*1 208
PAPADAKOS, Justice. agree
I with the results reached in this majority However, I appeal. believe that facts this case do require employment prejudice set analysis as forth recent decision of Pierce, Commonwealth v. our 153, 515 Pa. (1987). A.2d 973 Defense counsel’s strate- gy reasonable that it was calculated to serve client’s best interests. We have so in majori- concluded opinion. There is no ty go need to further in the any inquiry.
Lastly, I out point want term “harmless error” been applied prosecutorial has traditionally to and court errors It should not only. be used the context of cases dealing with ineffective assistance counsel.
v. FINK, Jr., Judge, Honorable Harold B. President the Court County of Common Pleas of Potter Pennsylvania, Respondent.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued June 1987.
Decided Oct. *2 Potter, L. Pittsburgh, Keuch, Robert Harrisburg, Robert Director, J.I.R.B., Executive for J.I.R.B. Stretton, Chester,
Samuel C. West for respondent. NIX, C.J., LARSEN, Before and FLAHERTY, zappala McDermott, hutchinson, PAPADAKOS, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT FLAHERTY, Justice.
This case is a review of the recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board that Judge Harold B. Fink be removed follow, from office. For the reasons that we affirm the Board’s recommendation and order that Ha- rold B. Fink be removed from position as Judge Court of Common Pleas of Potter County. August 17,
On 1982 the late John Bodley, Court Common Pleas of Bucks County witnessed a sentencing proceeding (herein- conducted by Judge Fink after “Respondent”). Judge Bodley wrote to the State Court Administrator concerning this proceeding and stated sadistic,” “cruel and “offensive,” and that he had acted This “consciously” “abominably.” complaint was directed to the Judicial Inquiry and Review (hereinafter Board Board”), which, “the by August of 1984 had received other complaints alleging misbehavior of Re- spondent.
On November 1984 the Board notified Respondent that it was conducting an inquiry investigation concerning complaints which had been received concerning his judicial Thereafter, conduct. 16, 17, on April 1986 the *3 Board conducted Investigative an Hearing panel before a of two Board members. Respondent present was at these hearings, represented counsel, was by and permitted was testify, although he was not permitted to cross-examine witnesses. 20,
On June 1986 the Board issued a “Notice of Institu- tion of Formal Proceedings,” and set forth seventeen counts alleged of judicial 29,1986, misconduct. On July Court, upon Board, recommendation of the reassigned Respondent to non-adjudicative duties.
Formal hearings before three members of the Board were conducted 15, between 9, October 1986 and February A special prosecutor presented the case against Respondent 15, 16, on October 17 and Respondent November 20. presented 20, 21, evidence on 3, 4, November December 1986, 9, and 2 February 1987. On March 1987 the Board issued Report adopted which it findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to six counts. One count parts of withdrawn, two other counts had been and the Board declined to counts, address the remaining concluding that Respondent’s misconduct with respect
211 of- from compelled mentioned removal six counts fice.1 The for de novo review.2 case comes to this Court
The 2,300 testimony, approximately pages record consists memoranda, sum- briefs, letters and pages at least maries, comprising approxi- evidentiary exhibits materials, we 3,000 all of which pages of written mately carefully have reviewed. OF THE CASE
I. BACKGROUND a framework to set forth attempt an may of the Board findings and conclusions charges, of the Board’s find- understood, summary our preface we there Although of the case. synopsis with a short ings instances of between were isolated conflict in this case—be- complainants local attorneys various —the precipitat- event which seems to have primary fore the decision of the complained ed the conduct judicial two members prosecute District County Attorney with evidence and tampering of the Potter bar for County evidence found at hindering prosecution they when withheld charges by which were not addressed the Board were: 1. The Code; Pennsylvania Sentencing 1. Seven violations of the 4010(B)(1). banishment; apply 2. Two counts of failure to Pa.R.Crim.P. illegal imposing 3. Two counts of sentences statute; testing non-compliance 4. One count of with the blood improperly using judicial office to influence 5. Two counts of (a Board). others third count was addressed conduct; 6. Two counts 7. One count of abusive and discourteous judicial plea bargaining; filming proceedings; 8. Misconduct in the of court *4 antagonism Improper judicial toward attor- 9. neys; conduct based on Respondent Empaneling juries paraofficials after 10. student and so; by Pennsylvania had been directed the Chief Justice of not to do confidentiality proceedings. of of Judicial Board Breach Constitution, V, 18(h) Pennsylvania perti- of 2. Article Section the part, provides: nent pro- Supreme shall the record of the board’s The Court review ceedings may permit of on the law and facts and the introduction removal, discipline suspension, additional evidence. It shall order retirement, recommendation, compulsory wholly reject as or or the just proper. it finds and scene in crime a murder trial. This matter will be C, III fully infra, discussed more at Section but for it now to out point will suffice the attorneys prosecuted, Stenhach, George friends, Walter and Respondent’s were attempted that he to their discourage prosecution, and that those he angry perceived causing became whom as the prosecution. apparent
When it became prosecution Stenhach of proceed spite Respondent’s it, would efforts abort there developed a tension Respondent between infra, attorney, district discussed an had effect Respondent’s treatment of legal involving matters the dis- attorney, trict and which became known to other members of small, The of Potter County consisting bar. bar members, only eleven and there apparently developed a cleavage between those who increasingly Respondent’s saw injudicious behavior as and those who did not. By August relationship Respondent between and the Dis- trict Attorney of County deteriorated to the point that the district attorney requested a Judicial Inquiry Respondent, Review Board investigation of and on October 18, 1984 the Potter Bar County Association a resolu- passed tion, calling vote 7 to for the Judicial Inquiry investigation Review Board to conduct an Respondent’s judicial conduct.
II. THE MYSTERY WITNESS matter, As a preliminary Respondent’s second we address claim that Respondent erred in determining Board attempted counsel the Board they deceive when failed their disclose full knowledge truthfulness of witness whose testimony they proposed to offer. The ma- jority of the Board found that and his counsel engaged in an by proposing effort to deceive the Board offer the an testimony person, unidentified a “mystery witness,” some testify complainants who would who had testified against Respondent were involved with illegal drug use. The witness” was unidentified “mystery *5 agencies cooperating police he was allegedly because threats on his life. there had been testimony of the witness’s” gravamen “mystery The had testified complainants have that the who would been drugs and were Respondent illegal were users against attempt in an to re- against Respondent falsely testifying to oppose him from office because he was known move therefore, inter drug Respondent proposed, use. illegal alia, remain secret “mystery identity the witness’s” special prosecutor. cross-examined the by and that he not be conditions for unwilling to accede to these The Board was witness,” and the “mystery “mystery of the appearance the that Respon- testified. It later was revealed witness” never dent, counsel, witness” “mystery his and counsel for the the Board were made to proposals knew at the time these tests ad- polygraph witness” had failed “mystery that the the FBI that his the FBI and had admitted to ministered a lie. testimony was and an attorney his Respondent,
The found majority conspired to the witness” attorney representing “mystery to tell the Board failing on the Board by a fraud perpetrate test polygraph had failed the that the witness” “mystery FBI was The lying. had admitted to the that he Respondent, attorney also found that the majority place attempted for the witness” “mystery calling “mystery restrictions on the unreasonable claim that he was could later witness” so that to call a critical witness. right denied findings these Board dissented to Two members that there did not indicate grounds that the evidence Although majority fraud. any attempt at concerning the witness’s that information Board determined forthcoming when counsel truthfulness should have been concluded that coun- minority made his offer of proof, fraud because not amount to sel’s failure to do this did to address the proper counsel it was not believed proof, an offer of making truthfulness when question and admis- polygraph because counsel intended to elicit lying evidence on The minority sion of direct examination. as one analyzed dispute which concerns whether the *6 and of polygraph lying goes evidence admission to the of or weight the evidence to its a matter on admissibility, Further, which reasonable minds can the disagree. minori- that counsel for ty “mystery observed the witness” consist- asserted his in the of his ently belief truth client’s testimo- notwithstanding. the ny, polygraph examinations Finally, counsel the because for witness” communicated “mystery safety Respondent his concerns for his client’s to and his counsel, all may acting protect three well have to the been death, from a “mystery perceived witness” threat of not to for lay groundwork the future claims of error the pro- reasons, ceedings. these For all the minority concluded respondent doing that counsel for no more than zeal- event, ously defending his client and any counsel’s attempted behavior did not constitute an fraud. doWe not address or the findings consider Board’s the Respondent attempted concerning deceive Board the proffered of testimony the witness” “mystery because findings charges those do not concern formal made against the Respondent. If the wishes initiate Board action against the parties involved in the “mystery epi- witness” sode, commenced, proceedings then formal should be those charged charges them, should be notified of the against given should be an they opportunity prepare defense respond charges. to the purposes For of the adjudica- case, tion of this the witness” “mystery matter has no bearing part forms no of our consideration or rationale. III. THE BOARD’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND OF
CONCLUSIONS LAW With the exception the Board’s finding concerning witness,” the “mystery agreed entire Board on the facts legal case and the conclusions which derive from facts, although minority those the two Board members majority’s dissented to the recommendation removal office, from and recommended instead that The facts con- pay years. for two without suspended unanimously agreed, on which the Board clusions of law upon or based Board's undisputed are either credibility, are as fol- Respondent's determination lows:
A. COMMUNICATION WITH PARTIES IMPROPER PENDING RESPONDENT. TO LITIGATION BEFORE Estate, Inc. brought & of 1979 Martin Hess Real an June (No the Potter Commission against County Planning action County) adjudicate question 410 C.P. on a the Commission’s failure to act proposed of whether development estate was tantamount to plan approval real Respondent. The case was listed before The plan. advised his client that since Commission’s statutorily had acted within its allotted Commission *7 time, and prevail, the would he recommended that plaintiff plaintiff the allow the to take a default judg- Commission ment. to plaintiff that the was about Respondent
When learned Di- he the Executive judgment, fake a default contacted notice to the directly, rector of the without Commission so, Execu- and the doing suggested that was plaintiff had the had a defense which tive Director that Commission lawyer and the Commission’s should not been raised that pro to file an answer nunc tunc. Respondent then petition met ex and him parte lawyer gave with the Commission’s filed the suggested the same advice. The Commission plaintiff’s motion for de- Respondent motion. then denied petition to granted fault and the Commission’s judgment also mo- plaintiffs file a late denied Respondent answer. ques- for and certified the judgment pleadings tion appeal. for The was settled on finally tion matter appeal. actions Respondent’s The violated Board concluded that 3(A) Code of Judicial Conduct.3 Canons and 2(A) 2(A) provides: Code Conduct 3. Canon or the offJudicial §ik»88id Appearance Impro- Impropriety end ol A Avoid priety in All His Activities A. A judge respect comply should with the law and should conduct himself at all promotes public times in a manner 2(A) requires judges appearance avoid even the Canon integri- confidence impropriety promote public 3(A) impartiality judiciary. requires Canon ty duties judges impartially their and with faith- perform ful adherence the law.
As out, the Board pointed judge for a to contact one before him parte ex parties and direct that party’s defense, and then grant motions based upon his ex parte advice is unconscionable. Even admitted that his actions in this case were “terrible” and “dead wrong.”
B. OF ABUSE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWERS. custody a child Respondent presided November of 1984 over Kinter, (C.P. Kinter v. dispute, No. 347 of Potter Glassmire, a Attorney complainant Daniel County), which case, father, represented in this minor’s resident Ohio, sought runaway daughter. who the return The brother, Kinter, daughter her William staying did County, Pennsylvania not wish to return Kinter question in the case Ohio. The was whether daughter remain with her or should brother be returned father in Ohio. her
During a hearing on preliminary objections, Respondent declared a recess and asked to meet alone in chambers with Kinter, David (not son another the defendant-son) of the plaintiff. At this meeting Respondent informed Kin- David ter that Respondent and Attorney Glassmire did get *8 along, that Attorney Glassmire given was to “impractical” integrity impartiality the
confidence in Canon judiciary. of the 3(A) provides: A Should Perform the duties His Impartially Office Diligently judge The precedence official duties of a take over all his other judicial activities. His duties all include the duties of his office prescribed by duties, performance law. In following these the apply: standards Adjudicative Responsibilities A. (1) judge profession- A should law be faithful to the and maintain interests, competence unswayed by al partisan it. He should be clamor, public or fear of criticism. had “bad Attorney Glassmire that problems, solutions to should Attorney the and that Glassmire judge, mouthed” “satisfactory to work out a attempting involved not be meeting Respondent’s purpose the ease. to conclusion” man to the persuade young Kinter to with David re- to daughter allow the runaway his father to convince brother, least temporarily.4 her at main with what Kinter told Glassmire Attorney David Subsequently, the judge’s moved for had said and Glassmire judge the made on the record orally The recusal motion was recusal. as follows: for I like to make a motion
“MR. would GLASSMIRE: this have the recuse himself from case and this Court to hear another appoint judge Court Administrator State facts addition, gone through I have the case. after recusal, I also then allegations the for the would relating to be an motion that the recusal matter making immediate the judge Snyder another under case. heard that we wish to set forth on allegations “The and facts is, one, that the regarding Record the recusal number the concerning David testified as follows what he told private meeting: Kinter at in-chambers give you ought said-certainly I think I A. I I can essence. you problems in the that I’ve some with Mr. Glassmire to tell had law, very past. knowledgeable we have had some He but upon talking practicality, based his lack of so I am difficulties you you, necessary it’s understand this. Furthermore, you many ought know that there times have been time, past and it’s in the where he's bad mouthed me from time to me, you feeling positive have so I want to tell crucial that towards you what I told the this in case he does. Thai’s about essence of man. 20, 1986). (Nov. investigato- Respondent also N.T. 922 testified at hearing subject: ry on this you you say Q. as Did to Mr. Kinter that wanted him to act an thought emissary you proper resolution to work out what was the ought Mr. because Mr. Glass- and that he not to involve Glassmire merely mire would be obstructive? I, I, I Mr. Glassmire would be obstructive A. No. knew that my long experience Mr. But he has upon Glassmire. based get proper I unfortunate habit —all that wanted do was to expedient way problem was before me as solution to the in as just way way possible, I to do it was I did it.... felt 17, 1986). (April N.T. 165 *9 Court met parte ex with attorney George Stenhach on September 1984 in signed Wellsboro and an Order placing temporary Margot Kinter custody with Brian Kinter. two,
“Number that said Order signed without the benefit of prior action, testimony any suit, complaint filed, or petition having been and thus before this matter - was before this jurisdiction. Court’s three, “Number that at subsequently approximately 4:53 P.M., the actions were filed at number 347 1984 and at number 348 1984 regarding matter the Office of the Prothonotary of Potter County. or, number,
“Number next me, P.M., excuse at 5:05 two— the Order described in paragraph two above was filed in the Office the Prothonotary of Potter Pennsylvania. County, five, “Number regular and customary office hours of the Prothonotary of Potter at all times in County, question, are from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. six,
“Number it has been observed by Attorney Daniel F. Glassmire that this practice Court’s and custom regard custody matters has been that temporary Orders of the Court are not issued unless and until testimo- ny under oath has first been presented by the party seeking such an Order that demonstrates an exists emergency which requires such signed. an Order to be number, seven,
“Next I believe there exists an appearance that this Court has acted preferentially and with favoritism as presented said Order by Attorney George Stenhach which differs from the manner which similar matters are presented by handled when other attor- neys practicing County Potter before this Court. eight,
“Number that Attorney Daniel F. Glassmire has attended Bar meetings of the County Bar Associa- tion and he has heard this Court admit that has treated Attorney George Stenhach in a manner and fashion more favorable and less demanding me, than that stated —excuse than that standard imposes upon which he other members *10 County. Potter County practicing Potter Bar of the of think that That, day on the 18th October—I County Potter Bar that paragraph, next numbered signed by Attorney resolution a formal adopted Association Potter Bar County F. as an officer Daniel Glassmire it, resolution, Judge critical said was Association and of said copy Fink has received Judge Fink and that resolution. Fink has on Judge many paragraph, numbered
“Next that he dislikes At- privately publicly stated occasions him personally finds offen- Daniel F. Glassmire and torney sive. number, Attorney stated that Judge Fink has
“Next prac- County F. should leave Potter Daniel Glassmire Wellsboro, Pennsylvania due to Tioga County, tice law Attorney Fink and Judge which exists between conflict F. Daniel Glassmire. number, Fink he knows that has stated that Judge
“Next Leete and like to with the lawfirm of what he would do it. away with Next get but that could Glassmire number-— I’m sorry?
“THE COURT: one? Repeat “MR. that GLASSMIRE: Yes, please. “THE COURT: has that he Judge Fink stated “MR. GLASSMIRE: That do with the lawfirm Leete knows what he would like to get away would not it. but that he and Glassmire number, Leete and Glassmire that the lawfirm of “Next partners area with Coudersport is a two-man lawfirm the F. John B. Leete and Daniel Glassmire. seventeen, Judge urged Fink has the Exec-
“Number and Youth Servic- Director Potter Children County utive that the lawfirm es and the Potter County Commissioners as solicitors for discharged Leete Glassmire despite Judge Youth County Potter Children and Services of work quality Fink’s admission and statement done by Leete and Glassmire representing County good Children and Youth had and competent. Services been number, November, “Next that on the 9th day Fink, Judge matter, in the above-captioned actively sought to speak an ex privately parte basis with speak Andrew Kinter and did so with him.
“Next paragraph, that numbered Andrew Kinter was the son William Kinter. next, that Andrew Kinter a chief witness
“Number— on behalf of disposed William Kinter and was favorably William Kinter’s case. number,
“Next that said conference between Fink *11 and Andrew Kinter lasted approximately thirty minutes. number,
“Next subsequent that to immediately Judge Kinter, Fink’s conference with Andrew Judge that Fink asked to confer attorneys with Daniel F. Glassmire and George Judge’s Stenhach Chambers. number,
“Next that at the conference in Chambers with Judge Fink, Attorney Stenhach and Attorney Glassmire present, the following statements by Judge were made Fink. (A), Subparagraph that he told Andrew Kinter that he, the Judge, did not get along with counsel to (referring Daniel F. Glassmire). (B), that he had serious differences (again referring with counsel Glassmire). to F. (C), Daniel that those differences would “remain so forevermore”. (D), Next subparagraph, the Court then indicated he that Margot knew that Kinter was dependent a child and should placed be with Brian Kinter. Next subparagraph, suggested had to result Andrew Kinter and essentially
asked Andrew Kinter to act as Court’s intermediary discuss this with Kinter William and others and other parties interested to see if this matter could be settled in that fashion. Next subparagraph, he told Daniel F. Glass- mire that such settlement discussion would best imple- he, Glassmire, mented if Daniel F. did not participate in the negotiations or discussions of such a settlement. Next subparagraph, (G), I believe that Daniel F. Glassmire’s not be beneficial. discussions would in such involvement “stay Glassmire should that Daniel F. subparagraph, Next Next it”, subpara- discussions. referring to said out of had told Andrew reiterated that he then the Court graph, F. Daniel Attorney had “differences” with Kinter that he Glassmire. Kinter that had told Andrew that he paragraph,
“Next inferred that F. have might Daniel Glassmire Attorney he handled sincere in how Fink be less than would this case. paragraph.
“No new numbered longer subparagraph, Chambers, became visi- During Court the discussion taking Glassmire for upset Attorney with bly annoyed of the Court’s comments. *12 portion speak during substantial permitted not or reply conference and the end of the conference and then at the purpose for only speak then was allowed taking F. Glassmire was addressing Attorney Daniel why F. Daniel Attorney notes and assure the Court purpose taking the notes for Glassmire was him” to “reporting anyone. intentionally is Judge Fink paragraph,
“Next numbered relationship attorney/client with attempting interfere and his F. Attorney exists between Daniel Glassmire client, William Kinter. installed Judge Fink has
“Next paragraph, numbered Kinter William the mind of the seeds of doubt into [sic] regarding the effectiveness of Daniel F. Glassmire repre- Judge senting case before Fink. paragraph,
“Next numbered at the close 9, 1984, proceedings on November that the Court stated open counsel, Court “we ran into a problems few but that’s for the That par course”. Kinter William was to regular reports concerning receive the status Margot Kinter under the stipulation, but that he has not received such any reports, stipulation having said been entered November, the 9th day of 1984.
“Next paragraph, numbered that William Kinter does not believe that he will receive fair trial before Fink and that there an appearance of bias impropriety. Honor,
“Your I motion, would now—that concludes that would, I course, like to follow up with a motion that this recusal motion be heard by another and I judge, Publications, cite Municipal Inc. versus Snyder [322 Pa. Super. A.2d 1084 (Pa.Super.1983). Thank you, 464] Your Honor.”
Board Exhibit the Kinter Testimony Custody Hearing, January denied the motion and re- quested that Glassmire file the motion in writing. How- ever, days later, four before Glassmire filed a written motion but after Respondent had reviewed Glassmire’s mo- tion from the testimony, transcribed notes of he summoned office, Glassmire to his held him in summarily contempt and him fined given Glassmire was no $300. notice of the pending contempt charge.
Respondent’s explanation for the contempt citation was that he was offended Mr. Glassmire’s “arrogance,” although Respondent admitted that Glassmire’s actions did not obstruct Kinter proceedings. The statutory ele- ments (1) of criminal contempt are misconduct in pres- court; (2) ence of the an intent to disrupt judicial proceed- ings; (3) and actual obstruction of the administration of justice. 42 4132(3). Pa.C.S.A. Superior Court vacated § *13 and contempt reversed the citation on appeal.
223 contempt the issued Respondent found that The Board Mr. Glassmire he was with annoyed solely citation because Kinter the intended to obstruct Glassmire not because and fact, himself testified that Respondent In proceeding. proceed- did obstruct the for recusal not motion Glassmire’s 20, 1986). (November The Board also N.T., 930-31 ings. 2(A) 3(A) Respondent violated Canons concluded in holding in an attorney the Code of Judicial Conduct is personally annoyed of court because he contempt criminal a gross appearance the “created displeased attorney or to faithful to obligation his be impropriety, contravened judi- in the law, public confidence and has undermined ciary.” to its elements and
When the Kinter matter is reduced of Respondent’s personal light when it is considered Glassmire, ap- import its full becomes Attorney dislike of what occurred Kinter was substance, that the parent. acting custody In a rather than judge presiding proceeding, arbiter, proceed- himself into the impartial interjected as an meeting plaintiff’s with the ings by demanding private a son that his father’s to convince the attempted son and undermined the Having to trusted. lawyer was use the relationship, attempted he then to attorney-client judge to case which the favored impose son a solution requested by which the relief contrary attorney. Finally, add injury father and the disfavored when the found out what had injury, attorney judge son, suggested judge he that the told client’s and when (which was) re- obviously Mm against was biased recusal, contempt. quested judge held it rises to judicial unacceptable; Not is such conduct only outrageousness. the level of In Au- OFFICE.
G. IMPROPER OF JUDICIAL USE v. over Commonwealth gust presided (C.P. Buchanan, homicide County), No. counsel, case, in which that defense Wal- it became known Stenhach, portion had withheld George ter at the had discovered alleged weapon they murder *14 crime scene. Walter and George Stenhach were personal friends Respondent. of When learned that the district attorney intended to recommend to the Attorney of General that the Pennsylvania Attorney General initiate Stenhachs, a against criminal action the Respondent vigor- ously attempted to dissuade the pros- district from attorney ecuting or recommending prosecution. He also “intensely” urged an assistant district attorney persuade the district Further, prosecute. not to he contacted the Attor- ney directly General and attempted to convince the Attor- ney prosecute. General Finally, Attorney when the appointed General a special prosecutor, Respondent contact- ed special prosecutor urged prosecutor the special not to a criminal against initiate action the "Stenhachs.
The Board concluded that
of Respondent
conduct
2(A)
violates
2(B)
Canons
of the Code of Judicial Con-
2(B)
duct.
precludes
Canon
a
from
judge
lending
pres-
tige
his office
private
to advance the
interests
others.5
observed,
As the Board
“interference
a judge
prosecu-
tion decisions adversely affects the appearance
propriety
and impartiality,
particularly
judge
a one
county.” For
reasons,
these
courts have
judges
condemned
who involve
in the
themselves
decision of whether or
prosecute
not to
crime. Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Perform-
ance,
33 Cal.3d
(1983):
657 P.2d
... Gonzalez intentionally exploited his judicial office to attempt to influence disposition criminal matters. His conduct therefore constitutes willful mis- conduct. As a matter of he law has violated also Canon 2(B) of the Conduct, Code Judicial provides that “A judge should not allow his family, social or other relationships to influence his or judicial judg- conduct ment. He should prestige not lend the of his office to 2(B) provides: Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct social, judge B. family, A should not allow his or other relation- ships judicial judgment. to influence his conduct or He should not prestige lend private of his office to advance the interests of others; convey knowingly permit convey nor should or others to impression they special position are ain to influence him. testify voluntarily He should not as a character witness. others; nor should he interests private advance position special are in a they impression convey * * * insistence Petitioner’s influence him ...” about his conduct nothing improper” judicially he “saw urging attorneys district approaching dismissal] [i.e. misconduct, for that of willful charge preclude cannot should judge conduct that a intentional term embraces Petition- authority. his judicial beyond have known was of his judicial of the nature misunderstanding patent er’s *15 aggravate to mitigate but serves not responsibility of his misconduct. severity at 10. of the Board
Report to be likely the Board that there agree with fullyWe and of impartiality in the fairness public little confidence openly one of its judges of when judiciary Pennsylvania as to wheth- to influence the decision brazenly attempts and prosecuted. er his friends will be DISQUALIFY. Respondent When D. FAILURE TO 1977, was an acrimo- campaign in was elected to office which, alia, accused Respondent one in inter nious Patterson, incumbent, being of “soft on Judge Perry election, in when Respondent crime.” won that Respon- Judge brought son was before former Patterson’s requested the defendant drug charges, dent on related request denied the Respondent recusal. Respondent’s former feelings against had no bad stated he ghost my “The came down holy Patterson and that feelings.” all those Patterson shoulder and cleansed me of (the son) Respondent sentenced by jury was convicted imprisonment. Superior months Court him to 11.5 to 23 sentence, ruled that judgment reversed the motion, and remanded the granted should the recusal have who sentenced judge, case for a trial before another new defendant to ARD. Supply Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Respon- Smoker said, gas company he “I hate the damn dent admitted that them I would.” against and if I could find a to rule way motions for recusal in Na- Thereafter, Respondent denied Corp. tional Fuel Gas v. Supply Robinson threatened to hold in if contempt attempted counsel he present in support evidence bias his motion of recusal. The Respondent’s Board found that failure grant motions of recusal these cases constituted violation of 3(C)(1)(a) Conduct, Canon Code Judicial requires judge disqualify himself when his impartiality reasonably be might questioned.6
We note that Respondent claims that his remark gas about the company tongue cheek,” was made “with gas ruled in favor of the after company making the remark, and that the episode entire involves “an inconse quential being remark which is blown out of all propor Answer, tions.” Respondent’s p. Exhibit 38. We dis agree. The property, well-being, and sometimes the free of litigants dom are in the judges. Tongue-in- hands of cheek remarks which announce judge that the will favor one party over another are if grossly improper, and such made, remarks are the judge who makes them must stand from any down which he has controversy indicated a bias. courts at Impartiality of lies heart our system *16 work; it justice; system is what makes the and it is not a proper subject for levity.
E. CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENN- SYLVANIA. September On 1984 this Court issued a of prohibition against Respondent, writ who had improperly the ordered Potter County district and various law enforcement officers and staff to to in depositions submit a pending criminal an proceeding. opinion by authored the Justice, Chief this Court ruled that criminal the law makes 3(C)(1)(a) 6. provides: Canon of the of Code Judicial Conduct Disqualification C. (1) judge disqualify proceeding A should himself in a in which his impartiality might reasonably questioned, including be but not limited to instances where: (a) prejudice personal concerning party, he has or bias or knowledge personal proceeding. disputed evidentiary concerning facts for of such that taking depositions no provision contrary. in to the ruling abused his Respondent jurisdiction remand, that stated this open court Upon “monstrous,” “frivolous,” “a trav- decision Court’s esty”: a trial any
I find it monstrous Court should overrule assign to to Judge trying justice prevails, who see reason seems to appearing a frivolous like it —there Nix, respect, due authority, no Justice all says Chief Procedure, thing, of Criminal allow such a in the Rules therefore, we’ll and the wasn’t even ad- reverse issue as I it to compelled proceed dressed ... I am see [B]ut Ordered____ case, of this and it is so One last the trial word, day I I would like to have a say enough, cannot concerning on what I to be a expound travesty believe witness- particular refusal to submit the Commonwealth’s support by and the of that Chief depositions es to Court____ Supreme Justice 27-28, 24 at Board at Exhibit 34. Report Respondent’s The Board found that comments violated 2(A) 3(A)(6) 3(A)(6). judges Canon precludes Canons making public pending judicial comment about any from proceeding.7 respect Respondent’s With criticism Court, destructive, the Board found that his remarks were public tended confidence they to undermine 3(A)(6) provides: 7. Canon the Code of Judicial Conduct Impartial- A the Duties His Office Should Perform Diligently ly and judicial judge precedence The duties of a take over all other judicial His all of his activities. duties include the duties office duties, performance follow- prescribed law. In the these ing apply: standards Adjudicative Responsibilities A. proceeding in the This subsection does not public ments in (6) part A information judge of Court the course should any [******] *17 court, personnel subject of their official abstain procedures prohibit and should from judges public of the court. duties require his direction from comment or from similar abstention on making public about a explaining and pending control. state- for nature, judiciary, grievous and that were of serious they in violation of Canon
We agree Respondent’s comments were violative 3(A)(6), Canon find but we decline to violation of any Canon it, 2. This Court does not nor enjoy, should a sovereign from criticism immunity by judges, stated or lawyers citi- zens Commonwealth. Indeed legitimate criticism is legal often the basis of scholarship, reason, and for that isit However, encouraged. be judges lawyers are duty- ways bound to state their criticism in do not scathingly incite the undermining the public’s confidence in the judiciary, while we believe that Respondent’s comments ill-advised, in this intemperate tone, case were and im- in that proper they concerned a pending matter before court, they did not rise to the level of violating Canon 2.
F. INTERJECTION RELIGION AND OF RELIGIOUS PROCEEDINGS, (a) BIAS IN JUDICIAL In In re Alfred Villa, (C.P. 9No. of 1981 County), Potter a case which involved the anti-social teenage conduct of a boy, Respon- interrupted dent delinquency hearing called for an in-chambers conference probation officer, with the the com- director, mental munity health guidance and a counselor. At this meeting, Respondent suggested that the boy might possessed be by demons and that a priest local should him examine to determine whether an exorcism was re- quired. Respondent then called a separate meeting with parents the boy’s and told thing. them the same The parents felt compelled to accede to Respondent’s request for an examination to determine boy whether because, possessed, mother, according to the boy’s Respon- spoke dent with the voice of authority and she was con- cerned that treatment for her son proceed would not until the judge’s wishes were complied with. The boy was exam- ined a priest “possessed found not by de- mons,” and so no exorcism was performed.
(b) At probation close of a revocation hearing Commonwealth v. Connelly, No. (C.P. of 1980 County), Respondent, while in judicial robes and seated on
229 bench, to the bench and handed her called the defendant in Pocket.” Printed My entitled “The Cross religious a card Respondent testified religious poem. card was a on the on out this card in similar circumstances he had handed he occasions to those whom believed six approximately card. message Respon- on the accept needed and would needs person he can determine whether a dent feels that gift “the given the card because he has been accept and will of discernment.” hearing a
(c) Respondent presided of 1986 over April of sentence in a motion for reconsideration Common- (C.P. Weeks, County). 1985 Potter At v. No. 83 of wealth defendant testified that he had been “bom hearing Christ, further had “found” and as again,” that he Jesus temperament, began “speaking he religious evidence of his the defendant’s Although Respondent in denied tongues.” reconsideration, wearing judi- while Respondent, motion for robes, em- physically cial descended from the bench and in the defendant as a “brother Christ.” braced a Respondent presided in 1986 over Similarly, February protection hearing from abuse Commonwealth v. James Watson, (C.P. during County), No. of 1986 again” the defendant testified that had been “bom While accepted that he had Jesus Christ as savior. robes, from the wearing Respondent descended judicial physically bench and embraced the defendant as “brother in Christ.”
(d) knowledge stated that it was common among the Potter members of the local bar County Jail convictions, strong religious that he has and he stated it was for him to a lesser sentence to a criminal proper give in the actively engaged practice defendant who was religion Respondent’s than to one who was not. Because of bias, Respon- religious parties appeared known who before dent their frequently professed religious practices.
(e) a child Respondent presided In November 1979 over matter, Mohr, (C.P. Potter No. 544 of 1979 custody Mohr v. of two County) previously granted custody which he had minor children to the father. The mother was an admitted alcoholic and person, unstable but at the custody hearing, she “I stated have become Christian. I have become reborn. I am enough.” stable Respondent stated that he believed she had urged been reborn and her petition change order, court to the custody but the mother subse- quently admitted that she remained an unstable alcoholic.
(f) Respondent testified religious that his activities and profession of in religion the courtroom were intended to “foist” and encourage the belief in practice of Chris- tianity among Christians. When asked if he would obey a direct order from this Court cease religious in activities courtroom, he equivocated.
The Board found that Respondent 2(A) violated Canons 3(A)(1) of Code Judicial Conduct in that he favored parties certain who appeared him before based their statements religious of belief and practice and in that he attempted to alter the custody arrangements in the Mohr case based only on the mother’s statement of religious belief. is, course,
It of axiomatic that an litigant’s individual religious beliefs and practices may not be considered by any judicial officer in any legal proceeding in this Common- wealth. That a litigant might be treated favorably because of his religious identity, rather than because of the merits case, of his would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and concept is a foreign to any notion of fundamental fairness. And yet the possibility religious- of ly-biased treatment is precisely what was raised in the cases where Respondent court, stated words, actions and religious preferences. fact, In Respondent himself ac- knowledged that his religious preferences were so well known that criminal defendants commonly professed Chris- tian beliefs practices in an attempt get reduced sentences.
Our system of government grounded on individual freedom to participate or not participate in religious activi- ty. And extends, this freedom needless to say, to those litigation. in civil and criminal involved When a of a judge Pleas openly personal of Common indicates a affinity Court faith, of the Christian as persons opposed persons for religious persons faith, no faith or of non-Christian he has imprimatur approval affixed the state on a particular This is the stuff of type religious oppression, belief. freedom, and it will not be tolerated in this Commonwealth. although last in a
Only
year,
different and less egregious
case,
context than this
we stated:
more than
Pennsylvania,
any other
sovereignty
history,
traces its origins directly to the principle that the funda-
right
mental
of conscience is inviolate. See The Papers
Penn,
(Dunn
I
Dunn,
William
Vol.
&
University
Press),
Pennsylvania
51-52, 90-93, 268,
pp.
280, 452, 511.
general, thus,
our Commonwealth is neutral regarding
religion.
It neither encourages nor discourages religious
It
belief.
neither favors nor
religious
disfavors
activity.
A citizen of this
free,
Commonwealth is
longstanding
right,
not,
practice
religion
fit,
or
as he sees
*20
whether he practices
religion
strictly
exclusively
private matter,
not a matter for
the state.
inquiry by
Eubanks,
201, 206,
Commonwealth v.
511 Pa.
For these agree we the Board Respon- with 2(A) 3(A)(1) dent has violated Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
IV. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS Although agree we with the Board that the findings fact and conclusions of law stated heretofore are sufficient to compel Respondent’s from the removal bench and that the remaining charges against respondent need not be addressed, nonetheless, it is for appropriate, a fuller under- standing case, charges, initiating to discuss two other guilty plea bargaining directly with defense counsel in 319,
violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. and unfair treatment attor- he disliked.8 neys County
In District July, Attorney Jeffrey preparing for murder prosecution Leber was of a case which one Richard Cornish had been shot and killed by one may acting Bruce McCaslin. McCaslin have been in concert Cornish, wife, with Carol the decedent’s and both she and McCaslin were incarcerated and charged with murder. In week of July, prisoner, Thomas, the first another James told had jail authorities that he heard McCaslin make cer- he, tain statements about the Cornish murder which Thom- as, wished communicate authorities. As a result of information, arranged for police brought Thomas be to the office. attorney’s being district Thomas was held on charges unrelated to the Cornish murder.
Prior to his attorney, interview with district Thomas right fact, waived his to have counsel and in present, insisted that his counsel be told of this interview be- cause counsel represented his McCaslin as well. Thomas feared of reprisal some from apparently type either other prisoners, interview, who might find out about the or from counsel, his who might displeased that Thomas had discussed McCaslin’s case attorney. with district any event, the district took a from statement Thomas gave polygraph later Thomas a examination. gave statement,
After Thomas he then asked to speak request appointment a new attorney. Subsequently, July Respondent pre- sided a hearing over on a motion for a continuance filed McCaslin, counsel for defendant based on what defense counsel prosecutorial characterized as misconduct inter- viewing Thomas without counsel being present. At that *21 hearing, Respondent stated:
I don’t know what the subject matter of that confer- [the was, ence between Thomas and the district attorney] but it completely was unethical for the attorney district supra summary charges by 8. See n. 1. for a not addressed the Board. with public communicate Mr. Thomas without the defend- consent, er’s the district particularly when knew that the defender public represented also Mr. McCaslin. something
That’s in this 29 years, been business —I’ve thing, and I’ve never heard of such a Not never. only that, I do couple but understand weeks after made, initial contact was ... Mr. Thomas ... was taken up police state barracks and given poly- graph again test or no notice no communication or no consent of his counsel also again who at time still Mr. represented McCaslin.
It is in view my incredible. There is no understanding or appreciation of an attorney/client there is relationship, no understanding appreciation or of confidential commu- nication between client. attorney and
It is clear to me that the district attorney trying was Reagle’s use one of Mr. against clients one of another Mr. Reagle’s clients without permission virtue of fact they’re both in jail.
Board Ex. Transcript Hearing, of Continuation Com- McCaslin, N.T., 24,1984). monwealth v. 10-11 pp. In (July subsequent hearings Respondent continued to refer to this of prosecutorial misconduct, “worst case” with the result that defense counsel in both the McCaslin and un- related Thomas cases began to build a strategy based on claims of prosecutorial McCaslin, wrongdoing. for ex- ample, motions to dismiss filed on theory were prosecutorial misconduct. Opinion Board Ex. Com- McCaslin, (C.P. Co.). monwealth v. No 21 of 1984 was, course, There nothing improper in the district attorney’s Thomas, interview with since knowingly, Thomas voluntarily, intelligently presence waived coun- sel, event, any request, at his testifying, own on matters to charges unrelated against him. 13, 1984,
On September while McCaslin case was on appeal suppression decision, from a Respondent purported suppression ordér the the Thomas interview
234 grounds “prosecutorial However, misconduct.” because of the pending appeal, Respondent’s court was without to jurisdiction enter an order in McCaslin. Subsequently, case, recused himself from the McCaslin and specially presiding judge ruled that there prosecuto- was no rial misconduct and that the Thomas interview was not to suppressed. 15,1984 Respondent
On October accepted the guilty pleas Thomas, of James in the McCaslin case, informant and his wife Dolly, who were incarcerated for crimes unrelated to the McCaslin murder. At the sentencing hearing, Re- announced spondent negotiated that he had pleas the guilty himself, without knowledge of the district attorney. As he it, “I put went to the defense counsel and indicated that if to they plea were enter a guilty charges as set forth, I impose would sentences of incarceration to time 24, 2, served.” Board Ex. Sentencing Hearing in Com- p. Thomas, monwealth v. Dollie and James 24No. and 25 of (C.P. 1984 Potter County), October 1984. There is no doubt that prohibits Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 judicial involvement in negotiating a guilty plea. Additionally, District Attorney Leber testified before the Board’s investigatory panel that James Thomas’s sentence was under the minimum time provided for sentencing under the guidelines because he had an extensive criminal record. 16,1986). N.T. (April Cornish, the matter of Carol the wife of the murder victim, the district entered into a attorney plea bargain pled Cornish to solicitation guilty to commit murder tampering evidence, physical in addition to which agreed Cornish the McCaslin testify cooperate trial. The district entered this plea bargain into because he was convinced that there was insufficient evi- dence to convict her of criminal homicide. Board’s Ex. Letter of District Leber Atty Deputy Atty. General (October 31, 1984). Keuch Respondent presided at hearing plea hearing Carol Cornish's guilty stated as follows:
From I have this out of what read about case file, I but think help may can’t defendant be the most culpable charged two defendants with the if singular crime murder. Borne out for no other allegations sought reason than the that this defendant *23 McCaslin, another, solicit namely, Joseph person not act, person who committed but allegedly another to commit the crime of murder.
Now, are I’m aware that there certain con- problems nected with known to the prosecutions, general public not Court, but, I got and not to the to that I known have say grave bargain with the difficulty plea that was entered into parties. between the
I have I grave difficulty with offenses. think they’re grave I too lenient. have with the difficulty suggestion sentence, that’s too lenient. From Iwhat now, know I and understand that there are—can be many thus,
facts I brought my far, attention which have not far, properly so thus been brought my atten- tion.
Perhaps I my expression is am premature, but com- pelled to express the which I thoughts expressed, have and I guess I’d have to it’s say shocking almost me. I took the five I minute recess because had to meditate on issue of how much authority a Court had or didn’t accepting have in plea guilt. a
Had I concluded that I had ultimate authority, I wouldn’t accepted have it I because can’t with express sufficient clarity emphasis my disappointment based upon what I seen in file have and what I have read outside the file. 20,
Board’s Ex. Cornish, v. Entry Commonwealth of Plea 27, Hearing, 1984). 18-20 (July Ultimately, Cornish’s guilty entered, plea was though Respondent assert, continued late as as the sentencing hearing, “that this particular case represents probably the grave most and serious incident of miscarriage of I justice have ever been connected with.”0 Board Ex. Cornish, Commonwealth v. Sentencing 236 1984). (December 3, 24
Hearing, Following acceptance plea, Respondent press called conference which he stated that the in the case guilty plea Cornish was “a gross and a N.T. injustice” “travesty justice.” (December 3, 1986). events,
As result of these in August, 1984 District wrote to the Attorney Inquiry Leber Judicial and Review request investigation Respondent’s Board to an judicial thereafter, conduct. Shortly Respon- October dent wrote to the General of Attorney Pennsylvania to request Attorney General intervene in the McCas- lin murder and the prosecution guilty plea Cornish on the grounds acting that the district was in these cases reasons, for “personal political” and that his treatment of the cases “inconsistent justice.” The Attorney intervene, General declined to presumably because the being (McCaslin McCaslin case was vigorously prosecuted murder) was later of first degree convicted and because a *24 plea bargain had been entered into with Carol Cornish that consistent litigating with the difficulty charges against her.
Although of these acts of any Respondent, taken in isolation, might seem an error of judgment or a matter on minds could disagree, together, reasonable taken we believe indicate a they pattern designed behavior undermine the and career of District reputation Attorney above, Leber. As discussed mis- Respondent purposely characterized the Thomas as prosecutorial interview miscon- duct; he illegally plea bargain initiated with the Thomas- es; he publicly disapproved plea bargain of the Cornish it; unjudiciously attorney proposing berated the district for cause, and he requested, good without that the Attorney General assume for certain criminal responsibility pending cases. All of this conduct affected the administration of justice in Potter County Respondent’s and none of actions had any sound basis law. believe,
It significant, Respondent’s attacks we upon the district continued after the even Cornish accepted, had when in plea been January Respon- again dent contacted the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, request this time to investigation criminal of District Attorney Among Leber. other matters complained of was alleged prosecutorial Leber’s misconduct arising from the arrest and prosecution George and Walter Stenhach.
Other matters which Respondent complained of are sum- marized in the Attorney General’s letter of June 1985 as follows:
1. Possible marijuana and cocaine usage by the District as substantiated Attorney, by Patterson; one Lawrence 2. The prosecutions absence cocaine initiated by District Attorney’s Office Potter County; Stenhach matter]; [The 4. Possible conflict of interests between the District Attorney of Potter County and Tioga County Attorney William Hebe.
Board Ex. 31. After an investigation, the Attorney General determined that there was no substance to charge use; drug that no drug cases had been prosecuted because no drug made; arrests had been that the Stenhach matter had processed been Attorney General’s office and Mr. it; Leber had no part in and that conflict any of interest matters should be referred to the Disciplinary Board be- cause they are not criminal.
Respondent’s request for a investigation criminal of Dis- trict Attorney conduct, short, Leber’s was without any basis, as just Respondent’s other complaints about *25 district had been without in McCaslin, basis Thomas, and Cornish pattern matters. The emerges from this conduct is that of a attempt vindictive to ruin the district attorney’s career.
While it may be a private matter as to whether a judge personal has enemies, he may personal not allow his feel- ings to affect his behavior case, on the bench. In this Respondent’s personal dislike of certain members of the bar them,9 he only way spoke
not affected the but also it making his fair and ability impartial legal affected This, matters, and determinations. to understate is rulings conclude, therefore, of office. that Respondent, abuse We matters related to the his treatment of above McCas- cases, 2(A) (B) lin and Thomas violated Canons and 3(A)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct in that he did not preserve judicial impartiality; personal allowed relation- conduct; ships judicial influence and he did not remain faithful to the law and unswayed by partisan inter- ests. is, course,
It a sad for this day Court when it must conduct, from office. judge Judge judicial remove Fink’s however, jeopardized right appear has those who County the courts of Potter to receive fair and impartial treatment. are convinced Fink We has no understanding fundamental of the impartiality judicious temperament required of judges. Judges are not autocrats; forces; police are not are they they religious advisors; and do not they legislate their own rules and Rather, statutes. they impartial are arbiters under typical example testimony concerning Respondent’s 9. A treat- ment of certain members of the bar is as follows: Judge, Danny says you JUDGE MUNLEY: berate him. You call prick F-ing him a this. simply JUDGE FINK: That’s not true. That's not true. - JUDGE MUNLEY: You’ve never called him that? pain JUDGE FINK: I called him a in the ass. you prick? JUDGE MUNLEY: Did ever call him a Now, always JUDGE FINK: No. Never. I reserved that for his partner. (November 1986). Attorney N.T. 943 Glassmire testified: Q. Glassmire, Judge you Mr. has Fink ever referred to in uncom- plimentary language? Repeatedly. A. Q. Judge say you? What does Fink Well, A. he talks in an obscene manner to me on occasion and also calls me various names on occasion. Q. you? What names does Fink call ass, prick, A. He has called me a he’s called me an he’s called me a ass, pain humility, being in the he said I lack he’s accused me of rude, arrogant, being just generally many, he’s berated me on occasions, many repeated publicly privately. both 607, (October 17, 1986). N.T. *26 rules of court precedents, and statutes of this Common- appear wealth to insure that those who before them receive justice. power judge enormous, The of a and concomi- tantly, position no our society higher demands standards. Because Harold B. Fink has not high met these standards and because he has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct herein, the manner discussed accept we the recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board that Harold B. Fink removed from office and ineligible “thereafter be office,” for PA. judicial V, CONST. Art. (I). Sec. subsec. The Prothonotary is further directed to send a certified of this copy opinion to the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the several election county boards of the Common- wealth. It is so ordered.10
LARSEN, J., did not participate the decision of this case.
NIX, C.J., files a concurring opinion in which McDermott, j., joins.
NIX, Justice, Chief concurring. agree
I with the analysis set forth in opinion the majority with the exception of the finding a violation of Canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct in respondent’s see criticism of an opinion Court, of this at 367-368. While the comment in poor taste or even injudicious, it was probably a spontaneous reaction to an unfavorable ruling. Although greater restraint is to be expected from members of the bench of Commonwealth, it nevertheless must be recognized that judges even share the frailties of human nature. Such a miniscule departure from the deportment expected from the jurists this Commonwealth should not provide predicate for disciplinary sanction.
However, eliminating from complaint consideration this against Fink, I am nevertheless constrained to agree appeal has raised ten issues on from the Board’s determination. Because some of these issues have been addressed in opinion, the text of this and we have reviewed all of the others and merit, find them without these claims are denied.
with the majority pattern of behavior set forth on this record compels the conclusion that he is unsuited for office and judicial must be removed from the bench. I *27 join opinion therefore of the majority, except as noted. In view of the bizarre record, behavior reflected I would be inclined to stay removal, the Order of upon petition behalf of respondent expressing willingness to undergo a mental evaluation by competent physician Court, designated by this for a determination as to whether respondent appropriate an candidate for compulsory re- 5, 18(h) tirement under Article section of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
McDERMOTT, J., in this joins concurring opinion.
v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (VEPCO CO.) CONSTRUCTION Appeal CO., of VEPCO CONSTRUCTION and United States
Fidelity Guaranty Co. Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Jan. 1987.
Decided Oct. notes Attorney number, insisted that the Court “Next “very he had said down that also Daniel F. Glassmire write counsel”, Daniel F. referring Attorney nice about things Glassmire, being made reference said statement Kinter. what he told Andrew Attorney notified the Court paragraph, “Next numbered again never be able F. that he would Daniel Glassmire Daniel F. Glassmire. have informal conferences with number, Daniel F. Glassmire Attorney “Next