Case Information
*1 Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MURPHY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
____________
RILEY, Chief Judge.
This appeal asks whether a claim for compensatory damages brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. Semmie John Guenther, Jr., filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging his former employer, Griffin Construction Company, Inc., discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. Guеnther passed away while his charge was still pending, so the special administrator of his estate filed suit on his behalf when he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The district court dismissed the action, concluding federal common law called for application of the Arkansas survival statute, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(a)(1), and finding Guenther’s claim had abated. Guenther’s estate appeals, and having jurisdictiоn under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Guenther began working for Griffin Construction in 2008, and he oversaw construction projects across Arkansas and Texas for four years. In the spring of 2012, he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Guenther requested and received roughly three weeks’ leave from work to receive treatment, and he returned to work when it appeared the treatment was successful. In 2013, Guеnther learned the cancer had spread throughout his body. He notified Griffin Construction he would need to take another three weeks’ leave to undergo radiation therapy. Instead, Griffin Construction fired Guenther and told him he could reapply for any openings in the future if he wished. Despite alleged promises to the contrary, Griffin Construction also immediately cancelled Guenther’s insuranсe policies.
Guenther filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. He died before the administrative process was complete. In May of 2015—roughly 22 months after Guenther was fired, 20 months after he filed his charge, and 12 months after he passed away—the EEOC issued its right-to-sue letter, having found reasonable cause. Justin Guenther, special administrator of Guenther’s estate, filed suit under Title I of *3 the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, et seq., and thе Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-123-101, et seq. Griffin Construction filed its answer and then moved to dismiss the action, contending the claims did not survive Guenther’s death. The district court adopted the Arkansas tort survival statute as the federal rule of decision, agreed that Guenther’s ADA claim abated at his death, and entered judgment for Griffin Construction on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). We reverse. [1]
II. DISCUSSION
Whether a complaint states a cause of action is a question of law we review on appeal de novo. See Minch Family LLLP v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed Dist., 628 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2010). We assume all well-pleaded factual allegations are true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and affirm dismissal under Rule 12(c) only if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. Under normal circumstances the faсts as alleged here would state a plausible claim under the ADA. However, Guenther, the would-be plaintiff, died before he could file suit. The determinative issue at this stage becomes whether the ADA claim for compensatory damages survived Guenther’s death. [2]
Whether a federal claim survives is a question of federal law. See Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980). Congress could have supplied the answer by
explicitly instructing courts on how to resolve situations like this one. It did not. The
ADA is silent on the claim-survival issue, and “[t]here is no general survival statute
*4
for federal-question cases.” 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1954. Nor does 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)—which
directs courts to fill gaps in certain federal actions with state law when state law is not
“inconsistent” with federal law—apply to the ADA. Thеrefore the question of
survival “is governed by federal common law when, as here, there is no expression
of contrary intent” from Congress. Smith v. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
“The more difficult task, to which we turn, is giving
content
to this federal
rule.” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
*5 First, state law should not be incorporated where doing so would “‘frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs.’” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., [4]
So what did Congress say? Congress declared its interest in passing the ADA
was to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate” with “clear,
strong
,
consistent
, [and]
enforceable
standards” to address the “serious and pervasive social
problem” of disability-bаsed discrimination on a case-by-case basis. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added); see Clackamas,
Griffin Construction contends that allowing Guenther’s claim to abate under Arkansas law does not frustrate this national mandate. In making this contention it [5]
relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s holding in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584 (1978), and our decision in Parkerson v. Carrouth,
We are not persuaded by this analogy. Robertson and Parkerson involved
§ 1983 actions as to which Congress had expressed its preference for state law via
§ 1988(a). See Parkerson,
Furthermore, Robertson was a “narrow” holding “limited to situations” where
allowing a claim to abate under state law would have “no independent adverse effect
on the policies underlying § 1983,” namely compensation and deterrence. Robertson,
*7
in Parkerson because the state statute was less hospitable than was the case in
Robertson, although we emphasized our belief there was still no threat to deterrence
because § 1983 wrongdoers “have no means of knowing their victim will die during
the pendency of the victim’s action.” Parkerson,
We agree with Guenther’s estate that abatement of compensаtory ADA claims poses “a special threat to enforcement.” This is because the very nature of the ADA makes it more likely the aggrieved party will die before the case is complete given the health issue which brings him or her under the statute’s protection. These are not “farfetched assumptions”—as was the case in Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592-93 n.10—because ADA claims specifically involvе disabled plaintiffs alleging they were discriminated against because of their disability. Congress passed the ADA to eradicate discrimination against disabled persons, some of whom may be targeted precisely because of their poor health. A state law allowing claims to abate when the aggrieved party dies impedes this broad remedial purpose.
State law is also unsuited to fill a gap in federal law “when the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards.” Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98. The district court found no such distinct need notwithstanding the fact “[t]here are, of course, certain uniformity interests implicit in all federal laws.” To be sure, deceased victims’ claims would actually abate, which minimized any impact on § 1983’s purposes. See id. at 591-92. That is not the case here. Under the district court’s interpretation of the Arkansas statutе, survival of ADA claims would be the rare exception rather than the general rule. This possibility is made more likely considering the path to trial for an ADA
claim is often measured in years, not months. A plaintiff must first exhaust the
administrative process. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a). Guenther’s
exhaustion process took almost two years. Adding to this concern is the possibility
that defendants may prolong litigation with the potеntial that the claim will abate. We
believe this would be contrary to the overall purpose of the ADA. See id. § 12101.
*8
the interest in uniformity is particularly strong in cases where the rights, obligations,
and liabilities of the United States or its officers are implicated. See, e.g., Carlson,
It cannot be said uniformity is irrelevant when filling interstices in federal anti-
discrimination law. The ADA embodies Congrеss’s attempt to create a
“comprehensive national mandate” where “the Federal Government plays a central
role” in enforcing “consistent” standards. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (3). The
Supreme Court saw fit to create a uniform definition for “employee” status under the
ADA in Clackamas,
We agreе with the district court that the ADA’s federal character, taken alone, is not enough to prove the need for a uniform rule. To hold otherwise would mean state law should never serve as the rule of decision for federal actions. Griffin Construction, however, suggests applying state law here provides the uniformity of process this consideration is intended to effect. To accept mere uniformity of prоcess—without giving any attention to uniformity of results—could make uniformity virtually irrelevant. We do not consider it trivial that Guenther’s claim would have survived in many states. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 611.20. In settling somewhere between these two extremes, we find Congress’s call for a “national mandate” with “consistent” standards and the desire to effect the “evenhanded application” of the ADA’s anti-discrimination provisions both weigh in favor of a uniform federal rule.
Griffin Construction suggests incorporating state law would not frustrate the
ADA’s underlying policies or disrupt uniformity because, by analogy, we incorporate
state statutes of limitation for ADA claims. See Gaona,
In addition, the backdrop against which Congress remained silent is different
for time limitations and survivorship. See generally Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. Solimino,
Lastly, we think the district court overemphasized the relevance of the state-
law presumption detailed in Kamen to the issue here. Kamen was a shareholder
derivative action where the Court addressed whether tо displace state corporate law
and create a universal-demand requirement for the Investment Company Act of
1940—that is, whether to create a uniform federal rule that would disallow
shareholders from bypassing corporate directors and bringing a suit in the
corporation’s name even if first going to the directors would be futile. See Kamen,
For all of these reasons, we hold federal common law does not incorporate state
law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or
abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. We join other courts that have allowed
the individual’s estate to bring and maintain a suit for compensatory damages under
the ADA in place of the aggrieved party. We intimate no view as to whether a claim
for punitive damages would survive, particularly in light of the traditional federal
common law rule that penal claims—as distinct from remedial claims—abate on
death. See, e.g., Kettner,
III. CONCLUSION
Guenther’s ADA claim for compensatory damages survived his death. Griffin Construction is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The district court’s decision is reversed, and because the estate’s state claim was dismissed based on the district court’s finding as to the federal claim, we remand both claims to the district court for further proceedings.
______________________________
Notes
[1] The district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim without deciding whether it had abated as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
[2] The district court grouped the alleged damages sought into three categories: “(i) loss of employment compensation; (ii) loss of reputation and self-esteem; and (iii) mental anguish and emotional distress.” The estate makes no claim on appeal for punitive damages under the ADA and conceded in the district court the non-recovery of punitive damages.
[3] A number of courts have nonetheless looked to § 1988(a) to address the
survivability of ADA claims. See Kettner v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 570 F. Supp.
2d 1121, 1131 (D. Minn. 2008) (collecting cases). But the district court correctly
“reject[ed] the notion that § 1988(a) applies to the ADA” given § 1988(a)’s exprеssly
limited application to actions brought under “titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised
Statutes.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). None of these enumerated provisions include the
ADA, and Griffin Construction does not propose the provision should apply on
appeal, so we will not belabor the issue. See, e.g., Kettner,
[4] The district court found this consideration inapplicable given its belief “there
is no federal ‘program’ at issue in this case.” But the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,
[5] We assume without deciding thаt Guenther’s claim would not survive under Arkansas’ survival statute, though the parties dispute this point.
[6] The Court made this difference clear in Robertson: “[S]urvivorship rules in
areas where the courts are free to develop federal common law—
without first
referring to state law and finding an inconsistency
—can have no bearing on our
decision here.” Robertson,
[7] Robertson involved the Louisiana survival statute, which allowed § 1983
claims to abate only if the aggrieved pаrty was not survived by a spouse, child,
parent, or sibling. See Robertson,
[9] The Court cited commercial law, property law, and family law as examples of
other areas traditionally “governed by state-law standards.” Kamen,
[10] Before this case, every district court to address the issue within our circuit had
reached this same conclusion. See generally A.H. v. St. Louis County, No. 4:14-CV-
2069,