106 Ga. 608 | Ga. | 1899
The defendant in error instituted an action, naming certain trustees of Mt. Zion Baptist Church as defendants. The petition contained two counts. In the first count it was alleged, that eight persons named were, as trustees of Mt. Zion Baptist Church, indebted to the petitioner in the sum of six hundred dollars, besides interest, on a promissory note, that the same was due, etc., which note was secured by a mortgage on certain property of the church, being real estate fully described in the petition. The second count alleged that the petitioner held a claim against the trust estate of Mt. Zion Baptist Church, to the amount of six hundred dollars, besides interest, etc., which estate was held and owned by the trustees named, for the benefit of the church; that this sum of six hundred dollars was furnished for the use of the trust estate, which estate consists of the land described; that the sum of money mentioned was furnished to the trustees for the use of the trust estate in paying off and discharging a materialman’s lien held by the Willingham Lumber Company against the trust estate, for material furnished for the building of the church known as Mt. Zion Baptist Church on the lot of land described; that the amount so paid to the Willingham Lumber Company was $349.03; that said money was also used in the payment of a debt of $64.70 due to Mrs. Payne on a mortgage held by her against the trust estate, and in paying off and discharging claims and demands of the City of Atlanta against said trust
On the trial evidence was introduced, tending to show that at the time of making the note the church owed Venable Brothers, for curbing, $45.80, another bill to the City of Atlanta, for curbing, $25.55, and another bill for street improvements to
This court in the case of Beckwith v. McBride, 70 Ga. 642, in discussing the powers incident to the trustees of a church, ■says: “The object in creating this trust was to remove the property from the power and control of the congregation and ■parish and place it elsewhere. From its very nature, this charitable provision must have a trustee to look after and administer it. This is unlike an ordinary trust; it is perpetual, and the estate conveyed can not exist without it. Such a manager of charitable donations is not and can not, from the very nature of things, be a mere dry trustee, charged only with the duty of protecting the title to the property.” For these reasons, as well as also from the necessity of the case, the trustees, who hold and manage the property belonging to a voluntary association organized for religious purposes, are the only necessary parties defendant in a proceeding to subject the trust property to a claim for which it is liable. If it were a rule that every member of the congregation should be a party defendant, it would practically be impossible that the proceedings so instituted should terminate in a judgment. Here, according to the evidence, about one thousand members constitute the congregation. Necessarily, by withdrawal, removal, death, and ■other changes, this congregation is daily diminishing or increasing. Besides, such congregations usually consist of minors as well as of adults. So that it is impracticable to require these members, some of whom are not subject to suit in the ordinary way, to be made parties defendant. For those reasons, we ap
A number of objections’were urged by the plaintiffs in error to the introduction of testimony. We have carefully noted each of these objections, and find no error in the ruling of the court. And inasmuch as the debt due to the petitioner was a lawful claim against the trust estate, and the proceedings to enforce the same were in accord with the requirements of the-statute, and there were proper parties defendant to the action,, we find no-error in the action of the judge in directing a verdict for the petitioner.
Judgment affirmed.