Claimant Joseph Jernigan appeals the district court’s 1 оrder affirming the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Jernigan was born in December 1959 and has a ninth grade education. He worked as a punch press operator from Mаy 1978 until January 1981, and also worked briefly as a telephone solicitor in 1983. On February 15, 1979, Jernigan suffered an industrial injury that resulted in the amputation of his right forearm.
On April 16, 1984, Jernigan filed applications for disability insurance bеnefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
2
R. at 99-102. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. At Jerni-
Jernigan testified that he began experiencing depression soon after the amputation of his forearm, has had pain in his right stump, neck and eyes since the operation, and has had an alcohol dependency problem that resulted in three alcohol-related arrests. R. at 221-224. Jernigan also indiсated that he could lift five pounds, sit for one-half hour, walk one block, and stand for two hours before becoming tired. R. at 80-81. Finally, he stated that he occasionally assisted with housework, visited relatives аnd friends, and watched television. R. at 229-231.
In addition to listening to Jernigan’s testimony, the AU reviewed numerous medical reports and hospital records. Jernigan was first hospitalized on February 15,1979, following the accidental amputation of his right arm. He was treated over the next few months by Dr. Phillip George, an orthopedic surgeon. George noted that the amputated arm healed properly and Jerni-gan had аcquired good control of his prosthesis. R. at 156, 160. Jernigan was released from the hospital and returned to work on January 14, 1980. He continued working until he was laid off in January 1981. R. at 158.
Dr. James Klieforth, a surgeon who exаmined Jernigan on September 30, 1982, noted a well-healed stump on the right arm. R. at 170. In June, 1983, Jernigan was treated at an emergency room for a fractured left hand resulting from a recent football injury. R. at 181-82. On August 7, 1983, Jernigan was involved in a bar fight and was treated for a left hand fracture and hip pain. R. at 177-78. Jernigan was first treated at the emergency room for complaints of nervousness on August 11, 1983, was diagnosed as having an acute anxiety reaction, and was prescribed medication. R. at 176. In March of 1984, Jerni-gan complained of nervousness, depression and back pain. Although he was prescribed medication for his nervousness, the medical report indicated that Jernigan’s arm was healing properly and. he was using his prosthesis effectively. R. at 173.
At the Secretary’s request, Dr. Farida Farzana performed a psychiatric evaluation on June 11, 1984. Farzana noted that Jer-nigan was not on medication and was not seeing a physician on a regular basis. Far-zana concluded that Jernigan suffered from a generаlized anxiety disorder and episodic alcohol abuse. R. at 188-91. On June 14, 1984, William Birge, D.O., examined Jernigan and diagnosed mild depression and anxiety. The doctor recommended psychological counsеling and vocational rehabilitation. R. at 183-186. On October 20, 1984, Dr. Edwin Wolfgram, a psychiatrist, diagnosed Jernigan as suffering from periodic alcohol abuse and an inadequate personality. R. at 193-94. Finally, Dr. Jerome Holliday, a psychologist who tested Jernigan on November 5, 1984, concluded that Jernigan had neurotic depression stemming from his 1979 injury. R. at 196-98.
After hearing the evidence, the AU determined that Jernigan was not suffering a
II. DISCUSSION
Jernigan argues that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence on the record. Crucial to Jernigan’s argument is the ALJ’s alleged failure to properly review his subjective complaints of pain under the standards of
Polaski v. Heckler,
In reviewing the Secretary’s decision, we must consider: “(1) whether, as required by
Polaski,
the Secretаry considered all of the evidence relevant to the claimant’s complaints of pain; and (2) whether the evidence contradicted the claimant’s account, so that the Secretаry could justifiably discount the [claimant’s] testimony for lack of credibility.”
Benskin v. Bowen,
Under
Polaski,
the absencе of an objective medical basis that supports the subjective complaints of pain is just one factor to be considered in evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain.
Polaski,
We find the AU properly interpreted the record in finding that Jernigan was not entitled to disability benefits prior to December 31,1982. The evidence indicated that Jernigan was able to adjust remarkably well to the loss of his arm; he was able to return to work and did not leave his job due to medical reasons. Jernigan performed light housework, watched television, and visited friends and relatives at least three times a week. The medical reports indicate that Jernigan was not confined to his home; he was treated for injuries stemming from playing football and being involved in a bar fight. Jernigan sought no medical treatment from January
We also note that Jernigan’s application for unemployment compensation benefits adversely affects his credibility. A claimant may admit an ability to work by applying for unemployment compensation benefits because such an applicant must hold himself out as available, willing and able to work.
Perez v. Secretary of HEW,
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude the Secretary’s decision denying claimant’s benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and accordingly we affirm that decision.
Notes
. The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
. Jernigan first filed an application for disability and disability insurance on August 31, 1982. He alleged a disability as of January, 1981, stemming from a right arm amputation. The Secretary denied the application and Jernigan did not pursue the claim further.
. To be eligible for suрplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Act, a claimant must show he was under a continuing disability while his application was pending. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.330, 416.335. The AU found that Jernigan developed a severe аnxiety reaction with neurotic depression in August of 1983 that rendered him disabled at the time his application was filed on April 16, 1984.
. Jernigan’s insured status under Title II of the Act expired on December 31, 1982. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(3)(B), 423(c)(1)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130.
. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence. It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales,