91 Pa. Commw. 372 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1985
Opinion by
Bruce K. Judd appeals here the decision and order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) declaring Mr. Judd, who had resigned his position with the Department of Public Welfare (DPW), ineligible to receive unemployment benefits pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Mr. Judd’s final position with DPW was as an Income Maintenance Policy Specialist I in DPW’s Bureau of Policy in Harrisburg where he worked from July, 1981 until he resigned on September 30, 1982. Prior to his promotion to the position with the Bureau of Policy, Mr. Judd had been employed for twelve years by DPW at the McKean County Board of Assistance where he served finally as a Casework Supervisor I. He applied for the position with the Bureau of Policy in April, 1981 believing that, if he remained with the McKean County Board of Assistance, he would soon be furloughed.
Upon relocating to Harrisburg in July, 1981, Mr. Judd began to experience financial problems due to his inability to sell his home in Bradford and having to pay for housing in Harrisburg. Mr. Judd’s net biweekly salary in July, 1981 was $649.00; his mortgage
■ Mr. Judd’s financial difficulties did not abate though and, on November 30, 1981, after learning of a vacant caseworker position with the McKean County Board of Assistance, he submitted a written request for a voluntary demotion and transfer to that position. He withdrew the request after learning that any transfer would not be effective until near the elate his second child’s birth was expected; also, his financial situation improved when he was able to lease his Bradford home in December, 1981.
In or around May, 1982, the Judds received notice from the McKean County Tax Claim Bureau that, if payment were not made on their 1981 property taxes, in the amount of $1589.71, their home would be subject to forced sale. Then in June, the Judds’ tenants moved and the Judds were unsuccessful in renting the house again. Therefore, Mr. Judd, worried about mortgage arrearages and unpaid property taxes, wrote to the McKean County Board of Assistance and requested that he be permitted to fill an available Income Maintenance Worker Trainee position. Mr. Judd was informed in August, 1982 that the McKean County Board of Assistance would fill the available trainee position from the civil service list.
Mr. Judd, from the outset, had discussed his financiál problems, and personal problems which stemmed
After resigning his position with DPW and moving back to Bradford, Mr. Judd applied for unemployment benefits. The Office of Employment Security (OES) denied his claim and the referee to whom Mr. Judd’s appeal was referred for hearing affirmed the OES’ decision. On appeal the Board concluded that Mr. Judd’s emotional stress did not constitute an adequate health reason justifying his decision, corroborated by his physician, to terminate his employment and, while Mr. Judd’s financial difficulties may have been severe, they were voluntarily assumed when he accepted the
Mr. Judd has appealed to this court and, on appeal, he argues that the Board’s decision that emotional stress does not constitute an adequate health reason to justify termination is contrary to the controlling authority of this court and our Supreme Court and that, health reasons aside, Mr. Judd’s financial difficulties created the economic necessity which has previously provided claimants with necessitous and compelling cause to terminate their employment.
The issue of whether a claimant has terminated his employment for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature is an issue of law subject to our review. McNeil v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 51 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 315, 414 A.2d 727 (1980).
Mr. Judd is correct in pointing out that anxiety and emotional' distress can be necessitous and compelling cause for terminating one’s employment, Fetterman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 78 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 233, 467 A.2d 402 (1983); Central Data Center v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 73 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 465, 458 A.2d 335 (1983), and that a claimant does not necessarily have to present expert medical evidence in order to establish that he had compelling medical reasons for terminating his employment, but instead may establish that fact by any competent evidence such as claimant’s own testimony and/or documentary evidence, Steffy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 367, 453 A.2d 591 (1982).
Mr. Judd’s emotional distress was established, we believe, by claimant’s own testimony and documentary evidence. Unlike the emotional distress suffered by the claimants in Fetterman and Central Data, how
Our starting point must be with the Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 548, 45 A.2d 903 (1946). In that case, Judge Reno set out to reconcile the language of the statute which would compensate an individual voluntarily unemployed with good cause with purpose of the act to relieve economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment :
‘Voluntarily’ and ‘involuntarily’ are antonymous and therefore irreconcilable words, but the words are merely symbols of ideas, and the ideas can be readily reconciled. Willingness, wilfulness, volition, intention reside in ‘voluntarily, ’ but the mere fact that a worker wills and intends to leave a job does not necessarily and always mean that the leaving is voluntary. Extraneous factors, the surrounding circumstances must be taken into account; and when they are examined it may be found that the seemingly voluntary, the apparently intentional, act was*378 in fact involuntary. A worker’s physical and mental condition, his personal and family problems, the authoritative demands of legal duties —these are circumstances that exert pressure upon him and imperiously call for decision and action.
When therefore the pressure of real not imaginary, substantial not trifling, reasonable ■ not whimsical, circumstances compel the decision to leave employment, the decision is voluntary in the sense that the worker has willed it, but involuntary because outward pressures have compelled it .[footnote omitted]. Or to state it differently, if a worker leaves his employment when he is compelled to do so by necessitous circumstances or because of legal or family obligation, Ms leaving is voluntary with good cause, and under the act he is entitled to benefits. The pressure of necessity, of legal duty, or family obligations, or other overpowering circumstances and his capitulation to them transform what is ostensibly voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment. (Emphasis in original.)
158 Pa. Superior Ct. at 556-57, 45 A.2d at 903.
In Rettan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 287, 325 A.2d 646 (1974), we held that a poor financial condition may transform a voluntary termination into involuntary unemployment.
Thus, financial difficulties will seldom present those circumstances set forth in Sturdevant which compel the decision to leave employment and transform voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment compensable under the law. Only when the claimant has done everything in his power to alleviate the financial burdens which seemingly compel the decision to leave employment will the claimant be eligible to receive compensation, since leaving employment is obviously seldom conducive to bettering one’s financial situation.
We hold that,-under these compelling financial circumstances, Mr. Judd’s resignation was involuntary for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Law and he is eligible to receive benefits.
Order
Now, this 26th day of August, 1985, the decision and order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-222355, dated September 16, 1983, is hereby reversed.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, an amended, 43 P.S. §S02(b).
The claimant in Rettan, a sewing machine operator, was told she could not continue working until she obtained a pair of glasses. Rettan could not afford to purchase the glasses; we reversed the Board stating that the Board’s determination that claimant’s separation was voluntary and, therefore, disqualifying was incorrect as a matter of law.