105 Cal. 20 | Cal. | 1894
The right of ownership to the proceeds of a two-thousand-dollar benefit certificate, issued by a mutual benefit society, known as the American Legion of Honor, forms the subject of this litigation. The society is not an active party to the litigation, having paid the money into court, and being entirely satisfied with the court’s adjudication as to whom it belongs. The respondent and appellant are brother and sister, and the beneficiary certificate was taken out by the mother, Emily Kate Jory, and made payable upon her death to the daughter appellant, or any other member of the mother’s family whom she might thereafter ■ in her lifetime designate.
The by-laws of the society provide that members may, at any time when in good standing, surrender their benefit certificates, and have new ones issued, payable to such beneficiary dependent upon them as they may direct, subject, however, to the provisions of section 2: “ Such change to be made upon petition to the supreme secretary, signed by the member desiring to make the change, attested by the secretary of the subordinate council, and having the seal of the subordinate council attached, substantially in accordance with the form prescribed in this section.....The fee to be paid for a new certificate issued shall be one dollar, and must
Several years after this certificate was issued the mother became desirous of changing the beneficiary named therein, to wit, the appellant daughter, and to substitute therefor the respondent son; and in furtherance of such desire, and for the purpose of complying with the laws of the society, she attempted to secure control of the original certificate which was then in the keeping of her daughter appellant, in order that she might surrender the same to the society; but she was unsuccessful in this endeavor. Upon this question the court found the fact to be that “ she (the daughter) refused to redeliver the same to the said Emily Kate Jory, although frequently requested so to do by her as alleged in said amended complaint, but kept and concealed the same for the purpose of endeavoring to prevent her said mother from designating the plaintiff herein as the beneficiary thereunder, and securing the said two thousand dollars herself, and so kept and concealed it until after her mother’s death, as alleged in the amended complaint on file herein.” And this finding is supported by the evidence.
Laying aside any question of interest in the original beneficiary certificate resting in the daughter by virtue of matters arising in parol between the mother and the daughter, we are clear that as between the original beneficiary, the daughter, and the proposed new beneficiary, the son, the proceeds of this policy belong to the son. As between them there was a substitution of beneficiaries in the eyes of a court of equity. If the Legion of Honor was here as an aggressive party, insisting as against the claims of the son upon a strict compliance with its by-laws before it could be compelled to take money from its treasury, possibly a different question would be presented; but, as between these parties litigant, the court will administer justice from the standpoint of equity, and bring to the solution of this question those broad principles upon the basis of which equity always deals. The general rule unquestionably is that a change of a beneficiary cannot be made by the insured unless a substantial compliance with the laws and regulations of the society is had; yet courts of equity have recognized various exceptions to this "general principle, and the facts of this case bring it squarely within one of the well-recognized exceptions. This exception is build ed upon the principle that equity does not demand impossible things, and a
The present case comes squarely within this exception, and in principle is identical with some of the cases we have cited. For the purpose of changing the beneficiary, the insured complied in detail with every rule of the society, save the single one of surrendering the certificate, and this she was unable to do after using due diligence to that end. Impossibilities are not required, and if the certificate had been lost or destroyed, and thus the surrender made impossible, equity would have treated the surrender as duly made; and in legal effect the certificate was lost in this case. But there is another well-settled principle of equity equally fatal to appellant’s claims. No person can take advantage of his own wrong. No man is allowed to come into a court of equity, and reap beneficial results from his own iniquity. If Mrs. Jory had the right to make the change of beneficiaries, and did all that it was possible for her to do toward making such change, but was prevented by the acts of appellant from a consummation of her intentions, then appellant will not be allowed to derive any benefit from her fraudulent conduct. If a fraud of her own practicing prevented a legal substitution of beneficiaries, then as against her an equitable substitution will be held to have taken place.
If the insured, Mrs. Jory, had a legal right to make a change of beneficiaries at the time she attempted so to do, then the maxims of equity which we have applied to the facts of the case dispose of this litigation fully and entirely. But, as a further ground of defense to
The principle here under consideration is the most recent growth of mutual benefit association law, a branch of the law which in itself is young in years; and we know of nothing in the law which deprives a person contemplating membership in a mutual benefit association from so contracting with the proposed beneficiary as that when such certificate is issued, equities in favor of the beneficiary are born of such merit that the insured member has no power to defeat them. The few authorities shedding light upon this question declare the rights of the beneficiary are such as to create a vested interest in the proceeds of the certificate. (Smith v. National Ben. Soc., 123 N. Y. 85; Maynard v. Vanderwerker, 24 N. Y. Supp. 932.) Possibly this is not a correct declaration of the principle of law applicable to the conditions; for a second beneficiary might be substituted, wholly innocent of the contractual relations existing between the insured and the first beneficiary, and his substitution give rise to the creation of equities in his behalf, all controlling upon a judicial disposition of the rights of the parties concerned. If the original beneficiary’s interest was vested no subsequent conditions could possibly arise which would defeat his right, and for this reason we think it can hardly be termed a vested interest. The whole matter seems to be rather
The respondent is a volunteer beneficiary, and it only remains for us to ascertain from the record what the appellant’s equities are, as disclosed by the evidence. She claims by her answer that she and her mother entered into a mutual agreement, whereby each should join a mutual benefit society and make the other a beneficiary under the certificates issued, and that said agreement was carried out. Appellant further alleges that she paid all initiation fees, dues, and assessments upon the benefit certificate taken out by her mother. If these moneys were paid out by appellant under and by virtue of a contract between the parties, and in pursuance of this agreement and scheme for mutual insurance, then she has equities which entitle her to recognition in a court of justice, for it would be a gross imposition and fraud upon her to allow the insured to change her beneficiary under these circumstances. Though wrong and injustice form an unpleasant sight to a court of equity, yet that court will never close its eyes because the sight is an unpleasant one, but rather with vision all the keener will reach out its strong arm to protect the wronged and innocent party.
In this case, after hearing all the evidence, the court
It is stated that the court committed an error in admitting in evidence statements made by Mrs. Jory prior to her death, to the effect that she had asked appellant several times for the certificate, and that appellant would not give it up. Conceding the evidence objectionable, as being hearsay, still no harm to appellant arose by its admission. There is an abundance of other evidence in the record, showing a demand upon her for the certificate, and substantially nothing to the contrary. While she may have formally denied in her answer the allegation of demand made in the complaint, and while she may also have stated at the trial that no demand was made upon her, the whole record is opposed to the statement, and the whole theory of her own case, both in pleading and evidence, is opposed to it; for her case rests upon the claim that her mother was not entitled to the certificate, but that it was her own separate property, of which she was entitled to the absolute and exclusive control. She does not state in her evidence that she would have given it up to her mother if it had been demanded, but, upon the contrary, it is conclusively shown, both by her pleading and evidence, that she would not have done so if a demand had been made. Under these circumstances the statements of her mother as to a demand were not prejudicial, even conceding them to be erroneous.
It is ordered that the judgment and order be affirmed.
Harrison, J., and Van Fleet, J., concurred.