Opinion
In this foreclosure action, the defendant Ann C. Zubretsky appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her homestead exemption claim in which she sought to exempt $75,000 of the net proceeds from the voluntary sale of her home.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The defendant mortgaged to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., real property located at 16 Chapman Drive in Westbrook (property). On April 24, 2009, the plaintiff initiated a foreclosurе action on the property, claiming that the mortgage was in default.
On May 23, 2009, the defendant entered into an agreement to sell the property for $585,000. On June 11, 2009, the defendant filed a homestead exemptiоn claim seeking to exempt up to $75,000 of the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the property from Cachе’s right of recovery. Cadle opposed the defendant’s homestead claim, arguing that the defendant, through a private sale, was seeking to invoke a safeguard afforded to a judgment debtor in a proceeding brought by a judgment creditor.
On July 2, 2009, the court denied the defendant’s homestead exemption claim. On July 14, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for articulation and reargument of the court’s July 2,2009 order. The court granted the defendant’s motion, and, on September 2, 2009, the court heard reargument on the defendant’s homestead exemption claim.
On September 9, 2009, the defendant sold the property and satisfied the two mortgages held by the plaintiff. To effectuate the sale of the рroperty, Cadle agreed to release its two liens and entered into an escrow agreement with the defendant. After the defendаnt satisfied the mortgages, she had a balance of $85,522.91 from the proceeds of the sale, which was placed in escrow.
On September 16, 2009, the plaintiff withdrew the action as to all parties. On September 24, 2009, the court denied the defendant’s homestead exemption сlaim, concluding that the homestead exemption is inapplicable to voluntary sales and foreclosure of consensual liеns. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that the court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on her homestead exemption claim and in concluding that the homestead exemption is not available to protect the proceeds of a voluntary sale from a judgment lien creditor. Before we address these issues on appeal, we must first determine whether the court had subjеct matter jurisdiction to address the defendant’s homestead exemption claim on September 24, 2009.
The parties failed to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in their initial briefs to this court. We, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whethеr the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue its September 24, 2009 judgment denying the defendant’s homestead exemption claim. After reviewing the arguments presented by the parties, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the defendant’s claim.
After the court denied the defendant’s homestead exemption claim on July 2, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for articulation and reargument. On July 30, 2009, the court granted the motion. The court heard reargument on the defendant’s claim but beforе it issued a decision, the plaintiff withdrew the action. “Under [the] law, the effect of a withdrawal, so far as the pendency of the action is concerned, is strictly analogous to that presented after the rendition of a final judgment or the erasure of the case from the docket. . . . The court unless [the action] is restored to the docket cannot proceed with it further . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotatiоn marks omitted.) Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Twine,
The defendant argues that the court had subject matter jurisdiction on September 24, 2009, because, before the plaintiff withdrew the action, both she and Cadle requested that the court retain jurisdiction to rule on her homestead exemption claim. Even if motivated by a desire to resolve the dispute, the court did not have the authority to grant this request. “[T]he parties to an action cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court by their consent, silence, waiver or private agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lowe v. Lowe,
Thе judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Connecticut’s homesteаd exemption is codified at General Statutes § 52-352b (t). Section 52-352b identifies assets that are exempt from posljudgment procedures. Subsection (t) exempts “[t]he homestead of the exemptioner to the value of seventy-five thousand dollars, or, in the case of a monеy judgment arising out of services provided at a hospital, to the value of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars, provided value shall be determined as the fair market value of the real property less the amount of any statutory or consensual lien which encumbers it. . . .” Genеral Statutes § 52-352b (t).
Specifically, the plaintiff claimed an interest in the property by virtue of a mortgage in the amount of $194,250, which was recorded on the West-brook land records on April 10, 2001, and a second mortgage in the amount of $261,500, which was recorded on June 24, 2004.