After a jury trial, Michael Quintrell Jordan was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault in connection with a shooting at a nightclub. He argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on one of the counts, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the other count, and that the trial court erred in charging the jury. Because the evidence authorized Jordan’s conviction on both counts and the challenged charge was proper, we affirm.
In the early morning on October 11, 2009, Jordan got into an argument at a nightclub, and a bouncer used a “chokehold” to forcibly ej ect him from the club. The two exchanged words, and J or dan told the bouncer, “wait ’til I go to the car, I’ll be back.” The bouncer construed this as a threat that Jordan “was going to go get a gun.” Another club employee called the police, and the bouncer remained outside the club. A few minutes later, several shots were fired in the bouncer’s direction. One of those shots hit a bystander, who was standing outside near the bouncer.
2. Aggravated assault against the bouncer.
The indictment charged Jordan with aggravated assault against the bouncer by shooting at the bouncer with a gun, a deadly weapon. See State v. Nejad,
“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults ... [w]ith a deadly weapon....” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). “A person commits the offense of simple assault when he or she either ... (1) [ajttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) [cjommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury.” OCGA § 16-5-20 (a).
No witness testified to seeing the shooter, but circumstantial evidence supported a finding that Jordan fired the shots. This included evidence that, shortly before the shooting, the bouncer had forcibly ejected Jordan from the club, that Jordan had told the bouncer he was going to his car and would be back, that the bouncer viewed Jordan’s comments as threatening and thought he was going to get a gun, and that the subsequent shots were fired in the bouncer’s direction. See Giles v. State,
Although, as Jordan points out, the bouncer did not specifically identify what he was afraid would happen, the bouncer’s testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, authorized a finding that he was in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury as shots were fired in his direction. The bouncer testified that he was afraid and “tr[ied] to get out of the way” when he heard the shots. He also testified that, as this occurred, others pushed him back into the club and onto the floor, and that afterward he saw bullet fragments inside the club and bullet holes inside and outside the club. See Craft v. State,
Moreover, the evidence set forth above, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, also depicted circumstances from which the jury could infer that Jordan intended to shoot the bouncer. A jury may infer criminal intent from the circumstances, see Campbell v. State,
Because a rational trier of fact could have found that Jordan shot a gun in the bouncer’s direction, attempting to commit a violent injury against him and placing him in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, the trial court did not err in denying Jackson’s motion for directed verdict on the charge that he committed aggravated assault against the bouncer.
3. Aggravated assault against the bystander.
The indictment charged Jordan with aggravated assault against the bystander by shooting him with a gun, a deadly weapon. Unlike the bouncer, the bystander’s testimony did not show that he was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury at the time of the shooting, as required for an assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). Jordan argues that the evidence also was insufficient to show that he intended “to commit a violent injury to the person of another,” as required for an assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1). We disagree.
As explained above, the jury was authorized to infer from the evidence that Jordan intended to shoot the bouncer when he instead shot the nearby bystander.
[W]hen an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State,
4. Jury charge.
Jordan argues that the trial court erred in charging the jury on aggravated assault. As explained below, his argument lacks merit, but we take this opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard of appellate review for such a claim of error.
(a) Standard of review — usage.
Appellate review of the jury charge is de novo. Collier v. State,
Both parties write that the standard of review is “plain legal error” — which is an expression this court has adopted as a synonym for “de novo.” See id. But the state confuses the plain legal error standard with the plain error doctrine — which is something else entirely. The plain error doctrine authorizes consideration on the merits for a narrow category of issues that had been waived. See Collier,
Use of “plain legal error” as a synonym for “de novo” is apparently unique to this court. We coined the expression in Leverett v. Jasper County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
We conclude that the phrase “plain legal error” should not be used to designate the de novo standard of review. Instead, we recommend describing the standard of review applicable to questions of law as simply “de novo” — as in, “we review questions of law de novo.”
(b) The trial court properly charged the jury.
Jordan argues that the trial court erroneously charged the jury that a defendant can commit the assault required for an aggravated assault by “intentionally committing] an act that placed the alleged victim in reasonable fear of immediately receiving a violent injury.” He contends that this instruction was improper because “[t]he indictment specifically avers the attemptedbattery type aggravated assault” in the count alleging aggravated assault against the bouncer. But the indictment was not so specific. It merely alleged that Jordan “unlawfully ma[de] an assault upon the [bouncer] with a gun, a deadly weapon, by shooting at him.” This allegation could encompass either method of committing an assault — attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of another under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), or committing an act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). “The trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State,
Judgment affirmed.