delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Lawrence Juliano was injured while employed by Schullo Plumbing Company in the construction of buildings owned by defendants Joseph and Emil Oravec, doing business as Major Construction Company. He brought this action based upon the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 48, pars. 60, 61 and 62) against the owners and Leonard Taylor, a carpentry subcontractor, against whom defendants Oravec filed a third-party complaint. A jury returned a $75,000 verdict against defendants Oravec—Taylor having been dismissed from plaintiff’s action—and in favor of the Gravees and against Taylor in the same amount in the third-рarty action. The Appellate Court for the First Judicial District reversed (
On June 2, 1961, plaintiff was working on one of the two buildings being constructed by defendants at 5237-39 West Warwick Avenue in Chicago. As an apprentice plumber, Juliano both assisted and observed the two journeymen plumbers engaged in their trade and performed tasks at their direction, including carrying necessary materials to them. During that day the three men worked on the second floor of one of the two buildings, installing rough plumbing which was to be concealed in the walls. Construction on the building had reached a stage at which the exteriоr walls, the roof, and much of the interior framing had been completed. At the time of the injury, sub flooring had been laid on the second floor. The subflooring consisted of l-inch-by-8-inch spruce lumber, having a finished thickness of approximately 7/8 of an inch, nailed down to form a continuous surface. Ultimately, the subflooring was to be covered with what is termed finished flooring, but until that later phasе of construction, the sub flooring was the only support provided for those working on the building. No signs were posted on the site regarding the floor’s safe load capacity.
At approximately 1:00 P.M. Juliano and his coworkers were installing soil, waste and vent pipes in the second-floor bathroom area. Approximately ten to twenty feet away from where they worked stood a portable butane furnace which the plumbers used to melt lead needed for making watertight pipe joints. At the request of one of the journeymen, Juliano dipped a quаntity of molten lead from the furnace, using a ladle with a capacity of about two pounds and a handle fourteen inches in length. As he walked back to the bathroom area, Julianо’s foot went through the sub flooring up to the knee, his elbow hit the floor, causing the ladle of lead to be thrown toward him and molten lead went into his right eye and down his arm. Juliano’s co-workers pullеd him up from the jagged hole and removed the now-hardened lead from his eye. They then took him first to Northwest Hospital and then to Garfield Park Hospital. The plaintiff suffered burns along his right arm from thе shoulder down to a portion of his fingers; the burns on his right eye and lids caused the loss of sight in that eye and considerable physical distress. During the weeks following the accident plaintiff underwent surgery twice and an enucleation of the right eyeball was performed. Subsequently, he was fitted with a prosthetic eye.
Defendants’ first contention is that the Structural Work Act has no applicаtion to this case. In support of this proposition it is argued that each of the three sections of the Act upon which plaintiff relies in some way excludes these facts. Section 1 in part provides that: “all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corрoration in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate proteсtion to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material thаt may be used or deposited thereon.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 48, par. 60.) Defendants claim that because the sub flooring was built as an integral part of the building itself and not for “use in the erection,” it cаnnot be considered one of the devices enumerated in the statute. In so arguing, defendants recognize that agreement with their position would necessitate overruling our decision in Louis v. Barenfanger (1968),
Defendants also claim that neither section 2 (par. 61) nor section 3 (par. 62) applies to the structure in this case because it was to be used as a “private residence.” Section 2 of the Act requires that the floors of certain structures “be capable of bearing *** a live load of fifty (50) pounds for every square foot of surface in such floors, ***.” Section 3 provides that the owners of certain types of structures under construction must “display conspicuously *** a placаrd stating the load per square foot of floor surface, which may with safety be applied to that particular floor ***.” Both sections specifically exempt from their covеrage private houses used exclusively as private residences. In this case, the buildings under construction were to be two-story apartment buildings with each floor a separate rеsidence. For the reasons adequately discussed by the appellate court we reject defendants’ construction of the Act. To conclude that any structure containing within it рrivate residential units is outside the scope of the Act would be to frustrate the clear legislative intention of affording broad protection for working men.
Having determined that sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Structural Work Act apply to these facts, we now consider whether the jury properly could have found that a willful violation of these sections occasioned thе plaintiff’s injury.
We have examined the provisions of section 3 only once previously and then in the broad context of deciding the Structural Work Act’s constitutionality. (Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co. (1911),
Plaintiff must, of course, establish a willful violation of the Act by dеfendant. Defendant is deemed to have known that which he reasonably should have known (Miller v. DeWitt (1967),
The proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be determined from a consideration of all the attending facts and circumstances. (Schultz v. Hеnry Ericsson Co. (1914),
Because of our conclusion that section 3 furnishes an adequate basis upon which to affirm the jury award, we need not consider the application of sections 1 or 2 to these facts.
The judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.