13 La. 24 | La. | 1839
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs assert title to different portions of land
The latter claims under Bringier, by several mesne conveyances, and the record shows that Bringier was the proprietor of a tract of land on the river Mississippi, having a front of about twenty-seven arpents, with the ordinary depth of forty, and was clearly of that class of persons who had a right under the pre-emption laws, to purchase, to a greater or less extent, the adjacent public land in the rear of their plantations. Under the act of 1820, to which we shall hereafter allude more particularly, Bringier did purchase a quantity of land in his rear, not exceeding the superficies of his front tract. This purchase embraces the locus in quo. Neither party has a patent, and in this respect both parties stand upon the same footing. The question, therefore, presented for our consideration is, whether Bringier purchased- more land than he was entitled to under the act of 1820, in-relation to the plaintiffs, who were also front proprietors, and, in consequence of a bend in the river, were entitled to purchase a part of the same land entered by Bringier. This renders it necessary to examine critically the acts of congress-under which the parties claim.
The right of preference in question was first extended to the proprietors of front tracts by the 5th section of an act of congress p.assed in 1811, entitled “an act providing for the final adjustment of claims to lands, and for the sale of the public lands in the territories of Orleans and Louisaina, etc.” This part of the statute expired by its own limitation in three
That act of congress accords to every owner of a front tract of land, “ a preference in becoming purchaser of any vacant tract of land adjacent to and back of his own tract, not exceeding forty arpents in depth, nor in quantity of land that which is contained in his own tract.” it is made the duty of the principal deputy surveyor of each district, “under the superintendence of the surveyor of public lands south of the State of Tennessee, to cause to be surveyed the tracts claimed by virtue of this section ;” and it provides, that he shall “in all cases where by reason of bends in the rivers, etc., etc., bordering on the tract, and of adjacent claims of a similar nature, each claimant cannot obtain a tract equal in quantity to the adjacent part already owned by him, to divide the vacant land applicable to that object between the several claimants, in such way as may appear to him most equitable.” The same section, after providing for the manner of giving notice, and fixing the mode and time of payment, concludes by declaring, that “if any such person shall fail to deliver such notice within the said period of three years, or to make such payment or payments at the time above mentioned, the right of pre-emption shall cease, and become void, and the land may thereafter be purchased by any other person, in the same manner, and on the same terms, as are or may be provided by law for the sale of other public lands, etc.”
1 . ... . , The front tracts of all the parties to this suit are situated upon a point formed by a bend of the river, and the side lines converge in such a manner as that there is not sufficient land in the rear to give to each the quantity equal to that contained in his original tract. It is, therefore, clear that if all had purchased under the act of 1820, it would have become the duty of the surveying department to apportion the land
But it is further urged, on the part of the appellants, that the public lands cannot be. sold without a previous survey, and that the officers of the government are not authorized to sell to any individual at private sale, until he produces to the
Such is undoubtedly the general law which regulates the sale of the public lands. But the statute in question creates clearly an exception to that rule, by authorizing the sale of the back lands in tracts of different quantities, and irregular shapes, and which require to be surveyed and laid off after the sale. The act declares that the date of the purchase shall be the date of the notice, thereby clearly indicating that the title of the purchaser shall vest independently of any survey ; and at the time of filing the notice, subject as we have already observed, to a reduction in quantity, in cases of other claimants, and an insufficiency of land for all.
It is again urged, that Bringier’s application contained no legal statement or description of the situation and extent of land which he wished to purchase; that there was no plat of survey of the tracts which the front proprietors were entitled to purchase. In support of this position, .we are referred to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, relative to the location or laying of land warrants in Kentucky, in which it was held that the calls must be so specific and precise, as to enable others to locate the adjacent vacant lands. In deciding in the case now before us, upon the sufficiency of Bringier’s notice or application, we cannot look beyond the statute under which it was made, and by which it must be governed. No particular form is prescribed, much less does it require the exhibition of a survey. Any description which would show that the applicant or claimant is a front proprietor, and entitled to the benefit of the act, would in our opinion suffice.
It is lastly contended, that the decision of the surveyor general, whose duty it is to apportion the public lands among the different claimants under the pre-emption laws, approved by the public functionaries to whom he is responsible, cannot be inquired into in courts of justice, and is final between the parties; and it is shown that the operations of the surveyor
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed, with costs.