{¶ 2} Appellant was married to appellee, Gregory Justice, on June 20, 1992. Appellee works for the Middletown Fire Department and serves in the Air Force Reserves. He earns $66,000 per year working for the fire department and $18,000 per year as a *2 reservist. Appellant has a master's degree in business and certification in project management. She worked for NCR Corporation for 16 years. In 1997, she earned $140,000 with NCR. The parties adopted two children during their marriage. When the children were adopted, appellant began to scale back her employment. During the time between the adoption of the first child and the adoption of their second child, appellant worked a 40-hour four-day work week and had a base salary in the range of $112,000. After her second child was adopted, she began working in a position that required her to work from home 32 hours over four days per week and paid her $92,000 per year. In 2000, NCR experienced a reduction in force, and appellant's position was eliminated. Appellant was offered the opportunity to pursue another job within the company and also received job placement assistance; however, appellant did not return to work. Instead, she became a full-time stay at home mother. In 2003, appellant began working as a part-time associate faculty member at Antioch University, where she continues to be employed. Her current salary is $20,250, and she works approximately sixteen hours per week.
{¶ 3} The trial court, in light of appellant's work history and the fact that the children were both starting school full-time in the fall, imputed income to appellant in the amount of $65,000. Based on the imputed income, the trial court refused to award appellant spousal support and awarded child support in the amount of $230.88 plus the two percent processing fee per month. The trial court also allocated the assets of the parties, including marital liabilities. Appellant appeals from the trial court arguing three assignments of error.
{¶ 4} Appellant's first two assignments of error are related, so we deal with them together:
{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS VOLUNTARILY UNDEREMPLOYED, WHICH RESULTED IN THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IMPUTING INCOME TO APPELLANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $65,000 PER *3 YEAR FOR PURPOSES OF SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT DETERMINATIONS."
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING INCOME TO APPELLANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $65,000 PER YEAR, WHICH RESULTED IN THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING THAT SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAS NEITHER APPROPRIATE NOR REASONABLE AND ORDERING APPELLEE TO PAY APPELLANT ONLY NOMINAL CHILD SUPPORT."
{¶ 7} Whether a person is voluntarily underemployed and the amount of income to be imputed "are matters to be determined by the trial court based upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Rock v.Cabral (1993),
{¶ 8} R.C.
{¶ 9} In order to impute income, the trial court must make a specific finding that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.Williams v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2006-09-103,
{¶ 10} Appellant asserts that she is not voluntarily underemployed because she is abiding by the plan she and appellee adopted during their marriage that she would stay home with the children until they attend school full-time, at which time she would pursue a position that would not be as demanding as the corporate positions she had held in the past. We note that plans adopted during marriage may not be feasible once the marriage breaks down. Gregory v. Gregory, Montgomery App. No. 22011,
{¶ 11} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining the amount of income to impute because the court failed to address each of the factors listed in the statute. Specifically, appellant cites the court's failure to consider the age and special needs of the children and the availability of employment in the geographic area. However, the decision of the trial court addresses these statutory factors. The trial court made findings with respect to the factors that are the subject of appellant's two specific arguments. With respect to the age and special needs of the children, the trial court noted that, although appellant testified regarding her concern about being available for her children, this testimony was inconsistent with her plan to obtain a full-time teaching position while earning her doctoral degree at a separate university in a different city. Further, the court noted that the children were starting *5 school full-time the week following the hearing. With respect to the availability of employment in the geographic region, the decision specifically discusses the growth experienced in Southwest Ohio.
{¶ 12} The amount of the income imputed by the court is coincidentally equal to the median salary in business education. Appellant asserts that it was error for the court to select this number because no evidence was presented that full-time positions were available at any local colleges or universities in the field of business education. However, the court did not state that it selected the number because it was the median salary in business education, and we will not infer such reasoning. Further, despite appellant's contentions, we do not believe that the court was confined to determining her potential income in the field of business education when she is trained and has experience as a business professional. See Rock,
{¶ 13} We note that while consideration of relevant factors outlined in the statute is mandatory, Williams v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2006-09-103,
{¶ 14} We next turn to the application of the determination of underemployment and imputation of income to the calculation of child and spousal support.
{¶ 18} Appellant argues further that, in considering the income of the parties, the trial court was required to consider appellee's income from all sources. The trial court stated that it considered all of the factors outlined in the statute. Further, the court considered the income of both parties, both actual and imputed, in its analysis of the issue of spousal support. The trial court indicated that it woulduse the income from appellee's full time job with the Middletown Fire Department, which is $66,000, in determining appropriate spousal support. Appellee works more than full-time at this job alone. As such, the trial court stated that it would not use the income from appellee's second job in the Air Force Reserves in determining the amount of spousal support. The court stated that for spousal support purposes, the court would not require him to work a second job. Because the trial court gave *8 consideration to appellee's income, we find that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to use appellee's income from his second job in determining the amount of spousal support. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in fashioning an equitable award of spousal support.
B. RELATIVE EARNING ABILITIES OF THE PARTIES
{¶ 19} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in its consideration of the relative earning abilities of the parties because it incorrectly imputed income to her in the amount of $65,000. The trial court stated in its decision, however, that it believed that appellant's earning potential was likely greater than appellee's, not just equal to his. Appellant has in the recent past earned significantly more than appellee. The trial court received testimony from an occupational specialist regarding salary trends in appellant's field of expertise. The trial court's findings with respect to this matter are supported in the record and are not an abuse of discretion.
C. STANDARD OF LIVING ESTABLISHED DURING THE MARRIAGE
{¶ 20} Appellant relies on Buckles v. Buckles (1988),
{¶ 21} Although the trial court did not specifically address the standard of living of the parties in its decision, it was not required to make specific findings of fact on this factor. While the statute sets forth factors to be considered by the trial court, if the court does not specifically address each factor in its order, absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court presumes each factor was considered.Carroll v. Carroll, Delaware App. No. 2004-CAF-05035,
{¶ 22} We conclude that the trial court properly considered the factors listed in R.C.
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 24} Appellant's third assignment of error states:
{¶ 25} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE AND ORDER THAT APPELLEE IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR BACK REAL ESTATE TAXES OWED ON THE MARITAL RESIDENCE."
{¶ 26} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allocate responsibility for the payment of back real estate taxes owed on the marital residence. Appellant argues that appellee acknowledged responsibility for the real estate taxes and that this court should therefore allocate responsibility to him. The parties stipulated that the proceeds from the sale *10 of the residence would be split equally between them. The proceeds were so split, except that appellant withheld $5,000 of the proceeds from appellee. Appellant claims that she is entitled to this money because she believes she should not be held responsible for late real estate taxes that were due at the time of the closing. She claims that these late real estate taxes were appellee's responsibility. Appellee argues that because the parties stipulated as to the division of the proceeds of the sale of the home, this real estate tax issue was not before the trial court for consideration.
{¶ 27} Allocation of assets, including debts, is within the province of the trial court. Under R.C.
{¶ 28} Testimony was taken at trial regarding the real estate tax debt. Appellee testified at trial that he had made real estate tax payments into an escrow account with the mortgage company during the time that he had assumed sole responsibility for making mortgage payments while he was residing in the home. He indicated that he was unsure from what time period the late real estate taxes accrued, but indicated that they accrued during the time that appellant and appellee were living together in the home.
{¶ 29} The record is clear that the trial court had knowledge of the real estate tax liability. The entry specifically addresses the parties' other marital debts; however, the judge does not specify responsibility for the real estate tax liability We find that the trial court's failure to specifically address the allocation of the real estate tax liability was an abuse of *11 discretion. Appellant's third assignment of error is sustained. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings according to law and consistent with this opinion. However, we specifically refrain from commenting regarding the $5,000 that appellant withheld from appellee in the distribution of the net proceeds of the sale of the residence, as that issue is not properly before this court.
{¶ 30} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
*1BRESSLER and POWELL, JJ., concur.