The appellants appeal the judgment of the superior court dismissing their appeal.
The appellants, adjacent and nearby property owners, appealed to the superior court the decision of the Valdosta/Lowndes County Zoning Board of Appeals granting Julius H. Trottеr, Jr., a special exception. Trotter, the nonresident defendant, filed no response to the appeal. The zoning board of apрeals filed a motion to dismiss which motion the appellants moved to strike. After a hearing and upon review of the pleadings, the trial judge granted thе motion to dismiss on the grounds that the appellants had, in effect, failed to allege their "aggrieved” parties status (see Code Ann. § 69-1211.1;
City of East Point v. Crosby & Stephens, Inc.,
1. Code Ann. § 69-1211.1 accords a right of appeal to the superior court to "[a]ny person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved by any decision of the board of zoning appeals ...” The statute also provides that the procedure for appeal "shall be the same as an appeal to the superior court from any decision made by the court оf ordinary and as specified in Chapter 6-2. . .”
(a) The appellants filed their appeal in the form of a petition in which they described themselvеs as appealing because they were "dissatisfied” 1 with the decision and judgment of the Valdosta/Lowndes County Zoning Board of Appeals. On appeal it is argued that their failure to *129 describe themselves as aggrieved property owners in the notice of appeal and to describе their substantial interest adversely affected by the rezoning deprived the superior court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
As noted by the Supreme Court in
City of Atlanta v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta, Inc.,
Code Ann. § 6-103 (replacing repealed Code Ann. § 6-204) states that "[n]o particular form [for apрeal to the superior court] shall be necessary for the notice of appeal, but the following is suggested . . .” The suggested form states basicаlly that the appellant appeals to the superior court the judgment entered by the lower tribunal on a specified date. The apрellant’s notice of appeal contained this same basic information and was therefore sufficient under section 6-103. Furthermore, Code Ann. § 6-115 рrohibits the dismissal of the appeal based on a defect in the appellants’ notice of appeal. That statute provides that "[n]o appeal shall be dismissed because of any defect in the notice of appeal. . . but the superior court shall at any time permit suсh amendments and enter such orders as may be necessary to cure the defect.” Therefore, insofar as the trial court’s dismissal of the apрeal was based on the appellants’ failure to allege that they were aggrieved in the notice of appeal, the ruling was error.
This court’s decision in
Evans v. Augusta-Richmond County Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
(b) In a de novo proceeding such as the one invоlved in this case, a reference to the "pleadings” generally refers to the entire record sent up to the superior court from the lower tribunal and not only to the appellant’s petition for appeal. Here, the trial judge ruled that he reviewed the pleadings before ruling that thе appellants had failed to show any substantial interest adversely affected by the rezoning. It was subsequently learned that the zoning board of apрeals had neglected to forward to the superior court three petitions signed by appellants and others indicating their opposition tо Trotter’s application for a special exception. These petitions were submitted in response to notices to "interested property owners” sent them by the appellee.
Code Ann. § 6-114 (a) imposes a duty on the agency appealed from to transfer the record to the superior court. Code Ann. § 6-115 prohibits dismissal of any appeal because of the agency’s failure to transmit a portion of the reсord. See also
McSherry v. Israel,
2. The second ground on which the trial judge dismissed the appellants’ appeal was their failure to join indispensable parties (see Code Ann. § 81A-119). The appellants named as defendant the individual to whom the board of zoning appeals granted the special exception; under this circumstance it was not necessary for him to namе the present property owner and the contracting party for purchase as defendants in this case. With regard to the board, the trial judge mаde it a party-defendant in his order (see Code Ann. § 81-121). He could not then proceed to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the board
*131
had not bеen made a party to the appeal by the appellants. See generally
Smith v. Merchants &c. Bank of Milledgeville,
The court also notes that while the zoning board of aрpeals is an administrative body, and not a court, it is generally regarded as being a quasi-judicial body. 101 CJS 969, Zoning, § 205. As such, it would seem to be an inappropriаte party to an appeal of its ruling in the superior court. However, grants of applications for special exceptions are within the original jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeals (see Ga. L. 1957, pp. 2502, 2510, stating powers of the Valdosta/Lowndes County Zoning Board of Appеals), and such grants represent an exercise of a legislative function. 101 CJS 1037, Zoning, §§ 273, 278. This power is an exception to the general rule that zoning boards of appeal lack any legislative power. 101 CJS 972, Zoning, § 208. For this reason, the joinder in this case of the zoning board of appeals as a party/defendant was not error.
Judgment reversed and remanded with direction.
Notes
This term is commonly used in petitions appealing judgments of the probate court to the superior court.