Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian)Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian)
Presently pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Debtor/Defendant, Gregory M. Adalian (“Adalian” or “Debtor”). The Motion seeks to dismiss the Adversary Complaint filed by the Plaintiff, Emerson M.F. Jou (“Jou” or “Plaintiff”)- For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss is denied in part and granted in part.
I. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (J).
II. Facts and Procedural History
On July 14, 2011, Adalian filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Several months later, on November 1, 2011, this Adversary Proceeding was commenced by Jou who has filed a Complaint seeking a determination of non-discharge-ability of certain debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) as well as a denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3), (4) and (5).
Jou and Adalian were initially partners in SCV Development, a California Limited Partnership (“SCV Development”). Adali-an was the General Partner and Jou was a Limited Partner. Jou claims to have invested approximately $282,000 in SCV Development. He also alleges that on March 1, 1991, Adаlian borrowed $70,000 from him and two other individuals. Ostensibly, the money was to be used solely to meet partnership obligations. Jou’s share of this note was $50,000. As security for the note Adalian assigned to Jou and the two other lenders his interest in certain vacant land in Pasadena, California as well as his interest in an “ABS partnership.”
Subsequently, on August 3, 1992, Adali-an borrowed an additional sum of $50,000 from Jou. Again, the money was purportedly to provide funds so that Adalian could continue to meet partnership obligations. As security for this note, Adalian again assigned to Jou his interest in the Pasadena property and ABS Partnership. As additional security, Adaliаn assigned his interest in SCV Development.
The notes were never repaid, and the loan funds were allegedly used for purposes other than to meet the partnership obligations. Jou claims that the vacant land in Pasadena, was never quitclaimed to him by Adalian as was required by the terms of notes. Adalian also allegedly transferred all of his interest in SCV Development to a third party without notifying Jou, who was protected by a written assignment of those interests and by Ada-lian’s fiduciary obligation as a General Partner under California law.
The parties have been disputing this debt for some time now. Prior to the bankruptcy Jou filed a civil action against Adalian in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, case
III. Discussion
A. Standard to Decide a Motion to Dismiss Under F.R.B.P. 7012(b)
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b) incorporates, and makes applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings, Rules 12(b) — (i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’. Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7008. Factual allegations in the complaint should be treated as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc.,
The standards for considering a dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6) have been discussed at length in two fairly recent Supreme Court decisions. In 2007, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for morе than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, at 1949 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
B. Pleading Requirements for Allegations of Fraud Under F.R.B.P. 7009
As the instant Complaint includes allegations of fraud, it is first helpful to review the heightened pleading requirements for claims that allege fraud. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as incorporated in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7009, applies to a complaint where fraud is plead. Rule 9(b) requires the party alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud”. Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). The Third Circuit has explained that a complainant “should accompany her pleading with ‘the first paragraph of any newspaper story’ — that is, the ‘who, what, when, where and how’ of the events at issue.” In re Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. Securities Litigation,
This heightened pleading standard for fraud allegations furthers important purposes. For example, it gives defen
C. Counts of Dischargeability Under § 523
The first three Counts of the Complaint assert causes of action under § 523(a)(2) for false pretenses, reprеsentation or fraud; § 523(a)(4) fraud as a fiduciary or embezzlement; and, § 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury. Adalian has argued that applicable statutes of limitation bar all of these claims under California law, where the notes were executed. California has a four year statute of limitations to commence an action under a written contract and a three year limitation to commence an action for fraud. See generally, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 337 and 338 (West). When considering the timeliness of dischargeability actions, bankruptcy courts have developed a two-step inquiry. A debt must first be established and seсond it’s dischargeability is adjudicated. The first inquiry, the establishment of the debt, addresses any underlying state statutes of limitation; and second, “the nature and ultimate decision as to the discharge-ability of such debt, is solely governed by the limitations periods established by bankruptcy law.” In re Glunk,
If a statute of limitations defense exists under state law, it is applicable within the first inquiry; whether the debt is established. Jou and Adalian dispute whether the debt has been properly established. Previously, Adalian filed an adversary proceeding within this bankruptcy case, Adversary Case Number ll-ap-00436. Therein, Adalian sought a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to restrain Jou’s collection attempts, which included an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. That adversary proceeding was settled by the parties. There, they agreed that the automatic stay would remain in effect until a final determination of whether or not Jou’s claim against Adalian is discharged. In accordance with their settlement, I will not here address whether a debt has been properly established. Consequently, I will not address the underlying state statute of limitation defenses. To the extent that I may find the obligation nondischargeable, the applicability of those defenses аnd the amount of the debt may be fixed within the Hawaii Litigation that has currently been stayed. See In re Antonious,
As to the second inquiry, the timeliness of a dischargeability action falls under the requirements found in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Rule 4007(c) addresses the limitation period for filing an adversary complaint to determine dis-chargeability under § 523(a)(2), (4), and
1. Count One, Dischargeability Under § 523(a)(2)
Generally, dischargeability under § 523(a) as a matter of policy is strictly construed against creditors and liberally construed in favor of debtors because of the overriding bankruptcy purpose of granting debtors a fresh start. See Anto-nious at 181. The first count of the Complaint requests that Jou’s claims against Adalian be found non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2). Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that a debt is non-dischargeable where it is:
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by&emdash;
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition;
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Generally, proving a § 523(a)(2)(A) exception to discharge requires a showing that: (1) the debtor made representations knowing they were false; (2) the debtor made the representations with the intent and purpose of deceiving the plaintiff; (3) the creditor justifiably relied on the debtor’s false representations; and, (4) the creditor suffered a loss or damage as a proximаte consequence of the representations having been made. See In re Antonious at 182; In re Burns,
The false pretense or misrepresentation must be both material and made with the intent to deceive the party to whom it was directed. See Field v. Mans,
The allegations of fraud under § 523(a)(2) are found in paragraphs 22 through 64 of the Complaint. Jou’s Complaint alleges that Adalian defrauded him on two occasions, both with respect to the initial obligation. First, Jou was allegedly defrauded while entering into an agreement with respect to two notes, executed
Construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Jou, the Complaint is deficient of specific allegations showing either express misrepresentations, or a sufficient description of circumstances that show conduct creating or fostering a false impression. As explained above, allegations of fraud must be plead with particularity. What particular false representations were made to Jou at the time the loans were made? Or, what particular conduct created a false impression to him? It is not sufficient to merely imply that a fraud occurred. A complaint must demonstrate the plausibility of its claims. The Complaint has plead facts that are merely consistent with Adalian’s liability, however, it has stopped short of demonstrating the plausibility of these claims. The Complaint has not alleged specific statements or circumstances showing false pretenses or representations were made at the time of, or prior to the execution of the notes. Nor, has the Complaint alleged specific statements or circumstances that demonstrate Adalian had an intent and purpose to deceive. While the Complaint does make general representations that Adalian failed to fully comply with his obligations under the notes and the settlement, these general representations alone are insufficient to support a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the claim under § 523(a)(2).
2. Count Two, Dischargeability Under § 523(a)(4)
Section 523(a)(4) provides that a debt is nondischargeable where it is for (1.) fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity; (2.) embezzlement while acting in any capacity; or, (3.) larceny while acting in any capacity. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4); see also In re Hatch,
To prevail under the first prong of § 523(a)(4), a plaintiff must prove that, while acting in a fiduciary capacity, the debtor engaged in fraud or defalcation. See Tyson at 522, citing In re Marques,
Under § 523(a)(4), fraud requires intentional deceit, rather than implied or constructive fraud. See Tyson at 522. “Defalcation occurs for purposes of § 523(a)(4) when a fiduciary misappropriates or fails to account for money or other property held in trust for another. Even an ‘innocent’ default by a fiduciary who fails to fully account for money received qualifies as defalcation in this context.” In re Baillie at 469 (citing Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis),
The second prong of § 523(a)(4) requires embezzlement while acting in any capacity. “Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come.” In re Hatch at *6 (quoting Borchardt v. Ferrell (In re Ferrell),
[23] Jou was alledgelly a Limited Partner in SCV Development; Adalian was the General Partner. Jou alleges that Adalian was a fiduciary in that capacity and he borrowed funds for the specific purpose of paying partnership obligations. The funds were then used for other purposes. The Ninth Circuit has held that under California law, partners are fiduciaries to each other under § 523(a)(4). See Ragsdale v. Haller,
3. Count Three, Dischargeability Under § 523(a)(6)
The third count of the Complaint alleges that Jou’s claims against Adalian should be found nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6), which excepts from a debtor’s discharge any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor ... ”. Again, the burden is on the creditor to prove the elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan at 291,
In Kawaauhau v. Geiger, the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of “willful and malicious injury.”
The Complaint’s allegations under § 523(a)(6) are found in paragraphs 79 through 109. Jou essentially claims that Adalian injured him through a series of transfers of property which placed his assets out of Jou’s reach. The allegations primarily refer to transfers of Adalian’s own property. While these transfers may have made Adalian incapable of repaying Jou, and thus injuring him in some sense, they do not rise to a § 523(a)(6) claim. A “Debtor’s transfer of his own property does not result in a Section 523(a)(6) non-dischargeability claim.” In re Picard,
Moreover, the Complaint fails to show that any of Adalian’s acts were made deliberately or intentionally to injure Jou; it merely alleges that the acts led to injury by placing assets outside of Jou’s reach. An act that merely leads to an injury is insufficient, “nondischаrgeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury” Kawaau-hau at 61. Finally, the Complaint does not even posit that the alleged willful and malicious acts actually created any debt to Jou. It merely suggests that the acts made recovery for other debts more difficult. The plain language of the statute excepts from discharge “any debt — [ ... ] (6) for willful and malicious injury ... ”. § 523(a)(6) (emphasis added). Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Adalian’s debt to Jou is for willful and malicious injury; rather, the debt was created when Adalian borrowed money from Jou in 1991 and 1992. Actions taken later which may have made repayment of the initial debt more difficult cannot make the debt itself one for willful and malicious injury. In sum, I find that the Complaint fails to state a claim under § 523(a)(6) and the Motion to Dismiss is granted as to this count.
D. Counts Objecting to Discharge Under § 727
Counts four, five and six of the Complaint seek to deny Adalian’s discharge under § 727(a)(3), (4), and (5). Frequently, the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose has been described as to provide, the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start. See, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,
1. Count Four, Objection to Discharge Under § 727(a)(3)
Section 727(a)(3) provides that the court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless:
the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3). Consistent with the reservation of discharge to honest debtors, this section requires a debtor to produce enough information for creditors to determine and track the debtor’s financial and business transactions. See In re Jackson,
Once a creditor has shown the inadequacy of the debtor’s records, the burden shifts to the debtor to provide an adequate justification for the failure to keep or preserve records. Jackson at 797, citing In re Ryan,
The litany of allegations purporting to support a denial of discharge under § 727(a)(3) are found in paragraphs 110 through 162 of the Complaint. Among other things, Jou has alleged that Adalian has:
• failed to file personal federal or state tax returns since 2000;
• failed to еver file tax returns for his wholly owned corporation International Telephone Services, Inc., which was incorporated in Nevada on September 25, 2002;
• testified that he received a note payable to him for $95,000.00, but has no records of the transaction and cannot even remember who owed him the money;
• no records of SCV Development, a California Partnership, in which he is the general partner;
• no records of the sale of several parcels of residential and commercial real property in California;
• no records of multiple non-arm’s length transactions involving real property in Pennsylvania; and,
• very limited records showing “loans” to his wholly owned corporation, International Telephone Services, Inc.
Again, at this stage, I assume the truth of well plead facts. These allegations are more than sufficient to support a cause of action under § 727(a)(3). The Motion to
2. Count Five, Objection to Discharge Under § 727(a)(4)
The Complaint’s fifth count alleges that the Debtor’s discharge should be denied under § 727(a)(4)(A) and (C), which states:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—
(A) made a false oath or account;
[...]
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property, or advantage, or a promise of money, рroperty, or advantage, for acting or forbearing to act; or ...
§ 727(a)(4)(A) and (C).
Under § 727(a)(4)(A), the objector must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the debtor made a false oath or statement; (2) the debtor knew the statement was false; (3) the debtor made the statement with the intent to deceive; and, (4) the statement was material to the bankruptcy case. In re Von Kiel,
To sustain an objection to discharge under § 727(a)(4)(C), the objecting party must establish both; (1.) knowledge and a fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor; and, (2.) receipt of, or an attempt to obtain, or the giving or offering of, money, property or advantage, or a promise of these, for a purpose, namely, action or forbearance in the case in which the offender is a debtor. In re Stokes,
... covers any “extortion,” even using that word in a broad, general sense, and bribery. It also covers an attempt to extort, and an attempt to bribe. [ ... the section] clearly contemplatеs the denial of a discharge to debtors who accept a “bribe,” i.e., money or property, advantage or a promise of these for acting or forbearing to act in or in connection with the case. It also includes the giving or offering of a bribe by the debtor.
Id.
The allegations with respect to § 727(a)(4) are found in paragraphs 163 through 173 of the Complaint. Jou has plead that Adalian failed to accurately answer questions on his Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs. Jou alleges that Adalian indicated on his Schedules that every tax entity was owed the sum of $1.00 and that he subsequently testified
3. Count Six, Objection to Discharge Under § 727(a)(5)
The final count of the Complaint requests a denial of discharge under § 727(a)(5). Under this section, discharge may be denied if the debtor fails to satisfactorily explain a loss or deficiency of assets. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5). Similar in purpose to § 727(a)(3) and (4), the purpose of § 727(a)(5) is to require a debtor to make a full and complete disclosure of his or her finances in order to obtain the privilege of a discharge, the burden of discovering assets may not be placed upon others. See In re Grammenos,
Once a loss or deficiency of assets has been established, “[a] bankruptcy judge has ‘broad power to decline to grant a discharge where the debtor does not adequately explain a shortage, loss or disappearance of assets.’ ” In re Jacobs,
The allegations related to this count are found in paragraphs 174 through 183 of the Complaint. Jou has pled that Adalian signed a $500,000.00 note in favor of Jeff McDaniel on September 6, 2006. Yet, Adalian has no copy of the note and could not explain by whom or for what purpose the money was used. Nevertheless, the entire amount with interest was repaid in June of 2010 and without the note there is no way to determine, what rights of contribution Adalian may have against other parties. Jou has also alleged, that Adalian made two loans to his wholly owned company International Telephone Services in the amounts of $7,000.00 and $5,000.00. Again, Adalian can allegedly provide no explanation of the disposition of the funds or explain why his company is not obligated to repay him. Finally, Jou
IY. Conclusion
Consistent with the reasoning given above, the Motion to Dismiss is Granted as to Counts One and Three of the Complaint and is Denied as to Counts Two, Four аnd Six. As to Count Five, the Motion is Granted inasmuch as the count is based on § 727(a)(4)(C), and Denied to the extent that it is based on § 727(a)(4)(A). Jou is granted leave to amend the Counts which were dismissed. If he chooses to do so, Jou may file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Opinion. Adalian shall then file a responsive pleading to any subsequently amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days. If no subsequent amended complaint is filed, Adalian shall answer Counts Two, Four, Five and Six of the Complaint within forty-two (42) days of the date of this Opinion.
An Order will follow.
Notes
. Drafted with the assistance of Ryan B. White, Esquire, Law Clerk.
. Unless otherwise noted, all future statutory references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 37 ('‘BAPCPA”).