Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co.Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co.
The appellee, Institutional Mortgage Company, filed in the Brevard County, Florida, Circuit Court an instrument styled “Petition to Enforce Compliance with Judgment“. The appellant, Junction Bit & Tool Co., was named as the “respondent“. We will refer to Institutional Mortgage Company as “plaintiff” and Junction Bit & Tool Co. as “defendant“.
The petition alleged that the plaintiff acquired ownership of some shares in the capital stock of the defendant and requested the defendant to register in defendant‘s records the plaintiff‘s ownership of such stock, but the defendant refused to do so. The petition also alleged that defendant had been ordered by the Brevard County Circuit Court in another cause, Civil Action No. 46546, to effectuate the stock transfer. The petition concluded with a prayer that the court enter an order requiring the defendant to register the stock transfer and to issue new stock certificates to the plaintiff.
The defendant is a Colorado corporation which has qualified under Florida law to transact business in Florida and pursuant to Florida law had appointed a resident agent for service of process. On 30 March 1970 the petition and summons were served on defendant‘s resident agent for service of process. The defendant moved to dismiss the petition on various grounds. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the petition with leave to amend. The defendant has appealed from this order contending that service of process was insufficient, and the trial court should for that reason have quashed the service and dismissed the cause without leave to amend.
Under
The law of this state provides several methods by which initial process may be served on a foreign corporation. A foreign corporation may be served by serving an officer, director, or a resident business agent of the corporation, or, in the absence of the foregoing, any agent transacting business for the corporation in this state. See
“Process against any corporation, domestic or foreign, may be served:
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“(5) If a foreign corporation shall have none of the foregoing officers or agents in this state, service may be made upon any agent transacting business for it in this state.”
In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Simari, Fla. 1966, 191 So.2d 427, the Florida Supreme Court held that service of process under the quoted section on a foreign corporation which had neither qualified to do business in this state nor appointed a resident agent for service of process would confer on the Florida court in personam jurisdiction over the foreign corporation only where the cause of action arose out of the activities of the corporation in the State of Florida.
Florida law formerly provided a similar method by serving a foreign corporation which had failed to designate a resident agent for service of process. As to such corporations,
The appellant relies on the Zirin and Illinois Central decisions as authority for his contention that service of process on a foreign corporation under
The Illinois Central and Zirin decisions are clearly distinguishable on two grounds. First, they dealt with statutes authorizing service on any agent doing business for the foreign corporation in the State of Florida. The statutory provisions now in question authorize service on a resident agent specifically appointed for the purpose of receiving process. Secondly, in the Zirin and Illinois Central cases, the Court had before it foreign corporations which had neither qualified to do business in Florida nor appointed a resident agent for service of process. In the present case the defendant corporation has both qualified to transact its business in Florida and appointed a resident agent for service of process.
From our review of the present State of Florida law, we conclude that the limitation that the defendant seeks to impose on service of process under
The limitation on service of process raised by judicial fiat in the Illinois Central and Zirin decisions are thought to be necessary to bring the statutes there before the court into accord with the due process clause of the
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no error has been demonstrated by the appellant and the order appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CROSS, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur.