Joseph W. DEMOCKO, Donald Jones and James Samis, Appellants, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Appellee.
No. 12-1944.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Dec. 6, 2013.
281
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David R. Sheridan and David L. Dorff, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) can revoke resident hunting licenses previously granted to Joseph Democko, Donald Jones, and James Samis on the basis they do not qualify as residents under
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
During July 2010, the DNR issued notices to Democko, Jones, and Samis indicating that, following a review of documents submitted to the DNR, each did not meet the criteria to claim resident status under
Because Democko, Jones, and Samis allege there is not substantial evidence to support the agency‘s decisions, we set forth the facts specific to each as detailed in the stipulations that each entered into individually with the DNR prior to his contested case hearing and as detailed by the ALJs following the contested case proceedings. We then set forth the findings of the district court.
A. Joseph Democko. According to Democko‘s stipulation, he has substantial ties to North Carolina. He is a doctor of chiropractic medicine licensed to practice in North Carolina. He maintains a chiropractic practice in North Carolina. Though he actively treats patients in North Carolina, Democko spends most of his time running the chiropractic business and leaves the business of seeing patients primarily to three other chiropractors he employs. Democko also owns, supervises, and manages three other businesses in North Carolina. Democko‘s wife and three minor children live in North Carolina. His car insurance bill, though obtained through an Iowa insurance agent, is forwarded to his North Carolina address, a large home held in his wife‘s name. Democko files nonresident tax returns in North Carolina. Finally, he holds a lifetime nonresident hunting license issued by the State of North Carolina.
The stipulation also contains facts showing that Democko has ties to Iowa. He holds a chiropractic license in Iowa, provides consulting services to a chiropractor in Albia, is an adjunct professor at Palmer College of Chiropractic in Davenport, and has provided “hands on” chiropractic services in Iowa since February 1, 2010. Democko owns a farm in Monroe County and is president of Wild Lands for the Future, Ltd., an Iowa corporation owning farm real estate in Monroe County. Democko is registered to vote in Iowa and voted in person in Iowa in the 2008 and 2010 general elections. He has also filed resident income tax returns in Iowa since 2006 without challenge from the Iowa Department of Revenue. Democko has consistently held a resident hunting license in Iowa since he established Iowa residency. His utility and other business bills are forwarded to his Iowa address. Democko states Iowa is the place of his true, fixed, and permanent home and the place to where, whenever he is absent, he intends to return.
The ALJ found additional facts. The home Democko claims in Iowa is a small, rustic, cabin-like structure with no landscaping or other indicators of occupancy. Democko admits he is an avid deer hunter
The ALJ noted the question of residence, which the ALJ equated with domicile, is a fact-intensive question. The ALJ further noted that, according to the definitions of “principal and primary residence or domicile” and “resident” contained in
The ALJ reasoned that North Carolina is the place to which Democko always returns from travel. According to the ALJ, Democko‘s “frequent travels to such places as Iowa, New York, and other states are almost always book-ended by his presence in North Carolina.” Further, the ALJ found it significant that Democko spends approximately forty-five percent of his time in North Carolina, as compared to twenty percent in Iowa. The ALJ noted that “[w]hile the percentage of time spent in Iowa as compared to that percentage spent outside of Iowa is not necessarily dispositive to the question of residency, I do find it to be a relevant inquiry.” The ALJ also noted North Carolina is where Democko‘s immediate family, including an infant, reside. The ALJ found it “hard to conclude that [Democko] intends to reside apart from his young and recently enlarged family” based on the lack of any indication Democko‘s wife or children intend to move to Iowa or become residents of Iowa. In addition, the ALJ noted Democko‘s business interests in Iowa are “less permanent and presumably less lucrative in nature than his North Carolina businesses.” Finally, the ALJ contrasted the rustic cabin in Iowa with the home in North Carolina, an expensive home in an upscale golf and lake development. Based on the above facts, the ALJ concluded Democko does not meet the criteria for obtaining resident hunting and fishing privileges under
B. Donald Jones. According to Jones‘s stipulation, he spends the majority of his time outside of Iowa. Jones‘s spouse lives in New Jersey. The couple‘s New Jersey residence is solely in his wife‘s name. Jones primarily derives income from his ownership of a UBS financial services office located outside Iowa. Jones is transitioning into retirement, and the business is now operated by Jones‘s son, though Jones still maintains an advisory role. Jones has obtained nonresident hunting or fishing licenses in Arizona, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Wyoming.
The stipulation also indicates Jones has contacts with Iowa. For instance, Jones established Iowa residency in 2007. Jones has held an Iowa driver‘s license since 2007 and was selected to be a juror in Monroe County. Jones does not individually hold properties or vehicles in Iowa, but such assets are owned by Hobbs Lake, LLC and Powderhorn Ridge, LLC, Iowa companies equally owned by Jones and his wife. The companies have filed Iowa resident income tax returns since 2007. Jones himself has filed Iowa resident income tax returns since 2009. Though the companies
The ALJ found Jones spends more than fifty percent of his time outside of Iowa and returns home to New Jersey, where his family lives. The ALJ noted that although Jones plans to build a house in Iowa after his son fully takes over his business in New Jersey, these events have not yet occurred. As a result, the ALJ found Jones does not qualify as a resident of Iowa for the purposes of obtaining resident licensing privileges under
C. James Samis. According to Samis‘s stipulation, since 2006 he has claimed Iowa residency, held an Iowa driver‘s license, been a registered Iowa voter, regularly voted in general and special elections in Iowa, and filed Iowa resident income taxes. In 2010, Samis applied for a homestead tax credit in Iowa. Samis resides in the lower portion of his home in Iowa and rents out the upper portion year round. Samis and his wife own approximately eighty acres in Monroe County. He and his wife own Chesapeake Adventures, LLC, which owns three farms in Iowa. Samis actively farms his eighty acres and the three other farms. He does not employ a third party to oversee the farming operations. Further, just over fifty percent of the company‘s income is derived from Iowa. Finally, Samis acts as a sales representative in Iowa for numerous companies.
The stipulation also contains Samis‘s admission that he spends the majority of his time outside of Iowa. In particular, the stipulation shows ties to Maryland. Prior to 2006, Samis claimed Maryland residency. He owns a small business in Maryland. His wife is a Maryland resident employed at a university in Maryland. Further, the limited liability company he owns with his wife is registered in Maryland. Samis has obtained nonresident hunting and fishing privileges in every state other than Iowa.
The ALJ found Maryland was the state to which Samis returned home and where Samis‘s family lives. The ALJ noted that Samis and his wife own a home and a business in Maryland and that Samis spent a significant amount of time outside Iowa during the year preceding the hearing taking care of his mother who had been ill. The ALJ acknowledged Samis and his wife also own a home and business in Iowa. In light of the evidence, however, the ALJ concluded Samis was not a resident for the purpose of obtaining resident licensing privileges under
D. District Court Review of Agency Action. After the natural resource commission affirmed the decisions of the ALJs, Democko, Jones, and Samis filed a consolidated petition for judicial review in the district court. They claimed
Upon review of the record, the district court affirmed the agency in a thorough opinion. The district court agreed with Democko, Jones, and Samis that the State of Iowa distinguishes between landowners and nonlandowners for the purposes of hunting licenses under
The district court also rejected the constitutional challenge. The district court concluded Iowa landowners do not have a fundamental property right to hunt and the legislature had statutorily modified whatever common-law right landowners may have had to hunt on their land. In particular, it noted the legislature placed ownership of wildlife in the state and created a complex statutory scheme to regulate hunting.
This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review.
We will uphold an agency‘s factual findings if, after reviewing the record as a whole, we determine they are supported by substantial evidence. See
This case also involves the agency‘s interpretation of certain statutory provi-
Here, we are convinced the legislature did not clearly vest the DNR by a provision of law with the authority to interpret the terms “principal and primary residence or domicile” or “resident” for purposes of
III. Discussion.
A. Statutory Framework.
Further, under
Under
physically resided in this state as the person‘s principal and primary residence or domicile for a period of not less than ninety consecutive days immediately before applying for or purchasing a resident license, tag, or permit under this chapter and has been issued an Iowa driver‘s license or an Iowa nonoperator‘s identification card.
The DNR is generally charged with issuing licenses under
B. Substantial Evidence and “Resident.”
1. Positions of the parties. Democko, Jones, and Samis claim the decisions of the ALJs in their respective cases were not supported by substantial evidence. In support of their argument, they quote Julson v. Julson, 255 Iowa 301, 305, 122 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1963), for the proposition that multiple factors go into the determination of who is an Iowa domiciliary: “(1) a definite abandonment of the former domicile; (2) actual removal to, and physical presence in the new domicile; (3) a bona fide intention to change and to remain in the new domicile permanently or indefinitely.” They also cite Goodsell v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, 261 Iowa 135, 139, 153 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1967), for the proposition that the term “resident” can take on many different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Democko, Jones, and Samis assert that under Julson and the record in each of their cases, the ALJs were required as a matter of law to find they were Iowa residents for purposes of
Democko, Jones, and Samis also contend the agency‘s decisions were infected with an error of law in the interpretation of
The DNR responds that substantial evidence supports the factual findings of the ALJs in all three cases. The DNR asserts the ALJs determined that Democko, Jones, and Samis each spends the majority of his time outside of Iowa, that they each have spouses, and in some cases children outside of Iowa, that they have businesses outside of Iowa, and that they return frequently to their out-of-Iowa homes to rejoin their families after trips. The DNR argues the evidence supporting these factual findings is sufficient to support the decisions of the agency.
On the issue of interpretation of the alleged ninety-day physicality requirement of
Finally, the DNR argues the ALJ did not apply any rule requiring Jones and Samis to spend the majority of their time in Iowa during the course of the year preceding their license applications. The DNR asserts the ALJ simply noted neither Jones nor Samis spends a majority of his time in Iowa as one factor in the determination. The DNR argues the ALJs applied the correct legal standard in determining Democko, Jones, and Samis are not residents for the purposes of
2. Analysis. Before we consider whether substantial evidence supports the findings of the agency in these cases, we must first set forth the proper legal standard. We recognize the concept of residency can have different meanings depending upon context. See Goodsell, 261 Iowa at 139, 153 N.W.2d at 460 (noting some of the many contexts in which the term “resident” has been construed, such as in cases involving taxation, venue, voting rights, school attendance, military service, and unemployment compensation benefits);
Here, however, the legislature has required that a “resident” for the purposes of
Applying this statutory standard, we conclude the determinations of the agency are supported by substantial evidence. The families of Democko, Jones, and Samis reside in locations outside of Iowa, and Democko, Jones, and Samis regularly return to these locations after traveling to Iowa and to other states. There is no evidence indicating Democko, Jones, or Samis is estranged from his respective family. Indeed, the record suggests otherwise. Further, while each maintains business and property interests in Iowa, each also maintains business and property interests outside of Iowa.
Further, we agree with the DNR that neither it nor the ALJs interpreted the ninety-day requirement of
Similarly, we find no indication the ALJ who heard Jones‘s and Samis‘s contested cases applied any requirement that Jones or Samis spend a majority of their time in Iowa. As noted by the DNR, each stipulated to the fact that he does not spend a majority of his time in Iowa. Further, we note the ALJ found that each does not spend a majority of his time in Iowa in addition to other factors. Thus, reading each decision as a whole, it is clear the ALJ did not regard this fact alone as determinative, but simply as one powerful factor in a determination under
1. Positions of the parties. Democko, Jones, and Samis point out that Iowa law distinguishes between resident and nonresident landowners. They note that only Iowa residents may obtain the benefits granted Iowa landowners under
Democko, Jones, and Samis recognize, as they must, that the United States Supreme Court has held a state may distinguish between resident and nonresident hunters under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm‘n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1862-63, 56 L.Ed.2d 354, 368 (1978) (holding access by nonresidents to big-game hunting in Montana does not fall within the category of rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause). However, Democko, Jones, and Samis maintain Baldwin does not address the question of whether a state may discriminate between resident and nonresident landowners.
Democko, Jones, and Samis contend a landowner‘s right to hunt the land he or she owns is part of the privileges and immunities arising out of land ownership. They argue that to not allow a nonresident landowner the same right to hunt as a resident landowner based only upon the landowner‘s partial absence from Iowa and the location of the landowner‘s family is a violation of the nonresident landowner‘s constitutionally protected privilege of land ownership. In support of this argument, Democko, Jones, and Samis extensively quote Borden v. Selden, 259 Iowa 808, 814-20, 146 N.W.2d 306, 311-14 (1966). In Borden, this court held that, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, the state could not discriminate between resident and nonresident landowners for purposes of granting agricultural land tax credits. Id. at 818-20, 146 N.W.2d at 313-14. In short, Democko, Jones, and Samis claim the distinction between resident and nonresident landowners found in
Democko, Jones, and Samis also rely upon State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 152 N.W. 501 (1915). In Ward, a landowner was prosecuted for illegally killing a deer, which at the time was eating fodder. Id. at 187-88, 152 N.W. at 501-02. Prior to the time the landowner killed the deer, a herd of deer had repeatedly damaged his crops. Id. at 186-87, 152 N.W. at 501. We held that, under the particular facts of the case, the landowner had the right to kill the deer to protect his property. Id. at 189, 152 N.W. at 502-03. Democko, Jones, and Samis seek to extend Ward to support a right to kill deer outside the context of property protection.
The DNR responds that an Iowa landowner has no property right to hunt on his or her land. The DNR relies heavily on Baldwin as well as Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006), in asserting
2. Analysis. It is clear that Iowa‘s licensing scheme not only distinguishes between residents and nonresidents, but that it distinguishes between landowners and nonlandowners as well. For example,
As noted by one commentator, nonresident hunters have challenged allegedly discriminatory regulations on nonresident hunters since the mid-nineteenth century. Jodi A. Janecek, Hunter v. Hunter: The Case for Discriminatory Nonresident Hunting Regulations, 90 Marq. L.Rev. 355, 356 & n. 9 (2006) (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 4 Otto 391, 24 L.Ed. 248 (1876) (holding a state law prohibiting nonresidents from planting oysters in a riverbed owned by the state did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause)). In recent years, challenges to nonresident hunting restrictions have resurfaced. See, e.g., Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 832, 836 (rejecting challenges to North Dakota hunting regulations by nonresidents under the dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause); Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1137-38 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that Florida‘s regulations imposing higher licensing fees on nonresident hunters and limiting the number of licenses available to nonresident hunters did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that any challenge based on the dormant Commerce Clause was moot); Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 993-95 (9th Cir.2002) (concluding a cap on nonresident hunting of bull elk and antlered deer was subject to the dormant Commerce Clause). The question of state authority over wildlife and game has also recently received attention from Congress. See, e.g., Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 831, 833 (noting Congress passed the Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005 in response to the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Conservation Force).
The sole constitutional issue presented for our review is whether Iowa‘s distinction between resident and nonresident landowners for the purposes of granting special hunting privileges under
The United States Supreme Court has declared the Clause protects nonresidents from discrimination only with respect to “fundamental” privileges or immunities. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1027-28, 79 L.Ed.2d 249, 258-59 (1984); see also Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383, 98 S.Ct. at 1860, 56 L.Ed.2d at 365 (noting the Clause only requires states to respect “those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity“). Exactly which privileges are fundamental is often a fighting issue. In Hoeven, the Eighth Circuit implied certain property rights established under state law may be fundamental. See 456 F.3d at 835 (looking to North Dakota law to determine “whether hunting constitutes a stick in the bundle of property rights accompanying land ownership” in North Dakota); see also Taulman v. Hayden, No. 05-1118-WEB, 2006 WL 2631914, at *5 (D.Kan. Sept. 13, 2006) (looking to Kansas law to determine whether hunting is a privilege protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause). If a fundamental privilege of property ownership is present, the next inquiry is whether the state can show sufficient justification for the discrimination. See Borden, 259 Iowa at 814-15, 146 N.W.2d at 311 (noting the Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States“); Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 834 (stating the second step in the analysis is “whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination“); see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222, 104 S.Ct. at 1029, 79 L.Ed.2d at 261 (“It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference in treatment.“). We need only address the initial inquiry.
In Baldwin, the United States Supreme Court held recreational hunting is not a fundamental privilege protected by the Clause. 436 U.S. at 388, 98 S.Ct. at 1863, 56 L.Ed.2d at 368. The Court noted “hunting by nonresidents ... is a recreation and a sport” and “not a means to the nonresident‘s livelihood.” Id. at 388, 98 S.Ct. at 1862, 56 L.Ed.2d at 368. The Court further noted equality in access by nonresidents to the state‘s big-game population was “not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union.” Id. at 388, 98 S.Ct. at 1863, 56 L.Ed.2d at 368. Baldwin, however, did not involve the right of a nonresident property owner to engage in hunting on his or her own property, but rather only the more general right of nonresidents to hunt within a state‘s borders.
We think the nub of the issue is whether, under Iowa law, an Iowa landowner has a property right to hunt on his or her property. Regardless of what might have been at common law, we conclude the legislature has extinguished any such right.
The legislature has declared that “[t]he title and ownership of all ... wild game, animals, and birds, including their nests and eggs, and all other wildlife, found in the state, whether game or nongame, native or migratory ... are hereby declared to be in the state.”
We note that our approach is consistent with that of other jurisdictions who have considered the issue. In Hoeven, the court relied heavily upon its findings that statutes committed extensive hunting regulation to the arms of the state. 456 F.3d at 835. It further noted any discriminatory effect a state statute permitting residents, but not nonresidents, from hunting on their own land without a license only pertained to recreational hunting, not a fundamental property right. Id. Accordingly, the court held the state regulations did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 836. Largely tracking the reasoning of Hoeven, a federal district court came to the conclusion that Kansas statutes comprehensively regulating hunting similarly abrogated any previously existing common-law right to hunt on one‘s own land. See Taulman, 2006 WL 2631914, at *5-6. We find these authorities persuasive.
We do not see Ward as inconsistent with our approach. Ward establishes the principle that, in a criminal prosecution, property damage may serve as a justification for the killing of deer on one‘s own land. See 170 Iowa at 189, 152 N.W. at 502. We do not think Ward stands for or can be extended to establish the general right of a property owner to hunt wildlife on his or her own land in light of the comprehensive statutory scheme regulating hunting in this state.
Similarly, we do not think Borden supports the arguments of Democko, Jones, and Samis. The issue in Borden was whether sufficient justification existed to explain the grant of a tax credit to resident landowners but not nonresident landowners under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. 259 Iowa at 815, 146 N.W.2d at 312. First, Borden predated Baldwin. Moreover, Borden does not address whether a property owner has a right to hunt wildlife on his or her own land that is sufficiently fundamental to trigger the Clause‘s protections. Instead, it pertains to alleged justifications for unequal tax treatment.
In sum, we think Baldwin, Hoeven, and Taulman provide the better framework for disposition of this case. Applying this framework, we find in light of the extensive statutory scheme that landownership in Iowa is not accompanied by the right to hunt on one‘s own land. Therefore, the limited statutory right of resident landowners to hunt certain wildlife on their land granted by
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.