JULIO IGNACIO LOURIDO LEON, GINA MERCEDES VALDIVIESO SANTOS, et al. v. MILLON AIR INC., a Florida corporation, MILLON AIR CARGO, INC., a Florida corporation et al.
No. 00-11938
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
(May 21, 2001)
[PUBLISH] D.C. Docket No. 98-07128-CV-LCN
Before EDMONDSON, FAY and NEWMAN*, Circuit Judges. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the context of a fatal airplane crash. The appeal is from the May 17, 1999, order of the District Court for the Southern District Florida (Lenore C. Nesbitt, District Judge) dismissing on the ground of forum non conveniens a suit by Julio Ignacio Lourido Leon and numerous other plaintiffs, all of whom are citizens of Ecuador. The suit was brought against Millon Air, Inc. (“Millon Air“), an air cargo carrier and other defendants whom the plaintiffs claim are responsible for the October 22, 1996, crash of a cargo-carrying aircraft owned and operated by Millon Air. The plane, which had no passengers, crashed shortly after take-off from Manta, Ecuador. In addition to killing the three members of the crew (who are not plaintiffs) the crash killed 30 residents of Ecuador living in the neighborhood of the crash site, and injured many others. The appeal is also from the District Court‘s March 29, 2000, order denying the Plaintiffs’ motions for new trial under
Procedural History
More than 700 people allegedly injured by the crash have filed approximately 100 lawsuits in state and federal courts in the United States. In 1997, thirty-six of the cases in the Southern District of Florida were consolidated before Judge Nesbitt under Case No. 96-3165, which is referred to in the pending litigation as Cedeno v. Millon Air (although its caption is Joza, et al v. Millon Air). On January 12, 1998, Judge Nesbitt dismissed the consolidated Cedeno cases on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Court retained jurisdiction “over the enforcement of the concessions made by the Defendants and approved by this Court.” Cedeno Op. at 12. These were (1) concession of “primary liability for damage caused” by the crash, (2) acceptance of service and jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts, (3) waiver of statute of limitations defenses, and (4) satisfaction of any final judgments entered by the Ecuadorian courts. Id. The Cedeno plaintiffs timely appealed.
On January 27, 1998, the Congress of Ecuador enacted “Law No. 55,” which provides:
Without affecting its literal meaning, articles 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Civil Procedure Law, are hereby interpreted so that, in case of international concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff can freely choose to demand [i.e., to file a complaint], in Ecuador or in another country, with the sole exception of cases which pursuant to an explicit provision of law, must be resolved by Ecuadorian Judges, like the divorce of an Ecuadorian citizen . . . . In the case that the demand is filed outside of
Ecuador, the national competence and the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian Judges on the case will be terminated forever.
In December 1997, just prior to the enactment of Law No. 55, a Broward County state court dismissed a consolidated action brought against Millon Air by 106 Ecuadorans allegedly injured by the crash. Some of these plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in an Ecuadorian court of first instance, which in April 1998 dismissed the case because of Law No. 55.
This development prompted the Cedeno plaintiffs in September 1998 to ask this Court to stay the Cedeno appeal and remand the case to the District Court. Meanwhile, on October 13, 1998, the Superior Court of Justice of Portoviejo (Ecuador) reversed the trial court‘s decision in the case involving the 106 plaintiffs in the Broward County suit, holding that Law No. 55 did not apply to cases that a United States court had dismissed because of forum non conveniens. “It should be supposed that law 55 is in effect when a foreign judge has taken up the cause and is hearing it, but not in a case in which the foreign judge has refused to hear the lawsuit, as has done the Broward County Judge in his decision.”
Ultimately, this Court remanded the Cedeno litigation to the District Court, without adjudicating the correctness of the forum non conveniens dismissal.
On October 15, 1998, the Plaintiffs in the pending case (“Plaintiffs” or ”Leon
On May 17, 1999, Judge Nesbitt entered an order dismissing the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. Noting the marked similarity between the Leon and the Cedeno cases, she relied primarily on her reasons for dismissing Cedeno (described below), adding only explicit consideration of Law No. 55. On that issue, she acknowledged that Law No. 55 had been enacted since her Cedeno decision, but
The Leon Plaintiffs subsequently moved for a new trial, alleging newly discovered evidence that Millon Air had denied liability in one of the Ecuadorian actions, in violation of their Cedeno promise to contest only damages. The District Court rejected this motion, on the ground that the Ecuadorian action where Millon Air was contesting liability did not involve a Cedeno plaintiff.
B. The Cedeno Decision
In dismissing the pending case, Judge Nesbitt relied primarily on the reasons she had given for dismissing the Cedeno case. In Cedeno, Judge Nesbitt required Millon Air to show that there was an adequate alternative forum, that the balance of “private interests” and “public interests” weighed in favor of dismissing the litigation to the alternative forum (with the public interests coming into play only where the private interests were at or near “equipoise“), and that there would be no inconvenience or prejudice to plaintiff in filing in the foreign forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 266-69 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947).
Judge Nesbitt found that Millon Air had made each of the required showings. First, she found that the Ecuadorian courts were an adequate alternative forum. She acknowledged that there had been a strike by judges and that some judges had been removed from the Supreme Court, but concluded, based on Millon Air affidavits, that the strike was over and that the “instability has been resolved and the Ecuadorian legal system is again functioning normally.” Cedeno Op. at 4 (unreported). The fact that punitive damages would be unavailable in Ecuador was of no moment because the “potential for a smaller damage award is not a basis for the denial” of a forum non conveniens motion; the remedy provided by the Ecuadorian courts would not be “‘so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.‘” Id. at 6 (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 254).
Second, Judge Nesbitt weighed private interests, i.e., location of proof, availability of compulsory process, and other practical problems. Judge Nesbitt found that the private interests weighed in favor of dismissing the case, primarily because the witnesses as to damages (the only issue in the case, since Millon Air conceded liability) were located in Ecuador, beyond the reach of the District Court‘s compulsory process, and “presumably” most of them spoke only Spanish. Judge Nesbitt conceded that a plaintiff‘s choice of forum was accorded deference, particularly where the
Next, the District Court considered the public interests, i.e., “administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion, the interest in having local controversies decided in their home forum and the interest in having laws determined by their home tribunal.” Id. at 9-10. Judge Nesbitt indicated that her inquiry here was academic, since she believed that public interests come into play only when the private interests are at or near equipoise, interests she had already found strongly favored dismissing. Nevertheless, the District Court noted that the public interest factors also favored dismissing. Judge Nesbitt said she was “cognizant of the backlog in Ecuador‘s court system” but noted that the damages issue was “very simple,” and that the Cedeno claims could be consolidated in Ecuador with the Broward cases. Id. at 10. The Court also noted that Ecuador had an interest in trying cases that bore on Ecuador‘s air traffic control system, and that Ecuador would be better able to cope with Spanish-speaking witnesses. Id. at 10-11.
Finally, the Court noted that it would be possible to reinstate the case in Ecuador, since all defendants had agreed to jurisdiction and service of process. The Court did not in this opinion discuss Law No. 55, since it had not at that time been enacted.
Discussion
A court of appeals reviews a dismissal based on forum non conveniens for abuse of discretion, according the District Court “‘substantial deference.‘” Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 951 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 257). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Szumlicz v. Norwegian America Line, Inc., 698 F.2d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 1983).
Except in one particular, we agree with the District Court‘s summary of the law of forum non conveniens. The moving party must demonstrate that (1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice. See Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 951; C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1983). As described more fully below, balancing private interests requires determining the convenience of the parties, affording domestic plaintiffs “a strong presumption” that their forum choice is sufficiently convenient, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and a weaker
In challenging the District Court‘s application of these criteria, the Appellants dispute (a) the adequacy of the Ecuadorian forum and (b) the District Court‘s balancing of the private interests.
A. Availability and Adequacy of the Ecuadorian Forum
A defendant has the burden of persuasion as to all elements of a forum non conviens motion, including the burden of demonstrating that an adequate alternative forum is available. Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 951. Availability and adequacy warrant separate consideration. See Satz, 244 F.3d at 1283-84. An alternative forum is “available” to the plaintiff when the foreign court can assert jurisdiction over the
A defendant also bears the burden of proving the “adequacy” of the alternative forum. See Satz, 244 F.3d at 1282 (defendant carried burden of proving Argentina was an adequate forum). In Piper, the Supreme Court has noted that dismissal may be improper where “the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.” 454 U.S. at 254. Courts have been strict about requiring that defendants demonstrate that the alternative forum offers at least some relief. See, e.g., Mercier v. Sheraton International, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir. 1991) (reversing forum non conveniens dismissal required where defendant failed to prove “expressly that Turkish law recognizes claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract“).
However, “[a]n adequate forum need not be a perfect forum,” Satz, 244 F.3d at 1283, and courts have not always required that defendants do much to refute allegations of partiality and inefficiency in the alternative forum. As Judge Ryskamp has noted, the argument that the alternative forum is too corrupt to be adequate “does
The reluctance to hold an alternative forum inadequate on these grounds has manifested itself not only in the degree of corruption or inefficiency that must be shown, but also in the allocation of the burdens of proof. Some courts have said that an alternative forum is presumptively impartial and efficient, and have put at least the burden of production on the plaintiff to show that this is not so. See, e.g., Vaz Borralho v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379, 393-94 (5th Cir. 1983) (“the district court may presume that the foreign law is adequate, unless the plaintiff makes some showing to the contrary, or unless conditions in the foreign forum otherwise made known to the court, plainly demonstrate that the plaintiffs are highly unlikely to obtain basic justice therein“), overruled on other grounds, In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1163 n.25 (5th Cir. 1987); cf. El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (plaintiff‘s general
In Eastman Kodak, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida determined that, where the plaintiff had produced evidence of serious partiality in Bolivia, the defendants had failed to meet their burden of persuading the Court that this evidence was incorrect, and that the forum was in fact adequate. 978 F. Supp. at 1087.1 We think this was the correct approach: defendants have the ultimate burden of persuasion, but only where the plaintiff has substantiated his allegations of serious
Applying the foregoing approach to the pending case, we first consider whether the Ecuadorian courts are available notwithstanding Law No. 55. In her opinion in the pending case, Judge Nesbitt explicitly considered the one factor distinguishing the
The next issue concerns the Plaintiffs’ attack on the efficiency and impartiality of the Ecuadorian courts. To meet their burden of production on this issue, the Plaintiffs rely entirely on the arguments and affidavits submitted in the Cedeno action. The Plaintiffs’ major allegation in Cedeno was that the judges of Ecuador were out on strike and the 31 justices of the Supreme Court had been removed by the Congress.
However, Judge Nesbitt noted that as of the time of her ruling in Cedeno, “[t]he judges have returned to work,” “the instability has been resolved[,]” and “the Ecuadorian legal system is again functioning normally.” Cedeno Op. at 4. The Plaintiffs do not contend on this appeal that these findings were clearly erroneous.3
The Plaintiffs’ other challenge in the Cedeno litigation to the adequacy of the Ecuadorian forum was a claim of specific, chronic shortcomings with the Ecuadorian legal system. In the Cedeno record, affidavits from observers of Ecuadorian courts identified these deficiencies: a lack of financial resources, illustrated by the allocation to the courts of less than two percent of the national budget, the use of manual typewriters in 90 percent of the courts, and the absence of computers in the trial courts; congestion and delays, illustrated by case filings of one thousand lawsuits per judge, with disposition of 200-300 cases per judge; and backlogs, illustrated by one
We do not believe this evidence is sufficient to satisfy the Plaintiffs’ burden of production. While the logistical and financial problems facing the Ecuadorian courts are undoubtedly substantial, the Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that such problems would preclude the fair and reasonably expeditious adjudication of the simple damages issues presented by the pending case.4 Significantly, the Ecuadorian courts handling claims by other Manta air crash victims have issued their jurisdictional rulings in short order, and they appear to be taking submissions on the merits in at least one case (that of Ms. Roca, discussed below) where Millon Air is disputing liability. On this record, the District Court did not exceed its discretion in finding Ecuador to be an adequate forum.
B. Balancing the Private and Public Interests
Yet even according Plaintiffs’ forum choice at least the diminished presumption of convenience to which it is entitled, the District Judge did not exceed her discretion in finding the private factors to weigh in favor of dismissal. Judge Nesbitt‘s finding was premised on the Defendants’ having conceded liability for the crash in the Cedeno action, which meant that the only triable dispute was whether the deaths or injuries of
We also note that the Plaintiffs have not challenged Judge Nesbitt‘s finding that the public interests strongly favored dismissal. As she observed, the Ecuadorian courts are already hearing Manta crash cases, and Ecuador has an interest in determining the extent of damages payable when planes crash in Ecuador on
C. Denial of a New Trial
The Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to challenge the dismissal order by motion for a new trial under
D. Conditions of the Dismissal
Unlike the dismissal order in Cedeno, the dismissal order in the pending case (perhaps inadvertently) did not recite the conditions to which the Defendants had agreed. We therefore modify the dismissal order in this case, see
Conclusion
The Order of the District Court dismissing on the ground of forum non conveniens is modified as provided in this opinion, and, as modified, is affirmed. The Order denying a new trial is AFFIRMED.7
