JOSEPH L. RICHARD v. SECRETARY OF STATE
Oxf-18-31
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
August 16, 2018
2018 ME 122
HUMPHREY, J.
Argued: July 19, 2018;
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] Joseph L. Richard appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Oxford County, Clifford, J.) affirming the decision of the Secretary of State to impose a three-year administrative suspension of Richard‘s driver‘s license because of a fatal accident that he caused in 2014. See
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The fоllowing undisputed facts are taken from the Secretary of State‘s decision, including the Hearing Examiner‘s findings, and the procedural facts are drawn from the Superior Court‘s record. See Manirakiza v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 2018 ME 10, ¶ 2, 177 A.3d 1264.
[¶3] On July 15, 2014, Richard was driving on a street in Brewer when his vehicle crossed the center line and collided with an oncoming vеhicle. Two of the three passengers in his vehicle died as a result of the injuries that they sustained in the collision.
[¶4] The Secretary of State sent Richard a notice of suspension on May 13, 2016, advising him that, in accordance with
[¶5] At the hearing, Richard testified that he did not remember the crash, but he asserted that a cardiac event had caused him to lose consciousness. Thе Hearing Examiner found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support that theory because “[h]is physician [was] only able to speculate that a connection between the accident and Mr. Richard‘s cardiac condition [was] possible. And the hospital reсords indicate Mr. Richard experienced atrial fibrillation one week after the accident, with no known prior history of such an event.”
[¶6] In a decision dated September 7, 2016, the Hearing Examiner upheld the Secretary of State‘s three-year suspension of Richard‘s driver‘s license. The Hearing Exаminer found and concluded that Richard negligently operated a motor vehicle when he fell asleep while driving and swerved into oncoming traffic, and determined that Richard‘s negligent operation of the motor vehicle caused the deaths of two other people. The Hеaring Examiner explained that “[o]ne of the most basic and critical requirements placed on all drivers is to maintain control of the motor vehicle at all times. No external interference caused Mr. Richard to leave his travel lane. As he admitted to [the detective] just hours after the crash, he recognized that he was feeling tired as he drove but elected to keep driving until he reached a truck stop. That decision unfortunately had terrible consequences.”
[¶7] On October 27, 2016, Richard petitioned the Superior Court for judicial review of final agency action pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Proof
[¶8] Richard first argues that
[¶9] The question of whether an offense defined by statute is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction, see State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 705 (Me. 1983), and we first look to the plain language of the statute to determine the Legislature‘s intent. See Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 19, 107 A.3d 621. We will take “into account the subject matter аnd purposes of the statute, and
[¶10] By its plain language, the statute is civil in nature and imposes a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to suspension and revocation hearings. See
[¶11] Despite the Legislature‘s plain intent to make
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an altеrnative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. . . .
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). After considering these seven factors, we conclude that section 2458(2-A) is not so punitive in purpose аnd effect as to render it a criminal offense. See id.
[¶12] The first factor in our analysis is whether
[¶13] With regard to the second factor, we note that the sanctions imposed by sectiоn 2458(2-A) have not “historically been regarded as a punishment.” Anton, 463 A.2d at 706 (quotation marks omitted). We have, however, previously held that “[r]evocation of the license is nonpunitive in character,” and is merely intended “to provide the public with safe roadways.” Savard, 659 A.2d at 1268; see also Anton, 463 A.2d at 707 (“[S]uspension of an operator‘s liсense does not tend to make the offense criminal if it is not imposed to punish the individual but reflects a judgment that the violator should not continue to drive.“). Our conclusion in Savard was based on the principle that “[t]here exists no absolute right to obtain and hold a driver‘s license. The driver‘s license is a рrivilege to which certain rights and responsibilities attach and for valid reasons involving public safety may be granted or withheld. . . . The suspension of that privilege merely signifies the failure of the holder to comply with the agreed conditions.” Savard, 659 A.2d at 1267-68 (citations omitted).
[¶14] Consideration of the third factor also does not disclose a punitive purpose—the suspension is not imposed based on a finding of scienter associated with the criminal law. See Anton, 463 A.2d at 706. The only requirement for the suspension to become effective is that the offender negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner that caused the death of another person, and neither knowledge nor intent is an element of negligent operation. See
[¶15] With regard to the fourth factor, Richard contends that the Legislature had
[¶16] As to the fifth factor, the behavior to which section 2458(2-A) applies will not necessarily amount to a crime. As the circumstances here demonstrate, a driver‘s negligence may result in deaths and yet not result in any criminal prosecution.
[¶17] Next, we consider the sixth factor—whether section 2458(2-A) has a purpose, other than punishment, that can rationally be associated with it. As set forth above, section 2458(2-A)‘s purpose is to promote public safety by providing the public with safe roadways. See Savard, 659 A.2d at 1268.
[¶18] Finally, the seventh factor addresses whether thе three-year driver‘s license suspension is excessive, or reasonable, in relation to the nonpunitive objective of promoting public safety. See State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 51, 985 A.2d 4. As we held in Anton, “[a] proceeding to revoke a driver‘s license is a reasonable regulatory measure to protect public safety.” 463 A.2d at 707. When, as here, a driver‘s negligent operation of a motor vehicle causes a death, the suspension of that driver‘s license for three years is a reasonable regulatory measure and is in no way excessive.
[¶19] Because the factors articulated in Anton weigh heavily in favor of the conclusion that section 2458(2-A) is not so punitive as to be a criminal prosecution, we decline to impose a burden higher than preponderance of evidence and affirm the court‘s determination of that issue.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Suspension
[¶20] Finally, Richard contends that the Hearing Examiner‘s finding that his operation at the time of the fatal accident
[¶21] “When the Superior Court acts in an intermediate appellate capacity pursuant to
[¶22] Section 2458(2-A) mandates that the Secretary of State “suspend for a period of at least 3 yеars a person‘s license if the Secretary of State, based on the Secretary of State‘s records or other sufficient evidence, finds that person to have negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner so as to cause the death of another persоn.”
[¶23] We have previously held that “[i]n any ordinary case, one cannot go to sleep while driving an automobile without having relaxed the vigilance which the law requires, without having been negligent; it lies within his own control to keep awake or cease from driving; and so the mere fact of his going tо sleep while driving is a proper basis for an inference of negligence sufficient to make out a prima facie case, and sufficient for a recovery, if no circumstances tending to excuse or justify his conduct are proven.” Gendron v. Gendron, 144 Me. 347, 350, 69 A.2d 668 (1949) (quotation marks omitted). The Hearing Examiner‘s finding that Richard fell asleep while driving his vehicle is supported by competent evidence. On multiple occasions after the accident, Richard reported that he must have “dozed off.” The only circumstance tending to excuse Richard‘s conduct is his alleged cardiac event, but the Hearing Examiner reasonably concluded that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support that theory. Further, as the Hearing Examiner found with support in the record, regardless of the reason for the fatigue, Richard was aware that he was tired but chose to keep driving, hoping tо make it to a truck stop. The Hearing Examiner did not err by concluding that falling asleep while driving and causing the deaths of two people constitutes negligence.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Jeremy W. Dean, Esq. (orally), Portland, for appellant Joseph L. Richard
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Oxford County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-10
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY