Joshua Cooper v. Logistics Insight Corp. - Dissent

Therefore, to Ms. on court to calculate and add salary benefits.12 and other salary court determine and Thompson’s the trial shall award the remand additional Thompson’s award career during add to Ms. that have and benefits accrued leave, pay, sick retire- supplemental ladder appeal. of this The trial court pendency ment, ac- salary benefits that have Thomp- shall calculate and award Ms. also during pendency appeal. this crued attorney’s son the reasonable fees incurred appeal. as a result this Costs this Additionally, in a prevailing plaintiff as appeal are taxed to the Board. action, Thompson § 1983 Ms. is entitled attorney’s pursu- reasonable fees recover Thiboutot, § v.

ant to 1988. Maine 9-11, L.Ed.2d 100 S.Ct.

U.S. (1980); Wimley Rudolph, (Tenn.1996). remand, On court shall calculate and award

the trial attorney’s Thompson

Ms. reasonable of this appeal. fees incurred as result COOPER, Joshua et al. we trial to con- Finally, direct the court on remand as proceedings expedi- duct the tiously possible as so as to conclude this CORP., et al. LOGISTICS INSIGHT litigation allow five-year the correct Tennessee, Supreme Court of proceed. This decision does not process at Nashville. seeking the Board from to termi- preclude long so Thompson’s employment nate Ms. Feb. 2012 Session. her and pays as Board first reinstates Jan. pay damages and other back which Indeed, she is entitled. counsel Ms. acknowledged as

Thompson much oral However,

argument. should the Board Thomp-

choose to seek termination of Ms. it employment, comply

son’s must with the

procedures prescribed by the Tenure Act.

Conclusion herein, explained

For the reasons we properly

conclude the trial court

granted Thompson summary judg- Ms. properly damages

ment and awarded her

pursuant to the Act Tenure attorney’s

well as fees pursuant judgment of

Accordingly, the the Court of

Appeals judg- is reversed part, and

ment of the trial court is reinstated. How-

ever, case is remanded to the trial parties stipulated Thomp- pursuant holding

12. Because Ms. our herein does damages son’s entitlement these and be- implicate the decision in Mumford. damages cause trial court awarded these Carey Nashville, Baugh, Scott and Mark Tennessee, for the appellants, ProLogis- tics, Inc., Logistics Insight Corp., and Joe Murray. Nashville, Tennessee, Cooper Mr. Todd, ProLogistics warehouse. As

Daniel C. MasterStaff, trailer, Inc. out of a Joe backed towmotor appellees, Murray, employee ProLogistics, Discover RE. an of away trailer from the truck and the drove OPINION fell out of loading dock. The towmotor the HOLDER, J., the delivered M. JANICE trailer, “signifi- Cooper and Mr. sustained Court, in GARY R. of which opinion the cant, injuries” to his back and permanent WADE, C.J., A. and CORNELIA CLARK spine. JJ., LEE, joined. SHARON G. and a claim for work- Cooper Mr. asserted at work as employee An against ers’ benefits Master- third-party of a tort- result of the actions result, began As a MasterStaff Staff. permanent The suffered feasor. disability pay temporary benefits Mr. medical care. required that injuries Cooper’s paid and Mr. medical ex- Cooper filed a claim for injured employee The penses. and compensation benefits filed against third-party tortfeasor. lawsuit his filed Cooper Mr. wife also in the employer The intervened lawsuit 22, 2008, January claim on Mr. pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Murray, ProLogistics, Logistics In- protect section 50-6-112 its sub- Corporation1 Chancery in the sight against any recovery from rogation lien County. complaint for Rutherford The al- third-party tortfeasor. negligence part leged of defen- third-party lawsuit with the settled the $1,000,000 damages sought dants and of voluntarily tortfeasor and dismissed Cooper’s injuries for Mr. and Mrs. Coo- employer requested case. The per’s of loss consortium. trial, claiming case be set for that it was lien entitled to a settlement Coopers’ MasterStaff intervened in the proceeds for the cost of future medical action, asserting statutory negligence may paid be on behalf of the benefits that lien for workers’ injured employee. We hold that the em- paid may benefits had been ployer’s subrogation provided by lien Ten- recovery against any in the future nessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 in Coopers from the defendants not of future does include cost medical chancery court action. See Tenn.Code may be in- provided benefits that an 50-6-112(c)(1) (2008). §Ann. MasterStaff jured employee. equitable a “common law and also asserted right subrogation” any Mr. History I. and Procedural Facts Cooper third-party from the obtained de- (“MasterStaff’) MasterStaff, Inc. is an fendants. employee-contracting company. Master- 10, 2009, July filed On MasterStaff employed Cooper Staff Joshua and as- itemized list signed operator him to work a towmotor $44,698.62 amount of that it had incurred ProLogistics, (“ProLogistics”). Inc. January Cooper’s on Mr. behalf. In January Cooper On Mr. was en- Coopers settled claims gaged moving pallets goods from chancery at a court parked loading trailers dock into the the defendants in ac- loading Coopers complaint also dock. The named as defendants moved voluntarily Murray these owners the trailer that Mr. dismissed defendants. voluntarily tion and dismissed their claims WL granted permission *5. We appeal. prejudice. those defendants with February MasterStaff filed a Analysis II. to set for trial. motion the case Master- As an question, initial ProLogis- asserted that it had no notice Staff tics asks whether an injured employee and settlement that the settlement did a third-party required defendant are of all dispose of the claims between the approval obtain the to set issue parties regarding because the tle a case when has a subro- Cooper’s Mr. future medical gation pursuant lien to Tennessee Code expenses outstanding. was still The trial Annotated section 50-6-112. We previous 7, court set the case for trial on June ly have held that Compensa the Workers’ The the chancery defendants in court tion Law does not an require employee to filed a to action motion dismiss for failure obtain employer’s an agreement before to a Tenn. state claim. See R. P. Civ. settling the third-party tortfeasor. 12.02(6). The defendants asserted Hunley v. Silver Mfg. Furniture they should be dismissed from case (Tenn.2001). 555, We reiter Coopers required because the were to ate, however, worker, injured that an imburse MasterStaff from the settlement spouse, worker’s or a third-party proceeds.2 The trial court concluded may tortfeasor seek approval any court voluntary the order of dismissal “resolved “to settlement ensure that the allocation of against all claims defendants” proceeds settlement between the worker granted the motion dismiss. to spouse and the worker’s fair is and reasona ble.”3 Hunley, 38 S.W.3d at 559. An MasterStaff appealed. The Court of is employer entitled to reasonable notice of Appeals held that expenses future medical approval action which court are not too speculative a matter of law sought. Hunley, 38 559. Al employer’s to included in against an lien though practice the better would have against proceeds third-party a suit been the Coopers for to obtain court ap tortfeasor remanded the case to the proval of settlement with the defen trial court. Cooper Logistics Insight action, the chancery dants in court M2010-01262-COA-R3-CV, Corp., No. Compensation Workers’ Law did not re *4, 1874577, (Tenn.Ct.App. 2011 WL *5 quire to do so. them 16, 2011); May see Tenn.Code Ann. 50- 6-112(c)(2). of Appeals The Court also principal issue this case is that the Coopers’ held dismissal of suit whether Tennessee Code Annotated sec chancery defendants grants employer tion an 50-6-112 subro- action assign court did not serve as an gation for lien the cost of medical ment of their negligence claims to Master- expenses proceeds of an em pursuant Staff ployee’s third-party Tennessee Code Anno lawsuit tort- 6—112(d)(2). section Cooper, interpretation tated 2011 feasor. Workers’ 50— however, gistics. ProLogistics, 2. Statements counsel made reflect that the Counsel for Coopers have reimbursed MasterStaff Cooper the trial Mr. informed court that had $44,698.62 medical in the amount $190,000. been The record is not clear Cooper. incurred behalf of Mr. whether this settlement included Mrs. Coo- per’s claim for loss of consortium. 3. The record does reflect the terms of Coopers settlement between the and ProLo- (cid:127) 1967, require employer an question In presents Law Compensation provide up years to two de novo. law, we review Gerdau which 503, in an amount not exceed benefits Ameristeel, Ratliff, Inc. ch. May Act of (Tenn.2012). $3500. 3,§ Acts 816-17. Pub. relating statute the current To construe (cid:127) limitation on an In to remove the lien employer’s to an total party, from a require and to compensation benefits the evolution of the helpful review it is Department of notice to the Tennessee Compensation Law in Tennes- Workers’ amounts exceed Labor when such injured employee In see. Act of ch. May $5000. paid by his to medical benefits entitled 3,§ 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts 291-92. not to for a exceed six period (cid:127) require injury. after months for a maximum of pay medical benefits (1950). Liability for medical bene- 3, 1973, years. May Act of ch. three $800, not and the total could exceed fits 379, 4, 1368, § 1973 Pub. Acts Tenn. liability for benefits workers’ 1369. could not exceed Tenn.Code $7500. 1977, Assembly In the General removed 6878(e) (1950). 6875, §§ the on the limitation duration medical has Compensation The Workers’ Law benefits, thereby opening the door to fu- times increase amended numerous to been employee ture benefits the medical to the period employer time for which is in were unlimited both duration and for medical responsible 19, 1977, 417, ch. May amount. See Act of to the total care and increase amount 1,1977 1039,1040. § Tenn. Pub. Acts employee may receive: medical benefits an governing statute suits The (cid:127) 1953, to require employer In to third-party undergone tortfeasors also has benefits in an amount provide medical Compensation changes. Workers’ 3, to Act of Apr. not exceed $1500. provided injured Law that an originally 1953, Ill, 1,§ ch. 1953 Pub. Tenn. remedy must elect employee pursue to 402, Acts 402-03. against either the or the third employer (cid:127) 1957, to In increase the duration of for party responsible injury. his Millican from six to benefits months Stores, 93, Tenn. 270 Home 197 13, 1957, year. one Act of Mar. ch. 372, (citing 373 S.W.2d Tenn.Code 1, 733, § Pub. 1957 Tenn. Acts (1932)). § Assembly 6865 The General 734. in applicable statute to amended 1949 (cid:127) 1959, to employer In require permit employee an to recover benefits in provide medical benefits an amount employer pursue from an and also to an Act of not exceed Mar. $1800. party responsible action the third 1,§ ch. 1959 Tenn. Pub. Millican, injury. for 270 his S.W.2d at Acts 530. 14, 1949, Act of ch. 227 (citing Apr. 373 (cid:127) 897, 897-98). In Tenn. Acts require employer 1949 Pub. provided

provide Notably, medical benefits an amount the amended statute “subrogated an plus employer not to exceed additional an would $1800 paid payable of the expenses.” “unusual medical extent amount $700 Millican, 362, 3, 270 chapter.” Act of Mar. ch. 1963 under this S.W.2d 6865). 1282,1283-84. (quoting Pub. at Acts 373 This statute provide lump-sum recovery construed the from the third-party tortfeasor, he compensation ben- would in effect receive credit “dou- Millican, Reece, ble benefits.” employee. owed to 288 S.W.2d at efits Millican, addition, In periodic duration 374. In future medi- Reece, payments would be shortened. cal benefits were not issue because the S.W.2d at Future medical as a benefits injured worker died result of his Millican, were not at issue in Reece. injuries. S.W.2d at 372. In our General amended York,

In Reece v. Compensation pro- Workers’ Law to (1956), this Court addressed if vide that the employee’s recovery in a application credit to which suit party At the entitled. time of Reece, exceeds injury employee employ- er, not, the employer weekly to a has at [that] entitled maximum $8500 time, paid discharged his full maxi- benefits and medi- mum compensa- [workers’] benefits exceed See cal $1500. ..., tion 6875, 6878(e) shall be entitled (Supp. §§ Code Williams 1953). to a liability, credit his future Reece, it received accrues, to the extent the net recovery from a third-party tortfeasor. $5000 collected exceeds paid by the amount at 449. was award- employer. weekly ed benefits Reece, in the total of amount $8500. §Ann. (Supp.1963). 50-914 In at 449. employer required pro- the was vide a medical benefits for maximum of that agreed employee This Court the year, one and the provid- medical benefits required to reimburse the employer was plus ed could exceed for $1800 $700 medical hospital expenses paid by for “unusual medical expenses.” Tenn.Code $785.50, employer the in the amount of effect, (Supp.1963). Ann. 50-1004 this $4,214.50. Reece, leaving a balance of decision, permit- statute codified the Reece held, however, S.W.2d at 450. the We that ting employee an future period- recover weekly compensation payments ic of payments the would employer from be deferred. employer and allowing benefits the to be

Reece, weekly 450. The statutory for the maximum reimbursed weekly benefits would commence when the benefit which the employee was enti- that have installments would accrued from tled. date injury equaled the of the net the $4,214.50. Reece, employer

credit to the of The 1963 amendment to the statute 288 S.W.2d at 449-50. We granting employer reasoned the lien it more employee employee’s recovery was beneficial in an ac- periodic receive payments party presently of workers’ tion codi- is pe- for an benefits extended fied as Tennessee Code Annotated section as if the were employee receiving pre- riod his 50-6-112 and remains identical to the Reece, statute, wages. See 288 S.W.2d at If exception stylistic vious with the of to receive an pay- changes relating were those amendment to the ments at the time he phrase, same receives statute of limitation.4 The “and (a) injury 4. Tennessee Annotated death Code section 50-6- When for which provides, pertinent part, payable chap- in is today know them because unlim- ... dis- fits as we has not employer were not avail- future medical benefits liability for ited full maximum charged his employee at the time of able to an may therefore compensation,” [workers’] Reece, in Reece decision. in context of be understood timing of the which the issue is in the context of the removal It compensa- periodic payment and duration the limits on following tion payments to em- future medical benefits available lump-sum settlement ceipt the employer’s that we reexamine ployees third-party tortfeasor. lien. This has twice subrogation’ Court subrogation lien employer’s medical bene- unlikely that future addressed It is considered, in available to light for future medical benefits particularly fits were injured employee. See Hickman v. Cont’l on the of the limitation (Tenn.2004); Baking time of the Reece both at the benefits Cnty., 24 S.W.3d The Reece Graves v. Cocke decision (Tenn.2000). cases, we In both of these the decision did not ad- recognized of workers’ held that the “credit on the lump-sum payment dress benefits, liability” include future which was then an future does not Hickman, 143 S.W.3d typical expenses. workers’ com- medical “exception” to 78; Graves, in a 24 S.W.3d at 288. We periodic payments pensation award if lien employer reasoned that held a similar to the manner which manner pro- wages. his 288 for future medical had received settlement, logical proceeds It at 450. conclude ceeds hostage held for an indefinite phrase, “and the has not would be that the when discharged period ... his full maximum to reimburse paid and compensation,” employee sought did the medical benefits [workers’] 78; Hickman, future medical the future. 143 S.W.3d at not include unlimited bene- (2) recovery by the under circumstances creat- In the event the net ter caused worker, ing legal liability against person by a some or to whom the worker's those damages, employer pay survives, the other than to right of action exceeds the amount worker, injured injured the or the worker’s employer paid by employer, the and the has right dependents, shall have the to take not, time, paid discharged the at the and compensation chapter, this the under and liability employer’s full maximum for work- worker, injured or those whom the in- to compensation chapter, ers’ under this the right jured worker’s of action survives the employer shall be entitled to a credit on law, may pursue the worker’s or accrues, employer’s liability, future as it remedy by proper in a of action court the ex- the extent net collected competent jurisdiction against the other paid by employer. ceeds die amount the person. worker, (3) the or In the event those survives, right whom the worker’s of action (c)(1) recovery against In event of a the the recovery, and effects a collection of worker, person by by or those to by judg- recovery, person, from the other survives, right of whom the worker’s action ment, otherwise, in- or without settlement otherwise, by judgment, settlement or by employer, employer tervention employer's for work- maximum to a credit on shall nevertheless entitled chapter compensation ers' under this has liability future workers' fully partially paid discharged, been compensation, as it accrues subrogation shall have lien recovery. chapter, net extent of the employer may recovery, and the any protect in and en- intervene action force the lien. Graves, em- put at 288. If the an end to that see debate. See John A. held a lien for the cost of future ployer Day, Subrogation Future Pay- Medical of ments, (“For medical benefits B.J. 33 dec- covery party, from a third lawyers ades for claimants and worker’s pro- be unable to benefit from would [sic] insurers have debated recovery. ceeds of future medical benefits. over.”). That is debate now The Hickman are The law re- Graves and decisions garding subrogation in conflict with decision of this of future medical ben- in issue in Court Reece. At Reece was efits in cases has timing weekly of the commencement of the years, been settled a dozen and the benefit to the em- set forth in reasoning Graves Hick- when ployee was entitled to man is valid. still employ- credit for the amount of the full party. settlement a third ee’s addition, long we have adhered Assembly’s apparent acceptance General the rule when a prior decision has pro- procedure adopted Reece for addressed and operation construction viding pay- a credit future periodic statute, principle of stare decisis ments, now codified Tennessee Code will unless apply the General Assembly 50-6-112, Annotated not en- section did change acts to the statute. LaManna v. compass an award unlimited Tenn., Univ. medical benefits. 877, 881 The General has broad discretion to the scope define principle deci- sound stare procedure claims and the for recovering requires uphold prior us to our prece sis benefits. promote consistency law Gerdau dents Ameristeel, Inc., promote confidence in this 506. It is Court’s fully power Whitney, decisions. Carroll v. within of the General As (Tenn.2000) (Anderson, C.J., sembly dis to amend Tennessee Code Anno senting). This will overturn set 50-6-112 employ tated section to allow an rule of when only tled law there is an error recovery of er’s the cost of future medical the precedent, precedent when the benefits incurred and to obsolete, adhering when to the precedent delineate the manner in which such recov cause harm greater would to the communi ery occur.5 ruled on should We have the decisis, ty than stare when disregarding statute, operation construction and of the prior precedent conflicts with a consti prerogative and it is the of the General provision. tutional In re Estate McFar change Assembly it. See McKesson & of land, (Tenn.2005). Robbins, Store, Dep’t Inc. v. Emps. Gov’t Reversing prior our decisions in Graves Inc., any Hickman not accomplish and does of (1963) (stating that when the con Court’s purposes. these struction of a statute been “on has twelve application years, An- books” for courts should fol of Tennessee Code acts). legislature notated section low the decision until the 50-6-112 was debated for decades, several years following and Graves decision the twelve the Graves 5. The owed § addressed the 440.39 legislatures to an employee. issue of (providing of other See, jurisdictions for the medical benefits e.g., Fla. Stat. have of ers’ thur future benefits owed to an retained Compensation Larson in a & Lex K. trust Law fund); Larson, § 117.01 see generally Larson's ^[5] Work- to be 6 Ar- of amount of MasterStaffs subro- Assembly has not tion decision, General consistent gation proceedings lien and the statute. acted to amend opinion. with this reason to reverse compelling no seeWe ac- legislative of in the absence direction III. Conclusion usurp have us dissent would tion. The lien hold We re- Assembly, General prerogative employee’s recovery from against an law, on a settled issue verse course by Code party provided Tennessee law, into the uncertainty introduce ex Annotated section 50-6-112 does deci- confidence in Court’s undermine pro to be tend to future medical benefits unwilling to do are so. sions. We to the by employer. We remand vided holdings reaffirm our We therefore Costs proceedings. trial court for further and Hickman. MasterStaffs Graves MasterStaff, are appeal of this taxed proceeds lien surety, its for which execution with the defendants the settlement issue, may necessary. if does not extend to chancery court action benefits to which the cost of future medical KOCH, JR., J., C. filed WILLIAM may Mr. be entitled. MasterStaff Cooper dissenting opinion. to state a claim for therefore has failed KOCH, JR., J., WILLIAM C. Tenn. R. granted. which relief can be See dissenting. 12.02(6). P. Civ. are, injuries work-related Employees’ Finally, Appeals the Court of occasion, par- the fault of third caused that the record insufficient also held years Approximately fifty ago, ties. equita if to determine MasterStaff had Assembly General addressed Tennessee right subrogation and ble remanded parties how from these third recoveries case to trial court for further consider em- apportioned should between the 1874577, at Cooper, ation. 2011 WL *5. ployee employer. appeal and the This Law is entire Compensation Workers’ quires interpret apply us to Tenn. statute, ly rights and the creature 50-6-112(c) (2008), Ann. one of Code responsibilities parties are derived fifty-year-old these statutes. Rather than solely from the statutes. Curtis G.E. statutory applying plain language, Capital Space, Modular undertaken to Court has harmonize (Tenn.2005). Assembly The General changes Ann. 50-6-112 with other Code sub- equitable right has not provided in the Law that Compensation Workers’ statutory subro- rogation in addition to after 50-6- were made Tenn.Code Ann. gation lien set forth Tennessee Code There is no 112 was enacted. doubt that section Castle

Annotated 50-6-112. Cf. should Tennessee General Eng’g, man v. Ross revisit Ann. 50-6-112. How- (Tenn.1997) (declining permit to does, ever, I until General equi injured employee use principles to ac- interpret apply would and statute subrogation table defeat to cording plain meaning. Accordingly, its to lien). statutory I must respectfully dissent. us, appears it From the record before I. Cooper’s

that Mr. employee- for an Cooper claim remains unresolved. therefore Joshua worked We MasterStaff, named contracting company to the trial court for a determina- remand January On MasterStaff Inc. as- MasterStaff that it asserted was entitled to Mr. signed Cooper operate to towmotor1 “a common equitable law and right of sub- ProLogistics, Inc. at a in warehouse rogation” with to regard Mr. Cooper’s re- Smyrna, Tennessee. The work called for covery from the third-party defendants “as Cooper Mr. to drive the towmotor into the to workers’ compensation benefits parked trailers of trucks the ware- which have been to paid date and those dock, loading pallets house’s to remove may which be paid in the future.” trailers, from the and goods place then to July 10, 2009, On while the Coopers’ pallets in the Just warehouse. as Mr. against lawsuit the third-party defendants Cooper backing towmotor out of Mr. Cooper’s and trailers, of the Murray, employ- one Joe claim were pending, MasterStaff filed an of ProLogistics, ee drove the truck to itemization of the bills medical it had al- which the trailer away was attached ready paid on Mr. Cooper’s behalf. These loading dock. Mr. Cooper’s When $44,698.62. bills totaled MasterStaffs trailer, towmotor reached the back of the counsel also informed counsel for the Coo- out driveway. it fell onto the concrete pers the third-party defendants that caused “significant, permanent injuries fall MasterStaff pursue intended to the issue Cooper’s] spine.” to back and [Mr. liability medical and that “it was January eight days On follow- actively obtaining expert medical proof as incident, ing Cooper Mr. and his wife Cooper’s] [Mr. to reasonable future medi- negligence against filed a action five third expenses.” cal parties Chancery for Ruther- point on, From this the conduct $1,000,000 of all County, ford seeking in com- parties must be damages light considered Cooper’s injuries bined for Mr. lawyers’ understandings Cooper’s legal and Ms. loss of consortium. Af- principles applicable Coopers apportionment ter filed an amended com- plaint voluntary dismissal, employer, and notice among employee, proceeded against their claims negligent Mr. third-party Mur- when the em- ray, ProLogistics, Logistics Insight ployee elects pursue simultaneously (“the Corporation third-party defen- damage claim against party the third and a dants”). claim against employer. Based on this Court’s decisions In addition negligence to his action in Hickman v. Baking Continental defendants, the third-party Mr. (Tenn.2004), and Graves v. Cooper pursued a claim for workers’ com- County, (Tenn.2000), Cocke pensation benefits MasterStaff. counsel for took position MasterStaff claim, response to this MasterStaff be- that MasterStaff be entitled would to re- gan pay Mr. medical Cooper’s expenses ceive from Mr. Cooper’s recovery from the provide temporary him disability third-party only defendants the work- benefits. On April MasterStaff ers’ benefits it had party up moved intervene as a the Coo- recovery, time of pers’ third-party lawsuit but also the defen- dants assert a lien Mr. cost of future Cooper’s that were recovery from the known or third-party defendants. calculable at the time of the recovery. In addition to its lien” For “subrogation part, counsel for the 6—112(c)(1)(2008), TenmCode Ann. Coopers and third-party the defendants 50— A1. "towmotor” is a name common for a forklift. and that MasterStaff was not MasterStaffs recov- settlement that position the

took for recovery an additional Mr. entitled to com- limited to the workers’ would be ery expenses. Cooper’s anticipated medical actually had been benefits that pensation also third-party argued defendants recovery. the time of the paid at permitted that if the trial court Master- third-party and the Coopers Once trial, trial proceed Staff to court that understood MasterStaff defendants voluntary should aside the dismissal of set vigorously pursue intended claims them or- Coopers’ Mr. anticipated Cooper’s cost of for the Coopers der the return settlement care, they negotiated and medical future proceeds.3 negligence claims. Coopers’ settled third-party on the During hearing MasterStaff in or They did not involve April motion to on defendants’ dismiss these negotiations. MasterStaff of inform 2010, the trial court was informed that Mr. 22, 2010, trial en- January court On claim had Cooper’s Coopers’ prepared an order tered yet not resolved because he had not been Coopers’ claims lawyer dismissing improvement maximum reached medical third-party defendants expert and that had estimat- MasterStaffs provided This order Master- prejudice. Cooper’s reasonably expected ed Mr. Coopers’ notice that the Staff with its first expenses currently were future medical es- been negligence claims had resolved.2 $200,000. 7, 2010, May timated at On February filed On MasterStaff trial entered granting court an order It motion to set the case trial. motion to third-party defendants’ dismiss the settlement between argued January based on its conclusion that the third-party and the defendants Coopers voluntary order of dismissal “re- dispose all claims between the “did not [third-party] solved all claims regarding because the issue Mr. parties” Defendants.” expenses medical still Cooper’s future appealed to the Court of MasterStaff trial outstanding. April On Appeals. opinion May filed on motion and set granted court MasterStaffs held the court that this Court’s deci for trial June the case County sions in Cocke Hick Graves meantime, third-party In the defen- Baking man do v. Continental Co. not 12.02(6) R. Civ. dants filed P. that, proposition as a “stand for matter claims. motion to dismiss MasterStaffs law, are in all They insisted that Tenn.Code Ann. 50- speculative too to be circumstances includ 112(c)(1) permit did not MasterStaff to ed an employer in the credit available to 6— 50-6-112(c)(2).” lien pursue the Coo- under Tenn.Code Ann. pers’ recovery award because MasterStaff Cooper Logistics Insight Corp., No. M2010-01262-COA-R3-CV, receive reimbursement would WL pro- (Tenn.Ct.App. May benefits it had *4 2011). to Mr. to the The court held that Cooper up vided time also Master- Coopers did 2. While the of the settlement was not 3. The not file a similar motion to time, join revealed at that counsel for the third- respond and did not in or to the dismiss party informed the trial court defendants later third-party motion. defendants’ $190,000. Cooper that Mr. had been The record is clear whether this settle- Cooper's ment included Ms. consortium claim.

643 pursue directly could not claim When we upon Staff are called to interpret a statute, third-party goal defendants under our is to ascertain the Gener 6—112(d)(2). §Ann. Cooper Assembly’s al purpose for enacting the 50— Logistics Corp., 2011 Insight v. WL statute and then apply the statute in a 1874577, way at *4-5. the court Finally, fully accomplishes held that purpose the record was not to permit sufficient without expanding application determining whether beyond MasterStaff was en scope. statute its intended Mitch Utils., to equitable Fayetteville titled for the ell v. Pub. 368 S.W.3d 442, (Tenn.2012); of Cooper’s Mr. future medical 448 Lind v. Beaman 14, (Tenn. January Dodge, 889, related to his 2008 356 S.W.3d 895 2011); Cooper Insight v. injury. Logistics Corp., Overstreet v. TRW Commercial 1874577, Div., 626, (Tenn. WL Based on Steering 2011 at *5. these 256 S.W.3d 630 2008). conclusions, Appeals of legal set This rule of para construction is of the trial of importance aside court’s dismissal Master- mount when interpreting complaint Staffs and remanded case to workers’ compensation statutes because granted court.4 the trial This Court benefits and proce third-party application per defendants’ dures are entirely creatures of statute. appeal mission to address again 626, the Martin v. Lear 90 Corp., S.W.3d 632 (Tenn.2002). rights employees, employers, and third- These statutes were enacted party tortfeasors in circumstances when an because the tort system common-law employee has sustained a in perceived work-related to be employees unfair both jury caused a third-party employers,5 tortfeasor. and and thus these statutes

serve as a substitute” “complete for the previous proce common-law remedies and II. Liberty Stevenson, dures. Mut. Ins. v.Co. The issues in this call on case us to 178, 182, 760, 212 Tenn. 368 S.W.2d 762 interpret apply compen- interpretation sation statutes. The application present of these ques- Today’s statutes statutes Ameristeel, embody tions law. comprehensive system Gerdau Inc. v. reflecting 503, (Tenn.2012); 368 Ratliff, 506 Assembly’s the Tennessee General careful v. Seiber Reeves 284 S.W.3d Logging, balancing of the interests of both the em (Tenn.2009). Accordingly, 298 we will ployee Lang and the employer. v. Nissan Am., Inc., (Tenn. view the lower interpret- courts’ decisions N. 170 572 2005); ing applying compensa- the workers’ Stratton v. United Inter-Mountain Co., tion statutes to (Tenn.1985); the facts this case de Tel. 695 S.W.2d Co., without a presumption novo of correctness. v. Cain-Sloan Clanton S.W.2d at Exam’rs, Rich Tennessee Bd. Med. 443. The General has plenary (Tenn.2011); 350 S.W.3d authority, subject Lazar v. only constitutional re Aluminum, straints, benefits, rights, J.W. 346 S.W.3d 441-42 to define the (Tenn.2011). in workers’ procedures compen- available Appeals 4. The Court of did address the 5. See Clanton v. Cain-Sloan (Tenn.1984); Dickey W. third-party Mfg. S. request Co. defendants’ vacate the Moore, voluntary order dismissal and to order the (1961) (quoting v. Industrial Stertz Coopers proceeds to return the settlement if a Washington, Ins. Comm'n 91 Wash. new trial were ordered. (1916)). 158 P. 044 Div., Ameristeel, Steering 256 S.W.3d at Commercial Gerdau proceedings.

sation (2 Childress, 630; v. 21 Tenn. at 506. While Miller Ratliff, v. 368 S.W.3d Inc. Hum.) (1841). 320, by Tenn.Code Ann. 321-22 are directed the courts (2008) construe the workers’ 50-6-116 III. ... “equitabl[y] statutes compensation pro- Tennessee’s workers’ and of objects purposes the end that attained,” by gram designed employees is to benefit may be realized and chapter recovery providing expeditious and certain liberty at alter or extend they are not injuries employers from for work-related beyond mean their obvious these statutes Ameristeel, employers by limiting and to their Ratliff, benefit Inc. v. ing. Gerdau v. exposure. Clanton Cain-Sloan 506; v. at Wausau Ins. Co. 368 S.W.3d Co., (Tenn. at nine 538, During 677 Dorsett, S.W.2d 172 542-43 S.W.3d 2005). following decades the enactment of the Assembly solely General is 1919,6 have fre- program courts com responsible creating purposes. out its The two changes quently pointed any and thus pensation program, (1) pro- are: purposes most often cited of scope application program in the or vide for the Assembly, workers must from the General come earning power loss of capacity v. Fayetteville courts. Mitchell work work-related Lib- Utils., injuries, caused 368 at 451. Pub. S.W.3d Starnes, erty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 563 S.W.2d Assembly’s purpose The General most 178, (Tenn.1978); 179 Mathis v. J.L. For- reliably language found of stat- Sons, 130, 128, 188 rest & 216 Faye Pyles Norma utes themselves. (2) 967, (1949), 967 put S.W.2d Family LLC v. Lynch Purpose Putnam in- providing compensation burden of 196, (Tenn.2009). 213 Cnty., 301 S.W.3d jured employing workers on the businesses Thus, focus, courts should least them, Jellico, Lynch City v. 205 S.W.3d of initially, language the statute. 384, (Tenn.2006); 390 Kinnard v. Tennes- Inc., Nye Bayer Cropscience, v. 347 Co., 206, 209-10, see Chem. 157 Tenn. 7 (Tenn.2011). 686, 694 S.W.3d courts (1928). 807, S.W.2d 808 (1) give must words used in the statute (2) However, decades, ordinary meaning, throughout their natural pointed in the context in which courts have to other purposes consider words they appear, presume the workers’ program. One significant pre General intended that each word most of these is to given Cnty. making effect. Knox ex rel. Envtl. vent re employees a double Control, covery. v. & Pest Inc. v. Arrow Correll E.I. de Nem Termite DuPont Exterminators, 511, (Tenn. Inc., 350 524 & 207 ours 754 (Tenn.2011); State, 2006); Gilreath, Coleman v. 341 S.W.3d Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. (Tenn.2011); Green, (Tenn.1981); v. 272 Green Mitchell (Tenn.2009). Usilton, 5.W.3d When 146 Tenn. 242 S.W. a constitutional statute is clear language Workers’ only experts unambiguous, policy the courts’ have noted that “[t]he apply strong course is to construe and the statute double is a one.” avoiding Larson, Dodge, written. Lind v. Beaman 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Lar 895; Compensation Overstreet son’s Law TRW Workers’ Apr. 6. Act ch. Tennes- substantive modification in Code of (codified (1932)). §§ Pub. Acts 369-401 with non- see 6851-6901 (“Larson’s 110.03, (2009) § at 110-10 compensation program they: because ”). Compensation Law We have place Workers’ the financial burden the employ- of prohibition this an characterized as “inte injury ee’s party responsible to the gral part” compensation of the workers’ same extent if no compensa- workers’ Co., program. Eagle involved, (2) Walters Indem. tion was prevent the employ- 383, 386-87, 166 Tenn. 61 S.W.2d obtaining from while, ee a recovery double (1933). time, at same recovering additional damages that would not be available under significant

Yet another purpose the workers’ program, and compensation program, from its (3) permit employer to come out even very beginning, has been provide to by being reimbursed for its workers’ com- or injured employee employer pensation expenditures. 6 Larson’s Work- ability place the full of the em burden ers’ Compensation Thus, § Law 110.02. ployee’s injuries person persons on the or goals of the who injury caused the or dis program are advanced an giving em- ability. See Inc. Plough, v. Premier Pneu ployer the “to right collect from blame- matics, Inc., (Tenn.Ct. 660 S.W.2d worthy an party equivalent amount App.1983). permit injured The decision to the compensation paid it will and/or employers or pursue neg workers to an pay injured employee,” 6 Larson’s ligence parties claims the third Compensation 116.01[1], Workers’ Law injuries whose conduct caused their is byor permitting employer pursue based on “the moral idea that the ultimate claim party the third who caused from wrongdoing upon loss should fall employee’s injuries its employee if the wrongdoer.” 6 Larson’s Workers’ Com pursue himself or does herself 110.01, pensation Law at 110-2.7 Ac claim, 6 Compensation Larson’s Workers’ cordingly, elementary “it is if a 116.01[4], §§ Law 116.03. stranger’s negligence the cause injury the claimant in the course of IV.

employment, stranger not be in should degree any absolved of his or her normal original compensa- Tennessee’s obligation to pay damages injury.” for such provided: tion statute Compensation 6 Larson’s Worker’s Law injury Whenever an for which com- 110.01, at 110-3. pensation payable chapter under this statutory provisions in the Workers’ shall have been sustained under circum- Compensation Law that permit creating recoveries stances in person some other from third parties whose conduct causes than the employer legal liability to pay employee’s on-the-job thereto, injuries damages respect are the injured strictly for the employee benefit at may, option, his either claim employer. v. Eagle proceed Walters Indem. or law against 668; 166 Tenn. at such person damages, other to recover Weaver, Bristol Tel. or proceed Co. employer both the 243 S.W. These pro- person, and such other but he shall not policies both; visions advance the be the workers’ entitled collect and if Fisher, principle (Tenn.2004) This was also at the heart 563-64 ("[Tjhe adopt goal Court's principal decision to the doctrine of mod comparative fault comparative McIntyre ified fault in McIntyre v. Balen [was] to link one's tine, (Tenn. 1992). harm.”). degree causing See Ali v. one’s of fault otherwise, the shall employer or tlement is awarded under this any compensation having paid to the extent of subrogated chapter, law, having become liable or payable under such or collect, name therefor, in his own may shall have a lien therefor name in the may such from the purpose, for the brought suit any protect to intervene in action legal against liability whom person other such lien. enforce exists, indemnity paid the damages (1955). §Ann. 50-914 injured employee. to the payable or (1932).8 § 6865 2 Tennessee Code of the years Five after the enactment construing earliest decisions Among our amendment, had occasion 1949 this Court section, pointed out that it this this Court be how the statute should to determine right to elect employee the “gives the in which a de- applied in a circumstance compensation or dam- he will seek whether employee’s settled claims ceased widow damages recover both but he cannot ages, the parties without against two third Usilton, v. compensation.” Mitchell knowledge employer. or consent 425, 242 S.W. at 650. Accord- Tenn. at 146 The insisted it should be relieved employer employees held that who ingly, this Court liability under the workers’ from further compensation benefits accepted workers’ statutes because widow compensation not a employer pursue could had into settlements with entered these party. a third damage claim disagreed. In parties. This Court Usilton, 426, at Mitchell v. ruling that the upholding the trial court’s at 650-51. S.W. employer entitled to a credit was 1949, the Tennessee General Assem- compen- obligations its under the workers’ 6865, part Section ad- bly amended act, sation we stated that: Usilton,9 holding in Mitchell v. dress our lan- replaced original notwithstanding amendment This such settlements part, of Section relevant guage em- parties widow with these third following: with the compen- ployer would remain liable or injury death for which extent, When by full provided sation compensation payable but, statute; that he would be enti- Compensation Law was [Workers’] liability equal a tled to credit his creating caused under circumstances a money actually collect- liability person other legal against some ed as consideration for covenant pay damages, employer than the and the release. This would sue right ... shall have the injured [worker] specif- since the Act appear proper to take under such law ically gives lien employer upon ... injured may pur- [worker] said recovery by judgment, settlement remedy by proper sue his ... action otherwise. competent jurisdiction against court of Stores, Inc., Tenn. Millican Home person. other In the event of re- such (internal 99, 270 covery person from such other omitted). quotation ... marks by judgment, set- [worker] 14, 1949, 1,§ Apr. ch. ch. Apr. Act of Act See also (codified Tenn. Pub. Acts 897-98 Acts 1919 Tenn. Pub. 374-75. 50-914(1955)). Tenn.Code Ann. years handing down only Two after its deci- The appeal issue on was whether Stores, Inc., in Millican sion v. Home this could refrain from paying its remaining addressed how “credit” Court lia- until credit in the York, remaining should be in Reece v. amount of the

bility applied balance of the Tenn. 288 S.W.2d 448 from the third party York, was exhausted. involved an who Reece perma- case 594-95, nently totally as a 288 S.W.2d at disabled result of an 449-50. Revers- ing the trial judgment, court’s party. accident a third determined that the trial court began paying erred be- bene- it cause fits, “should have ordered the and the install- employee negligence filed ment payments to be deferred and not party. action the third The em- commence until the sum total of $5,000 the net ployee recovered from the third of weekly credits installments that would party, dispute and a concerning arose how have accrued from date of the injury recovery this should be credited against equal would be net credit of employer’s compensation worker’s lia- $4,214.50.” York, Reece v. 199 Tenn. at bility employee. to the 597, 288 S.W.2d at 450. tried, When Reece v. York was the em- When the Tennessee General Assembly ployer’s maximum to the liability § amended Ann. Tenn.Code 50-914 in under workers’ compensation program 1963, it codified “credit” to which em- $8,500.00.10 statutorily fixed at ployers were entitled accrued and court trial decided that of the em- $785.50 liability future under the workers’ compen- ployee’s recovery from the party third amended, sation statutes. As be should used to reimburse the employer § pertinent Ann. 50-914 provided part for the workers’ benefits it that: already paid. had The court also decided $4,214.50 that the remaining Provided, balance of further, that event said net be should credited employer’s recovery by ... the [worker] exceeds future liability. amount paid by employer, and not, The trial court time, then subtracted the the employer paid has said maining balance discharged recov- full maximum his liabili- ery from the party ty ..., from the employ- for [workers’] er’s maximum liability11 and employer determined shall be entitled to a credit on the employer immediately accrues, should be- his future as it liability, to the gin making weekly payments recovery to the em- extent the net collected ex- ployee for 236 weeks until the remaining paid by employer. ceeds the amount $4,285.50 obligation further, however, balance of its had been Provided that in event York, 593-94, paid. Reece v. Tenn. at ... a recovery, effects [worker] 288 S.W.2d at thereof, 449. collection from such per- other employer’s An liability open-ended liability regard maximum an em- face to their “furnish, ployee precisely statutory could obligation be ascertained because free of charge” hospital workers' medical and care to capped statutes employees under Tenn.Code Ann. 50-6- the amount of employer medical benefits the 204(a)(1)(A)(Supp.2012). required pay. be could General As- sembly statutory cap removed this on medical = result, $8,500.00-$4,214.50 $4,285.50. payments in employers aas settlement, an employer other- circumstances in which has

son, or by judgment, wise, by the em- discharged intervention or his “full maximum without shall, nevertheless, employer liability compensation,” for ployer, credit his future 50-6-112(c)(2) to a entitled provides Ann. an Code liability compensation, as for employer’s [workers’] employer with a “credit on the ... to the extent of said net it accrues accrues, it to the liability, as extent recovery. recovery exceeds the net collected paid by employer.”13 Finally, (Supp.1963). § 50-914 TenmCode Ann. in which an circumstances following the In decisions handed down recovery “without intervention effects amendment, this noted that employer” and collects that essentially statute retained the amended settlement, otherwise, by judgment, that had existed before system the same 50-6-112(c)(3) gives TenmCode Ann. legislative and that the amendment “[t]he “a credit on the fu- intent is to reimburse compensation, ture under a Com payments [Workers’] made chapter, it accrues to the extent recovery1 from ‘the net pensation award net recovery.” of the ... the ex by the obtained obligation total tent of This the of Ten- analysis of maturation Mary Act.” v. Compensation the Beam compensation nessee’s workers’ statutes (Tenn. 510, 477 S.W.2d 513 land Cas. par- third pertaining against to remedies 1972). also that the cred This Court held ties that the Assem- demonstrates General equal ... “although may it it is allowable bly important policies has the addressed compen the [workers’] and thus terminate (1) placing of: the financial burden the Royal Indem. Co. v. liability.” sation party the employee’s injury responsible on Schmid, 619, 474 S.W.2d (2) injury, preventing employees for the 647, 651 (3) recovery, and obtaining from a double §Ann. 50-914 In Tenn.Code was permitting employer to be the reimbursed § 50-6- redesignated as TenmCode Ann. its expendi- (1983) designations 112 and subsection Assembly tures. The has balanced General were added to the statute. With ex- employees employers interests of pertain- amendment in 1985 ception an by giving employers both ing to the of limitations for third- statute employee’s recovery interest from a actions,12 party statutory provisions party § third Ann. Code 50-6- —Tenn. parties have governing claims third 112(c)(1) employ- also a credit on —and substantively for al- unchanged remained it liability er’s future accrues—Tenn. fifty Currently years. most TenmCode 50-6-112(c)(2), (3). §Ann. Code 50-6-112(c)(1) §Ann. provides employ- an escaping There much “subrogation er with a lien” an is no has employee’s recovery changed fifty years since the Gener- party by a third “judgment, adopted or otherwise.” In al the last substantive Assembly settlement 393, § ch. May [against party], less 12. Act of tort action third rea (codified at Acts Tenn. expenses, including attorneys' Pub. sonable fees.” 50-6-112(d)(3)-(4) (2008)). Inc., § Code Ann. Servs., Cross v. Am World Pan 1987) (Tenn. (overruled on oth § purposes 13. For the Ann. 50- grounds by Sys., er Summers v. Command 6-112, recovery” "net employee's is "the (Tenn.1993)). 867 S.W.2d 315-16 employee in total amount collected behalf,” governing employee’s they amendments of the statutes re on submitted parties in workers’ dispute coveries trial court. Graves v. employ cases. Cnty., Cocke 24 S.W.3d at 286. The trial maximum court, er’s lia emphasizing uncertainty bility Yet was fixed. even after Gener future medical the impor- monetary al removed all tance of finality, decided “the credit temporal on the of an em limits provided for in Tenn.Code Ann. 50-6- ployer’s liability hospital medical and encompass 112 did not future medical pay- courts, expenses, following Tennessee’s parties ments when the for a lump settled Assembly’s intent General reflected award.” sum v. Cnty., Graves Cocke words the workers’ stat at 286. utes, employers continued hold that Court, When the case reached this we claim

were entitled to a credit county’s observed that the claim based on employee’s recovery from third language of Tenn.Code Ann. 50-6- party, even if the amount credit 112(c) “plausible.” Graves Cocke See, recovery. exceeded the amount of the Cnty., However, with- Servs., Inc., Am e.g., Cross Pan World out our addressing previous holdings in 30; 749 S.W.2d at Aetna Cas. & Sur. v.Co. Stores, Millican v. Home Inc. and Reece v. Gilreath, York, the Court sided with the policy arguments and held that “the ‘credit

Y. the employer’s as used interpretive history of Tenn.Code 6—112(c)(2), in Tenn.Code Ann. 50— 50-6-112(c) Ann. relatively remained encompass not does future medical pay- straightforward and consistent until ments parties when the have settled the when this handed Court down Graves v. case for a sum lump award.” Graves v. (Tenn.2000). County, Cocke 24 S.W.3d 285 Cnty., 24 Cocke S.W.3d at Instead 288. of The case a county involved maintenance basing opinion its on the of language Tenn. injured supervisor seriously who was in a 50-6-112(c), §Ann. Code the Court relied work-related automobile accident. The su- four policy on considerations.14 pervisor filed a compensation workers’ ac- against county tion negligence and a Fourteen after years the decision in claim the driver of the automobile v. County, Graves Cocke revisit- Court injury. that caused his its interpretation ed of Tenn.Code Ann. 50-6-112(e) supervisor settled his lawsuit in Hickman v. Continental Co., (Tenn.2004). Baking the driver the other automobile 143 S.W.3d 72 and then into negotiations employee entered This case a bakery involved who county to settle his attempted when he to “free a parties claim. When the not agree could jammed dough conveyor.” control Hick- the county’s Co., on claim that it was entitled to man v. Baking Continental 143 credit “for future expenses paid medical S.W.3d at 74. The employee filed suit (1) (3) employees ployees 14. The Court already paid; noted that will be for benefits that spending employees restrained from might their workers' com- not seek needed medical pensation "for they required benefits fear that some or all of treatment because will be themselves; may (4) pay those benefits have to be returned to the for it that con- finality if cern judgments needed treatment over the is "com- (2) sought;” employers might pelling.” Cnty., that seek reim- v. Graves Cocke 24 S.W.3d at judgment against bursement and obtain a em- 288. 650 Co., Baking 143 conveyor Hickman v. of the Continental the manufacturer Thus, at 78. decision

and also filed S.W.3d Court’s obtain- employer. After against his regard claim in the Hickman case with the manu- settlement from ing a sizeable application of interpretation and Tenn. conveyor, facturer exclusively on Code Ann. 50-6-112 rests compensation claim. tried his workers’ County. the rationale of Graves v. Cocke the em- that The trial court determined This considers the doctrine of “against credit its ployer was entitled “commanding impor- stare decisis to be of payment periodic future [for Area tance.” v. Nashville Habitat Webb benefits],” Hick- Humanity, S.W.3d 431 346 Co., Baking v. 143 man Continental (Tenn.2011); Metropolitan Gov’t Nash- determined, relying at and also S.W.3d Poe, Cnty. ville & Davidson v. the em- County, v. on Graves Cocke 383 S.W.2d It medical ex- “was ployee entitled stability gives principles “firmness life and that for the balance his penses McFarland, of law.” In re Estate §Ann. 50-6- no credit [Tenn.Code (Tenn.2005). It also expenses.” applied such should be 112] guards appellate judges “writing] Co., Baking v. Hickman Continental personal opinions public policy on Cnty., law.” into Knox Jordan reviewed the trial When this Court (Tenn.2007) (citing Lewis decision, that, it noted unlike the court’s Powell, Jr., F. Stare and Judicial Decisis County, circumstances Graves Cocke Restraint, 13, 16 Sup.Ct. 16 J. Hist. had not ]). Powell, Stare Decisis [hereinafter lump sum.” Hickman v. “settled Baking Continental However, repeating the words of Justice However, Court, relying non- Brandéis, stated this Court has also statutory between workers’ distinction we do view the doctrine of stare decisis disability pay- benefits and “a universal inexorable command.” expenses for future medical to treat ments Overton, City Memphis v. 216 Tenn. held: injuries, work-related 293, 298, 98, 100 (quot 392 S.W.2d placed Employees will be difficult Co., ing v. & Burnet Coronado Oil Gas 285 being position spend not able to 393, 405, 443, L.Ed. U.S. 52 S.Ct. 76 815 period if third-party recoveries even (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also credited the third- payments are 845, Hayes, Alcazar v. 982 852 S.W.2d n. 5 party recovery. these Holding funds (Tenn.1998). stability, It is a rule of not a indefinite hostage period for an time Powell, Decisis, inflexibility. rule of Stare just unacceptable these cir- is Hist, Sup.Ct. Accordingly, 16 J. at 14. we it was cumstances as in Graves. As more have cautioned on than one occasion such, the com- logic underlying Graves to the [doctrine “mindless obedience us to reach a pels similar result this can stare confound truth.” decisis] apply holding case. We therefore Nye Bayer Cropscience, v. 347 present to case and Graves conclude n. 10 (quoting S.W.3d at 696 Davis v. employer] not entitled a [the Davis, 753, (Tenn.1983)). 657 S.W.2d 758 credit future for medical power This its Court should exercise

expenses that are unknown or incalcula- prior sparingly overrule very at the of the trial of the work- decisions ble time only compelling. ers’ case. when the are reasons

651 Co., Sears, 295, day 298, Roebuck & 206 v. Edingbourgh Millsaps, 197 Tenn. 271 (1960). 660, 13, 857, 664, (1954); Tenn. 387 S.W.2d 14 S.W.2d 858 Humphries v. Nonetheless, duty prin Sav. reject we have Manhattan Bank & Trust 174 25, work, (1938). ciples longer v. Tenn. 122 of law that no State S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. Kendricks, As we have noted in 603 another case involving 1994), continuing adherence to plain palpable and to correct an earlier decision statute, construing oath is to though they “may “[o]ur errors even have been do justice, perpetuate not to error.” acquiesced long re-asserted in for Jordan v. Baptist Three Hosp., Rivers 984 number of & years.” Mayor Arnold v. (Tenn.1999) Knoxville, 195, 202, (quoting Montgomery Aldermen v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 101 N.W.2d 90 S.W. In the workers’ (1960)). context, we have recognized prior that while decisions should not cogent justify Three reasons declining to arbitrary overruled “in an man cavalier continue to follow the interpretation of ner,” the doctrine of stare decisis “does 50-6-112(c) §Ann. in Graves v. demand have adherence decisions that County. Cocke The first reason is that its obsolete of ... le become because other interpretation of the is not statute faithful gitimate considerations.” Five Ex Star to the words of the itself. statute Third- Davis, Inc. v. press, party claims such as the one involved in (Tenn.1993). this pursued. case are not often Accord- ingly, I find little presume basis to that the This Court observed that doc- has Assembly rely General has come on the rig- trine of stare should be “more decisis interpretation Graves courts’ of the statute idly regard followed” with con- decisions or that the General has ever Walker, 191 struing statutes. Barnes v. been asked reconsider the statute in light of the Graves decision. (1950).15 However, there is categorical no prior rule that con- this Court’s decisions The second reason is that Graves v. struing binding statutes are on us in the County faulty Cocke is based prem on the way they binding same are on lower ise that are expenses some Powell, Decisis, courts. See Stare 16 J. how incalculable the context of work Hist, Thus, Sup.Ct. “cogent contrary, when ers’ case. To the exist, may reasons” readily and should future medical are calcu modify prior commonly revisit and either reverse or lable in personal awarded construing decisions statutes. injury See Mon- cases. See Mercer Vanderbilt (Tenn.2010), The currently 15. enhanced deference to con 858 it few defend decisions has struing assumptions statutes is based on the Agency, Transportation ers. v. Johnson legislature that the will in correct erroneous 616, 671-72, U.S. 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d and, therefore, terpretations of statutes J., (1987) (Scalia, dissenting); see also legislative signals legislative approval inaction Jr., Textualism, Eskridge, William N. The New of the manner in which a statute has been (1990), reprinted 37 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. Indus., interpreted. See Freeman LLCv. East Singer Sing in 2A J. Shambie Norman & J.D. Co., (Tenn. man Chem. 172 S.W.3d er, Statutory Statutes Construction 2005). conveniently While the doc malleable 48A:11, (7th ed.2007). § at 801 As Justice legislative might trine of inaction have some noted, an Powell has it "reflects unrealistic validity legislative where a circumstances political process legisla view of the and [a body repeatedly has declined to amend stat Powell, ability to fine ture's] tune statutes.” construed, ute after it v. has been see Brown Hist, Decisis, Sup.Ct. Stare 16 J. at 16. Loans, Inc., Tennessee Title 328 S.W.3d (Tenn. gov- Inc., see’s workers’ statutes Univ., 134 S.W.3d employee’s of an Amacher, erning disposition 2004); No. M1999- Henley recovery third we have made parties, 02799-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL disregard not it clear that we will 2002) (No (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan. *13-15 Ma- Assembly’s intent. Beam v. General filed). application P. 11 R.App. Co., De- 477 S.W.2d at 513. ryland Cas. Jury pro Instructions Pattern Tennessee mod- fact that most states have spite the calculating future principles vide the provisions ernized and revised jury also provide expenses16 relating to statutes medi awards of verdict to facilitate forms General parties,18 claims third our likely required in to be cal services regard has not. With future.17 case, Gen- issues in this I believe that the is that the effect of The third reason is in the Assembly’s eral intent reflected application on the County Graves v. Cocke § Ann. 50-6- plain language TenmCode 50-6-112(c) places § of Tenn.Code Ann. 112(c) employers entitles to both purpose at odds statute against the employee’s lien pursue employees claims allowing fu- covery the employer’s credit on inju for work-related parties third statutory liability. ture lien in Tenn. to benefit ries. This statute is intended 6—112(c)(1) the statu- Code Ann. 50— employ also the only employee but tory Ann. 50-6- credit TenmCode the em er the full burden of placing 112(c)(2), separate are and distinct. who ployee’s injuries person on the caused plain meaning accordance with Eagle Indem. them. Walters v. See (3), 50-6-112(c)(2), Ann. 668; Bristol 166 Tenn. at 61 S.W.2d credit to which an is entitled Weaver, Tel. 146 Tenn. at Co. v. a refund operate does not out 302; Inc. Premier Plough, S.W. at Rather, employee’s negates recovery. it Pneumatics, at 499. If employer’s responsibility pay addi- follow the reasoning Court continues to tional workers’ benefits until County, par the third Graves v. Cocke recovery net third from the caused negligence ties whose is party exhausted or until may medical services require future obligation pay very escape responsibility by full well benefits is exhausted. Consistent with shifting providing the financial burden of York, an this Court’s decision in Reece v. employer. future medical services to the recovery who from a obtains her recov- party must use his or “net VI. ery” to relat- pay for future medical care On ing injury the other occasions when to the until the net employer’s liability has been called to construe Tennes- exhausted.19 An upon Many Practice: these revisions how com- See 8 Tennessee Tennessee Pat- address 14.01, 14.50, pensation for future medical should Jury tern Instructions —Civil noted determined. Professor Larson has (12th ed.2012). 14.54 anticipate well-drawn statute will "[a] problem steps meet spell this out to 17. See 8 Tennessee Practice: Pat- Tennessee Compensation Law it.” Larson’s Workers' A, Jury Jury Appendix tern Instructions —Civil § [5]. 117.01 Form, 815, 823, B, 826, Appendix at Verdict Form, Comparative Fault Verdict provided pursu- care cost of medical (12th ed.2012). Compensation Law is ant the Workers' expenses penses to the for Mr. Cooper’s inju- related em- work-related only ployee’s injury recommences after the ries.

employee has exhausted his or her net

recovery paying necessary for the

reasonable medical from the injury.20

work-related

MasterStaff is entitled its subrogation §

lien under Tenn.Code Ann. 50-6-

112(c)(1) Cooper’s recovery Mr. third-party defendants. The COMPANY, DICK BROADCASTING lien is amount the amount of work- INC. OF TENNESSEE compensation ers’ benefits MasterStaff

had time of the settlement. MasterStaff is also entitled to a credit FM, OAK RIDGE al. INC. et 6—112(c)(2) § under Tenn.Code Ann. 50— Supreme Tennessee, because it intervened in Cooper’s Mr. ac- at Knoxville. tion the third-party defendants. This credit is its liability future Sept. 2012 Session. Cooper Mr. Jan. they benefits as accrue to the up Cooper’s of Mr. net recovery.

Therefore, I would reverse the trial judgment

court’s and remand case

with directions address and resolve the

remaining issues regarding MasterStaffs §

credit under Ann. 50-6-

112(c)(2). statute, Consistent with the (1) court

trial must calculate Mr. Cooper’s recovery”

“net third-party from the defen- (2)

dants, determine MasterStaffs future

liability for bene-

fits, Cooper’s define both Mr. obligations regard

MasterStaffs payment of the future medical ex- governed by by entirely a fee schedule established 20. This conclusion is consistent with Department Develop- of Labor and Workforce Professor Larson’s observation that: 50-6-204(i) ment. (Supp. Tenn.Code Ann. pains the statute not take If does deal 2012). applicable That schedule is to "all problem explicitly with the of future bene- any provided medical care and services fits, merely but for com- credits carrier employee claiming medical benefits under the pensation paid, for which Tennessee Compensation Workers' Act." liable, holding the carrier is the correct 0800-02-17-.01(l) Comp. Regs. & R. third-party recovery that the still excess provided employ- Medical care to an past actually paid over subject net credit ee to the set out as a 50-6-112(c)(2), (3) stands credit Tenn.Code Ann. would the carrier. employee's compen- derive from the workers' and, therefore, Compensation gov- claim 6 Larson's Workers’ Law sation would be 117.01[5], erned the fee schedule. at 117-13.

Case Details

Case Name: Joshua Cooper v. Logistics Insight Corp. - Dissent

Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 16, 2013

Citation: 395 S.W.3d 632

Docket Number: M2010-01262-SC-R11-CV

Court Abbreviation: Tenn.