Lead Opinion
This case involves a dispute as to the proper method of determining a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing civil rights plaintiff. The history of the case is as follows:
Morales sued the City of San Rafael (“City”) and a San Rafael police officer, Sergeant Daniel Hulett, alleging that Hulett unlawfully arrested Morales without an arrest warrant and without probable cause in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and state law. Based upon Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
Morales moved the district court for an award of fees in the amount of $139,783.25,
Relying on Farrar v. Hobby,
In addition to attorney’s fees, the district court held that Morales was entitled to recover costs in the amount of $8,119.16 from Hulett and that the City was entitled to recover costs in the amount of $2,708.04 from Morales. The district court justified its imposition of costs against Morales on the grounds that Morales prevailed only against Hulett and only on the § 1983 claim and that “[i]t follows that City of San Rafael has prevailed fully against Morales.”
Morales now appeals his attorney’s fee award and the imposition of costs against him.
ANALYSIS
I.
The district court misinterpreted this court’s memorandum disposition when it concluded that we “revived the verdict only as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.” Accordingly, it improperly concluded that the City was a prevailing party deserving of costs.
On remand, the district court awarded costs to the City based on its conclusion that the City had prevailed “fully” against Morales. However, the City prevailed only as to Morales’ § 1983 claim against it and remained a party to the action after summary judgment was granted in its favor on that claim. The jury verdict reinstated by this court was rendered in favor of Morales on his state law claims against the City.
Nowhere in our memorandum disposition do we state that only part of the jury’s verdict should be reinstated. To the contrary, we reversed the district court’s order granting JNOV and remanded the ease for entry of judgment in favor of Morales consistent with the jury’s verdict. The last paragraph of our order reads as follows:
Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict; the district court erred in granting JNOV. We reverse and remand. On remand, the district court shall enter judgment in favor of Morales on the jury’sverdict and proceed to determine Morales’ request for attorney’s fees.
The City obviously understood that our reinstatement of the jury’s verdict made it the losing party as to the state law claims against it, as evidenced by the fact that it filed a petition for rehearing on its own behalf, as well as on behalf of Hulett, and referred throughout the petition both to “the CITY and HULETT.” Because the City was not a prevailing party eligible for costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64(d)(1), the district court erred in awarding it costs.
II.
We review an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Corder v. Brown,
Here, in determining the fee award, the district court relied on Farrar v. Hobby,
The district court erred in its application of Farrar in this case. At the most general level, Farrar stands for the uncontroversial principle that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion for the district court to award attorneys’ fees without considering the relationship between the ‘extent of success’ and the amount of the fee award.” McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of California,
However, Farrar also stands for a more limited proposition, and it is in the application of this narrow second ruling that the district court erred in this case. In Farrar, the Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule governing a district court’s calculation of attorneys’ fees. The Court held that “nominal damages” cases in which the relief is de minimis are exempted from the general requirements that govern the calculation of attorney’s fees, including the requirement that a lodestar first be calculated.
Morales’ damages award of $17,500 in compensatory damages, while substantially less than what he sought,
In addition, even if Morales’ damages award were nominal, the Farrar exception would not be applicable here. Whether the plaintiffs “success is purely technical or de minimis,” id. at 117,
III.
The customary method of determining fees, which the district court should have used here, is known as the lodestar method. “The lodestar determination has emerged as the predominate element of the analysis” in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee award. Jordan v. Multnomah County,
If the district court had employed the proper method of determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee award and had calculated a lodestar figure, it would have been required to consider the amount of damages Morales was awarded in assessing the overall results obtained from the litigation. The district court was not only free but obligated to consider “the results obtained” by Morales, or “the extent of [his] success,” Hensley v. Eckerhart,
However, the amount of damages recovered by Morales is not the sole indicator of the extent of his success. See Riverside v. Rivera,
CONCLUSION
The Farrar exception to the general rule requiring the district court to calculate the lodestar figure to determine an attorney’s fee applies only to nominal damages eases in which the plaintiffs success is de minimis. Success is measured not only by the amount of the recovery but also in terms of the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed and the public purpose the litigation served. Because the monetary award was not nominal and because Morales’ success was not minimal, this case does not fit within the Farrar exception. We vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand for a new fee determination to be made in the manner explained in Section III.
We vacate the award of costs to the City because the City was not a prevailing party eligible for costs, and conclude that, to the contrary, the City is liable to Morales for costs.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. Morales arrived at this figure by calculating a lodestar figure-multiplying the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case by the number of hours they each expended-and then reducing that figure by the time expended on the unsuccessful Monell claim, 173.2 hours at $30,380.
Hourly Number
Attorney Rate of Hours
Peter B. Brekhus $255 266.25
Barry F. Wester $175 81.4
Matthew Brekhus $155 151.3
Linda J. Philipps $155 413.6
Kirk E. Wallace $135 25.4
Morales’ motion included extensive and detailed explanations as to why the lodestar figure of $134,759.75 was a reasonable fee in this case. The final figure of $139,783.25 includes Morales’ calculation of $5,023.50 in fees for attorney time expended in district court after the motion for fees was filed.
. We do not intend to criticize the district court in this respect and recognize that its error on remand may have resulted at least in part from the fact that our memorandum disposition was not as clear as it might have been.
. In McGinnis we held that the district court erred when it expressly refused to consider the amount of actual damages in determining the extent of the plaintiff’s success. Id. at 810 (holding that district court erred in deciding that it would not reconsider its attorney’s fee award if the plaintiff's damages award were reduced from $234,000 to $34,000).
. Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority opinion written by Justice Thomas, supplying the necessary fifth vote, but then wrote separately to explain "more fully” her view of the majority’s holding. See infra note 7.
. Morales’ counsel asked the jury to award between $150,000 and $250,000.
. Morales’ award is in stark contrast to the "one seventeen millionth” Farrar received. Id., at 121,
. The analysis outlined above parallels the approach adopted by at least two other circuits which have addressed the same issue. For example, the Seventh Circuit has expressly adopted a three-part test, derived directly from Justice O’Connor’s Farrar concurrence, for determining “whether a prevailing party has achieved a mere technical victory inappropriate for fees.” Johnson v. Lafayette Fire Fighters Ass’n Loc. 472,
. The twelve Kerr factors bearing on the reasonableness are:
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the feeis fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.
Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc.,
There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. "Only in rare instances should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the basis of other considerations.” Harris v. Marhoefer,
. Among the subsumed factors presumably taken into account in either the reasonable hours component or the reasonable rate component of the lodestar calculation are: "(1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation, ... (4) the results obtained,” Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles,
Adjusting the lodestar on the basis of subsumed reasonableness factors after the lodestar has been calculated, instead of adjusting the reasonable number of hours or reasonable hourly rate at the first step, i.e. when determining the lodestar, is a disfavored procedure. Corder v. Gates,
. The district court was correct that it need not "recite” the twelve Kerr factors, McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of California,
. The plurality opinion in Riverside expressly "reject[ed] the proposition that fee awards under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers.” Id. at 574,
. The district court should, as we stated in McGinnis, consider what Morales’ attorney did for his “actual client.” Id. at 810. However, the assessment of the “results obtained” by the actual client in a civil rights action should not be limited to the damages award that person received but also requires consideration of the non-monetary benefits the plaintiff personally gains from the lawsuit. Moreover, as McGinnis makes clear, the benefit received by the client is only "an important measure of ‘extent of success,’ ” and must be considered along with "the benefits [conferred] on others throughout society by winning a civil rights claim.” Id. (emphasis added).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent with regard to the attorney’s fees award. A lawyer’s fee of $139,788.25 for getting a client $17,500 is obscene. The district court properly determined that the amount was inappropriate under controlling law and cut the fee to $20,000. We should affirm that discretionary determination.
The majority purports to limit Farrar v. Hobby,
The aforementioned $17,500 compensatory damages: (a) is only a small portion of the damages that were sought by Morales; (b) is unaccompanied by punitive damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief; but (c) constitutes a warning to law-enforcement officers not to treat civilians unconstitutionally. Thus, the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Morales should be moderately, but not extremely, low. And $20,000 — a figure somewhat, but not too much, more than $15,000 [the suggested fee in defendants’ supplemental brief]— is the most appropriate amount for an attorney’s fee award to Morales.
That exercise of discretion was in accord with controlling law.
Farrar considered whether a civil rights plaintiff who receives only a nominal damages award is a prevailing party. The Fifth Circuit had held that plaintiffs who win only $1 are not prevailing parties, so attorneys’ fees cannot be awarded under Section 1988. Farrar,
The reasoning of Farrar compels the conclusion that it applies generally to section 1988 cases, not just to nominal damages cases. Farrar holds that “the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.” Id., at 114,
The Supreme Court in City of Riverside v. Rivera,
Justice Powell, the fifth vote to affirm in Riverside, “join[ed] only the Court’s judgment.” Id. at 581,
Putting these three cases together, the law is plain: while section 1988 fees are not necessarily held to a ceiling of the damages award or the one third contingent fee common in personal injury cases, the fee award has to be reasonable in relation to the results obtained, including societal benefits, and a limited success requires that a fee be limited by reasonableness in relation to the results obtained, even where the “lodestar” amount is much higher.
The majority opinion errs by requiring the district court to begin by making a lodestar calculation, and then to assess whether any
Our own decisions leave no room for the majority to adopt its different analysis of Farrar today. We have already rejected the majority’s limitation of Farrar to nominal damages cases, and we can reject our earlier decisions only by en banc review. United States v. Camper,
In Corder v. Brown,
In Harris v. Marhoefer,
We carefully considered how Farrar applied to a $34,000 award (not nominal) in McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken,
After Carder, Harris, and McGinnis, it is impossible, without rehearing en banc, for us to construe Farrar to apply only to nominal damages cases.
The majority also errs in substituting its judgment for the district court’s, regarding the extent of benefits Mr. Morales’s attorneys conferred on persons other than their client by their limited victory. It is firmly established that the district court has discretion over how much to award for attorney’s fees, and our review authority is limited to determining whether there was abuse of discretion. Hensley v. Eckerhart,
Mr. Morales’s attorney had made a formal demand for $250,000, and urged the jury to award $150,000 to $250,000 in compensatory damages, plus $500,000 in punitive damages. The jury decided that the police officer “unlawfully arrested or detained plaintiff as a result of negligent performance of his duties.” But it also decided that Mr. Morales himself was negligent and that his own negligence was also a proximate cause of his injury. They attributed 45% of the negligence to Mr. Morales and 55% to the police officer, and found total damages suffered by Mr. Morales of $17,500. Mr. Morales’s attorney wanted $139,783.25 in fees for getting his client $17,500 (the court decided that $17,500, not 55% of $17,500, was the appropriate award).
Mr. Morales won damages of $17,500, so a one-third contingent fee to would have been $5,833. That is the private market measure of the fee commensurate with the extent of success obtained for Mr. Morales. Cases like Mr. Morales’s are rarely handled on an hourly basis, because the clients cannot afford the risk of paying more than they win, and the lawyers cannot afford the risk of nonpayment. The district judge thought a fee of $20,000 took proper account of the reasonable time spent and rates chargeable, the extent of success for Mr. Morales, and the benefit conferred on the public. That is an extra $14,167 for what the lawyers did for the public, on top of the $5,833 for what they did for Mr. Morales. The judge noted that the $17,500 award “constitutes a warning to law enforcement officers not to treat civilians unconstitutionally.” Only that benefit could justify awarding more to the lawyer than his client obtained from his services. As we said in McGinnis, “[t]he ‘private attorney general’ theory lets the attorneys recover more than the benefit to their client would make reasonable, because they also confer benefits on others throughout society by winning a civil rights claim.” McGinnis,
There are several things wrong with an excessive award of attorneys’ fees in a case such as this. One is over-deterrence. The police, having been called by a private guard who had spotted a weapon, had taken a loaded M-l carbine from a van. The arresting officer knew there was a law against
Second, excessive attorneys’ fees awards in section 1983 litigation unduly divert legal resources from other uses. People injured by negligent drivers and on the job, people who need wills drawn, people who need tenants evicted or landlords restrained from unlawful evictions, people who need their construction contracts reviewed and bank loans secured so they can start work, have to compete for legal services with Mr. Morales, who can offer a lawyer $139,000 to sue a policeman for arresting him erroneously and holding him for two hours. Congress chose to give lawyers more of an incentive than the usual contingent fee out of the damages recovery to take section 1983 cases, but neither the words nor the purpose of section 1988 justify a $139,000 jackpot in a $17,500 case.
Third, excessive attorneys’ fees awards in civil rights cases harm the victims of civil rights violations. That sounds paradoxical, but is not surprising to anyone with experience in personal injury work. The wronged victim of the civil rights violation is likely to want, or if physically injured, need, money, as compensation for the wrongs done to him. But the cases are hard to win, and probably most wrongful arrest cases taken to trial lose on liability, or result in low or nominal awards. So the safest, fastest and most efficient way for the victim of the wrong to obtain money is likely to be settlement. But no municipality is going to settle a $17,500 case for $157,000, with the lawyer to get the lion’s share of the money. In any one case, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs lawyer will “ring the bell,” as personal injury lawyers put it. The settlement value to the city is likely to be the risk of a bad loss multiplied by its size, perhaps 10% of $150,000 to $200,-000. Also, a defense lawyer would be concerned about the ethics of a settlement where the plaintiffs lawyer, not the wronged plaintiff, gets the lion’s share of the money. It would look like a bribe to the lawyer to dump the case. The plaintiffs lawyer would have a very great financial incentive to talk his client out of settling, and to take the ease to trial. All the fees he might hope for from ten small settlements are unlikely to add up to one jackpot fee, so even if he wins a very small percentage of cases at trial, the lawyer will do better to try them all. If the fee is too high relative to the client’s recovery, then the lawyer’s economic interest conflicts with his client’s, because the client has only one case but the lawyer has many. The majority’s approach today turns the ease into a dollar slot machine for the lawyer. Most lawyers are honorable people, and the lawyers representing plaintiffs in civil rights cases are often highly idealistic, but economic incentives work in the long run on the best people. A lot of people wronged by the police are going to be wronged again by being talked into exchanging small settlements for big trial defeats, under the attorneys’ fees rule the majority adopts today.
Mr. Morales’s attorneys conferred a moderate benefit on their client, and are entitled
. The majority mistakenly relies on Jordan v. Multnomah County,
. We say in Stivers v. Pierce,
