27 Kan. 446 | Kan. | 1882
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was a petition for an injunction, brought by plaintiff against defendants, who are respectively treasurer and sheriff of Johnson county. It alleges substantially, that the plaintiff is the owner of property, real and personal, subject to taxation in said county; that the total amount of taxes levied upon his property for the year 1880 was the sum of $105.87, of which amount the sum of $19 was for a railroad bond tax; that the plaintiff tendered to the county treasurer at his office the full amount of all these taxes, except the sum of $19, the bond tax aforesaid; that the treasurer refused to receive such partial payment, or to give plaintiff a receipt for said sum of $86.87, or any receipt whatever, unless the plaintiff paid the whole amount of taxes, including said railroad bond tax; that the plaintiff is now, ánd always has been, ready to pay all taxes assessed against him except said railroad bond tax; that the treasurer has issued his warrant to the sheriff for the collection of the entire tax on plaintiff’s personal property, and that the sheriff is about to levy said warrant on the property of plaintiff; and the prayer was that the sheriff and treasurer be enjoined from selling any property of plaintiff for the payment of any portion of the taxes which had been tendered, and that the county treasurer be required to' receive such portion thereof. To this petition a demurrer was interposed, which was overruled by the court, and an injunction granted as prayed for. To reverse such ruling the defendant has brought this case to this court. The question presented is, whether a tax-payer can "at his option tender to
Section 89 of the tax law (Comp. Laws of 1879, p. 957,) reads:
“ When the treasurer shall receive any tax, he shall give a receipt therefor. If upon land or town lot, the receipt shall describe the land as it is described in the tax roll, and give the valuation thereof; and if upon personal property, it shall state the value thereof, and on the reverse side it shall give the amount of each kind of tax on each one hundred dollars.”
This plainly implies that the treasurer is entitled to the entire tax, before being required to give a receipt, and that the tax-payer cannot tender any sum of money he sees fit, and have the same credited on his taxes, or demand a receipt for the money thus paid. This implication is made the stronger by §91, which provides, “that any person charged with taxes, on the tax book in the hands of the county treasurer, may, at his option, pay the full amount thereof on or before the 20th day of December of each year, or one.-half on or before the 20th day of December, and the remaining one-half on or before the 20th day of June next ensuing.” Ex-pressio unius, exdusio alterius. Giving him by express statute the option to pay one-half at a time, excludes all other option on the part of the tax-payer. This is the clear intendment
The case immediately succeeding this, No. 2441, is precisely analogous, and the same order will be entered in that action. The next succeeding case, No. 2442, differs only in this, that the petition alleges that the railroád bond tax is illegal and void, as the plaintiff believes; but this allegation is simply one of a conclusion of law, and contains no facts showing such illegality. It is therefore no stronger than the petitions in the two preceding cases, and the same judgment must be •entered in that.