avoid the “detachable” amend permanent con advantage that an skate. The connection of the Johnson sliding that it avoided the heel was nection however, indicates history, same problem with the applicant noted as “perma the term applicant to add chose prior passages, From these art. to achieve nently” to the claims order to that outlined draws a conclusion similar applicant could possi this result. That the must affixed” above: “perma than bly have terms other added simply prevent sliding “affixed to mean patentable to create a distinction nently” reject dimension.” We this a horizontal simply art is prior irrele with asserted proposed definition conclusion: claim construction task. vant to our in a sliding as “permanently” “preventing claims; instead, we Courts do rewrite appear dimension” does not horizontal *9 by the to the terms chosen give effect deliberateness, required clarity, with the See, e.g., Texas patentee. Instruments impart to an precision and unaccustomed Comm’n, Trade Inc. v. International an otherwise clear claim term. meaning to 1018, USPQ2d F.2d Paulsen, 1480, 31 See In re F.3d (“[T]o (Fed.Cir.1993) construe the claims (“Although inventor is at 1674 an thing “permanent” if that un by TI would read as term is suggested manner in the out of the claims. express require limitation derstood to an infinite duration. an can This, ‘[c]ourts we will not do because claim philosophy; But construction is not give narrow claims to nor neither broaden wring we need not our hands when consid something different than patentee the ering implications metaphysical the of a ” Autogiro (quoting he has set forth’ what Instead, analysis of claim terms. we need States, v. 181 Ct.Cl. America United Co. recognize of that claim only construction is 391, 396, USPQ firmly reality by anchored in the under (Ct.Cl.1967)).). Here, the we hold that standing ordinary of those of skill the correctly “perma construed district court See, e.g., art. Hoechst Corp. Celanese ordinary and ac nently” according to its Ltd., BP Chemicals is, phrase the meaning' customed —'that (Fed.Cir.1996). In that the requires affixed” “permanently case, parties and district court this the the the between the bootie and connection agree that the rivet and screw attachment unremovable. base of the skate be in the toe area of the accused skate meet defi argues proposed that its “permanently affixed” claim limita meaning “permanently of nition supplies tions. This is so because the rivet affixed”— in a horizontal prevent sliding “affixed to permanent, unremovable connection. plane” ordinary and accustomed Indeed, description —is in the written of any phrase, of the meaning patent, the ’466 a rivet is cited as a conven event, presented has not evidence Salomon accomplish per fastening tional means ordinary contention that the support its Pat., 8, ll. manent connection. See ’466 col. meaning phrase and accustomed (describing 55-58 connection between base We, course, recognize “unremovable.” frame). perma and lower The rivet-made “ordinary and accustomed” mean “infinitely” nent connection is of course not dispute, a claim term will often be ing of permanent, because the rivet can be bro the terms irrespective clarity ken. The same is true of an embodiment Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan used. See permanent that achieved a invention Indus., Inc., 8,n. Med. portion connection between base Cir.1989) (Fed. n. portion the lower frame of the skate ‘dispute’ about (“Lawyers may create a injection molded unit. See using single word, nothing ambiguous but there is Likewise, 11.58-61. were an id. col. disput about linguistically [the or obscure provide per laminate used to adhesive present in the term] ed claim as used 13,11. connection, see id. at col. 48- manent claim.”). ordinary dispute But a over the permanence too could be de imply meaning does not and accustomed apart. the structure stroyed by breaking Here, meaning that such a does not exist. laminates, Screws, unlike rivets and are example, recognize we that the term for unscrewed, is, meant to be to be “permanently” has what can be said to be laminate, to the removed. A rivet or flavor of infiniteness about its mean contrary, permanent, meant to remain ing, might questions which raise about unless one is bent on break of the term in this claim: even the unremovable use affixed” permanent apart. most ing permanent structure and the connections between the bootie Here, that the district we are convinced can, all, after be undone base of the skate in holding court was correct that the ordi- upon the total destruction of the skate “perma- nary and accustomed however, This, does not mean itself. nently requires affixed” unremovable no connection between the bootie because the bootie and the connection between “infinitely” permanent, and skate can be base. there can be no and accustomed we with the district Indeed, agree Because meaning for the claim term. we af- permanently pressed any- hard to describe court’s construction would be *10 1366 A dispute

fixed, parties do and the utilizes a remova- device accused Salomons Supreme in War- Although the Court the heel of the bootie connect ble screw to the existence of reaffirmed ner-Jenkinson base,1 that the we conclude to the skate’s it did so with equivalents, the doctrine of granting sum- was correct court district equiva- ... of “concern that the doctrine infringement of no literal mary judgment own, ... a life of its lents has taken on plain language [T]he in favor of Salomon. patent claims.” 520 by the unbounded 56(c) entry of sum- mandates of Rule 1040, 28-29, 41 at 117 U.S. S.Ct. time for adequate after mary judgment, Indeed, re- unquestionably while 1871. motions, par- a against discovery upon vitality, equivalents doctrine of taining showing a sufficient ty who fails to make core in some tension with other exists es- of an element the existence establish law, patent perhaps most tenets of case, and on which party’s sential to patentee that the notably requirement proof of the burden party will bear distinctly “particularly point[ out and ] Catrett, 477 U.S. Corp. trial. Celotex appli- subject matter which the claim[ ] 2548, 317, 322, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 106 S.Ct. invention,” regards cant as his 35 U.S.C. (1986). ¶ (1994), § 112 2 the function of competitors re- provide

claims to notice to garding scope patent grant, of the see Ill Co., Binney & Carbon Co. v. Smith United accused Although Salomon’s 228, 232, 165, L.Ed. 317 63 S.Ct. 87 U.S. of a matter law—literal device cannot—as (1942) (“The 381, 232, USPQ 383-84 wheth we must still determine ly infringe, public ... of the inventor must inform the may none equivalents of er the doctrine asserted, monopoly so that it limits of the issues of genuine allow to raise theless "may features be safe- may be known which infringement un regarding fact material ly or manufactured without a license used equivalents. See the doctrine of der (internal may quotes not” omit- and which 242, Liberty Lobby, U.S. Anderson v. ted).). Boats, Inc. v. See also Bonito (1986). 2505, 255, 91 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. Thunder Craft allows in equivalents The doctrine 150-51, 971, 118, 109 S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d in some cases fringement to be found (1989) 1847, (describing how accused device where the elements of the pat- of the “carefully bargain” crafted substantially to the corre equivalent are entirely system “dependfs] ent almost of the asserted claim. sponding elements competition in the upon backdrop of free v. Hilton Co. Warner-Jenkinson designs and in- exploitation unpatented 17, 29, Co., 520 Davis Chemical U.S. novations.”). L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (1997). responded under the The courts have Infringement array question by developing such concerns is doctrine limitations, formulations, Mfg. and tests legal Tank & Co. v. fact. See Graver Co., regarding application 609- of the doctrine 339 U.S. Linde Air Products USPQ These reflect two ani equivalents. L.Ed. efforts 70 S.Ct. (1950). mating concepts. The first court, notes affidavit filed with the district puzzled 1. are the dissent’s insistence We (which fact-finding required with additional that the heel screw holds the heel respect nature of the heel to the "removable” may portion place) be un- bootie fully dispute indeed, it screw. K-2 does not ¶ ex- screwed. See Grande Aff. 5. Salomon's — acknowledges' is remova- the heel screw description ac- pert —that concurs with this ble, removing the heel screw allows and that ¶¶ See Sénée Aff. 14. cused skate. ("slight- portion heel of the bootie to lift genuine issue of material We will not create Reply ly”) upwards away from the base. See parties agree that none exists. fact where the Further, expert, K-2’s in an Br. at 20.

1367 of equivalents doctrine is limited. It can ate an element from the claim in its entire patent encompass not allow a claim to ty. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at subject matter could not have been 29, 117 1040, USPQ2d 1871; S.Ct. 41 at see patented; nor can it be used to ignore the Biomet, Inc., also Tronzo v. 1154, 156 F.3d Thus, patent. actual of the we 1160, (Fed.Cir. USPQ2d 1829, 47 1834 equivalents have held the doctrine of 1998) (“If theory a of equivalence would patent encompass subject cannot allow a limitation, however, vitiate a claim then prior matter in the existing art. See Wil there can infringement be no under the Sporting son Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey doctrine equivalents as a matter of Assoc., 677, 684, USPQ2d & 904 F.2d 14 law.”). Similarly, where patent the docu (Fed.Cir.1990) (“[A] 1942, 1948 patentee expressly ment identifies a role for a claim obtain, not should be able to under the limitation, the equivalents doctrine of can equivalents, doctrine of coverage which he not capture subject be used to matter that lawfully could have obtained from the does not substantially fulfill that role. See claims.”); by PTO literal Conroy v. Reebok Warner-Jenkinson, 40, 520 U.S. at 117 Int’l, Ltd., 1570, 1577, 14 USPQ2d 29 1040, (“An USPQ2d S.Ct. 41 at 1875 analy (Fed.Cir.1994) 1373, ([T]he 1378 funda sis of the played by role each element purpose mental of all equiva [doctrine the context specific patent of the claim will prevent evaluations must be to lents] thus inform inquiry as to whether a patentee “obtain[ing], under the doc function, substitute element matches the of equivalents, coverage trine which [the way, element, and result the claimed or patentee] lawfully could not have obtained whether the substitute plays element from the and [Patent Trademark Office] substantially role different from the by literal (quoting Sporting claims” Wilson element.”); Applied Materials, claim[] Goods).). may Nor it allow coverage of Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials obvious, “trivial,” or prior variations of the America, Inc., 1563, 1574, 98 F.3d see, art, e.g., Technologies, Southwall Inc. (Fed.Cir.1996) (hold USPQ2d Co., 1570, 1580, v. Cardinal IG 54 F.3d ing disputed limitation, claim USPQ2d 1673, read in (Fed.Cir.1995), for subject light description, of the written requires such matter could not have been lawfully patented in performed the first function not by instance. See the accused de 103(a) (“A vice). § 35 U.S.C. (Supp.1998) patent These limitations on the doctrine of may not be obtained ... if the difference equivalents questions are of law. See subject between the matter sought to be Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n. patented prior art are such that 1040, USPQ2d 117 S.Ct. at 1875 n. 8 subject matter as a whole would have (“Of course, legal the various limitations on been obvious at the time the invention was application of the doctrine of equiva person made to a skill court.”). lents are to be determined art.”). It is also fundamental that the text conceptual The second limita of the claim closely must be followed: tion on the doctrine equivalents is the element in patent “[e]ach contained claim patentee idea that may not use the defining scope deemed material to doctrine subject to recover matter that has invention, patented and thus the doc been example, prosecu surrendered. For equivalents trine of applied must be tion history estoppel will exclude from the claim, individual elements of the not to the doctrine of equivalents any subject matter invention a as whole.” Warner-Jenkin was, by argument amendment or dur son, U.S. S.Ct. ing prosecution, relinquished. See War USPQ2d at 1871. See also Pennwalt ner-Jenkinson, 30-31, 520 U.S. at Inc., Corp. Durand-Wayland, 1871; (Fed. S.Ct. Litton 1739-40 Cir.1987) (en banc). Therefore, Inc., Sys., Honeywell, Inc. v. the doc (Fed. trine of cannot be used to viti- art, Cir.1998) scope claims history estoppel prior (prosecution subject themselves, subject ac matter surrendered recapture of “bars *12 prosecution”). during tually surrendered matter. may in history estoppel cer

Prosecution B presumed, see Warner-Jen tain cases be 33, 1040, kinson, 117 41 at S.Ct. 520 U.S. ease, In this K-2 asserts the scope the of such USPQ2d at and the attaching removable screw the heel of be, on the circum depending estoppel can substantially in skate is bootie Salomon’s to stances, great “from to small anywhere to the affixed” equivalent v. Hughes Co. United zero.” Aircraft required by the claims of fastening States, 1351, 1363, USPQ 219 717 F.2d responds by ar patent. ’466 Salomon the (Fed.Cir.1983). Sys., Litton See also 481 K-2, prosecution and during guing USPQ2d at 46 1331 140 F.3d at reexamination, subject surrendered (“[T]he product a of scope estoppel is of connec encompassing matter removable argu and both [amendments the effects of the bootie and the base of the tion between concert.”); Avi working Sextant ments] that the agree We with Salomon skate. Devices, Inc., Analog 172 onique, S.A. law, equivalents, as a matter of doctrine of (Fed. 1865,1875 817, 832, USPQ2d 49 cannpt encompass the accused skate’s re Cir.1999) (“[P]rosecution history estoppel movable screw. operation the of the Warner- arising from reference describes and Johnson presumption allows doctrine Jenkinson operate.”). depicts easily In a an in-line skate with an re- equivalents no room to of vein, par also stated that upper portion similar we have shoe that can be movable pat subject ticular matter disclosed to the base of the skate. A sec- attached is deemed specification ent but not claimed reference, prior art French Patent No. ond Maxwell v. to have been surrendered. See (the reference”), 2,688,072 “French teaches Baker, Inc., 1098, 1106-07, 86 F.3d J. to the upper a soft bootie attached skate (Fed.Cir.1996). with at the toe and heel. base screws of law. See Again, questions these are art, pieces prior these two Given Warner-Jenkinson, at 520 U.S. 39 n. fact that undisputed the accused skate 1040, USPQ2d at n. 8. 117 S.Ct. a removable screw to attach the utilizes concepts' these together, Taken upper heel of the soft bootie to the base —'that equivalents is both limited the doctrine skate, concluding we have no trouble subject estoppel to this equivalents that the doctrine of cannot al- —reflects (and Court’s) Supreme ap- court’s patent’s “permanently ’466 affixed” low the appli- proach maintaining principled expand limitation to to cover the accused equivalents cation the doctrine of while removable screw. device’s hewing closely original the doctrine’s to First, because the Salomon skate’s re prevent patent. fraud on a purpose: to is, most, movable heel screw at an obvious Tank, at See Graver 339 U.S. S.Ct. variation of the French reference’s screw (“The 854, USPQ at 330 essence of the attachment and the Johnson reference’s may practice doctrine is that one fraud (either tak upper removable shoe alone or patent.”). these limitations on Where combination), equiva the doctrine of en equiva- inapplicable, are the doctrine cannot, law, expand as a matter of lents operates “prevent infringer to an lents encompass the Salomon the ’466 stealing the benefit of invention.” hold would allow skate. To otherwise (quoting Royal Typewriter Id. Co. v. Rem- patent, through ’466 the doctrine of Rand, USPQ ington subject equivalents, to cover matter Cir.1948) J.).). (2d (Hand, To patented in legally could not have been effect, however, have this the doctrine Goods, above, Sporting first instance. Wilson must, as noted remain equivalents Cf. 1948; at established 904 F.2d at Con within the boundaries 1576-77, applied roy, 14 F.3d at to the amended claim limitations. 1378; Technologies, Southwall Avionique, Sextant F.3d at 1580, USPQ2d (“[Prosecution at 1680. USPQ2d at 1875 history estoppel arising operation from the Second, prosecu- patentee, during presumption Warner-Jenkinson allows the tion, made amendments and statements doctrine of no oper- room to competitor that would lead reasonable ate.”). disagree. We subject that the mat- objectively conclude ter of removable screw attachments was Whether or not an amendment See, relinquished. e.g., Avionique, Sextant *13 patentability was made for reasons of ais 826-27, USPQ2d at 172 F.3d at 49 1871 legal question. Cybor Corp. v. FAS (“The i.e., estoppel, scope of the what sub- Inc., 1448, 1460, Technologies, 46 ject during matter has been surrendered (Fed.Cir.1998) (en 1169, USPQ2d 1178 prosecution by patentee, the is to be deter- banc) (application prosecution history of point of a vantage mined from the reason- law); estoppel question Sys., is Litton First, patentee.”). competitor able of the 1462, USPQ2d 140 at F.3d 46 at 1330 “permanently affixed” limitation of the (scope prosecution history estoppel is a response claims added in the ’466 was law); question of Avionique, Sextant 172 rejection the examiner’s of the claims in 826, USPQ2d F.3d at at 1870-71. In light doing of the Johnson reference. In case, prosecution this our review of the so, applicant explicitly the stated that the history plain makes it the amend “permanently affixed” limitation distin- ments relevant here were made for a “sub guished the amended from the claims “de- stantial reason patentability.” related to tachable” shoe of the Johnson reference. Warner-Jenkinson, reexamination, 520 U.S. at patentee when the During 1040, USPQ2d cited the French reference to the examin- S.Ct. at 1875. er, phrase the “at at least said toe are and amendments, The “heel-and-toe” which among heel area” was the text added to by during were entered the examiner re- relationship the claims. the Given be- a telephone examination after conference references, prior tween the art the amend- patentee, with the were made for such a made, by ments and the statements the id., reason. See 520 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. applicant, ordinary one of skill in the art 1040, USPQ2d at 1875. These amend- clearly would conclude that removable ments were entered after the citation of screw attachments the between bootie (in- prior additional art to the examiner relinquished. base were cluding highly relevant French refer- The district court in was correct con- above), ence unquestionably discussed cluding that the skate could not Salomon light in against earlier art cited infringe patent the ’466 under the doctrine claims, such as the Johnson reference. equivalents. it These facts make clear that the (re)issued probably would not have been C amendments, without which makes urges Salomon us to conclude that them, course, to patentability.” “related there no in explanation discernible 1040, USPQ2d Id. at 117 S.Ct. prosecution history for the “heel-and-toe” Sys., 1875. See Litton 140 F.3d at amendments discussed above. In this cir (amendments at 1330 made cumstance, Salomon, says presumption prior rejection without formal art can be prosecution in history estoppel favor patentability”). fact that “related by Supreme established Court War formally were words entered applies. ner-Jenkinson See 520 U.S. (after ap- examiner conversation with the 117 S.Ct. at 1873. plicant) applicant than rather does Thus, argues, Salomon our recent decision question not affect the of whether a sub- Avionique compels holding Sextant equivalents patentability that the doctrine of cannot be stantial reason related to Indeed, firmly reality by their addition. Salo- anchored the under- precipitated that “it is clear that the mon itself states standing ordinary of those of skill in the have allowed the examiner would not Yet, art.” this court does not even consid- prior claims over Johnson and the other ordinary er the in-line skate art limitations.” [heel-and-toe] without “permanently.” would attach to artisan Thus, conclude that the Warner-Jen we Instead, summarily this court concludes presumption, consequent' and the kinson “permanent” the term should mean against bar the doctrine it it what thinks should mean. inapplicable Avionique, under Sextant context, Divorced from words lose their See, e.g., Bai v. L L to this case. & See, Inc., 1350, 1355, meanings. and accustomed Wings, (Fed.Cir.1998) (hold Autogiro e.g., Co. America v. United States, the reason for an amend ing where Ct.Cl. prosecution from the histo (“Claims ment is clear (Ct.Cl.1967) USPQ presumption ry, the Warner-Jenkinson cannot be clear and on unambiguous their apply). does not face.”). “Permanent” in the *14 of context millennia; ranges mountain can mean CONCLUSION in “permanent” the context of hair treat terms, they in mean what general, Claim storm; ments can mean until the next rain correctly say. interpret- The district court “permanent” in the context of creased “permanently af- ed the claim limitation pants long can mean until the next airline require fixed” to an unremovable connec- class; trip “permanent” in coach in the tion between the bootie and the base of the genetic context of combinations can mean affirm the district skate. We therefore until the next mutation. in judges When holding that skate court’s Salomon ordinary tuit an meaning and accustomed cannot, law, of in- literally as matter context, they (usually divorced from are fringe patent. the ’466 We also affirm the unwittingly) subjective imposing their own holding district court’s that the doctrine of linguistic public values on decision. cannot, law, a matter of as be expand used to the ’466claims to cover the verbally recognizes As this court but summary skate. The judgment Salomon substantively ignores, understanding in favor of is affirmed. Salomon in ordinary one skill the art sets the proper meaning context for the of claim COSTS terms. Markman v. Westview Instru- No costs. ments, Inc., 967, 986, USPQ2d (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (“[T]he AFFIRMED disputed in in construing focus terms claim RADER, Judge, dissenting. Circuit ... objective on the test of in ordinary what one of skill the art at the today The court determines the “or- time of the invention would have under- dinary meaning” and accustomed mean.”). “permanently claim term stood the term to The art in affixed” sum- this marily precludes infringement both literal case is in-line The skates. reexam- and infringement under the doctrine of patent an ined ’466 claims in-line skate equivalents. My reading patent law and improved responsiveness with foot patent suggest in this case a different of a movements skater. result. by permanently achieves this result affix- ing upper flexible shoe to the base. The regard interpretation,

With to claim this “non-removable,” “permanent” terms hasty, unsupported judg- court reaches a therefore, context, in proper refer to a meaning “perma- ment on the of the term nently.” opines relationship court that it between the shoe and the This “need only recognize claim construction is base. portion.” opinion gives absolutely no fixed” to “said base This court

This court’s support “ordinary for its context or nevertheless finds the heel screw is af- meaning” accustomed “removable” without evidence it Instead, begins it with its conclu- fixed.” was ever removed or “meant to be” re- - ordinary and accustomed “[t]he sion— at all a particularly egregious moved ... phrase of this does not en- appeal summary stretch on judg- - compass affixation via removable screw” ment. any evidence from and does not consider (too much?) protests This court that it in skill the art. This those genuine will “not create a issue material extremely interpretation of court’s narrow parties agree fact where the that none phrase potentially deny pat- this could so, however, In doing betrays exists.” it because, any coverage, in the entee almost dangers appeal. on fact-finding theoretical, reading out-of-context of this K-2 Specifically, this court states that “ful- court, permanent. nothing almost After ly acknowledges ... that the heel screw is all, may recognize those of skill this art ” Certainly, ‘removable.’ did not con- (the that even lamination method of affixa- Indeed, away cede its entire case. patent) tion described is removable full examination of the context of K-2’s fact, In with a chemical solvent. an adhe- statement shows that court this has taken may, sive affixation to those of skill this dispute. sides in a factual K-2 in their art, in fact permanent (becoming be less explains: reply brief time) loose over than screws for connect- Though the screw the heel of the summary pro- ing shoes to skates. This [accused] skate can be removed with supply record does not the context ceeding *15 effort, it not substantially different necessary for an accurate decision. None- theless, question permanent this court dismisses the from a or non-removable supposed of a on the basis gluing connection. As with or laminat- meaning. accustomed ing, tightly the base and shoe are held Indeed, un- together and “become one.” Although the court construed the claim shoe, por- like the soft the heel Johnson context, biggest out of its stretch non-rigid tion of the skate [accused] fact-finding appeal on na- is its about the shoe cannot be removed from the base. ture of the accused skate. This court hast- Rather, pried up it can at most be ily finds that the accused skate affixes the slightly piece paper so that a can be shoe to the base with a “removable screw.” (nonetheless wedged underneath. purely On this factual issue summarily appeal), resolved and on added.) (Emphasis Again, at the other record contains no evidence the ac- place “fully that K-2 ac- cited to show ever or cused skate’s screw was removed removable, knowledges” that the screw is any purpose. would ever be removed for explains reply K-2 in fact in its brief: Hence, a conclusion about whether Though the screws can be with removed screw was or was not “meant to un- be (which effort, prevent the rivets the shoe Indeed, premature. screwed” is the rec- integrally-connected includes the toe and ord shows that the flexible shoe of the portions) being heel removed with- permanently accused skate was attached out it. destroying to the base at the toe area use of rivets Thus, imposed this court has its definition (unremovable?) Therefore, and an screw. of “removable” and its factual view of the if even a user disassembled the accused K-2, resolving on accused skate on thus gain allegedly shoe to access to the “re- - appeal testimony without and without a screw, movable” heel that user not could - full record the factual issues which are remove the shoe from the base because place. dispute the heart of this the first apparently four rivets and the unremova- point is that the record shows no ble screw the toe would ensure the portion” “permanently “shoe remained af- instance of removal of the heel screw and removing the heel for ever purpose no FOOTWEAR, LA INC. CROSSE the connection shoe

screw because Corporation, International Footwear any event. “permanent” skate remains Plaintiffs-Appellees, has never been removed Is a screw that removed “removable?” and will never be if it removable it make a difference Does STATES, Defendant- UNITED court) (in adopted by this the surreal sense Appellant. the shoe remains because No. 98-5158. pre- substantially “for affixed” to the skate therebetween?” This venting movement Appeals, United States Court ap- factual issues on court decides these Federal Circuit. peal summary judgment. and on Sept. 1999. hasty judgment about the This court’s skate includes rea- nature of the accused history. In this

soning prosecution about

case, however, prior art and the Johnson prosecution history indisputably dis- only which accommodated

cuss skates replacement

complete removal and prior emphasized art dis-

shoe. Thus the removal, permanent

assembly and in the toe and the

fixation. The rivets already

unremovable “removable screw” device from

removes this accused

similarity prior art from which with patentee distinguished itself. sum, only

In could have re- this court *16 (particu- infringement

solved this case

larly infringement by equivalents) by on

undertaking finding extensive fact

summary judgment appeal. and on Sad-

ly, finding appeal on the screw is summarily importing

“removable” “permanent” for removes this permanent

judgment connec- art.

tion with the in-line skate

Case Details

Case Name: K-2 Corporation v. Salomon S.A. And Salomon/north America, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date Published: Sep 13, 1999
Citation: 191 F.3d 1356
Docket Number: 98-1552
Court Abbreviation: Fed. Cir.
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