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Jose Bueno, Leon Trevino and Victor Alegria, Cross-Appellants v. City of Donna, Cross-Appellees
714 F.2d 484
5th Cir.
1983
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*4 Casiano, cient to find that defendants Cor- WILLIAMS, RUBIN, and Before GARZA dova, the plaintiffs’ and Yanez had violated Judges. Circuit rights; (3) that First Amendment WILLIAMS, instructions on the First Judge. jury JERRE Circuit court’s S. and prej- Amendment claim were erroneous filed suit in plaintiffs The in this case udicial; (4) Magallanes, proba- that Jose Donna, City court of district employee, possess property did not tionary Texas, and various elected officials of that trigger employment sufficient under 42 1985 and city1 U.S.C. §§ (5) that the process protection; plain- due either contending dis- resignations had alleged tiffs who forced charged resign posi- or forced to from their rights; (6) that process waived their due city tions with the in retaliation for their to support there was insufficient evidence support opponents of the defendants’ in a award, (7) that the jury’s damage and that their They alleged election. also city failing jury erred in to instruct the court violated resignations dismissals and forced good the defendants were entitled to a guar- process protection the minimum due Plaintiffs Victor immunity faith defense. anteed the Fourteenth Amendment. by Leon Trevino on cross- Alegría and The returned a verdict that de- denying that the court erred in appeal had or acted conspired individually fendants reinstatement. resignation to cause the dismissal or of the in this case are former plaintiffs in violation of their First Amend- The department works non-supervisory public further found that it rights. ment Donna, Texas.3 city, acting employees City policy was a custom or City finding defend- defendants/appellants 2. This is not contested are the 1. The appeal. ants on present and former Donna as well as various city employees sued in officers who were and truck; Magallanes city dump Jose drove the capacities. their individual and official Alegría at the Jesus and Leon Trevino worked dump. garbage Noe Ramirez worked resigned position Each was fired from or his States, verdict. Kincaid v. United 682 F.2d (5th in 1978 during period Cir.1982); a two month which Byrd v. Hunt Inc., Tool preceded immediately Shipyards, and followed a mu- Cir.1981). in Donna in which nicipal election defend- Lugo ants ran for re-election Cordova We adequate jus find evidence to council. tify concluding reasonable minds sup undisputed port opposition It was Jesus for the candidates was the reason Garza, Mario Vic- for the Alegría, Magallanes, resignation Jose Alegría, Magallanes, Victor Jose tor Vela and Leon Trevino Leon Tre Alegría, Clara vino, Alegría, Jesus and Mario Garza. Each op- the candidates who actively supported of these men had been seen participating in Lugo. Each man posed openly Cordova the political “pachangas” for the opposition meetings or “pa- attended various candidates, and each admitted support changas” opposition on behalf candi- of the defendants’ opponents. We are less voiced his openly support dates and satisfied, however, with the reasonableness six, Magallanes, these candidates. Of these of the verdict with respect to Noe Ramirez. Trevino, Alegría, Jesus and Vela were fired Ramirez testified that he actually supported for the shortly support opposi- after fact, the re-election of the defendants. In Alegría tion became known. Victor he he hoped said these candidates would be resigned, Garza but each testified he did so re-elected so that he get would a raise in only “pressure” resulting under from his salary. Ramirez was fired days four fol refusal the defendants.4 Noe *5 lowing the refusing election for to place a hand, Ramirez, on the other supported the favoring sticker one of the defendants on a election, defendants but claimed he city vehicle days several before the election. refusing was fired after to attach one of explained, however, He that he refused to political their stickers to a city vehicle sticker, mount the not because he did not shortly before the election place. took candidates, the support only but because he None of the men was given any reason did city not believe that vehicles should be termination, for his nor was he told of his used to political advertise candidates. Ra right hearing to a at which he could contest mirez admitted that he was told he was his discharge. at Testimony trial indicated fired because the “didn’t city need me.” that in part Donna of a city employee’s job Although testimony was somewhat con responsibility was assumed to be support inconsistent, voluted and say Ramirez did re-election, councilmembers in their bids for injured prior that he had been to his dis and that employees who refused this politi- could no longer perform missal and the type cal support would be fired. of work he had done previously. Several I. The First Amendment Claim testified that persons general Ramirez was ly inattentive to his duties. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence jury’s While a verdict is “presumptively 1. The defendants first claim that the correct”, it is not invulnerable. Kincaid v. evidence presented was insufficient sup- States, supra, 682 United F.2d at 1225. The the port jury’s finding that the plaintiffs simply evidence in this case cannot support were fired or forced to resign because of jury’s finding that Ramirez’ political support opposition for the activity was the cause of his dismissal. candidates. In order to support jury’s verdict, we only evaluate evidence The defendants 2. also claim that decide if impartial reasonable and minds evidence was support insufficient could flowing reach the result from the jury verdict directed specifically defend- department; “pressure” being maintenance Mario Garza and 4. This consisted of transfer- Alegría steady position

Victor stockroom red from work in one to almost clerks. Clara other, daily transfers to various more superintendent. menial Vela was water and sewer assignments. Cordova, Casiano, Healthy L.Ed.2d 471 In Mt. council members city ant prevail that “the de- held in order to jury Supreme found Court and Yanez. individually to conspired alleging discharge or acted action in retaliation fendants in an rights.” deprive rights, for the exercise of First Amendment knew contend that first, These councilmen proving, has the burden of plaintiff be held and cannot firings of the nothing constitutionally pro- that his conduct was manager. city of the for the actions liable second, tected and that this conduct was a motivating” “substantial or factor behind as a duty, that our We stress discharge. has made plaintiff Once reweigh is not to Appeals, showing, may this initial the defendant jury will overturn a in a case. We evidence if he liability “by prepon- avoid can show is such that if the evidence only verdict would derance evidence that [he] impar in the exercise of persons reasonable have reached same decision as to [termi- reach such a conclu judgment tial couldnot even in nating plaintiff’s employment] undisputed It was coun sion. protected the absence of the conduct.” Mt. responsible city’s personnel for the cil was Healthy, supra, 429 at and Yanez Defendants Casiano policies. case, In the instant the trial court fire, Lopezwho to and there told defendant that it must determine instructed offered at trial that Casiano testimony discharged that of at least one responded resign forced to “because of” their that “that was plaintiffs by saying candidate The court the defend- Testimony by a former activities. refused politics”. each and councilman indicated that had ants’ be instructed request Casiano, Yanez, company been in the have the burden of show- “plaintiffs during discussions about Lopez Cordova and [they] .. would not have been ing. who did not terminating city employees defendants herein but for terminated no re politically. There is amendment having exercised first have of quirement proof must been speech.” of freedom of these defendants de fered to establish that we must preliminary

cided to fire the individual As a matter specifically *6 objec when the plaintiffs for their activities determine whether defendants’ persuasive support timely, evidence was offered to tion to the court’s instructions the assertion that these defendants under Fed.R. preserved appeal and thus to fire who failed to willing any employee offering charge his to 51.6 Prior to Civ.P. there politically. Certainly, them that he was judge the the told counsel jury, jury’s was a “reasonable basis” for the find charges that “all require proposed to going ing liability against these defendants. filed, the anything given by and that be proposed by court inconsistent with that

B. Instructions Jury in full.” The preserved counsel would be for the de attorney The defendants next that the trial court then asked any he had filed other erroneous and fendants whether court’s instructions were attorney re charges with the court. The prejudicial constituted error. they that affirmative, that explained but Specifically, plied the defendants contend that office, were in his where he failed to the instructions the instructions give the trial court The court then typed. in Mt. had left them to Supreme mandated not said, having “You waive them for District Board of Edu Healthy City School 274, 568, Following to the court.” 429 97 them Doyle, presented cation v. U.S. S.Ct. objects plaintiffs’ support he before candi- instruction unless thereto 5. That the verdict, activity constitutionally protected stating is dates was retires to consider its dis- disputed appeal. objects tinctly on not he and the the matter to which objection.” grounds of his may party provides “no FedR.Civ.P. 51 that give assign giving an as or failure error the however, judge charge jury, sufficiently his directed the court’s attention prong whether had of the again asked the defendants second Mt. stan Healthy charge. The dard. it objections Accordingly, duty to the court’s was the stated, Your trial court to instruct on jury correctly as Hon- replied, defense “Not we law of or, urged.” applicable that the case. Failure to request other than do so not be solely on could excused on the point, judge relented At this basis of defects in the request. United and stated that “I am previous position Goss, 1344; v. supra, States 650 F.2d timely filed.” to consider them as going 231, Barham, United States 595 F.2d conditions, these we consider de- Under (5th Cir.1979), denied, & n. 18 cert. made, objections timely prop- fendants’ 1711, (1981). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 205 appeal. erly preserved conclude, therefore, We issue A second asserted obstacle to the the jury instructions is us. properly before success on review is that they defendants’ We now evaluate the de- substance of the now an which would place seek instruction objection given. fendants’ to the instruction on the to show that burden gave The trial court the following instruc- would not terminated have been “but tion: the exercise of their First for” Amendment you that, is, can Before determine instruction error. It rights. Such an is is the plaintiffs whether deprived plaintiffs’ clear in order to rebut deter- right, you constitutional must showing, “the initial burden shifts to the I mine —and think this is case is what the may liability by who avoid show employer, about, all I really do—from a preponder- preponderance a ing by of the evidence that ance evidence whether the defend- decision been same would have made words, ants committed the acts. In other absent constitutionally protected con you if don’t believe that the defendants 979, 983 Watkins, duct.” Bowen v. you in this case —if do not believe (5th Cir.1982). not satisfied you are from the evidence A requested instruction properly that the plaintiffs presented to you —dis- refused if it is improper, and a trial court is charged people resigned all these or they required request. to correct a defective they put political pressure because on v. Capitol Co., Stewart Transit 108 F.2d 1 they helped par- because the other (D.C.Cir.), denied, cert. 309 U.S. ty, you can’t find the defendants. L.Ed. 1036 Rule First, you before can consider what I however, does not demand submitted am to tell you, you about have to be charge be technically perfect to alert first, satisfied, fact, was, there court the need particular charge. for a cause; were caused explained As we v. United Dahlgren *7 resign give either or up positions their or States, 553 (5th Cir.1977), F.2d 434 “ulti discharged or were fired because of these mately it is the the court to responsibility of political you activities. First have be- be sure that the jury properly is instruct (Emphasis added.) lieve that. ed.” Id. at 440. long an inadequate So as It is self-evident that this not charge does improper request is to direct sufficient explain specifically that the defendants the defense, court’s attention legal to a the the escape liability by proving could that court is thereby alerted proper that a in would have been in employees terminated required. struction is United States v. The failure of any event. the trial court to Goss, (5th Cir.1981). language use the exact of the Supreme Here, however, the requested defendants Court’s decision Mt. Healthy, jury that the the plain instructed that our inquiry. does not end On review of a tiffs bore the that proving they charge burden of trial to the jury, court’s we must not would have but for discharged been determine “not whether the charge was political their request every particular”, activities. Such faultless in but whether rejected. way necessarily and wheth- formance was Accord- any was misled jury the prong Healthy the second of the Mt. understanding ingly, it had a correct er Corp., 704 F.2d standard —which would have allowed the v. Gulf Oil Pryor issues. task, escape liability they there- if could Cir.1983). Our defendants plaintiffs whether the court’s that the would have been fore, prove to determine adequately substance terminated in event—was conveyed any the adequately charge n of by jury. to and determined the Healthy requirements conveyed dual Mt the conditions, charge the Under these court’s jury- against the verdict proper, jury’s was that the in claim The plaintiffs the defendants can stand. ver jury’s proper because struction charge In the court’s a heavier reality put whether the of any question dict resolved on the than Mt. proof plaintiff burden for reasons employees defendants fired Mt. Healthy requires. Healthy requires activity. They political other than their motive be “a sub- only improper that the had to jury issue only that the explain in the dis- motivating stantial or factor” which was that of in this case determine that charge. jury Here the was instructed alleged who plaintiffs, side to believe—the plaintiffs find unless it it could not for resign in retali fired or forced they were motive was the improper found of their First Amend ation for the exercise Thus, the discharge. reason for the sole defendants, alleged who or the rights, ment required in this case would have instruction were terminated in plaintiffs that the found jury reversal if the had Because the job performance. adequate But the error in the instruction plaintiffs. were termi employees found that the jury jury higher met the is harmless because political participa “because of their nated upon plaintiff’s proof imposed standard election”,7 plaintiffs tion in the stringent the more instruction than Mt. by necessarily rejected argue Here the instruction Healthy requires. explanation exculpatory defendants’ motivating factor than foreclosed other firings. illegal Healthy one. The Mt. instruc- The court’s instructions agree. We tion does not do so. prove required plaintiffs that the this case Process II. The Due Claim “because of” they discharged ruled as a matter of the defendants’ The district court political support violated the law that the defendants had considera- opposition. Implicit jury’s procedural due rights plaintiffs were fired for plaintiffs tion of whether the them with the providing not process reasons was a consideration informing for their dismissal nor reasons. reasons they whether were fired for other hearing at which essence, right to a therefore, charge court’s left In While another, could contest their termination. legiti- room for a defense claim of such, concede that the the defendants discharge, and as ground mate written reasons for with prong provided of were would have satisfied the second informed of and were not an- jury’s Mt. standard. Healthy nonetheless hearing, they instruction, however, no their to a leaves swer to the possess, did not returned its ver- such room. Once Kennedy, Arnett v. fired under employees “because dict (1974), property activities, 40 L.Ed.2d any argument S.Ct. of” their *8 trig- right employment in their sufficient employees by the defendants process protection. due inadequate job per- ger terminated because of individually, acting caused the interrogatory dismissal or considered 7. The first resignation any because of of of read as follows: participation in elec- their you preponderance a “Do find from Answer “Yes” or “No.” defendants, tion of Donna? conspir- evidence that “Yes”. ANSWER: ing defendants or with one or more of the 492 policies discharged, instead, personnel resign

The effect but chose to order to obtain during job of Donna the relevant time a favorable reference. City recognized The Court that the teacher had “department that heads period provided a cause, constitutionally protected property right may, just terminate services so, in continued Even it employment. any employee supervision.” of under violation, found there due process was no policies provided proba The further that a because, by resigning, teacher “know- tionary employee could dismissed when ingly and chose intelligently to waive his department “in the head or judgment of right to a hearing improve in order to is not of a supervisor, quali his work record possibility obtaining of other employment.” em ty city’s merit continuation Id. at 286. policy, ployment.” any employ Under this ee, employee, was including probationary a Stewart does control this case. employment entitled until to continued opinion resignation makes clear that alone for his “just there arose cause” dismissal.8 automatically does not of constitute waiver it clear Consequently, is due process Stewart, In safeguards. a possessed constitutionally who were fired director of the had advised school the teach- in their protected property interest contin proposed er of the his reasons for dismissal Regents employment, ued Board of State testimony against and the nature of the 564, Roth, 577, Colleges v. 408 92 U.S. S.Ct. him, shortly before teacher had sub- 2701, 2709, (1972); 548 Shawgo 33 L.Ed.2d resignation mitted his letter. It is impor- 470, (5th 474 Spradlin, Cir.1983), v. 701 F.2d tant that the had administrator advised the process and were entitled to minimum due teacher several times the school would considerations before could be de provide hearing him with a if he wished to Arnett v. prived Kennedy, that interest. charges. defend himself against Under 154, 1644; supra, 416 94 at U.S. at S.Ct. conditions, college these met its initial Dekle, 1264, F.2d (5th Thurston v. 531 1272 a duty offering hearing. As the Stewart Cir.1976), vacated and remanded on other Court a explained, opportunity for “[t]he 901, grounds, 3118, 438 98 U.S. S.Ct. 57 meaningful hearing clearly existed and was L.Ed.2d 1144 (1978). declined.” No similar “opportu- Id. nity” intelligent or waiver of that “opportu- question

The more is difficult whether nity” existed here. Alegría Garza, Victor and Mario who ad- resigning positions, mitted from for measuring The standard an process entitled to the protection same due a right effective waiver of constitutional plaintiffs. as were the discharged Al- an requires that the waiver be “intentional though the no case defendants state author- relinquishment or abandonment of a known ity in support position, they contend Zerbst, right privilege.” Johnson v. 304 employee resign that an who chooses to 458, 464, 1019, 1023, U.S. 58 82 L.Ed. S.Ct. process protection outside due afforded waivers, (1938). evaluating 1461 In these by the Fourteenth Amendment. courts indulge every reasonable presump In 556 tion against finding Stewart v. F.2d 281 waiver. Parham v. Bailey, Cir.1977), Cortese, 95, 2001, brought 67, 1983, a teacher suit U.S. proc- (1972); Mosley school district for violation his due L.Ed.2d 556 Louis St. rights, professor Railway, ess as a claiming with Southwestern denied, protected (5th Cir.), in continued em- property cert. he ployment, Purport was entitled notice and an S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d 407 opportunity to be in his own ed waivers of heard defense fundamental constitutional prior guarantees The teacher are to the “most strin subject termination. had gent been informed he was In Re going scrutiny.” Bryan, to be Magallanes probationary employees 8. Defendants that Jose was a are likewise dismissa- only cause, “probationary,” “regular” employ- ble this distinction is irrelevant rather than regulations city’s provide ee. Because to our discussion. *9 process the due clause of the Cir.1981). quired The record must reflect (5th Amendment,” Fourteenth this Court has of actual knowl a basis for the conclusion determined that even in cases where the right or privi the existence of the edge of of an em- employer “postpones” right meaning, of its and understanding full lege, hearing a after ployee to secure until dis- comprehension consequence clear missal,9 reducing procedures “risk must be Escandar, the waiver. United States include, prior accorded. These must to ter- (5th Cir.1972). mination, written notice of the reasons for simply evidence in this case The opportunity termination and an effective to establishing a does not rise to the level Dekle, rebut those reasons.” Thurston v. plaintiffs say waiver. We cannot supra, 531 F.2d at 1273. We went on to hearing to notice and a rights waived their explain give that “effective rebuttal must of the relevant with “sufficient awareness” employee right respond to in writ- knowing intelligent A consequences. ing charges respond to the made to 1) knowledge right requires waiver orally charged before the official with the due, 2) the actual exist process making the termination de- responsibility of employees The process. ence of that cision.” Id. any rights hearings. aware of to In never least, therefore, At the the law re very dis fact, city policy it was not to afford a quires public employee pro that a with a charged employees hearing with either in continued be right employment tected reasons for their dismissal. The written given opportunity reply notice and an to hearing and opportunity meaningful for a prior to termination. Jones v. Orleans Par understanding opportunity —the Board, ish Cir. School which formed the basis for two elements denied,-U.S.-, 1982), cert. 103 S.Ct. not exist here. the waiver in Stewart —did 77 L.Ed.2d 1310 Because the' knowingly relinquish did not rules did city’s personnel require not when right hearing their to a informed of the reasons for employees be A right. resig aware of that forced never giv nor that discharge, employees legal impact does differ in from nation directly to opportunity respond en the discharge lacking a volition the choice them, it is clear that charges against resign. those rules were in violation of minimum The defendants in the alter process protection. due native that if the are deemed Damages III. in the possess legitimate property a challenge The defendants next the suffi- and if the employment, retention the court’s ciency of the evidence to resigned who did not waive these employees award. The court awarded each damage only exists rights, property interest $2,000 compensation for lost plaintiff proce that it is protected by the extent $4,000 wages and for emotional distress and safeguards city’s ordi provided dural rights. violation of constitutional argument rules. an nances and Such A issue is whether the rejected by Supreme preliminary specifically concerning contention may define defendants’ in Arnett: State “[w]hile us. The defend having properly awards is before and is not once property, what judgment for a notwith ants did not move rights defined those the Constitution ” or file a motion standing the verdict for a 416 U.S. at process.... defines due It new trial or remittitur. is well-estab defining “the minimum at 1659. In appellate lished that there can be no review elements re- pretermination procedural event, however, “postponed” it is clear hear- In dis- 9. The court’s reference to hearing ing contemplates be offered the dis- here were missals at issue effective without following employee opportunity, his termination. any hearing missed before or after dis- hearing that a There is no indication here charge. plaintiffs. afforded the would ever have been *10 494

of excessive or allegedly inadequate rights dam tional to have been proper. Several ages if the court was not given trial of the plaintiffs testified to the disruption exercise its discretion opportunity to on a caused their marriages and families Dillon, motion for a new trial. Baker v. 389 jobs. loss of their Several others were 57, Accord, (5th Cir.1968). Calcagni F.2d 58 forced to leave their homes in Donna and Corp., 1049, v. 603 Waterways Hudson F.2d seek employment in the northern United Owens, (2d v. 446 Cir.1979); Ryen 1051 F.2d migrant States as farm workers. The hu- Brown, 1333, 1334(D.C.Cir.1971); DeWitt v. miliation, uncertainty, and stress inherent 516, (8th Cir.1982). 669 F.2d Since being in an unemployed Mexican-American there no motion for a new trial in this was in the Rio Valley Grande with little or no case, reviewing we have no basis for education or literacy English is self-evi- discretion, trial court’s exercise of dent. reviewing no for the ade therefore basis Qualified IV. Immunity quacy damages. defendants next that the trial properly preserved An issue not court erred in not submitting proposed its will not appeal generally be considered in instruction on the affirmative defense of of exceptional absence circumstances. faith, qualified, good immunity to the Loflin, 1213, D.H. Overmyer Co. jury. They contend because they (5th Cir.), denied, 851, cert. 404 U.S. all times in compliance acted with the city (1971). 30 L.Ed.2d 90 We have upon charter and advice of their exceptional held such circumstances to exist attorney, they cannot be held liable for when the issue is a purely legal one or the constitutional violation. Wood v. Strick- asserted error is so obvious that the failure land, 420 U.S. 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d to consider it would result in a miscarriage justice. Fehlhaber, Fehlhaber v. The defendants requested that the court Cir.1982). jury: instruct Neither prong “plain of this error” Even if the plaintiffs prove you by standard is met Although here. the de greater weight of the credible evidence point fendants out all that his discharge or constructive [sic] except two—Clara Vela Aleg and Jesus discharge from his employment with [sic] actually earned more wages be ría — City Donna violated his [sic] tween the date they were terminated or procedural due process, it is an affirm- resign forced to and the date of trial than ative defense to all such claims herein would they have earned if they had contin by plaintiffs made herein that at all rele- ued to work for the City during Donna times, vant defendants herein acted un- time, this contention disregards the “good der a faith” belief that his [sic] fact that each of the men suffered various conduct was lawful. periods of unemployment finding before more lucrative Certainly work. this Court refused, The court and instead instructed will ignore not the damages plain due the the jury: tiffs for their time unemployment, lest you If find that the defendants were we penalize them diligence for their in fi acting within they, what as reasonable nally obtaining higher-paying employment. prudent persons, lawful, believe to be Awarding plaintiffs $2,000 compensato then can’t you against find defendants. ry damages for the time of unemploy words, In other if they really believed— ment prior finding their new jobs is is, only you if believe they acted proper, and because we are permitted but unlawfully, that has to be the first amount, review the excessiveness of the determination —what doing award is supportable. lawful and they acting good $4,000

We likewise consider the faith, award you can’t rule them. The be, emotional distress and violation of would constitu- standard reasonable and pru- Referring both or similar would not be available. under the same persons dent added.) elements, subjective (Emphasis objective circumstances.” *11 qualified immunity held that we have instruc- that this The contend defendants defeated if an official ‘knew or would be only to in that it referred tion was deficient should have known that the reasonably the im- qualified element of “objective” the sphere action he took within his of offi- Supreme the by test announced munity the con- responsibility cial would violate Strickland, and supra, v. in Wood Court [plaintiff] or if he rights stitutional subjective reference to any omitted took the action with malicious intention of their ten- was the focus standard which deprivation to cause a of constitutional instruction. dered ’” 102 at rights injury or other ... S.Ct. The de reject argument. this We Strickland, 2737, 420 Wood v. quoting a stan upon dependent fendants’ is position 321-22, (original 95 at 1000 U.S. at S.Ct. In Har law. longer good dard which is no emphasis). 800, 457 102 Fitzgerald, low v. U.S. S.Ct. even if the court’s failure Consequently, (1982), Supreme 73 L.Ed.2d 396 concerning subjec- this jury to instruct immunity “adjusted” qualified Court were qualified immunity tive component its earlier by established standard decisions error, The such error would be harmless. subjective test of with the dispensed Harlow, court determined light correctly In district good official faith. officials is tested “set- firings, faith” of defendant time of the the law was “good are objective standards. Officials purely by non-policy making employees tled” that damages civil in liability shielded from for their em- discharged public cannot be from does not violate sofar as their conduct because of their activi- ployment or constitu statutory established “clearly Burns, 347, 359, ties, Elrod v. 427 see person of which a reasonable rights tional 2673, 2682, (1976), 49 L.Ed.2d 547 96 S.Ct. 102 at 2738. would have known.” Id. reasons for must discharge and that written public employees. to terminated provided Moreover, immunity even if Dekle, supra. Thurston v. Because See evaluated the Wood v. by still Strickland objective “failed” this evalua- defendants standards, could have possible prejudice no tion, they qualified would have lost Following accrued to the defendants here. in event. immunity found, verdict, court jury’s the district V. Reinstatement law, “the as a matter of individual should have known reasonably defendants in their fa- Following jury’s finding sphere took within the that the actions Al- vor, Leon Trevino and Victor basic, violate responsibility of official would court for reinstatement egría moved the the de rights substantial constitutional with equivalent positions former or and, de consequently, fendants” remedy This City requested of Donna. good faith objective fendants had failed the mentioned in the district court’s was not an official’s im test.10 Loss of immunity judgment. from Wood v. munity suit under Strickland standards; inte normally either of two Reinstatement “an possible under thus, defend escape liability, remedy in order to for a gral part objective subjec prove ant had to both the first amendment.” which contravenes explained by the Su good Irvin, (E.D. tive faith. As F.Supp. v. Clary Harlow, in preme Tex.1980); Indepen Court v. Roma accord Guerra District, F.Supp. dent School the Court has defined [characteristically (S.D.Tex.1977); Hampton Training Smith identifying the circum- by these elements Nurses, immunity for qualified stances which School court, Harlow, require by explicitly Supreme and did a resolution In objective good jury. faith of defend- at 2739. stated that 102 S.Ct. properly be determined ant officials could RUBIN, not be denied on the B. Cir.1966), may Judge, spe- ALVIN Circuit concurring: ground cially would revive old that reinstatement antagonisms. Sturzing v. Fort Bend Inde the majority, Unlike I cannot read the District, 92, 93 (5th pendent School charge instructing the jury as “that it Cir.1974). explained Sturzing, As find could not unless it found rights constitutional fre “[enforcement improper was the sole rea- motive disturbing consequences. Re quently has (Emphasis son discharge.” origi- lief is to that which would be not restricted nal.) was instructed to determine of irritation.” pleasing and free the plaintiffs discharged whether “be- *12 (It re- cause activities.” Trevino, and if so Alegría an sponded affirmatively interrogatory to choose, to the right employment have a using very words.) these Numerous causes to their unconstitutional they enjoyed prior employer’s may of an dissatisfaction in to therefore remand the termination. We aggregate prompt discharge it to an em- this issue with instructions district court on no cause ployee though single alone would to order as to these two reinstatement to move it take such action. Under those option. at their circumstances, employee the would be dis-

charged “because of” each cause contribu- ting employer’s to this dissatisfaction. CONCLUSION VI. Thus, jury’s instruction the the and answer We find the evidence insuffi- that was case permitted in this a verdict in the plain- cient the jury’s to verdict that Noe even plaintiffs’ tiffs’ favor if the exercise of Ramirez because of was fired his rights their first amendment was but one activity, judgment and the in his favor on several among discharge. reasons for the First Amendment claim must re- respect, jury In this the instruction was versed. the on the jury’s We affirm verdict correct, for Mt. does Healthy not require First claim the Amendment all de- constitutionally protected that conduct be fendants as Alegría, Magal- to Jesus Jose discharge. the reason for The sole Mt. lanes, Garza, Alegría, Victor Mario Clara plaintiff’s Court held Healthy that a burden Vela and Leon Trevino. that protected to establish conduct was a judg- We also affirm the district court’s “motivating factor” or “substantial factor” ment that the the defendants violated due defendant’s not to the decision rehire process rights all the plaintiffs, including him. 429 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at Ramirez, Noe by failing provide to holding at 484. In that plain- L.Ed.2d the with written reasons for their termination burden, tiff had carried this the Court did or notice of opportunity hearing for a at finding not disturb district court’s dismissal, which they could contest their other reasons existed for teacher-em- and we damage affirm the court’s award to well; discharge as ployee’s contrary, each We plaintiff.11 remand to the district acknowledged additional reasons court with to rein- instructions order the Id. specifically. 573-75. statement Alegría of Jesus Trevi- Leon not, therefore, Healthy does require Mt. no. that, recover, employee to exclude con- PART,

AFFIRMED IN IN tributing REMANDED reasons. He must instead exclude Assuming PART. reasons. alternative an em- jury’s process rights 11. Because we for Noe affirm verdict his due violation of his n claim, process Ramirez rights on his due we likewise under the First Amendment or both. damage affirm his award. awarded damages The court punitive The not but were com- $4,000 $2,000 wages Ramirez lost for for damages pensatory. Compensatory justi- are suffering pain the mental resulted which in the same amount whether there fied was one job. from the It not loss of matters violation or two. constitutional job Ramirez because of lost his a violation (solely or But ployee discharged part) refusing was to Ramirez failed campaign.3 because he exercised his constitutional request to an on this interrogatory issue. employer escape can still rights, liability The question put was not jury if the by persuading employer whether Ramirez was for discharged re reason, discharged had not him for it fusing campaign but he whether was another discharged would have him for rea- discharged the opposite: “because of can preclude son.1 alternative reason political participation city elec [his] if it in no liability played part even fact in tion of While the Donna.” evidence con Therefore, employer’s decision. cerning the for his firing reason was contra finding that exercise of a constitutional best, dictory, testimony, sup his own prompted was the sole reason that ported objected parti the thesis that he employer employee does city san There displays property. on was impose alone under Mt. liability much discharged evidence that he was Healthy. performance. There unsatisfactory job literally discharged no evidence that he was When in future a similar issue is for political participation elec raised, Healthy Mt. proper charge would, therefore, tion. I hold that Ramirez It and clear. given. should be is succinct failed to question regarding create *13 preposition it to a Truncating two-word discharge political participation serious adequately present does not con- protest waived the as or the defenses to it. question stitutional being political based on abstinence. circumstances,2 however, we Under similar approved charge substantially like this. College, 588

Goss v. San Jacinto Junior Moreover, (5th Cir.1979).

96 over- weight supports

whelming evidence Therefore, I jury’s verdict. concur in

the result by majority. reached

I concur also reversal of verdict for Ramirez,

Noe but for a reason other than amendment, The first majority’s.

my opinion, protects engage refusals to

campaign activity support whether in of or

against the person candidate favored plaintiff plaintiffs’ 1. had Once the establishes “his con- activities noth- constitutionally protected ing duct was ... [and to do with their termination. ‘motivating a ‘substantial factor’ ... was] [i.e.] decision,” factor’ in ... state Educ., [a actor’s] See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 431 U.S. prove burden shifts to the “that it defendant 209, 232-37, 1782, 1798-1800, 97 S.Ct. 52 would have reached the same decision ... even (state (1977) L.Ed.2d 261 cannot condition em- protected in the absence of the conduct.” ployment on financial contribution union’s 287, 576, U.S. at S.Ct. at 50 L.Ed.2d at 484. expression views or Village Arlington Heights Metropolitan v. Cf. Maynard, Wooley v. political candidates); Development Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 714-16, 705, 1428, 1435-36, 97 S.Ct. 21, 555, 450, 21, n. 566 n. 50 L.Ed.2d 752, (1977) (state L.Ed.2d 762-63 cannot com- (to (1977) equal 468 n. 21 establish violation of pel display plate); motto on state license clause, protection prove plaintiff must that dis- Barnette, Virginia Bd. West State of Educ. factor; criminatory purpose motivating was a 631-41, 1182-87, 319 U.S. 63 S.Ct. prove burden then shifts to the defendant (1943) (state 87 L.Ed. 1633-39 cannot challenged decision would have been compel flag pledge allegiance); salute discriminatory purpose). reached absent Gaebler, generally First see Amendment Pro- Compelled Expres- tection Government categorically

2. The defendants asserted Association, sion and B.C.L.Rev. 1004- each of was terminated for a OS job-related resigned voluntarily, reason

Case Details

Case Name: Jose Bueno, Leon Trevino and Victor Alegria, Cross-Appellants v. City of Donna, Cross-Appellees
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 12, 1983
Citation: 714 F.2d 484
Docket Number: 81-2391
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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