175 P. 79 | Or. | 1920
“is every party to an action, suit or proceeding whose interest in respect to the final determination rendered therein, is or might be in conflict with a modification or reversal of the decision, order, judgment, or decree so given or rendered.”
The reasons for holding that Gress, Minnie Brake-bush and Karoline Janicke are adverse parties are set
“Defendant Karoline Janicke claimed to own the-land, mortgages upon which were foreclosed in the decree of the lower court and which was directed to be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the claims of the Hibernia Savings Bank, of Jubitz and Everett, and of the executrices and the executors of the will of Henry "Weinhard, deceased. Deficiency judgments were also secured against Karoline Janicke by Hibernia Savings Bank and by the executrices and executors of the last will of Henry Weinhard, deceased. In the decree, cross-appellant Haase was enjoined from asserting any further claim to the real property in question. In his appeal he is seeking to have his alleged lien on the real property reinstated and given priority over all other liens against said property, and he is also trying to have decreed fraudulent the deed by which Karoline Janicke took title to the real property in question. From this it is apparent that Karoline Janicke was and is an adverse party. If he prevails in his appeal, property claimed by her will be subjected to his lien. If he prevails in his appeal his lien will be decreed prior to those of the other lienholders, thus exhausting the proceeds of the sale of the land that much quicker and making it moi'e likely that she will have to pay the deficiency judgment rendered against her and in favor of the Hibernia Savings Bank and the executrices and executors of the will of Henry Weinhard, deceased.
“Minnie Brakebush to whom the notice of appeal was directed but upon whom, so far as the proof of service shown on the notice indicates, it was not served, is also an adverse party. Deficiency judgments were given against her and in favor of Hibernia Savings Bank and the executrices and executors of the will of Henry Weinhard, deceased. If cross-appellant Haase prevails in his appeal, an additional claim will be imposed upon the fund arising from the sale of the mortgaged property, thus exhausting that fund more*338 quickly and making it more probable that Minnie Brakebush will be forced to pay the deficiency judgments rendered against her.
“No notice of appeal was directed to, nor was any served on George Gress. Deficiency judgments were also pronounced against George Gress in favor of E. G. Jubitz, E. Everett and the executrices and executors of the will of Henry Weinhard, deceased. As with Minnie Brakebush and Karoline Janicke, Gress’ obligation to pay these deficiency judgments will arise only in the event that the sale of the mortgage premises will not produce a sum sufficient to satisfy the claims of the Hibernia Savings Bank, Jubitz and Everett and of the Weinhard Estate. If cross-appellant prevails and his lien is placed ahead of those of the bank, of Jubitz and Everett and the Weinhard Estate, then the probability of Gress being forced to pay the deficiency judgments against him will be enhanced. It is clear, therefore, that he would be injuriously affected by the reversal of the decree as asked by cross-appellant Haase. He is an adverse party and ho notice having been served upon him the appeal should be dismissed.”
This argument appears to be sound and conclusive, •therefore the cross-appeal is dismissed.
Cross-appeal Dismissed.
Argued January 20, affirmed March 2, 1920.
On the Merits.
(187 Pac. 1111.)
Department 1.
This proceeding is a consolidation of two suits for the foreclosure of two mortgages which are liens upon the same property, and involving the same parties. On April 30, 1914, the plaintiffs, Jubitz and Everett,
The defendants answered, contending that the contract between them and Glutsch relating to the liquor license was in violation of the municipal ordinance
A trial being had, there was a decree in favor of the plaintiffs and the Weinhard Estate for the sums found due to each, respectively, and foreclosing the mortgage, and the defendants Gress, Brakebush and Janicke appeal. Affirmed.
For appellants there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Crawford & Crawford and Mr. W. C. Camp-.
For respondents there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Wood, Montague & Hwvt and Mr. M. M. Matthiessen, with an oral argument by Mr. Matthiessen.
The first assignment of error is that the court overruled the demurrers to the complaint and to the Weinhard Estate’s cross-complaint. These demurrers are based upon the theory: (a) That there are several causes of suit improperly united; (b) that Emil Grlutseh, who as agent of the Weinhard Estate, entered into the option contract for the purchase of the liquor license, is a necessary party; (c) that the complaint discloses that a large part of the consideration for the note and mortgage consists of the transfer of a liquor license in violation of a municipal ordinance, and is therefore against public policy and avoids the entire transaction.
“No retail liquor license shall be granted either by original issue or transfer, to any- corporation, copartnership or association of persons, but the same may be granted to the individual members of a firm or copartnership.”
It will be observed that the cross-complainant, Louise Weinhard, Anna Wessinger, Paul Wessinger and Henry Wagner, are parties to the suit by virtue of their position as executors of the last will and testament of Henry Weinhard, deceased, who, during his lifetime, was the owner of a brewery. They do not appear in the pleadings as a corporation, or as an association, but as the trustees of the estate of a decedent. It does not appear, therefore, that they come within any of the classes to whom the issuance of a liquor license is prohibited. Nor is there anything in the evidence that brings them within the prohibited classes. It is made to appear that they were not incorporated, nor does it appear that they were an organized association for the carrying on of a business enterprise. The term “association,” as used in the ordinance, evidently applied to the legal definition thereof, which in 4 Cyc. 301, reads thus:
“An association may be defined to be a body of persons acting together, without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies, for the prosecution of the common enterprise.”
The personal representatives of Henry Weinhard, deceased, were not such an organization. After the death of the testator, they- continued the business of their testator, under directions and conditions of which we are not advised, and might much more accurately be classed as a copartnership, but in any event, they are
It is also maintained that no notice was ever given to Mrs. Janicke of the default of Cress and Brakebush. The sufficient answer to this is that the supplemental agreement signed by her expressly waives such notice.
There was some argument by defendants’ counsel to the effect that the note and mortgage are not valid, for the reason that no consideration is shown to have passed to Mrs. Janicke for the execution thereof. To this it may be said that the defendants have not pleaded a want of consideration, and therefore cannot now be heard upon that point: 9 Cyc. 737. However, if de
“It is not necessary that a benefit should accrue to the person making the promise; it is sufficient that something valuable flows from the person to whom it is made, or that he suffers some prejudice or inconvenience, and. that the promise is the inducement to the transaction. ’ ’
In conclusion we may say that we have examined the evidence very carefully, and are satisfied that the findings and decree of the trial court are correct. The decree is therefore affirmed. Affirmed.