JPMC v. CochranJPMC v. Cochran
David N. Patterson, 33579 Euclid Avenue, Willoughby, OH 44094 (For Defendants-Appellants).
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J.
{¶1} Appellants, James and Barbara Cochran, appeal from the July 3, 2014 judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, confirming a foreclosure sale. On appeal, appellants raise a standing argument. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶3} On December 2, 2010, JPMC filed a complaint against appellants seeking the balance due on the promissory note ($165,987.26) and to foreclose on the mortgage that secured its repayment.1 Attached to the complaint were the note, mortgage, January 4, 2007 assignment, and loan modification agreement. Appellants filed an answer on January 14, 2011. The trial court referred the matter to mediation which was unsuccessful.
{¶4} On June 6, 2012, JPMC filed a motion for summary judgment.2 Appellants did not oppose that motion. On April 30, 2013, the trial court granted the summary judgment motion and entered a decree of foreclosure and judgment against appellants in the amount of $165,987.26 plus interest. The foreclosure decree included
{¶6} At 9:23 a.m. on October 15, 2013, 37 minutes before the foreclosure sale was set to occur and before the trial court ruled on appellants’ October 8 motions, Mr. Cochran filed for voluntary bankruptcy protection under
{¶7} After the sheriff‘s sale but before its confirmation, JPMC provided the trial court with notice of Mr. Cochran‘s bankruptcy proceeding. Thereafter, the trial court stayed the foreclosure action. On February 4, 2014, upon Mr. Cochran‘s request, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed his case, thereby validating the October 15, 2013 foreclosure sale and permitting the action to proceed.
{¶8} On March 4, 2014, appellants filed a motion to stay execution of the judgment and confirmation of the sheriff‘s sale. The trial court denied appellants’ motion the next day.
{¶9} On March 13, 2014, the trial court also denied appellants’
{¶11} “The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Appellants by entering judgment in favor of the Appellee and denying the Motion to Set Aside as the Appellee failed to proffer competent, credible evidence to properly and sufficiently establish standing and that it was the real party in interest.”
{¶12} At the outset, we note that under
{¶13} As stated, appellants never appealed the foreclosure decree, despite its
{¶14} Thereafter, the trial court confirmed the foreclosure sale on July 3, 2014. The present appeal, Case No. 2014-A-0048, was filed from that order. In fact, the only judgment attached to their notice of appeal is that July 3, 2014 order. However, appellants do not assign error relating to the order of confirmation. Rather, appellants raise a single assignment alleging that JPMC lacked standing to foreclose the mortgage.
{¶16} Following a split among the districts, the Supreme Court of Ohio in 2012 ultimately dismissed the Suster analysis as non-binding, noting its plurality status. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017. The Court held in Schwartzwald that the issue of standing can be raised at anytime during the pendency of the proceedings. Id. at ¶22. Pursuant to Schwartzwald, at ¶21-22, standing is required to present a justiciable controversy and is a jurisdictional requirement. The Court held that since standing is required to invoke the trial court‘s jurisdiction, standing is determined as of the filing of the complaint. Id. at ¶24. The mortgage holder must establish an interest in the mortgage or promissory note in order to have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Id. at ¶28. The Court further held that “a litigant cannot pursuant to
{¶17} Arguments have been made that Schwartzwald is ambiguous. However, the issue of whether or not Schwartzwald equates standing with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction has most recently been addressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275. In clarifying its holding in Schwartzwald, the Court in Kuchta held that while standing is a jurisdictional requirement in that a party‘s lack of standing will prevent him from invoking the court‘s jurisdiction over his action, a party‘s ability to invoke the court‘s jurisdiction involves the court‘s jurisdiction over a particular case, not subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at ¶22.
{¶18} Specifically, the Court in Kuchta stated the following at ¶17-23:
{¶19} “* * * It is true that the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time and that a court‘s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders that court‘s judgment void ab initio. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, * * * ¶11. But * * * a court of common pleas that has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action does not lose that jurisdiction merely because a party to the action lacks standing.
{¶20} “The general term ‘jurisdiction’ can be used to connote several distinct concepts, including jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over the person, and jurisdiction over a particular case. Id. at ¶11-12. The often unspecified use of this polysemic word can lead to confusion and has repeatedly required clarification as to which type of ‘jurisdiction’ is applicable in various legal analyses. * * *
{¶21} “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to entertain and adjudicate a particular class of cases. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 * * * (1972). A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case. Suster, [supra, at] 75; Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 366, 370 (1881). A court‘s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court‘s authority to proceed or rule on a case that is within the court‘s subject-matter
{¶22} “* * * Ohio‘s common pleas courts are endowed with ‘original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters (* * *) as may be provided by law.’
{¶23} “* * *
{¶24} “Standing is certainly a jurisdictional requirement; a party‘s lack of standing vitiates the party‘s ability to invoke the jurisdiction of a court—even a court of competent subject-matter jurisdiction—over the party‘s attempted action. Schwartzwald at ¶22; Tubbs Jones, 84 Ohio St.3d at 77 * * *; State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 178, * * * (1973). But an inquiry into a party‘s ability to invoke a court‘s jurisdiction speaks to jurisdiction over a particular case, not subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶25} “A determination of standing necessarily looks to the rights of the individual parties to bring the action, as they must assert a personal stake in the outcome of the action in order to establish standing. Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dep‘t. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, * * * ¶27. Lack of standing is certainly a fundamental flaw that would require a court to dismiss the action,
{¶26} As stated, appellants filed the present appeal from the July 3, 2014 order confirming the sale. Generally, the only arguments properly before this court would be those related to the procedures employed in the sale and whether the court abused its discretion in confirming the sale. Deutsche Bank Natl. Co. v. Caldwell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100594, 2014-Ohio-2982, ¶18. Appellants’ sole assignment of error, however, concerns JPMC‘s alleged lack of standing to foreclose the mortgage. Nevertheless, because standing “‘can be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceedings,‘” we will consider appellants’ standing argument. Schwartzwald, supra, at ¶22.
{¶27} The record establishes that Mr. Cochran executed a promissory note in favor of Argent Mortgage Company, LLC on March 29, 2004. The note was secured by a mortgage, signed by Mr. and Mrs. Cochran. The mortgage was recorded one week later. On January 4, 2007, the mortgage was assigned to JPMC. The assignment was recorded one week later. On November 7, 2008, the parties entered into a loan modification agreement which increased the amount owed. On December 2, 2010, JPMC filed a complaint against appellants. Attached to the complaint were the note, mortgage, January 4, 2007 assignment, and loan modification agreement.
{¶28} Upon review, because the mortgage was assigned to JPMC before it filed its complaint, JPMC had standing to foreclose. See Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Hentley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99252, 2013-Ohio-3150, ¶25 (“a party may establish its interest in the suit, and therefore have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court when, at the time it files its complaint of foreclosure, it either (1) has had a mortgage assigned or (2) is the holder of the note.“); Schwartzwald, supra, at ¶28.
{¶29} Appellants also attack the sufficiency and credibility of the affidavits submitted by JPMC in support of its motion for summary judgment.
{¶30}
{¶31} Mr. Jeffrey‘s and Ms. Reichardt‘s affidavits indicate that they are Vice Presidents of JPMC and are authorized to make the affidavits on its behalf. As such, they have access to and are able to review the business records relating to appellants’ loan. Mr. Jeffrey and Ms. Reichardt averred that they were over the age of 18 and competent to testify; had reviewed JPMC‘s records; that they had personal knowledge of how the records were kept and maintained; that the records were kept in the ordinary course of regularly-conducted business activities; that the documents attached to their affidavits were true and accurate copies; and that JPMC was assigned the mortgage prior to and at the time of filing the complaint. They also provided information about appellants’ default and the sums owed as a result of that default. Attached to their affidavits were copies of the note and mortgage.
{¶32} We find Mr. Jeffrey‘s and Ms. Reichardt‘s affidavits sufficient under
{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ sole assignment of error is not well-taken. The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.