Jozens v. StateJozens v. State
Terrance Jozens appeals his convictions and sentences for battery and for committing a lewd and lascivious act, arguing that the convictions were predicated upon fundamentally defective charges. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
A two-count information charged that Jozens:
COUNT I: ... did commit a sexual battery upon a person eleven (11) years or younger, to-wit: [name], 6 or 7 years of age, by penile union or penetration of mouth, anus or vagina, or digital penetration of anus or vagina, in violation of
Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes .
COUNT II: ... did unlawfully and knowingly commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, to-wit: [name], age 6 or 7 years, by committing a sexual battery
upon said child, in violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes .
The victim, who was seven years old at the time of trial, described three separate incidents.
The jury found Jozens guilty as charged under Count II, and, under Count I, found him guilty of the lesser included offense of battery. He now asserts that both counts as charged are fundamentally defective, arguing for reversal despite the failure to raise the matter below. We will address the counts in order.
Under Count I, Jozens was charged pursuant to
(2) A person 18 years or older who commits sexual battery upon, or injures the sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon such person commits a capital felony, punishable as provided in
ss. 775.082 and921.141 ... .
In tracking the language of the statute, Count I adequately alleged the charge of sexual battery. See Budd v. State, 477 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Jozens asserts that it was error to charge multiple offenses in a single count. Any such error, however, was waived by the failure to challenge the information. Fountain v. State, 623 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 629 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1993). We affirm the judgment and sentence for battery.
In Count II, Jozens was charged with violating
(1) Handles, fondles or makes an assault upon any child under the age of 16 years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;
(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual lewd exhibition of the genitals, or any act of conduct which simulates that sexual battery is being or will be committed upon any child under the age of 15 years or forces or entices the child to commit any such act;
(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under
s. 794.011(1)(h) upon any child under the age of 16 years; or(4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child under the age of 16 years,
without committing the crime of sexual battery, commits a felony of the second degree... .1
Sections 794.011(2)-(5) of the sexual battery statute proscribe the commission of sexual battery as defined in subsection (1)(h) upon persons less than 12 years of age regardless of consent, and upon persons 12 years of age or older absent consent. “[I]ntercourse with a six-year-old child constitute[s] the crime of sexual battery regardless of unchastity or consent. By definition such activity could not be lewd and lascivious conduct under
Under
If a charging instrument completely fails to charge a crime, a conviction thereon violates due process. State v. Gray, 435 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1983). The complete failure of an information to charge a crime is a defect that can be raised at any time. Id. at 818. A conviction for a nonexistent offense is reversible fundamental error regardless of whether the issue was raised at trial. See State v. Sykes, 434 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1983) (one cannot be punished based on a judgment of guilt of a purported crime when the offense in question does not exist); Brown v. State, 550 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Herein, we find that the state‘s use of the phrase “by committing sexual battery upon said child” rendered the entire count fatally flawed. We therefore have no choice but to reverse the judgment and sentence for lewd and lascivious act as charged in Count II.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.
MICKLE and BENTON, JJ., concur.
BOOTH, J., dissents with written opinion.
BOOTH, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority‘s affirmance of the conviction under count I, battery. However, I must dissent from the majority‘s view that count II charges a nonexistent crime in violation of due process.
On appeal from his conviction, defendant challenges for the first time the wording of count II. That objection has been waived unless count II fails to charge any offense.
Although unartfully worded, count II does not completely fail to charge a crime under
I note the record shows that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to