20 Mont. 234 | Mont. | 1897
Appellant states as a proposition of law that although an attorney has authority, by virtue of his employment as such, to do all acts which affect the remedy in a suit, still he cannot, by virtue of his employment alone, do that which destroys his client’s cause of action; citing in support of this contention Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa. St. 315; Lambert v. Sandford, 2 Blackf. 137; People v. Lamborn, 1 Scam. 123; and Jones v. Inness, 32 Kan. 177, 4 Pac. 95.
The respondent does not dispute this statement of the legal principle controlling an attorney’s authority. This appeal, then, depends solely upon the answer to the question of whether or not Parker had authority to stipulate as he did.
A careful inspection of the evidence (all that is pertinent to the question being contained in the statement of facts prefixed) forces us to the conclusion that whatever authority Parker had to enter into the stipulation he did arose from the letter written him by Willson in reply to his own notifyingWillson of the terms of the proposed settlement. Parker’s, explanation of the purpose for which he instituted the action, in 1891 is unsatisfactory and obscure. He virtually concedes.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the lower court to enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of its complaint.
Reversed and Remanded.