Case Information
*1 Before B AUER F LAUM Circuit Judges V AN B OKKELEN District Judge . [*]
F LAUM Circuit Judge
. This about Federal Railroad Safety (“FRSA”). defendant, Southern Railway, claims bars who been wrongfully discharged obtaining relief * Of Northern District Indiana, sitting designation. ‐
through both ‐ arbitration pursuant and an administrative lawsuit FRSA. disagree. Although reasoning di ers from court’s, too conclude nothing bars an bringing both claims.
I. Background April Justin Reed, a trackman with
Southern (“NSR”), experienced a bout severe abdominal pain while working. He claimed that, after he informed his supervisor, company o ffi cials were reluctant provide medical treatment pressured him into signing statement he had been “injured on work.” Reed was on medical leave for about seven months. Soon after he returned work, company claims agent urged him state whether he thought April incident was work related. Reed admi tt ed that, notwithstanding his earlier estation, felt his work did play role his injury. responded fi ring Reed making inconsistent statements violating Rule N, internal rule requiring same day reporting site injuries.
Reed member Brotherhood Maintenance Way Employes Division International Brotherhood Teamsters, had negotiated with NSR. union believed his termination violated terms agreement. Following his termination—and pursuant Act, 153—Reed appealed dismissal arbitral board, Board 6394.
While proceedings before were pending, led complaint Occupational ‐ Safety and Health Administration, alleging NSR had violated Federal Railroad Safety FRSA prohibits railroad carriers from, among things, discriminating against employees who “notify, empt notify, railroad carrier of work related personal injury.” § 20109(a)(4). After waiting an appropriate period time, see id. 20109(d)(3), Reed brought original action district court.
Approximately seven months after Reed led his FRSA suit, Public Law issued its opinion. The Board concluded Reed’s violations company policy were grounds for dismissal awarded him reinstatement without back pay. Four days later, NSR moved summary judgment Reed’s FRSA suit. By choosing arbitrate his before Board, company maintained, Reed had triggered FRSA’s remedies provision:
Election Remedies.— An both another same allegedly unlawful act carrier. Thus, argued, had closed courthouse door claim. court denied NSR’s motion.
Southern Ry. WL (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2013). It reasoned arbitration proceedings were “election” because was mandatory, agreement “another arose out private rather than state statute. NSR successfully moved interlocutory review.
II. Discussion said above arbitrated
pursuant the Railway Labor Act because, in the rail industry, such required by statute. See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. U.S. (1972) (“[T]he compulsory character administrative remedy provided stems from contractual undertaking between parties but from itself.”); Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. F.3d (7th Cir. 2001). Speci cally, § First (i) requires disputes growing out agreements initially handled through rail carrier’s internal processes, those processes fail either party right appeal National Railroad Adjustment Board. Another provision, Second, permits unions rail carriers jointly establish special adjustment boards lieu National Railroad Adjustment Board; adjustment board was body heard Reed’s appeal.
NSR sees “provision needs get its foot door support, relies Supreme Court decision, & Western American Train Dispatchers Ass’n U.S. (1991), addressed similar phrase Interstate Commerce question Dispatchers whether exempted certain consolidating rail carriers “from antitrust laws all including State municipal law, necessary let [it] carry out transaction” operated relieve carriers 5 from obligations incurred in collective bargaining agreement. Id. at (emphasis added) (quoting 11341(a) (1988)). Court held that it did. particular, the Court identi ed the Act—“the law gives legal and binding e ect collective agreements” in rail industry—as “the law that is superseded when ICC approved transaction requires abrogation collective ‐ bargaining agreements.” Id. at (internal citations and quotation marks omi ed).
Just Supreme Court treated “law” Interstate Commerce Act purposes, however, does not mean that must treat “law” purposes. Dispatchers shows that reading permissible, it does require that outcome statutory text and context point other way. Simply put, Dispatchers does lay down mandatory rule about scope term “law” in statutes. See American Airlines, Inc. Wolens U.S. n.6 (1995) (distinguishing “all law” Airline Deregulation from “any other Dispatchers noting each phrase had be interpreted light “statute before us”). FRSA, other words, must read its own terms.
Here, court—like district courts have addressed question, like Department Labor’s Administrative Review Board—concluded does contend agreement itself law. agree. See, e.g. Dispatchers U.S. (“A contract no legal force apart law acknowledges its binding character.”); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts (2013) (“A contract law, nor does make law: plus makes ordinary contract enforceable obligation.”). Railway Labor Act not “provision of within meaning of Accord Ray v. Union Pac. R.R. , WL 5297172, at *6–8 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 13, 2013) ; Ratledge
v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., WL 3872793, at *10–17 (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2013); Mercier v. Union Pac. R.R. , WL (ARB Sept. 29, 2011); cf. Ba en fi eld v. BNSF Ry. Co., WL 1309439, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2013) ( nding that conclusion “at least colorable”) ; Southern Ry. Solis , F. Supp. 2d 43–45 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2013) (same).
All of these authorities analyzed NSR’s argument primarily terms scope “provision of law,” just described, nothing Dispatchers forecloses result. That said, we determine ‐ de novo, we are reluctant focus only particular snippet text. our view, there is conceptually simpler way address question. For even assuming arguendo Labor “law”, it must be “ sought ” law. Giving those words their plain meaning, cannot see how did.
difference between approach court’s be more terminological than anything. Often, arguments designed show “law” can just easily be used show kind which can “seek protection.” See, e.g. Ratledge WL at *14 (“[T]he rights plaintiff seeks enforce [in process]” are “contractual rights … [a]nd those RLA, plaintiff sought protection. ” (emphasis added)); WL *4 (“Reed’s right terminated just cause arises out RLA, instead out agreement.”).
In rst place, Railway Labor “does undertake governmental regulation wages, hours, working conditions. Instead it seeks to provide means by agreement be reached respect to them.” Terminal R.R. Ass’n v. Bhd. R.R. Trainmen U.S. 1, (1943). words, entirely agnostic as content any collective bargaining agreement. (Reed’s appeal point; court noted, claim he asserted arose solely collective bargaining agreement.) Likewise, Act’s streamlined procedures are intended “see that disagreement about [working] conditions does reach point threaten[ing] continuity work, remove conditions that threaten health safety workers.” Id. ; see Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris U.S. (1994); Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley U.S. 725–28 (1945). doubt that person who arbitrates based
on private contractual necessarily does so “under” federal merely federal statute requires that be brought before adjustment board. Cf. Graf Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. F.2d (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he fact activity regulated by statute, industry regulated Labor Act,” does mean “disputes between private parties engaged activity arise statute” jurisdictional purposes). But even grant was proceeding Act, seems quite odd say seeking it. Again, o ers no all; merely instructs him bring grievances cannot resolved property a speci fi c forum. By appealing to this forum, did protection under Railway Labor Act more than a litigant seeks protection under jurisdictional statute for Court Appeals for Federal Circuit, 1295, when he fi les an appeal a fi nal decision United States Court Federal Claims.
Perhaps, to use Secretary Labor’s example, an employee could seen seeking under Railway Labor if he brought a claim based on Act’s few substantive obligations: instance, if railroad carrier refused participate mandatory rst place. But where, here, employee’s based set forth his collective bargaining agreement, we conclude seeking agreement Labor As Supreme Court put it, “[i]n submi ing his arbitration, seeks vindicate contractual right .” Alexander v. Gardner Denver U.S. (1974) (emphasis added). analogizes Labor likewise source substantive rights, analogy inapt. Section provides plainti ff cause action deprivation constitutional statutory rights. See, e.g. Wilder Virginia Hosp. Ass’n U.S. (1990). The directs claimant appeal particular arbitral forum. Even were say, colloquially, plainti s “seek Secretary filed amicus brief invitation, reiterating expanding upon view Department expressed Mercier WL 4889278.
protection” under § (and applicable substantive right they aim to vindicate), we do see how same true of
NSR also contends nothing in FRSA requires “provision of itself create substantive invoked by employee. This argument shears those words of their context. FRSA states employee may “seek protection under both this section another provision law.” U.S.C. § It obvious what means to seek protection under FRSA: bring a claim founded on statute’s substantive protections. See id. § 20109(d)(1) (“An who alleges … discrimination violation subsection (a), (b) (c) this section, seek relief accordance provisions this .”). To protection another provision must mean something similar: bring claim founded a comparable substantive protection. For example, agree brought Occupational Safety Health Act, extends whistleblower protection employees le workplace safety complaint take protected action, would bar successive claim. See U.S.C. § 660(c). But nothing § o ff ers substantive akin 20109; o ers no seek. meager legislative history behind 20109(f) supports precisely interpretation. points us floor speech Congressman James Florio, manager bill House Representatives: agreed clarifying relationship between remedy provided here possible separate remedy
OSHA. Certain employees, employees working sum, although is indeed statute—and thus, we may assume, another provision law—it is strained to say Reed sought protection under by appealing his grievance to special adjustment board. Rather, sought protection under his agreement. plain statute therefore tells us is precluded obtaining relief under simply he appealed to 6394.
Although stop here, we note our conclusion buttressed FRSA’s history. When first enacted, provision read follows: Whenever an employee afforded this section and under other connection same allegedly unlawful act employer, such seeks must elect either relief pursuant this pursuant law. shops, could qualify both new remedy provided this legislation, existing remedy OSHA. It intention pursuit remedy should bar other, so avoid resort two separate remedies, which would result unneeded litigation inconsistent results. Cong. Rec. (Sept. 1980). argues excerpt
reflects broad purpose prevent all “unneeded litigation inconsistent results.” believe overreads Congressman Florio’s statement, firmly rooted “existing remedy” Occupational Safety Health
No. ‐
Pub. L. No. ‐ § 10, Stat. 1811, 1815–16. The original phrasing emphasizes can only under provision law itself affords retaliatory acts. FRSA obviously affords protection. See § 20109(a)–(c). But have said, in this afforded no substantive protections at all. It merely afforded statutory framework collective bargaining any disputes arise therefrom. addition, in Congress added provision FRSA affirmatively disclaiming any intention diminish railway employees’ rights. See § 20109(h) (“Nothing in this shall be deemed diminish rights, privileges, or remedies any employee any Federal or State or any agreement.”) argues its interpretation does “diminish” employee or remedies always remains free bring grievance, just both. suppose this literally diminution either remedy, although fine distinction—one sits uneasily with saving clause’s broad language. By contrast, 20109(h) fits snugly reading provision bars employees seeking duplicative relief overlapping antiretaliation whistleblower statutes; does Congress restyled again, very slightly, 2007; all parties agree changes were nonsubstantive remained constant. See S. Rep. 103d Cong., 2d Sess., (1994) (“As codification bills enacting titles United States Code into positive law, bill makes no substantive change law.”). diminish their remedies agreements way.
To clear, these additional sources confirm our interpretation but do control it. We find plain 20109(f) enough.
III. Conclusion choose hang our textual analysis different peg
than district court Secretary Labor, conclusion same: FRSA’s concerned with provisions law grant workers substantive protections, state writ large. provision, so A FFIRM court’s order denying summary judgment.