Joshua Mello v. Sean Killeavy.
No. 2017-198-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
April 23, 2019
(PC 16-4593)
Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
Justice Indeglia, for the Court. In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Joshua Mello (Mello), appeals from a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Sean Killeavy (Killeavy), based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
I
Facts and Travel
After a careful review of the record, we recite the following pertinent facts. Mello and Killeavy were both employees of Ramsay‘s, Inc. (Ramsay‘s), a small, family-owned company that provides maintenance and groundskeeping services for cemeteries in Rhode Island. Killeavy had worked as a seasonal laborer for Ramsay‘s since August 2015. Beginning in December 2008, Ramsay‘s employed Mello, first as a laborer, and later as a crew chief. The two employees apparently enjoyed a friendly relationship, and they engaged in practical jokes while on the job. Unfortunately, one such prank went too far.
On August 17, 2016, Mello and Killeavy were working at St. Mary‘s Cemetery in Bristol, Rhode Island. At one point during the workday, while Mello was occupying a bathroom stall, Killeavy, using a gas canister that he found on the job site, poured gasoline onto the bathroom floor as a practical joke. Expecting only to create a loud “popping” noise to scare Mello, Killeavy ignited the gasoline.2 Unbeknownst to Killeavy, however, the gasoline had flowed into the stall that Mello occupied, and, when the gasoline burst into flames, Mello was injured. As a result, Mello was hospitalized with significant burns, leaving him
On September 30, 2016, Mello filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court against Killeavy, alleging negligence and stating that “[o]n or about August 17, 2016 the [p]laintiff was at all times in the exercise of due care and performing duties on behalf of his employer” when the accident occurred. Killeavy answered, denying Mello‘s claims; he additionally sought defense and indemnity in this action pursuant to his parents’ homeowners’ insurance policy.3 He also sought defense and indemnity from United Ohio Insurance Company, which had provided both a commercial package insurance policy and a commercial excess insurance policy to Ramsay‘s at the time of the incident.4 Killeavy later propounded requests for admissions upon Mello.5
On February 21, 2017, Killeavy filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a statement of undisputed facts, arguing that the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred Mello‘s negligence claim because Mello had accepted workers’ compensation benefits from his employer for an injury occasioned by the acts of a fellow employee while on the job. In his memorandum in opposition to Killeavy‘s motion, Mello did not dispute Killeavy‘s statement of undisputed facts. However, he argued that, because Killeavy may have been on a lunch break at the time the injury occurred, Killeavy would not be considered an “employee” at the time of the incident and that
A hearing on Killeavy‘s motion for summary judgment was held on April 21, 2017. Mello argued that Ramsay‘s provided him workers’ compensation benefits before investigating whether or not Mello‘s injury occurred while he was on a lunch break. However, Mello admitted that, under
In the end, the hearing justice granted Killeavy‘s motion for summary judgment. She first noted that the main issue in the case was the application of the exclusivity provision to Mello‘s negligence claim. The hearing justice interpreted the exclusivity provision as providing immunity to employers and employees, and quoted our opinion in Manzi v. State, 687 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1997) (mem.), in which we stated that the Workers’ Compensation Act “bars a plaintiff from filing a second cause of action on the basis of a different legal theory in circumstances in which a plaintiff seeks recovery for the same injuries on which his or her workers’ compensation claim was based.” Manzi, 687 A.2d at 462. Moreover, she cited several of our opinions in reasoning that “it is well settled that there is no exception to this particular provision for intentional torts or wrongful conduct of a fellow employee.” The hearing justice then stated that, by accepting workers’ compensation benefits, Mello had waived any right he might have had to challenge whether he was injured during the course of his employment. She concluded by finding that the caselaw and statutes were clear: There was no exception to the immunity granted to coemployees under the exclusivity provision, which meant that Mello could not maintain his suit against Killeavy.
On April 27, 2017, Mello prematurely appealed to this Court.7 On May 16, 2017, an order entered granting Killeavy‘s motion for summary judgment, and final judgment entered in favor of Killeavy that same day.
II
Standard of Review
“A motion for summary judgment ‘is designed to decide in an expeditious fashion cases presenting groundless claims.‘” Hexagon Holdings, Inc. v. Carlisle Syntec Incorporated, 199 A.3d 1034, 1038 (R.I. 2019) (deletion omitted) (quoting Gallo v. National Nursing Homes, Inc., 106 R.I. 485, 487, 261 A.2d 19, 21 (1970)). “When we review a hearing justice‘s grant of a motion for summary judgment, we conduct our analysis de novo.” Id. “If we determine that ‘there exists no genuine
“We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 454 (R.I. 2012)). In so doing, our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature. See State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I. 2005).
III
Discussion
The crux of this appeal involves the application of several provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act to Mello‘s negligence claim. We begin with
“The right to compensation for an injury under chapters 29-38 of this title, and the remedy for an injury granted by those chapters, shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers, agents, or employees; and those rights and remedies shall not accrue to employees entitled to compensation under those chapters while they are in effect, except as otherwise provided in
§§ 28-36-10 and28-36-15 .” (Emphasis added.)
This Court has stated that “[w]hen an injured employee receives workers’ compensation benefits, the exclusivity provisions of
Moreover,
“[S]hall be held to have waived his or her right of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries if he or she has not given his or her employer at the time of the contract of hire or appointment notice in writing that he or she claims that right and within ten (10) days after that has filed a copy of the notice with the director [of the department of labor and training.]”
As such, “[a]n employee who has not retained his or her common law rights under
Mello concedes that he was injured by Killeavy while on the job site and that Killeavy was a coemployee of Ramsay‘s at the time. He has also admitted that he accepted workers’ compensation benefits from Ramsay‘s for his injuries. Additionally, it is clear that Mello did not notify Ramsay‘s of his intention to preserve any common-law right to sue in accordance with
However, Mello contends that
“Where the injury for which compensation is payable under chapters 29-38 of this title was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages in respect of the injury, the employee may take proceedings, both against that person to recover damages and against any person liable to pay compensation under those chapters for that compensation, and the employee shall be entitled to receive both damages and compensation.”
Section 28-35-58(a) .
Under
Mello avers that the absence of the word “employees” after the word “employer” in
In DiQuinzio, the plaintiff was injured on the job when a truck driven by a coemployee collided with another vehicle while on the highway. DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 41. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries and collected workers’ compensation benefits for those injuries, but thereafter attempted to sue the third-party leasing company, which had leased the truck to the employer, for the same injuries that arose from the accident. Id. There, we stated that, pursuant to
We answered a question similar to the one at bar in the case of Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369 (R.I. 1994). In that case, the plaintiff was injured when a vehicle driven by a coemployee collided with a cement truck. Boucher, 639 A.2d at 1371. The plaintiff collected workers’ compensation benefits for the injury he suffered and subsequently sued the third-party tortfeasors for damages. Id. The third-party tortfeasors then impleaded the coemployee into the case, claiming that they had a right to contribution for the coemployee‘s role in the plaintiff‘s injury. Id. The coemployee moved for summary judgment, claiming that she was immunized from contribution for the plaintiff‘s injury. Id. Nonetheless, the trial justice allowed the claim for contribution to move forward, stating that, when reading
The coemployee petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted; we ultimately quashed the motion justice‘s ruling. Boucher, 639 A.2d at 1379. This Court cited several cases, including DiQuinzio, in noting that no cause of action, either direct or for contribution, may be had against an entity or person made immune under
While Mello suggests that the rule may seem harsh in light of his injuries, in the past we have made no exception to the exclusivity provision for acts of coemployees that could be considered to be outside the scope of employment. See Diaz v. Darmet Corporation, 694 A.2d 736, 738 (R.I. 1997); see also Kong v. Kuncio, 754 A.2d 103, 103 (R.I. 2000) (mem.). In Diaz, the plaintiff was injured at work after being assaulted by the president of the company at which he was employed. Diaz, 694 A.2d at 737. The plaintiff then filed for workers’ compensation benefits; however, his application was denied after a workers’ compensation judge found that he had suffered no disabling injury. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the president of the company in Superior Court. Id. However, the Superior Court determined that the exclusivity provision barred this claim. Id. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that there was a willful-or-intentional-tort exception to the exclusivity provision. Id. This Court held that, “[o]n the basis of the statutory provisions and our prior case law interpreting those provisions,” the Superior Court was correct in determining that there is no intentional-tort exception to the exclusivity provision, and that “an employee waives
Additionally, in Kong, the plaintiff suffered injuries after being hit by a car driven by a coemployee while in their employer‘s parking lot after work. Kong, 754 A.2d at 103. The plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits and then attempted to sue the coemployee and his wife for the same injuries. Id. We held that, by virtue of receiving workers’ compensation benefits and not having notified his employer of his intent to preserve his common-law rights, the plaintiff had waived any common-law right he may have had to sue either the coemployee or his wife because any “liability [was] based solely upon the negligence of the co-employee, who [was] entitled to immunity under
In support of his purported “scope of employment” exception, Mello cites D‘Andrea v. Manpower, Inc. of Providence, 105 R.I. 108, 249 A.2d 896 (1969), in which we stated that an employee acts within the scope of his or her employment when “at the time and place of the injury [the employee] was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or something incidental thereto.” D‘Andrea, 105 R.I. at 108, 249 A.2d at 899. However, D‘Andrea is readily distinguishable from the instant case. There, we created an expansive definition of an employee‘s scope of employment, which tended to favor the person seeking workers’ compensation benefits. See id. Notably, D‘Andrea did not involve an injury brought about by a coemployee, or the exclusivity provision, and we have never applied the D‘Andrea standard for scope of employment in such cases. Id., at 109-10, 249 A.2d at 897-98; see Kong, 754 A.2d at 103; Diaz, 694 A.2d at 737. While Mello contends that we should apply that standard to third parties, his argument ignores the fact that neither the exclusivity provision nor
Finally, Mello advances public-policy arguments in favor of the application of a scope-of-employment exception to the exclusivity provision, citing to cases from other jurisdictions. We are well aware that other jurisdictions have created exceptions, “either by legislative enactment or judicial opinion,” to this strict rule granting immunity for tortious acts of coemployees. See Lopes, 560 A.2d at 950-51 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, “in the absence of a legislatively created exception to
There being no disputed issues of material fact left in this case, summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Killeavy on Mello‘s negligence claim.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. We remand the papers to that tribunal.
Joshua Mello v. Sean Killeavy.
No. 2017-198-Appeal.
SUPREME COURT – CLERK‘S OFFICE
April 23, 2019
OPINION COVER SHEET
Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
| Title of Case | Joshua Mello v. Sean Killeavy. |
| Case Number | No. 2017-198-Appeal. (PC 16-4593) |
| Date Opinion Filed | April 23, 2019 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia JJ. |
| Written By | Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia |
| Source of Appeal | Providence County Superior Court |
| Judicial Officer From Lower Court | Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal |
For Plaintiff: Ronald J. Resmini, Esq. For Defendant: Mark T. Reynolds, Esq. David E. Maglio, Esq. Scott F. Bielecki, Esq. |
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2016)