*1 value, cause, myriad of other or a age, it can obtain disputes,
factual faith claim- an insured’s bad genuine has raised if the insured
even rea- concerning the material fact
issues of conduct of the insurer’s
sonableness the claim.
processing in mind what this keep
It is essential is about about. The case
case is and is not dis- of a fact-based
whether the existence debatable, is sufficient to real or
pute, an insurer’s conclusion that
support claim is an insured’s processing
conduct matter of law. The record as a
reasonable genuine raises is- evidence that
contains concerning the rea- material fact
sues of treatment of Gue- of Allstate’s
sonableness jury to have a claim. She is entitled
bara’s I reverse and issues. would
decide these bad faith trial on Guebara’s
remand for
claims. KOFOED, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Joseph
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD WORKERS, LO- ELECTRICAL
OF 48, Defendant-Appellee.
CAL
No. 98-35030. Appeals,
United States Court
Ninth Circuit. Nov.
Submitted
Filed Jan. R.App. P. to Fed. argument oral unanimously agrees that this panel 1. This without appropriate submission case is *2 HALL, Before: CYNTHIA HOLCOMB RYMER, GRABER, Judges. Circuit HALL, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB Judge: (“Kofoed”)
Joseph appeals Kofoed from magistrate judge granting order of the favor of Internation- al Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“Local (“IBEW”), 48”), on Ko- foed’s claims under the Labor Manage- Reporting ment and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), §§ and 415. judge had enter final in the case because parties orally magis- consented to the judge’s authority while before the subsequently filed written consent forms. We conclude that Local 48 did not violate the LMRDA and therefore affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant Kofoed is member of party 48. Local 48 is a ato collec- (“CBA”) bargaining agreement tive with the National Electrical Contractors Associ- (“NECA”). ation In early Kofoed and other Local 48 members received not- for-rehire letters from employ- two NECA ers, Eleсtric, Inc., Christenson and Fri- berg Company. Electric The letters stat- ed employees that the were not eligible for rehire employers. 11, 1994, August
On
Kofoed carried a
sign
job
outside a
site where both Chris-
tenson Electric and Friberg Electric were
working. Kofoed’s sign said “Good Morn-
ing” on one side and “Be Safe” on the
other.
day,
On that same
fellow union
member Brad Twigger
sign
carried а
Joseph
Portland,
per,
Pro
Ore-
the message, “Blacklisted for no reason.”
gon, plaintiff-appellant.
signs
Both
painted
were
black with white
Paul
Hays, Carney,
C.
Buckley &
Twigger
letters.
sign
had carried his
Hayes,
Batchelor,
Jeffrey
M.
Jeffrey
job
front
days
site on several
Batchelor, P.C., Portland,
M.
Oregon, for
joined
him with his “Be
sign.
Safe”
the defendant-appellee.
Kofoed clаims that he
sign
carried his
because he was concerned with safety at
site,
particularly
safety
workers who were forced to
very
cross a
busy street. Twigger testified that he car-
sign
get
response
ried his
timely
from
filed his notice
appeal
manager
48 business
Ed
6,1998.
Barnes concern-
January
ing
not-for-rehire letters.
13, 2000,
January
On
Local 48 filed a
25, 1994,
August
On
Local 48 brought motion
district сourt seeking an
disciplinary charges against Kofoed based
*3
order correcting the record. Local 48 had
picketing.”
on his “unauthorized
Local 48 discovered that
parties
the
neglected
had
charged
violating provisions
Kofoed with
to file written consent
consenting
CBA,
of NECA’s
Local
bylaws,
48’s
and
the magistrate
jurisdiction
judge’s
under
provisions
IBEW’s constitution. The CBA
636(c).
28,
U.S.C.
2000,
On Fеbruary
included the CBA’s
par-
statement that all
Kofoed and Local 48 filed with the district
ties would benefit from
peace”
“continuous
court
stipulations
written
to the magistrate
adjustment
and
by
of differences
“rational
judge’s jurisdiction.
6, 2000,
On March
methods,”
common sense
an agree-
magistrate
the
judge entered an order cor-
ment that all disputes would be
in
handled
recting the rеcord to reflect that counsel
accordance with the
pro-
CBA. The CBA
parties
all
previously
had
consented to
vided a grievance procedure for union
jurisdiction
the
a magistrate
of
judge, and
bylaw
members.
provisions
stated
that
their consent was
by
confirmed
that Local 48 would
principles
establish
recently filed written consent forms.
practices
conciliation
and arbitra-
tion in settling differences with employers.
II.
JURISDICTION
The IBEW constitution prohibited num-
bers from
engaging
acts that were con-
reaching
Before
the merits of this
trary to
responsibility
their
to IBEW or we must first determine whether we have
interfered with Local
legal
48’s
or
jurisdiction over Kofoed’s appeal. See Ha
contractual obligations.
jek
Co.,
v. Burlingtоn N. R.R.
186 F.3d
1105,
Absent one of
A
on
hearing
charges began
on Oc-
statutory
exceptions, which
inappli
6, 1994,
tober
but Kofoed left
hearing.
here,
cable
“[l]ack of a
judgment
final
day,
The next
Local 48 notified Kofoed
the district court precludes our appellate
that it had withdrawn
charges
its
with the
jurisdiction.”
1108;
Id. at
see also 28
stipulation that it could refile them later
1291,
§§
1292. Our jurisdiction dе
with additional evidence. On August
pends upon
magistrate
whether the
judge
1995, upon Kofoed’s inquiry,
48 in-
had authority to render
judgment
final
on
formed Kofoed that
pursue
it would not
behalf of the district court. See 28 U.S.C.
the matter.
636(c)(3);
Hajek,
see also
186 F.3d at
Kofoed filed
against
the instant suit
Lo-
1107-08;
Peoplesoft,
Nasca v.
7, 1996,
cal 48 on
claiming
October
(9th Cir.1998).
578, 579
provisions
48 had violated
LMRDA,
636(c)
§§
29 U.S.C.
411 and
415. The
Title
jurisdic-
confers
case was
Magistrate
assigned
Judge
magistrate
judge
to “conduct
Jelderks,
John
who
already
was
all
hearing
proceedings
or
in a jury
nonjury
or
civil
related
case. The
orally consented matter
entry
and order the
judgment
(1)
to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction to
the case” when
the magistrate judge
hear their
judgment,
case and enter
“specially dеsignated
has been
to exercise
their consent
writing
court,”
was
reduced to
such
the district
(2)
and filed with the court at that time. On
magistrate
1, 1997,
December
judge’s authority. See also
Alaniz Cali-
granted summary judgment
Processors, Inc.,
F.2d
fornia
(9th Cir.1982).
as to all
Kofoed’s claims. The
Magistrate Judge Jelderks
entered
on December
designated by
the district court to
the case with
dismissing
prejudice.
hear Kofoed’s case. We must determine
OF REVIEW
III. STANDARDS
effective con-
parties provided
whether
sent.
grant
review a
We
Serv.,
Elec.
de novo. See T.W.
636(c)
specify
does not
While
Ass’n, 809
Elec. Contractors
Inc. v.
parties’
timing
precise
Pacific
(9th Cir.1987).
Viewing the
F.2d
record reflect
consent,
we
light
most favorable
evidence
ex
unambiguous
“clear and
parties’
we must determine
non-moving party,
protect
order
of consent” in
pression
issues of
genuine
there are
whether
Alaniz,
of consent.
voluntariness
the district
fact and whether
material
Int’l,
720;
King v. Ionization
see also
at
law.
correctly applied the substantive
Cir.1987) court
Inc.,
See id.
630-31.
636(c)
is silent as
*4
(noting
73(b)
consent).
the Feder
of
of
Rule
party
The decision to
requires
Procedurе
al Rules of Civil
under 29
intra-union remedies
exhaust
written con
and file a
parties
the
execute
411(a)(4)
filing
suit is re
before
form,
the voluntariness
protect
also to
sent
See
for an
of discretion.
viewed
abuse
Fed.R.Civ.P.
parties’ consent. See
No.
Stelling v.
Local Union
73(b)
note. We also
advisory committee
Cir.1978).
1379, 1391
from the conduct
will not infer consent
or
a local rule
parties,
the
even where
§ 411
IV. LMRDA
CLAIM
inference.
provides for such
general order
argues
magistrate
the
Kofoed
(local rule);
Hajek,
Section
CBA,
violation of the
“promote
whether or
democracy” by
union
not it
ensuring
so,
actually
that “uniоn members are
did
because
sign
free to discuss
his
was de-
policies
signed
union
and criticize the
to attract the
leadership
attention of workers
without
of reprisal.”
fear
United Steel
at the site. Because Kofoed thus engaged
Sadlowski,
workers Am. v.
457 U.S.
in conduct that would interfere with Local
(1982).
102 S.Ct.
Nor do the Rule previously given;
consent had been they
most reflect counsels’ intention to do
so.1
I believe that we should that for effective,
consent to be it must be clearly ALPHA unambiguously expressed THERAPEUTIC CORPORA- Clyde any proceed- conducts McCauley, TION and *7 636(e). ings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. As Plaintiffs-Appellants, provides, only the statute it “upon is parties” consent of the that a Nippon KYOKAI, Hoso Defendant-
judge may proceedings conduct and order Appellee. Likewise, entry judgment. as Rule provides, only it is “when all parties No. 98-55642. consent thereto” that a Appeals, may United States Court provided by exercise the 636(c) may conduct all Ninth Circuit. proceedings in a civil case. Prior consent is plainly Filed Jan. contemplated. PREGERSON, NOONAN,
Absent clear and Before: unequivocal communi- O’SCANNLAIN, dispositive rulings cation of consent before Judges. Here, misgiving arising I oversight have further about the use of from or omission.” 60(a) Rule in this case. Even if in some no clerical mistake or error in the record circumstances a motion to correct the record appears quite accurately record reflects —the might redressing be a vehicle sufficient the absence of consent record, 60(a) incorrect I do not see how Rule judge's jurisdiction. only "oversight” does the trick here. It allows for correction counsel, court, was a failure fill judgments, of "clerical mistakes in orders appropriate out and file the forms. parts of the record and errors therein
