*1 otherwise, expand most recent address on file. To find operation. Hyatt, the statute’s Rowe v. (1996) (in interpreting words must be to subtle
given plain ordinary meaning resorting without expand or forced construction to limit or statute’s operation). Therefore, the circuit court erred finding inap- ground. on this plicable the circuit court erred
Accordingly, by finding service on process Steele was insufficient.
CONCLUSION find the granting immediately We order Steele’s motion is by finding and that the circuit court erred insuffi- appealable process. cient service of the decision of the circuit court is
REVERSED.
TOAL, C.J., WALLER, PLEICONES, JJ., BURNETT and concur. BUILDERS, INC., Respondent,
JRS Henry NEUNSINGER, Judy Timms, G. and Atlantic Bank,
Savings FSB, Defendants, Henry Neunsinger Appellant. Of Whom G.
No. 25995.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard June 2004.
Decided June 2005. *2 Mary Arnold, Leigh Pleasant, of Mt. for аppellant. Koontz, Steven L. Smith and Smith, Wm. Mark Collins & Newton, P.A., Charleston, of North for respondent.
Justice MOORE: (Builder) in in favor of its respondent After a final (Homeowner), the against petitioner lien action mechanic’s fees to as the awarded Builder master-in-equity After case from the certifying this 204(b), SCACR, in part to Rule we affirm Appeals pursuant in part. and reverse
FACTS 30, 1998, an brought against On October Builder action Statute, to the Mechanic’s Lien he Builder asserted was $74,500 for in the performed owed work construction alleging home for Homeowner. Homeowner counterclaimed construction, contract, negligent causes of action for breach of warranty. sought and breach of Homeowner’s counterclaims *3 punitive damages. amount in unspecified an actual case, After the master found Builder enti- hearing was $65,048 that tled to for breach of contract and Homeowner $36,907.26 established he was entitled to on his counterclaim. The final result was for Builder the amount of $28,140.76. not Attorney’s were fees costs awarded either and Builder then filed motions for party. Homeowner attorney’s ground on the that each an award of fees was 29-5-10(b) (providing § under prevailing party S.C.Code attorney’s method for award of fees for prevailing party lien).1 action to foreclose mechanic’s order, The master filed an amended order. In $44,430.86 and final award to Homeowner was increased to $20,617.14. of judgment for Builder enterеd the amount was Further, of summarily the master found the amended version 29-5-10, § after of Builder’s although enacted the institution action, attorney’s and awarded to Builder as the applied fees attorney’s The amount of fees was $29,033.75. 29-5-10(b) infra, §
1. In аmended. will be was As discussed argues argues applies Homeowner while Builder former statute applies.
ISSUE Did the trial court err finding Builder to be the prevail- ing party who was entitled to fees pursuant to the amended § version S.C.Code Ann. 29-5-10 (Supp.2003)?
DISCUSSION pre-1999 contends the § version of when determining is the who for prevailing party the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees. Builder contends the amended § version of 29-5-10 should be applied retroactively.
The prior versiоn of the S.C.Code Ann. 29-5- 10(a) (1991), establishes that the prevailing party an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien shall be awarded attorney’s fees and costs up the amount of the actual lien awarded. (b) Subsection оf the prescribes the method used for determining states, who is the prevailing party, and in perti- nent part:
If plaintiff settlement, makes no written offer of amount for in prayed his complaint is considered to be his final offer of settlеment for purposes this section. If the settlement, defendant no makes written offer of his offer of settlement is considered to be zero. 29-5-10(b). Ann. § this Court specifically interpreted the 1991 statute
and held the following:
when party settlement, neither makes а written offer of plaintiffs offer is considered the amount prayed for in its *4 complaint and the defendant’s offer is considered to be zero. Whether or fairly unfairly, the statute does not make provi- sion for considering countеrclaims as negative offers of settlement. Co., 280,
Brasington 289, Tile Inc. v. 327 Worley, 491 (1997) 244, S.E.2d 248 in (emphasis original).
In response decision, to the Brasington the legislature 11, amended the effective nearly June eight 1999— months the underlying lawsuit was filed. The amended after provides, version in pertinent part, the following: settlement, the offer of makes no written If the defendant negative considered to be his his counterclaim is value of not asserted a If the defendant has of settlemеnt. offer to be is considered counterclaim, offer of settlement his zero. 29-5-10(b) of the (Supp.2003). Application §Ann.
S.C.Code Brasington change in would to the facts words, statute if the amended of that case. In other outcome would, in decision Brasington retroactively, to apply were effect, be overruled. authority not have the legislature does
Because Court, the amended by a decision this to overrule Carolina See Steinke South aрply retrospectively. cannot 373, 520 Labor, 336 S.C. Licensing Regulation, and Dep’t of (1999) authority lacked (holding legislature S.E.2d statute). of a retroactively interpretation overrule Court’s Moreover, judicial interpretation] that “a have found effect, and any and meaning of its statute is determinative only be contrary to the will amendment subsequent legislative applied and cannot be the date of its enactment effective from Co., Line Ins. 262 S.C. Lindsay v. Nat’l Old retrоactively.” 75, prior, on-point Because a S.E.2d rendered, statutory any subsequent judicial decision has been otherwise only. To decide apply prospectively amendments effect, judicial to overrule legislaturе, allow the doctrine.2 in violation of decisions case, is the question prevail who present In the (1991) §Ann. controlled ing party Brasington. of that statute interpretation this Court’s ver- prior that under asserting is correct Lindsay analysis beсause should be abandoned 2. The dissent states the such, and, as plenary power to amend statutes legislature's authority decide whether a not limit the Court should However, given retroactive effect. should be amendment statutes, the construc- plenary power amend legislature has while the Lindsay v. responsibility. See judicial function and of a statute is a tion (1974); Co., Boatwright Ins. Nat’l Old Line once McElmurray, legislature cannot particular this Court has construed оf the statute to alter our construction amend the statute thereafter upon invade retroactively. To do so is to have the amendment judicial power. *5 sion of the he would be the Neither a party made written offеr of settlement. Final judgment was $20,617.14.
entered for Builder in the amount of Applying formula in the statute and applicable interpreta- this Court’s in tion of that statute Builder’s Brasington, settlement offer is prayed $74,500, the amount for in the complaint, which was and Homeowner’s settlement offer is zero. Zero closer $20,617.14 $74,500. than Accordingly, Homeowner have been deemed the prevailing party and the entitled party attorney’s fees and costs.
CONCLUSION We reverse master’s deсision Builder entitled to finding fees as the prevailing party § under amended 29-5- 29-5-10, 10. the former Applying version of find Home- owner is entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party the mechanic’s lien action. second Appellаnt’s issue is af- 220(b)(1), SCACR, firmed to Rule and the following Bank, authority: South Carolina Nat’l v. Ham- Greenville mond, (1973) (as rule, it is essential to establishment of set off that claims or debts be mutual, i.e., they must or owing, subsist be between same parties same or right capаcity, must be of same kind or quality). the master’s decision is PART, AFFIRMED IN REVERSED IN PART.
TOAL, C.J., BURNETT, JJ., WALLER and concur. PLEICONES, J., in a dissenting separate opinion. dissenting: Justice PLEICONES the Court held that the Assembly General could not, doctrine, consonant with the enact a order to overturn the in a had result case we Co., already decided. Lindsay Nat’l Old Line Ins. words, In other the cannot, enactment, by legislative overrule our interpretation a statute. Boatwright McElmurray, years, Over the several past Lindsay Assembly’s been construed as limitation on the General authority to amend a and to have that amendment I of these retroactively.3 joined While have several *6 decisions, I that this of reading Lindsay, have come to believe could not Assembly lеgisla- which held that the only General decision, overly is broad. See tively reverse Court’s 1510, 298, 511 114 128 Roadway Express, Rivers v. U.S. S.Ct. course, the power 274 of has to (1994)(“Congress, L.Ed.2d It a that it believes we have misconstrued. amend bounds, even, make such а may broad constitutional within undo what it to be thereby perceives retroactive and change a of its consequences misinterpretation the undesirable of past work product”). statutory applies retroactively a amendment
Whether
and
ordinarily
statutory
interpreta-
a matter of
construction
tion,
Assembly
The
has the
not of constitutional law.
General
statutes,
to amend
and to determine whether the
authority
occurring
to matters
before its effec-
applies
general
“statutory
tive date. The
rule is that
enactments are
rather
than retroactive unless
prospective
be considered
legisla-
a
in the enactment or clear
speсific provision
there is
However,
stat-
contrary,
tive intent to
[citation omitted].
are
procedural
generally
utes
are remedial or
nature
which
Dep’t
held to
South Carolina
operate retrospectively.”
оf
Machines, Inc.,
25,
339
528
Rosemary
Rev. v.
S.C.
Coin
(2000).
limit on retroactivi-
only
The
constitutional
and
ty
process guarantees,
in a civil context4 derives from due
Const,
4,
I, §
prohibiting
passage
from S.C.
art.
law
that
of contract or
impairing
obligation
“has the effect of
divesting
rights
property.” E.g.,
vested
of
Schumacher
(1955).
77,
Chapin, 228 S.C.
The doctrine power authority frоm of anoth- government usurping Resources, 348 Dep’t er. Knotts v. Carolina Natural South legislature’s It is not the S.E.2d response judicial interpretation amendment of a statute in to a doctrine, offends the but rather our limitation on the which that Assembly’s authority General decide whether be effect. As held in change given retroactive Boatwright, power “the to amend *7 plenary statutes.”
In use my opinion, opportunity we should this to abandon and return to the Lindsay retroactivity jurisprudence our case, however, rules of construction. In this need not decide the amendment to whether procedural 29-5-10 was or remedial and thus should be effect. established the given retroactive rule that entitlement to costs is tо be determined costs, if effect at the time the suit is decided and the Brooks, I any, are to be awarded. Irwin that, in intent to the legislative would hold the absence contrary, statutory attorneys entitlement fees should be to the statute in effect at the time the determined final entered. Id. I therefore affirm the respondent. fees to master’s award respectfully I therefore dissent.