Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 1/29/2025 LYDIA JOY,
Plaintiff,
23-CV-11177 (MMG) -against- ORDER ADOPTING
CRIME VICTIMS TREATMENT CENTER REPORT & (CVTV), RECOMMENDATION Defendant.
MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge:
On December 2, 2024, the Honorable Sarah L. Cave issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part 0F Defendant CVTC’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Dkt. No. 24. Specifically, Judge Cave [1] recommended that: (1) Plaintiff’s Title VI Claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend to address identified deficiencies; (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend; (3) CVTC’s motion to dismiss be denied as to the Section 1981 Claim; and (4) Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims be dismissed with prejudice. See R&R at 21.
A district court reviewing a report and recommendation addressing a dispositive motion
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
see also Bradley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
, No. 12-CV-
7300,
Defendant CVTC filed timely objections to the R&R. Dkt. No. 25 (the “Objections”). CVTC objects to the R&R only insofar it recommends this Court not dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and expressly disclaimed objections to all other recommendations by Judge Cave. See Objections at 1. On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a response to the Objections. Dkt. No. 26 (the “Response”). The Court has reviewed those aspects of the R&R that were not the subject of any objection for clear error and finds none. See Braunstein v. Barber , No. 06-cv-5978, 2009 WL 1542707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009) (explaining that a “district court may adopt those portions of a report and recommendation to which no objections have been made, as long as no clear error is apparent from the face of the record.”). Moreover, the Court has reviewed de novo those aspects of the R&R that were the subject of the Objections. Having reviewed the record, the parties’ submissions in connection with the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the R&R, the Objections, and the Response, the Court agrees with Judge Cave’s thoughtful and well-reasoned analysis and conclusions in full and therefore ADOPTS THE R&R IN ITS ENTIRETY.
For the reasons articulated in the R&R, CVTC’s motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s Title VI Claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies identified in pages 11-14 of the R&R; (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to amend; (3) CVTC’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Section 1981 Claim; and (4) Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No.
12 and mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.
Dated: January 29, 2025
New York, New York
SO ORDERED. MARGARET M. GARNETT United States District Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LYDIA V. JOY,
Plaintiff, -v- CIVIL ACTION NO. 23 Civ. 11177 (MMG) (SLC) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CRIME VICTIMS TREATMENT CENTER, Defendant.
SARAH L. CAVE , United States Magistrate Judge.
TO THE HONORABLE MARGARET M. GARNETT , United States District Judge:
I.INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff Lydia V. Joy asserts race and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendant Crime Victims Treatment Center (“CVTC”), which she alleges wrongfully terminated her from a professional development training program. (ECF No. 1 (the “Complaint”)). CVTC now moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 12 (the “Motion”)), which Ms. Joy has opposed. (ECF No. 18 (the “Opposition”)) . For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following facts are summarized from Ms. Joy’s Complaint and Opposition, the
allegations of which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Motion. See N.J. Carpenters
Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC,
1. The Parties Ms. Joy, who is originally from Paraguay and whose primary language is Spanish, identifies as Hispanic. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2). In December 2021, she obtained a community health worker certification from LaGuardia Community College, where she was valedictorian of her graduating class. (Id. ¶ 3). Since March 2022, Ms. Joy has been employed at Lenox Health Greenwich Village Emergency Department (the “ED”) as an Outreach Services Associate in the Infectious Diseases Department. (Id. ¶ 4). In her position in the ED, where she “was employed [] during all relevant times . . . to the present [,]” Ms. Joy worked as a health educator and counselor in the HIV program. (Id.)
CVTC is “a recipient of federal and state funding” that provides training in rape crisis and domestic violence advocacy. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 28).
2. The Training Program
At some point, o ne of Ms. Joy’s co -workers reported to the ED Director that she was impressed with Ms. Joy’s work and recommended that she be added to a special team for sexual assault survivors, known as the “SAFE Team.” ( Id. ¶ 5). To join the SAFE Team, Ms. Joy needed to complete “special training.” ( Id. ¶ 7). A social worker in the ED referred Ms. Joy to CVTC’s Rape Crisis and Domestic Violence Advocate Training and Certification (the “Training Program”), which the social worker had comp leted herself “without incident.” ( Id. ¶ 8). If she completed the Training Program and joined the SAFE Team, Ms. Joy anticipated applying to the National Advocate Credentialing Program (“NACP”) to become a bilingual sexual assault case manager or bilingual counselor, higher paying positions that would involve counseling, serving as a case manager for survivors, managing a clinical case load, developing plans with survivors, assisting in legal matters, and making referrals. (Id. ¶ 6). Ms. Joy’s “employer”— i.e., the ED — approved her participation in the Training Program. (Id. ¶ 9).
Ms. Joy registered for the Training Program with the goal of becoming an Advocate within one year. (Id. ¶ 10). She “complied with all the processes from the interview, disclosed medical forms and information forms [to] CVTC, [and] signed up in their App,” among other tasks. (Id. ¶ 11). On September 26, 2022, Ms. Joy interviewed with CVTC’s Community Programs Coordinator and one of its social workers. (Id. ¶ 15). The same day, CVTC sent Ms. Joy an acceptance letter that listed the dates on which she was to attend a total of 40 hours of training. (Id. ¶ 16). On September 29, 2022, Ms. Joy returned by email “the procedures and legal documentation” required t o enter the Training Program, including medical records, a photograph, a copy of a photo identification, “Mount Sinai ED” forms, and a HIPAA release. ( Id. ¶ 17). Ms. Joy then received a copy of CVTC’s manual and training materials along with credentials and access to CVTC’s “app.” ( Id. ¶ 18 – 19). Ms. Joy believes that she had an agreement with CVTC to provide her with 40 hours of advocate training. (Id. ¶ 28).
On October 6, 2022, Ms. Joy participated in her first session of the Training Program, which ran for three hours, and the next day, was introduced to her CVTC mentor. (Id. ¶¶ 20 – 21). Following an additional eight hours of training on October 8, 2022, Ms. Joy corresponded with
her mentor, who informed her that “[o]ne of the most critical parts of the training was ‘role plays’” that practiced introductions to survivors to form “an emotional connection [.] ” ( Id. ¶ 21). Ms. Joy “completed all her role plays in English and had good feedback [.] ” ( Id. ¶¶ 21 – 22). Ms. Joy participated in further training and role play sessions on October 9 and 12, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 25). During the role play session on October 12, 2022, CVTC’s Clinical Director commented to Ms. Joy, “I can only imagine how difficult it is for you because your primary language is Spanish[,]” and “[t]his is difficult for you because of the lack of emotional connection with the survivor due to the language barrier.” ( Id. ¶¶ 25 – 26). Another trainee who is white performed the same role play as Ms. Joy and received positive feedback, while Ms. Joy did not. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 33 ). Ms. Joy viewed Ms. Karp’s comments as racist microaggressions. ( Id. ¶¶ 25 – 26). Based on the Clinical Director’s comments, Ms. Joy believes that “CVTC only accepts survivors whose prim ary language is English into the program[.]” ( Id. ¶ 27).
On October 13, 2022, Ms. Joy participated in another role play session, following which she was told “not to return for the last 16 hours of training” and her profile was removed from the CVTC App without explanation. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 41 – 42, 45). Ms. Joy believes that she was dismissed “because her first language is not English.” ( Id. ¶ 31). Ms. Joy reported her dismissal from the Training Program to her supervisor in the ED, who commented that “her employer paid for the hours and the fact that she was dismissed from the training ‘did not look good’ in her record.” ( Id. ¶ 34). The ED, concerned that Ms. Joy would no longer qualify for the SAFE Team position, planned to open an investigation and request information from CVTC. (Id.) On October 15, 2022, Ms. Joy inquired of CVTC’s Operations Director and Head of Human Resources the reason for her dismissal from the Training Program. (Id. ¶ 45). Later the same day, she received a response from CVTC ’s Community Programs Coordinator that discussed the importance of background checks for all CVTC volunteers and stated that:
[d]uring our initial phone call, I asked whether you were taking the CVTC training in your capacity as an [ED] employee or if you had planned to become a CVTC advocate. You answered that you had hoped to become a CVTC advocate. Previous [ED] staff who enrolled in our training did so in their capacity as hospital staff and community partners, with no plans to go on call as CVTC advocates. Because you stated you were taking the training of your own volition, you were held to the same standard as every volunteer candidate that goes through our program. Based on our concerns, we determined that it would not be appropriate for you to c omplete training this year and become an advocate with CVTC. I’m happy to have a conversation with you next week to go further into how we came to this decision.
I understand this news is difficult to hear, but we have been clear since Day 1 — as well as in your advocate interview — not everyone who is invited will complete training or become a CVTC advocate.
(Id. ¶ 46 (the “Oct. 15 Email”)). Ms. Joy asserts that, contrary to the Oct. 15 Email, she told CVTC that she was participating in the Training Program “for the opportunity the certification would provide to be part of the [SAFE Team] at [the] ED.” ( Id. ¶ 47). Ms. Joy alleges that CVTC’s explanation for her dismissal “is pretextual and that the true reason for being terminated from the [T]raining [Program] was based on race and national origin discrimination.” ( Id.) Ms. Joy responded to the Oct. 15 Email with additional questions regarding her dismissal, but did not receive a response from CVTC, which she believes “constitutes an adverse inference that her dismissal . . . was based on her race and national origin[.]” ( Id. ¶¶ 48 – 49, 52). Later in October, she received from CVTC a box of “gifts” including water bottles and phone accessories, which she sent back, believing them to be “some sort of bribery to not speak up about her unlawful termination from the [T]raining [P]rogram [.]” ( Id. ¶¶ 50 – 51).
As a result of her dismissal from the Training Program, Ms. Joy was “prevented [] from pursuing a more senior position with better benefits” in the ED and “was mortified and scared that her employer [the ED] might terminate her[.]” ( Id. ¶¶ 35 – 37; see id. ¶ 41). After her dismissal, Ms. Joy sought medical attention and counseling. (Id. at 14).
B. Procedural Background
On December 9, 2022, Ms. Joy filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSHR”) and the United States Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 53). During discovery in these administrative proceedings, CVTC disclosed that of the 63 people who participated in the Training Program, 55 are of United States origin and eight from other national origins, although none are Hispanic. (Id. ¶ 55). On September 26, 2023, Ms. Joy received from the EEOC a notice of right to sue letter (the “EEOC Notice”). ( Id. ¶ 57).
On December 23, 2023, Ms. Joy filed the Complaint, in which she asserts claims under the following laws: (i) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (the “Title VI Claim”); (ii) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (the “Title VII Claim”); (iii) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (the “Section 1981 Claim” ); (iv) the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 290 et seq. (the “NYSHRL Claim”); and (v) the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 502 (the “NYCHRL Claim”). (ECF No. 1 at 2).
On April 15, 2024, CVTC filed the Motion. (ECF Nos. 12 – 14). On May 13, 2024, Ms. Joy filed the Opposition, and on May 20, 2024, CVTC filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 18; 20). On October 24, 2024, the Honorable Margaret M. Garnett referred the Motion to the undersigned for this Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 21).
III.DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “factual
allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” ATSI Commc ’ ns, Inc.
v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,
In deciding a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, “the submissions of a pro se litigant
must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
B. Application
In the Complaint, Ms. Joy asserts five race and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims: the Title VI Claim, the Title VII Claim, the Section 1981 Claim, the NYSHRL Claim, and the NYCHRL Claim. (ECF No. 1 at 2). In her Opposition, Ms. Joy concedes that her NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims should be dismissed, and, accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of both claims with prejudice. (ECF No. 18 at 1).
The Court turns to analyzing whether Ms. Joy has adequately pled claims under Title VI, Title VII, and Section 1981.
1. Title VI Claim
In support of her Title VI Claim, Ms. Joy alleges that CVTC, which receives federal funding, discriminated and retaliated against her by dismissing her from the Training Program based on her race and national origin. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 31 – 32, 47). To support an inference that her dismissal was discriminatory, Ms. Joy relies on allegations that (i) CVTC staff stated that the role play sessions were “difficult for” Ms. Joy as a Spanish-speaker, and (ii) none of CVTC’s trainees were of Hispanic origin. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25 – 26, 55 – 56). In the Motion, as explained in further depth below, CVTC argues that the Complaint does not allege facts supportive of relief under Title VI.
a. Legal Standard
“Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination based on race[ , color, or national origin] in
any program that receives federal funding.” DT v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist. ,
Title VI claims “are subject to the burden - shifting framework” established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Johnson v. N.Y. Univ., No. 17 Civ. 6184 (VEC)
(GWG), 2018 WL 3966703, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018), adopted by, 2018 WL 4908108
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018); see Lopez v. Webster Cent. Sch. Dist., 682 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279
(W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Courts have applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis to cases arising under Title VI.”); accord Koumantaros v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 03
Civ. 10170 (GEL), 2007 WL 840115, at *7 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007). The first step of that
framework requires a plaintiff to “successfully assert[ ] a prima facie case of [ ] discrimination
against” the defendant. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
(2d Cir. 2004). If a plaintiff states a prima facie case, “defendants [then] have the burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.” Id. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offer ed by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dep ’ t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine,
b. Analysis
CVTC raises three arguments in support of the Title VI Claim’s dismissal: that (1) Ms. Joy’s allegations regarding its receipt of federal funds are conclusory and therefore deficient; (2) Ms. Joy “fails to allege how Title VI applies to CVTC or her claims ” ; and (3) Ms. Joy “makes no allegations that CVTC receives federal funds aimed pri marily at providing employment.” (ECF No. 13 at 13 – 14). Ms. Joy opposes these arguments to differing degrees. (See ECF No. 18 at 4 – 10). The Court addresses them in turn.
i. Federal Funding CVTC first asserts that the Complaint “alleges only in conclusory fashion that [it] receives federal funds” and that these “mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to support Ms. Joy’s Title VI Claim. (ECF No. 13 at 13). Ms. Joy disputes that her allegations regarding federal funding are conclusory and adds that she “does not have to prove her factual allegation[s]” at the pleading stage. (See ECF No. 18 at 6).
Although Ms. Joy is correct that she need not prove her claims at this stage of the
proceedings, the Court disagrees that her allegations regarding federal funding are adequate.
Receipt of federal funds is a required element of every Title VI claim, see, e.g., Tolbert, 242 F.3d
at 69, and merely alleging, without additional information, that an entity receives such funds
therefore amounts to no more than a “ [t]hreadbare recital[] of [an] element[] of a cause of
action.” Gottesfeld,
ii. Application of Title VI to CVTC
CVTC next argues that only entities that (1) “receive[] federal funding as a whole” or
(2) receive federal funding and are “principally engaged in providing health care (or one of the
other services enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(3)(A)(ii)) ”— namely, education, housing, social
services, or parks and recreation — may be held liable under Title VI, and that the Complaint fails
to allege facts to support the law’s application under either standard. (See ECF No. 13 at 12)
(quoting Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc.,
iii. Employment Practices Theory
Finally, CVTC argues that, to the extent Title VI applies and Ms. Joy is complaining about
employment practices, it is not Ms. Joy’s employer and that, even if it were, the claim would fail.
(ECF No. 13 at 14). In support of this argument, CVTC invokes Section 2000d-3 of Title VI, which
provides that nothing in it “shall be construed to authorize action under [Title VI] by any
department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer . . . except
where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance [the employer receives] is to provide
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3. Although Section 2000d-3 refers only to agency action, the
Second Circuit has held that the statute also applies to private actions. See Ass’n Against Discr.
in Empl., Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,
* * * Consistent with the above, although the Complaint allows for an inference that Title VI applies to CVTC, it does not contain sufficient factual allegations regarding CVTC’s receipt of federal funding or suggest that CVTC may be held liable under Title VI based on its employment practices. Because t he deficiencies in Ms. Joy’s allegations may be fixable through amendments to the Complaint, however, we respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED as to the Title VI Claim but that the claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. See Verdi v. City of New York, 306 F. Supp. 3d 532, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing Title VI claim without prejudice and with leave to amend where complaint lacked sufficient allegations regarding defendant’s receipt of federal funding).
2. Title VII Claim
Ms. Joy’s Title VII Claim is premised on her assertion that CVTC was her employer and engaged in discrimination and retaliation based on her race and national origin, i.e., dismissing her from the Training Program because her primary language is Spanish. (See generally ECF No. 1). CVTC argues that it was not Ms. Joy’s employer and is not covered by Title VII. (ECF No. 13 at 9 – 11). The Court agrees that Ms. Joy has not stated, and cannot state, a claim under Title VII.
a. Legal Standard
Section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to . . . discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, . . . or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, . . . or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2. Title VII defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer[,]”
an “elliptical statutory definition” that the Second Circuit has explained has as “‘a prerequisite . . .
that the individual have been hired in the first instance.’” York v. Ass’n of Bar of City of N.Y. , 286
F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Connor v. Davis ,
b. Analysis
Ms. Joy fails to state a plausible Title VII Claim for two reasons. First, she alleges
throughout the Complaint that the ED — not CVTC — was her employer. For example, she alleges
that she “was employed” as an “Outreach Services Associate for the Infectious Diseases
Department” of the ED “during all relevant times[.]” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4). She also alleges that “her
employer recommended and approved her for” the Training Program “run by . . . CVTC”— an
allegation that only makes sense if the ED, not CVTC, is her “employer.” ( Id. ¶ 1). Similarly, she
alleges that her “employer approved” her participation in the Training Program that CVTC runs.
(Id. ¶ 9; see also id. ¶ 36 (alleging that Ms. Joy was “scared that her employer might terminate
her because she was dismissed from a training program”); ¶ 41 (alleging that Ms. Joy “suffered
scrutiny in her work (current employer) for having been dismissed” from the Training Program)).
Because these specific allegations in the Complaint contradict Ms. Joy’s conclusory assertions
that CVTC was her “employer” for Title VII purposes, the Court need not accept them. See
Tsinberg ,
Second, Ms. Joy’s allegations fail to satisfy the “remuneration test” set forth above. See
York ,
Given Ms. Joy’s concessions that the ED— not CVTC — was her employer, she has not, and cannot, state a plausible Title VII claim against CVTC. Accordingly, we respectfully recommend that the Title VII Claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to amend.
3. Section 1981 Claim Ms. Joy contends that she had an “agreement” with CVTC, which “guaranteed” to provide her with 40 hours of domestic violence advocacy training. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 59). Without conceding any other elements of a Section 1981 Claim, CVTC argues that Ms. Joy has failed to allege the existence of any contract of which CVTC deprived her based on her race or national origin. (ECF No. 13 at 15).
a. Legal Standard
Section 1981 provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and extractions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “[T]he term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). “The rights protected by
[Section 1981 ] are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination[.]” Id. at
§ 1981(c). “ Section 1981 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender[,] [ ] religion,
national origin, or age[.]” Anderson v. Conboy,
To plead a Section 1981 claim, “a plaintiff must allege facts in support of the following
elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate the basis
of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities
enumerated in the statute (i.e., make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence,
etc.).” Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.,
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a [ Section 1981] plaintiff must specifically allege the
‘circumstances giving rise to a plausible inference of racially discriminatory intent.’” Bentley, Jr.
v. Mobil Gas Station, 599 F. App ’ x 395, 396 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Yusuf v. Vassar Coll.,
“An inference of discrimination may be drawn where ‘similarly situated’ patrons who are
not members of the relevant protected class are treated differently than the plaintiffs who
allege discrimination under section 1981 .” Oparaji, 2020 WL 9816011, at *14 (citing Lizardo,
“A plaintiff’ s naked allegation that the defendant acted based on the plaintiff ’ s race and
color is too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss.” Bentley, Jr., 599 F. App ’ x at 396 (citing
Albert v. Carovano,
b. Analysis CVTC argues that it provided the Training Program to Ms. Joy “for free” and was paid by the ED for her to participate, so Ms. Joy has failed to allege the existence of a contractual relationship. (ECF No. 13 at 15).
Section 1981 “offers relief when raci al discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual
relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so
long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual
relationsh ip.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald , 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). A Section 1981
plaintiff “must identify injuries flowing from a racially motivated breach of their own contractual
relationship, not of someone else’s.” Id. at 480. Construing the Complaint as favorably as
possible, the Court finds that Ms. Joy has alleged — barely — the existence of a contractual
agreement with CVTC under this standard. She lists the steps she took to register for, prepare
for, and participate in the Training Program, and that CVTC sent her an “acceptance letter” with
the training hours and dates. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 11, 16, 17, 27, 28). And she alleges that CVTC
dismissed her from the Training Program for, apparently, not speaking English well enough, thus
preventing her from completing the Pro gram’s objective— certification as a domestic violence
advocate. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 25 – 26, 30 – 31). A reasonable reading of Ms. Joy’s allegations is that CVTC
prevented her from completing the Training Program based on her race — Hispanic — which is
sufficient to plead a Section 1981 claim for purposes of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and
12(b)(6). See Mahmud v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr., 191 F. Supp. 2d 286, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(denying motion to dismiss Section 1981 claim based on denial of hospital privileges based on
race), reconsideration denied,
The Second Circuit has recognized the existence of an implied contract for Section 1981
purposes where a student who enrolls at an educational institution and “complies with the
terms prescribed by the university and completes the required courses [,]” such that the
institution “ must award him a degree.” Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharm. of Union Univ., 633
F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). In such a case, “a racially motivated dismissal thus runs afoul of § 1981.” Evans v. Columbia Univ. of the City of N.Y., No. 14 Civ. 2658 (NSR),
IV.CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. The Title VI Claim should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend.
2. The Title VII Claim should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to amend.
3. The Motion should be DENIED as to the Section 1981 Claim.
4. The NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: New York, New York
December 2, 2024
_________________________ SARAH L. CAVE United States Magistrate Judge Case 1:23-cv-11177-MMG-SLC Document 24 Filed 12/02/24 Page 23 of 23 * * * NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Garnett.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF
OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn,
Notes
[1] The R&R, which is appended to this Order for ease of reference, describes in detail the facts and procedural history of this case.
[1] Internal citations and quotation marks are omitted from case citations unless otherwise indicated.
[2] Given these two fundamental defects in Ms. Joy’s Title VII Claim, the Court need not analyze CVTC’s
alternative argument that the Training Program is not covered by Title VII (ECF No. 13 at 11), because
whether Ms. Joy’s participation in the Training Program was “part of the job” is a fact -intensive question
inappropriate for the pleading stage. See La Grande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co. ,