Julian v. LeeJulian v. Lee
The parents of D.L.J., and J.J., seek a writ of prоhibition to prevent the respondent from proceeding further in these dependency proceedings. Upon the filing of the petition we issued a rule to show cause and stayed further proceedings. We have considered the response to the rule and the petitioners’ reрly thereto, and we now deny the writ.
On November 8, 1984 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, (H.R.S.) filed petitions requesting detention orders for D.L.J. and her brother, J.J., the minor children of the petitioners. A detention order was entered for D.L.J. on November 8, 1984; a similar order was entered for J.J. on November 9, 1984, and they were taken into shelter care pursuant to these orders. On November 14, 1984 petitions for dependency were filed by H.R.S. on behаlf of the minor children.
On November 16, 1984 the court held a “continuation hearing” of the November 8 detention hearing, at the conclusion of which J.J. was оrdered returned to the custody of his parents and D.L.J. was ordered to remain at H.R.S. shelter care.
On February 13, 1985, 91 days after the petition for depеndency was filed, and 97 and 96 days, respectively, after D.L.J. and J.J. were taken into custody, the petitioners moved to have the dependency charges dismissed with prejudice on the basis that an adjudicatory hearing had not been held within 90 days of the earliest of the dates the children had beеn taken into custody. When these motions were denied, the petitioners filed this petition for writ of prohibition.
Petitioners argue that the motion for discharge should have been granted on the basis of former Rule 8.180(a), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which was in effect
Time. Every case in which а petition has been filed alleging a child to be delinquent or dependent shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing without demand within ninety (90) days of the earliest of the following dates:
(1) The date the child was taken into custody.
(2) The date the petition was filed.
In response, the State points out that effective January 1, 1985, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure were amended so as to distinguish between delinquency proceedings on the one hand and dependency proceedings on the other. While Rule 8.180(a) still retains the 90-day time limit, it now applies only to delinquency proceedings. A new section, 8.720(f) has been added to the rules, applicable only to dependency proceedings, which reads:
(f) Involuntary Dismissal. If an adjudicatory hearing is not begun within 180 days of the date the child was taken into custody or the date the petition was filed, whichever occurs first, the рetition for dependency shall be dismissed with prejudice on motion and hearing. The court may extend the period of time established by this rule on mоtion of any party, after hearing, on a finding that the interest of justice will be served by such extension. The order granting the extension shall be in writing and shall state the reasons for the extension. The general congestion of the court‘s docket, lack of diligent preparation, failure to obtаin available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays shall not constitute grounds for an extension.
We hold that the revisеd rule, effective January 1, 1985 applies here, because it is a rule of procedure and because that rule was in effect when the motions for discharge were filed. Because 180 days had not run on the speedy trial clock when the motions were filed, the juveniles were not entitlеd to discharge.
Rules of court designed to implement constitutional or statutory “speedy trial” rights are rules of procedure through which such rights arе enforced in this state, and are a proper exercise of the Florida supreme court‘s constitutional power to promulgatе rules of practice and procedure. State ex rel. Maines v. Baker, 254 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1971). See also Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1983). In State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1969) the court distinguished between substantive and procedural rules in this manner:
The rules adopted by the Supreme Court are limited to matters of procedure, for a rule cannot abrogate or modify substantive law. In some instances it is difficult to determine whether a rule relates to a matter that is substantive or a matter that is procedural... .
* * * * * *
Procedural law is sometimes referred to as “аdjective law” or “law of remedy” or “remedial law” and has been described as the legal machinery by which substantive law is made effective. Substantive law has been defined as that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which courts are estаblished to administer.
* * * * * *
As related to criminal law and procedure, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes thе punishment therefor, while procedural law is that which provides or regulates the steps by which one who violates a criminal statute is punished. [Citаtion omitted].
While there is a statutory right in delinquency proceedings to an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days from the earlier of the date on which the juvеnile is taken into custody or the date on which the petition is filed,
Writ DENIED.
COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
ORFINGER, Judge.
Petitioners urge us to reconsider our original opinion in this case because in their view it is in conflict with Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So.2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). We find no conflict, but believe some clarification is necessary.
Holmes v. Leffler involved the interpretation of
As we explained in our original opinion, no statute requires that an adjudicatоry hearing in a dependency (civil) proceeding take place within a specified time.
Except as clarified herein, the petition for rehearing is
DENIED.
COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.