Clem appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). The district court held that the Secretary’s decision that Clem was not entitled to benefits was supported by substаntial evidence. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
I
Beginning on May 7, 1984, Clem filed several applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on the basis of his inability to work duе to lack of reading and writing skills. These applications were denied and on May 29, 1985, Clem requested a hearing. The hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on September 23,1986. At the hearing, Clem presented evidence about his usе of alcohol. The ALJ reviewed the record, made specific findings, and denied Clem’s application on the ground that Clem was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (Act). The Appeals Council decided that there were not sufficient grounds for review of the AU’s decision and therefore let the decision stand.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), Clem then appealed to the district court. Acting upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the Secretаry’s decision was based on substantial evidence. Clem appealed the district court’s decision but only with regard to his claim for supplemental security benefits under Title XVI of the Act.
II
The issue before us as framed by the parties is whether the district court erred in concluding that the Secretary’s decision that Clem was not disabled, despite evidence of his alcoholism, was based upon substantial evidence and upon the proper legal standards. We review a summary judgment de novo.
Kellar v. Bowen,
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states in part: “[t]he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive_" The Secretary’s determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the Secretary aрplied the proper legal standards and if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the decision.
Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
In order to collect supplemental security income' from the government, Clem must establish that he suffеred from a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). To be considered disabled, Clem must have suffered from “a medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less thаn 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be of “such severity that [Clem] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Clem has the burden of showing that he is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5);
Hoffman v. Heckler,
But Clem’s main argument on appeal is somewhat different: he argues that the Secretary and the district court applied the wrong legal standard in concluding that he had not met his initial burden of proof. Clem relies upon our decisions in
Kellar,
In
Cooper,
we held that once the claimant establishes evidence of diagnosed alcoholism, the Secretary must
inquire
as to whether the claimant is able to control his use of alcohol and “must make a specific finding on the claimant’s ability to control his or her drinking and its disabling effect.”
There is no indication that our holding in
Cooper
was intended to supplant the claimant’s burden of proof that we set forth in
Sanchez.
Indeed, our discussion in
Cooper
suggests just the opposite. We did not purport to overrule, or even distinguish, cases holding that the burden is on the claimant to show he cannot do his previous work. Rather, we cited
Johnson v. Harris,
Admittedly, we used language in
Kellar
that could conceivably be read to support Clem’s position: “once [the claimant] shows that he is a diagnosed alcoholic, the burden shifts to the Secretary to make the inquiry whether [the claimant] has lost the ability to control his drinking, and whether alcoholism precludes him from obtaining and maintaining employment.”
In
Young,
we held that the claimant’s “pattern of heavy drinking did not disable him from performing his prior work,” and affirmed the district court’s denial of benefits.
Ill
Clem also contends that the district court should have remanded his case to the Secretary on the basis of new evidence submitted to the court. We review a district court’s refusal to remand to the Secretary on the basis of extra-record evidence for abuse of discretion.
Russell v. Bowen,
A claimant seeking remand must demonstrate that thеre is “new evidence which is material, and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Sanchez,
Clem submitted two notices of additional evidence involving a textbook excerpt, a disability determination, two psychological evaluations, and an alcoholic assessment. Yet Clem has failed to show good cause for not submitting this evidence earlier. His assertion that the evidence only turned up later, during another proceeding, is not sufficient to explain why it was not produced earlier in this proceeding.
Clem’s situation is analogous to the one analyzed by us in
Key,
in which the claimant attempted to present a new medical report supporting his position.
Similarly in
Allen,
we declined to remand for consideration of new psychological tests and psychiatric evaluations because “Allen knew of his mental problems and had several prior psychiatric evaluations.”
AFFIRMED.