131 Minn. 5 | Minn. | 1915
Plaintiffs sold a carload of beans to A. J. Thompson Company for a specified price which the purchaser agreed to pay upon the arrival of the carload at Fort Dodge, Iowa. The beans were to be loaded and shipped from Durand, Michigan, via the Grand Trunk Railway System, billed and consigned by plaintiffs to the order of “A. J. Thompson Go., notify Iowa Grocery Co.,” and plaintiffs were to draw their draft for the agreed purchase price, forward the same with the original bill of lading attached to a bank at Kansas City, Missouri, to be presented to A. J. Thompson Company for payment, and, upon the same being paid, the bill of lading was to be delivered to the purchaser. Pursuant to this agreement plaintiffs delivered the beans to the Grand Trunk Railway System at Durand, Michigan, and obtained a bill of lading naming plaintiffs as consignors and consigning the shipment to the order of said A. J. Thompson Company. The bill of lading contained this provision: “The surrender of this original order bill of lading properly indorsed shall be required before the delivery of the property.” As agreed, the draft was forwarded with the original bill of lading attached, but was not paid when presented and was returned to plaintiffs. The carload was transported to the destination, and by the defendant, the last carrier, delivered to the Iowa Grocery Company upon the written order of the consignee, but without the production of the original bill of lading. Plaintiffs sued defendant as for conversion, and upon the facts stated a recovery was allowed. Defendant appeals.
The consignee of a shipment is the presumptive owner thereof. Benjamin v. Levy, 39 Minn. 11, 38 N. W. 702; Dyer v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 51 Minn. 345, 53 N. W. 714, 38 Am. St. 506; Bank of Litchfield v. Elliott, 83 Minn. 469, 86 N. W. 454. But the presumptive ownership may be rebutted. The provisions of a bill of lading under which the shipment is made govern the rights of both carrier and shipper. The bill of lading becomes the symbol of the property described therein, and
The statement sometimes found in text books and in decisions that the carrier will be protected whenever delivery is made to the consignee, should be subject to the qualification that such delivery be also made according to the provisions of the shipping contract to which the shipper and the carrier are the immediate parties. It should be presumed that such contracts are made with reference to commercial usages with respect to the extensive shipments of grain and merchandise constituting such an important part of the transportation business, and so as to protect both the owner of the property and the carrier. Hence provisions in shipping contracts are not to be construed for the sole protection of one of the parties thereto, unless plainly so intended. It is common knowledge that very often the consignor is the owner of the shipment. And it is a daily occurrence to pledge the goods shipped to secure advances, and this is done by assigning the bill of lading, the symbol of the property. Often a consignor makes a conditional sale, as in this case, under the terms of which the goods are to be shipped and delivered upon payment by the consignee of the draft for the purchase price, usually forwarded attached to the bill of lading. The usages of the business world should not be lost sight of in construing shipping contracts.
This was an interstate shipment. Long ago the interstate commerce commission, whose business it is to regulate and make uniform rules in respect to interstate commerce, recommended two distinct forms of
• We do not think the authorities presented by appellant are convincing that the provision mentioned in an “order” bill of lading is solely for the benefit of the carrier which it may waive with impunity. In Chicago Packing & P. Co. v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. 103 Ga. 140, 2-9 S. E. 698, 40 L.R.A. 367, the bill of lading was made to the order of the shipper, who wrote and signed upon its face “Deliver to Hobbs & Tucker, or order, for collection.” The goods were delivered upon Hobbs & Tucker’s written order, while they held the bill of lading attached to the draft of the shipper, but the draft was not paid nor the
We do not believe any estoppel can with justice be urged because plaintiffs consigned the shipment to the order of A. J. Thompson Co. instead of to their own order, especially by a carrier who has failed to observe the plain stipulations of the contract of carriage, which, if observed, would have fully protected both parties. Plaintiffs, consignors by the bill of lading, never authorized a delivery to the.order of the consignee unless the latter had properly indorsed the bill of lading. The carrier took chances when the delivery was made without ascertaining that this bad been done, and it should now stand the loss.
Order affirmed.