OPINION AND ORDER
This action presents another strand in the web of litigation surrounding the alleged accounting fraud and eventual bankruptcy of the telecommunications company Global Crossing, Ltd. (“GC”). Plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank brings this action on behalf of a syndicate of commercial banks (“the Banks”) against various officers, directors, and employees of GC in connection with a series of loans extended to GC between August 17, 2001, and September 28, 2001, pursuant to a credit agreement entered into in August 2000 (the “Credit Agreement”). The Banks claim that GC made intentional and negligent misrepresentations to the Banks regarding the company’s compliance with certain financial covenants in the Credit Agreement in order to mislead the Banks into continuing to extend the company credit. Plaintiffs seek $1.7 billion in damages. Defendants now move for dismissal of, or in the alternative, for summary judgment against, the plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted in part; as to the remaining claims, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
The relevant facts, which are drawn from the complaint except where otherwise noted, are as follows. On August 10, 2000, the Banks entered into a Credit Agreement with GC to extend a total of $2.25 billion of credit to GC, $1.7 billion of which was in the form of. a credit facility (or line of credit) (the “Credit Facility”) and the remainder of which was in the form of a term loan. Under the terms of the Credit Agreement, the Banks agreed to extend credit to GC up to the $1.7 billion limit provided in the Credit Facility, provided a GC officer certified that the company was in compliance with the covenants and the other terms of the Credit Agreement at the time of each borrowing. Failure to comply with the covenants in the agreement would result in a default, terminating GC’s line of credit and causing all of its debt under the Credit Agreement (including the term loan and any amount extended under the Credit Facility) to come immediately due. Under the agreement, each loan request was “deemed” a “representation and warranty” by GC that no “event of default” had occurred. (See Jacobson Deck Ex. A, Credit Agreement § 4.02.) The Banks also secured the right under the Credit Agreement to inspect GC’s books and records “upon reasonable prior notice ... and as often as reasonably requested.” (Id. § 5.07.)
Whether or not the company was in compliance with its covenants was to be determined in part by calculating its “Total Leverage Ratio,” or, the ratio of its debt to a specific measure of its earnings styled as “four-quarter trailing consolidated earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization” (“Consolidated EBITDA”). GC was required to maintain a Total Leverage Ratio below 4.75 during the relevant time period, meaning that GC’s debt could not exceed 4.75 times its Consolidated EBITDA. Consolidated EBITDA, as defined in the Credit Agreement, included regular recurring income booked under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), as well as “deferred revenue,” which consisted of income received that could not, in accordance with GAAP, be booked in the current accounting period. The use of Consolidated EBITDA as a measure was significant in that a main source of GC’s revenue was sales of “indefeasible rights of use” (“IRU”), the right to use capacity on its fiber-optic network for a specified time period. Under GAAP, revenue from IRU sales could not be booked up front, but rather, had to be amortized over the life of the IRU. By including deferred revenue in Consolidated EBITDA, the company was able to report revenue from the IRU sales up front, thus increasing its total reported income and decreasing its Total Leverage Ratio.
The complaint alleges' that following a slowdown in the telecommunications industry in late 2000 due to a glut of capacity on the market, GC began engaging in “improper reciprocal trades of IRUs with other distressed participants in the industry.” (Comply 14.) These reciprocal transactions, or “swaps” of capacity, would typically involve a sale of capacity to another telecom provider in exchange for that provider’s agreement to purchase capacity from GC of an equivalent stated value; each company would then be able to book the revenue from the sale. In fact, the complaint alleges, these transactions were “of little to no value to [GC],” as the capacity purchased was unnecessary and the income created by the sales was artificial; they were entered solely in order to create the appearance of revenue, to inflate the Consolidated EBITDA, and thus to meet the company’s debt covenants and
Reporting revenue from the improper swaps up front and including it in its Consolidated EBITDA successfully deceived the Banks into believing that GC was financially solvent, when in fact it was on the brink of financial collapse. “The artificial revenue became a significant enough portion of [GC’s] Consolidated EBITDA to make the Defendants’ certifications false” beginning with financial statements submitted at the end of. the fourth quarter of 2000 (Comply 15), and allowed the company to continue to draw on its Credit Facility until it had reached the $1.7 billion maximum under the agreement at the end of September 2001. On the basis of GC’s inclusion of revenue from swaps in its 2000 annual report on Form 10-K and in its quarterly reports for the first three quarters of 2001, the Banks now bring claims against defendants for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, as well as related claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting. Defendants move for dismissal of all claims for failure to allege any actionable misrepresentations, and in the alternative, for summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiffs could not reasonably have relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Leeds v. Meltz,
B. Actionable Misrepresentations
The defendants’ principal argument on their motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims, and their sole argument on plaintiffs’ fraud claims in particular, is that the plaintiffs have failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation on the part of the defendants. In order to state a claim for fraud under New York law, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a “material misrepresentation or omission of fact.”
Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Andy Warhol,
The defendants’ arguments on this front are unconvincing, because disclosure of these transactions did not put the plaintiffs on notice of the underlying fraud. Plaintiffs do not claim that the defendants failed to disclose the existence of reciprocal capacity trades; indeed, as plaintiffs concede, the existence of such transactions was known to the Banks when they entered into the Credit Agreement in August 2000. (P. Opp.5.) Nor do they claim that reciprocal transactions are intrinsically improper: the Banks do not contest that, as the defendants have argued, such arrangements could serve the legitimate business purpose of allowing telecommunications companies to avoid unnecessary capital construction costs by engaging in mutual trades of capacity. Rather, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim is that beginning in the fourth quarter of 2000, GC’s transactions had no purpose other than to create the appearance of revenue. As such, they had no legitimate business justification, and GC’s reporting of the revenue derived from them was inherently false and misleading. It is therefore immaterial that defendants’ first and second quarter 10-Qs disclosed the existence of reciprocal transactions, as that is not what plaintiffs allege them to have misrepresented. 3
As a matter of pleading, plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the defendants’ financial statements in their 2000 10-K and their first and second quarter 10-Qs included revenue figures that were materially false and misleading (or, stated differently, that they omitted the material fact that the transactions in question were shams), and that these falsehoods were perpetrated in order to preserve the company’s ability to draw on a line of credit that was increasingly necessary for its day-to-day survival. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on these grounds is therefore denied. 4
C. Claims against “Reporting Defendants”
Defendants next challenge the plaintiffs’ claims (second and sixth causes of action) against two of the so-called “Reporting Defendants,” Susan Dullabh and Thomas Robershaw, for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations based on their signing of GCs borrowing requests submitted over the two-month period in question. The plaintiffs allege that because each borrowing requests was “deemed” a representation by GC that it remained in compliance with its covenants, when in fact it was not, the individual officers signing such re
If defendants were correct, the provision of the Credit Agreement deeming the borrowing requests to be representations about the company’s financial condition would be meaningless. This provision represented a bargained-for agreement between two sophisticated business entities. By allowing the Banks to rely on each borrowing request as a renewed representation that GC’s covenants remained satisfied, these requests served as a proxy for a more thorough, and undoubtedly more onerous, reporting requirement. This clearly operated to GC’s benefit in terms of ease of drawing on its credit. In turn, it provided important protection for the Banks in the event that such representations should prove false. Having so clearly benefitted from this provision, GC cannot now escape from its burdens by resort to the lame argument that the borrowing requests did not amount to a “facial misrepresentations.” Nothing in the law of misrepresentation requires courts to ignore the context in which a representation was' made, or the fact that it was only considered a “representation” pursuant to a separate contract between the parties. The Banks had every right to rely on these requests at the time they were made as “representations,” as they were understood under the Credit Agreement’s terms, and to have them legally construed as such in a subsequent tort claim for fraud. 5
Defendants’ further argument that Dullabh and Robershaw cannot be held liable because they were not parties to the Credit Agreement, and therefore did not agree to “deem” the requests representations of compliance, is equally devoid of support. The one case defendants cite,
Lemer v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union,
D. Negligent Misrepresentation and Related Claims
In addition to arguing that plaintiffs fail to assert an actionable misrepresentation for purposes of any of its claims, defendants further assert a specific challenge to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims. Defendants argue that these claims are deficient for two related reasons; first, that no “special relationship” existed between the Banks and the defendants such that the defendants were under a legal duty to speak with care, and second, that a purely contractual relationship cannot support a negligent misrepresentation claim. Defendants are correct.
Under New York law, in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff is required to allege that the speaker is bound to the other party “by some relation or duty of care.”
Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp.,
Plaintiffs argue that the Credit Agreement itself established the elements of a “special relationship” required by New York law:
(1) an awareness by the maker of the statement that it is to be used for a particular purpose; (2) reliance by a known party on the statement in furtherance of that purpose; and (3) some conduct by the maker of the statement linking it to the relying party and evincing its understanding of that reliance.
Doehla,
Kimmell,
relied on by plaintiffs, is not to the contrary.
Kimmell
explains that “[i]n a commercial context, a duty to speak with care exists when ‘the relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, [is] such that in morals and good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other for the- information.’”
Kimmell,
Plaintiffs also argue, however, that they have met the requirement of pleading a special relationship by alleging that the defendants “possessed specialized expertise, knowledge, and experience concerning [GC’s] accounting and actual financial condition.” (P. Opp.10.) According to plaintiffs, because the defendants were “far more knowledgeable about the fiber optic cable business, and particularly the structure and specific capacity needs of [GC’s] fiber optic network” than the Banks, the Banks were “absolutely entitled to rely upon Defendants’ representations in this regard.”
(Id.
at 11.) But this amounts to nothing more than knowledge of the particulars of the company’s business — and of the true situation underlying the misrepresentations pertaining to that business. This does not constitute the type of “specialized knowledge” that is required in order to impose a duty of care in the commercial context; if it were, every bank would have a claim against every borrower who failed to exercise due care in the context of commercial bank loans.
See LaSalle,
Finally, plaintiffs argue that at the very least, the question of whether a special relationship exists is a question of fact. It is true that several cases have so characterized it.
See, e.g., Suez Equity Inves
In each of these cases, the facts alleged in the complaint could fairly be read to justify a finding of a special relationship of trust and confidence, above that created by the contracts involved.
9
By contrast, where no such allegations have existed, courts have not hesitated to dismiss negligent representation claims on motions to dismiss. For instance, In
LaSalle Bank,
a mortgage loan purchaser charged that the seller had misrepresented the status of various mortgages purchased. The court rejected the argument that the defendant had a duty, “separate and distinct from its contractual one, to impart correct information based on [its] unique knowledge or access to information” about the mortgage loans in question.
Because plaintiffs’ fraud claims survive, the Court will now turn to defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these remaining claims.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Standard, for Summary Judgment
For their summary judgment motion, which was filed prior to discovery, defendants rely solely on financial reports and other documents available in the public record.
10
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute and when, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could disagree as to the outcome of the case.
See Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
B. Fraud Claims
With respect to plaintiffs’ fraud claims, defendants assert that the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. The crux of their argument is that, even accepting arguendo that the financial reports provided to the Banks were in themselves sufficiently false and misleading to survive the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ claims would fail because the Banks had access to information sufficient to put them on notice of the alleged falsehoods. Such access would have triggered a “duty to inquire” negating the reasonableness of the Banks’ reliance on those representations. The Banks’ information, according to defendants, derived from two sources: (1) GC’s
1. Test for Reliance and the Duty to Inquire
In order to prevail on a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation under New York law, plaintiffs must show that the defendants made a false representation of a material fact to the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were injured as a result of justifiable reliance upon that representation.
Dallas Aerospace,
As a threshold matter, plaintiffs assert that the proper test for reliance is not “reasonable” reliance, but “justifiable” reliance, which they argue is a less demanding burden. Although it is true that some cases use the language of “justifiable” reliance,”
see e.g., Christophides,
the distinction is hardly ‘ clear. Rather, it appears that the cases use these terms somewhat interchangeably.
See, e.g., Banque Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat’l Bank,
In addition, “[a] heightened degree of diligence is required where the victim of fraud had hints of its falsity.”
Christophides,
The parties’ legal dispute concerns the precise circumstances that trigger this duty to inquire. At oral argument and in a subsequent round of supplemental briefing on this subject (and to a lesser degree in their motion papers), defendants have argued that the duty to inquire is triggered as soon as a plaintiff has nay “hints of falsity,” or any information indicating that the statements
“may be
false.”
(See
D. Reply 6, citing
Christophides,
With respect to the appropriate legal standard, it is true that the language in some of the cases cited is quite strong.
See, e.g., Grumman,
These cases fall into two rough categories. The first are those in which a sophisticated party performs no independent investigation whatsoever, even when the context or background information available should arouse suspicion. As Judge Friendly noted, “[decisions holding that reliance on misrepresentations was not justified are generally cases in which plaintiff was placed on guard or practically faced with the facts.”
Mallis,
The second group of cases are those in which a term of a contract central to the plaintiffs claim explicitly disavows or contradicts any representation on the subject of the supposed misrepresentation. For example, in
Dallas Aerospace,
Viewed together, the facts of these cases do not support the interpretation that a duty to inquire is necessarily triggered as soon as a plaintiff has the slightest “hints” of any “possibility” of falsehood. In each of these cases, the notice to the plaintiff was clear and direct: it was either provided by plaintiffs own direct knowledge of the fraud, by the terms of an operative contract, or by circumstances surrounding the parties’ relationship
(e.g.
litigation) that would normally arouse suspicion. In each of these circumstances, the plaintiff may be said to have been “placed on guard or practically faced with the facts” of the complained of fraud,
Mallis,
2. Information Available in GC’s Books and Records
Defendants’ first argument is that the Banks, as sophisticated lenders with the “means” to discover the alleged falsehood, are foreclosed from claiming reasonable
This case is therefore distinguishable from those cases in which the plaintiff utterly failed to examine the defendants’ representations or to perform due diligence in entering the challenged transaction in the first place.
See, e.g., Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Insurance Co.,
Defendants effectively argue that GC’s own financial statements, which claimed to show that the company was in compliance with its covenants, were so transparently false — or at least, that the assumptions on which they were based were so apparently questionable — that no reasonable banker would have lent GC a penny without conducting further inquiry into their accuracy. That argument cannot, on this record, support summary judgment. A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the financial documents provided would not, on their face, have alerted the Banks to potential fraud. Just as disclosing the existence of reciprocal transactions does not amount to disclosure of the underlying fraud, neither would it necessarily have put the plaintiffs on notice that they should have investigated whether the reciprocal transactions were shams. Financial reports disclosing revenue from reciprocal transactions are quite different from those reports or documents held in other cases to have put plaintiffs on notice, such as the financial report in
Abrahami
showing “$54 cash on hand.”
Moreover, even had the Banks exercised their right to inspect' GC’s books, there is no evidence on the present record that they necessarily had the means to discover the fraud. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not precluded from claiming reliance if the facts allegedly misrepresented are “peculiarly within the [defendant’s] knowledge.”
Mallis,
Finally, defendants argue that reasonable reliance is impossible, because the Banks had bargained for the right to examine GC’s books and records but failed to exercise that right. There is no such bright-line rule, even where sophisticated entities are concerned. Under defendants’ reasoning, whenever a party bargains for a right which, if exercised, might provide the means to discover a concealed falsehood, it must exercise that right in every instance or risk extinguishing its remedies. Such a rule would not be realistic. Rather, the obligation to exercise the right of inspection must be understood as contingent on either
“indisputable access
to truth-revealing information,”
Doehla,
The defendants argue that information external to the financial reports themselves, namely the company’s plummeting stock price and negative public reports on GC issued during the relevant time period by financial analysts, should have raised sufficient questions about the swaps to trigger the Banks’ duty to inquire. This argument is more persuasive, and if defendants’ bright-line “hints of falséhood” test were the correct legal standard, the duty to inquire might well have been triggered. Information was readily available from a variety of credible and knowledgeable public sources casting doubt on both the value of the reported swap revenue and the company’s financial prospects overall. But, as established above, that is not the standard. Rather, the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ reliance hinges on whether, on these facts, a reasonable lender of equivalent experience should have inquired further. To prevail on summary judgment, defendants must establish that only one answer to this question is possible.
The most obvious indicator of impending troubles was GC’s stock price, which had plummeted from $29.19 a share at the time the Agreement was finalized to $4.98 a share, an 83% decline, when the Banks began lending money to GC under the Credit Facility on August 17, 2001; by the date of the last loan, it had declined to $1.80, a 94% decline. In addition, during the six weeks in which the Banks made their loans, GC’s bonds lost between 35 and 55% of their value. (Id. Ex. DD, EE.) This decline was mirrored by a similar decline in stock prices in the telecommunications industry in general, which had declined by a median of 86% between the date of the Agreement and September 30, 2001. (Id. Ex. HH.)
Analysts’ reports, too, raised significant red flags. For example, on August 3, 2001, a Lehman Brothers report explained, “[t]he optimistic view of [swaps] is that [GC] needed the capacity ... in parts of the world where its network wasn’t built out, and the $358M supplants capex that would have been spent to build out the network. The pessimistic view is that [GC] needs to spend this cash to solicit the business of other carriers, without which it would not be able to hit its numbers.” (Jacobson Decl. Ex. F.) Under the heading “2Q Results Weak: Lowering Rating to Hold From a Buy,” Credit Suisse First Boston described “disappointing recurring [revenues], and increased dependence on [revenues] derived from capacity swaps,” and noted, “given that swap revenues are difficult to equate to market price levels and, this quarter, were so large (21% of revenues]), we are concerned that the quality of revenues was weaker than we had anticipated.”
(Id.
Ex. B.) Merrill Lynch commented, “[w]hile we see capacity sales as staying stronger than many analysts have predicted, the fact that capacity/IRU sales make up a larger proportion of total revenues will nonetheless raise concerns over future growth rates and also cash flows.... Note also that capacity sales seemed to include a substantial contribution for capacity exchanged with other carriers.”
(Id.
Ex.I.) During the same period, Moody’s, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, and Standard and Poors all either downgraded GC stock or
However, as plaintiffs are quick to point out, the news on the street was not entirely negative, and many analysts’ reports were either steadfastly positive or distinctly mixed. First Union Securities, for example, commented that GC “views its commitments to purchase services as capex spending for reasonably priced network elements it would otherwise build. We believe that this is a reasonable explanation, however, we approach intercarrier revenue or swaps with what we believe is an appropriate amount of skepticism, as it is difficult to determine how much [of GC’s] spending is in direct exchange for other carriers’ decision to purchase services on [GC’s] network.” (Id. Ex. C.) In response to GC’s disclosure of a particular capacity trade, Piper Jaffray Equity Research Notes remarked that “[t]he market has viewed this transaction as a capacity swap rather than a true sale of capacity. While we disagree, the market does not seem to care, as it is looking for the bad in every telecom services earnings report and ignoring any good news.” (Id. Ex. G.) On August 13, Goldman Sachs wrote:
In response to the quarter, some concerns were also raised about revenues that [GC] collects from operators from which [GC] also purchases various types of network capacity (representing capital expenditures.) Critics term these transactions “swaps” and discount the quality of these revenues. Their concern is that the transaction only occurs as a way to fabricate revenues.... Our view is that these transactions for [GC] make sense, they are a normal part of operations (all carriers buy and sell to one another)[,] they will continue for [GC] and the industry, and that the accounting is correct.... [GC] is rare in actually disclosing what portion of its revenues is negotiated in connection with capex purchases that it makes. So its disclosure goes beyond standard accounting practices, and sheds a bright light on its operations.... Yes, Global Crossing is using, like most carriers, capacity purchases as an incentive to drive revenues. We’ve spoken to other carriers that explicitly put capacity purchase requirements in RFPs, in order to sell their own capacity as they fulfill their network requirements with other service providers. While transactions between carriers raises [sic ] the potential for abuse in the reporting of revenue, we see none of that in [GC’s] operations.
(Id. Ex. H.) In conclusion, Goldman Sachs gave GC an “[o]verall positive rating.” (Id.) On August 24, under the heading “Unreasonable Low Valuation Despite Superb Industry Positioning,” Deutsche Banc noted that “unfortunately, every carrier uses swaps or pseudo swaps to create their network over time. In [GC’s] case, the ‘swaps’ number was high, which the company acknowledged and disclosed. We note no other companies have done this.... We believe the lesser of two evils is swapping to create a network versus increasing CapEx to build from scratch.” (Id. Ex. K.) It reiterated its “[v]ery positive rating.” (Id.) Thus, even while some analysts had raised serious questions, their conclusions were ultimately mixed.
A reasonable jury could conceivably find that the prevailing view among analysts was negative, and that the totality of the circumstances should have put the plaintiffs on inquiry notice. But the appropriate reaction of a lending institution under these circumstances, when confronted with GC’s official declaration of substantial revenue and continued representations that it was in compliance with its covenants, is for a jury to determine. AI-
On balance, the question of what a sophisticated lender should have done when faced with the available information is one about which reasonable people could easily differ. Even if the Banks had launched an inquiry, it is not clear on the present facts that they could have discovered the alleged fraud. Defendants continue to dispute that there was any fraud to discover, and would surely have taken the same position had inquiry been made in 2001; no doubt, the truth will still be in dispute after extensive investigation through the discovery phase of this action. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the Banks’ reliance was unreasonable (or unjustified) because a sophisticated lender could have protected itself by making reasonable inquiries. Where “the reasonableness of rebanee depends upon factual determinations that are not plain from a review of the complaint and its attachments or that remain in dispute after discovery, the fraud claim should not be summarily dismissed on that ground.”
Doehla,
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint iá granted'as to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims (fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action), and denied as to plaintiffs’ fraud claims (first through fourth causes of action). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these remaining claims is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Defendants do not challenge the plaintiffs’ pleading on the other elements of a claim for fraud under New York law on their motion to dismiss. Those elements are knowledge of falsity, intent to defraud, reasonable reliance, and causation.
Schlaifer Nance,
. Defendants also reference disclosures made in press releases issued prior to the time-
. The defendants' argument that the revelations in the first and second quarter 10-Qs "superseded” any falsehoods in the 2000 10-K by revealing the existence of swaps is therefore irrelevant. Even if the quarterly statements corrected any past non-disclosure of existing swaps, this would not have made a difference because, as stated above, the issue was the nature of the swaps and not their existence.
- Defendants have not raised any defenses specific to plaintiffs’ claims for aiding and abetting fraud (third cause of action) or conspiracy to commit fraud (fourth cause of action), but have merely argued that these claims "cannot survive if the underlying claims are deficient.” (D.Br.9.) Because plaintiffs' underlying claims for fraud withstand the motion to dismiss, these ancillary claims survive as well.
. The fact that the reports did not contain “facial misrepresentations" is, however, relevant to the question of whether the Banks were on inquiry notice of the fraud. See infra Part II.C.2.
. Defendants’ attempt to distinguish
Cohen
is unavailing. Defendants argue that the Banks have not alleged that Dullabh and Robershaw had knowledge of the fraud, as plaintiffs have "acknowledged] was required in
Cohen v. Koenig."
(D. Reply 10.) But
Cohen
states that "[o]fficers and directors of a corporation may be held liable for fraud if they
participate in it or have actual knowledge
of it."
. Defendants also attempt to distinguish
In re Symbol Technologies Securities Litigation,
. Defendants do not challenge plaintiffs’ pleadings with respect to the other elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation, which are "(1) carelessness in imparting words; (2) upon which others were expected to rely; (3) and upon which they did act or failed to act; (4) to their damage.” Dallas Aerospace, 352 F.3d 775, 788 (2d Cir.2003).
. The other case cited by plaintiff,
Goodman Mfg. Co. L.P. v. Raytheon Co.,
No. 98 Civ. 2774(LAP),
. The evidence relied upon is limited to the text of the Credit Agreement; certain GC disclosures during 2001; certain press reports during the same period; securities analysts’ reports about GC; the market prices of GC's stock and the stocks of other telecom companies; and the GC Plan of Reorganization filed with the Bankruptcy Court. (See D. Br. 13; D. Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts).
. Defendants argue that the service of a JP Morgan officer, Maria Elena Lagomasino, on GC's audit committee during the relevant time period should have put the Banks on notice of the alleged fraud. This argument is without merit. First, the complaint does not charge Lagomasino with any particular knowledge. Second, there is no allegation that Lagomasino served on the GC board in her capacity as a JP Morgan officer. On the contrary, plaintiffs have provided evidence in the form of an email from an official at JP Morgan specifying the parameters of her roles with respect to the two companies: namely, that she would "not be serving at the request of [JP Morgan], but rather independently,” that her "fiduciary obligations as a director of Global and a [JP Morgan] executive are distinct from one another,” and that she "may not share with [JP Morgan] nonpublic information relating to Global ... acquired in [her] capacity as a Global director.” (Tom-back Deck Ex. A.) Any information that she might have known was therefore not chargeable to the Banks.
See New York Marine & General Ins. Co. v. Tradeline (L.L.C.),
. Plaintiffs argue that the Banks actually could not have exercised their right to inspect GC’s books, despite their contractual guarantee of that right, for fear of being sued, because they were "contractually obligated to lend — period—upon the presentation by [GC] of facially compliant documentation.” (P. Opp.23.) This cannot be the case; if it were, the bargained for right to inspect the company's books would be meaningless. "Under
