We granted the petition for review of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Kawasaki) to *151 entertain its appeal of interlocutory orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court). The first order effectively оverruled Kawasaki’s preliminary objections requesting the dismissal of the action filed against it by Denise Jordan, as Adminis-tratrix of the Estate of Derrick Jordan, a minor (Plaintiff) because of improper service in accordanсe with international agreement. 1 The second order denied Kawasaki’s request for reconsideration. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual background as follows:
On March 4, 1995, Derrick Jordan, a minor child was fatally injurеd at the Broad and Tasker Streets subway station of the Broad Street subway line while attempting to board the subway. Derrick Jordan sustained injury to his body, limbs and head which resulted in grave brain injuries. He died on March 6,1995 and is survived by his mother and father.
Plаintiff, Denise Jordan was appointed Administratrix of Decedent’s Estate by the Register of Wills of Philadelphia County on January 7,1997.
On January 22, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this action seeking recovexy for personal injuries sustained in the subway aсcident occurring on March 4, 1995. Plaintiff named Septa, the City of Philadelphia, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. as Defendants.
Plaintiff served Defendant (hereinafter, “Kawasaki”) with process by mailing a writ of summons via United States First Class Certified Mаil to Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.[,] 1-18 Nakamachi-Oori-2-Chrome, Chud-Ku, Kobe, Hyogo 650, Japan. On February 21,1997, Plaintiff again served Kawasaki with process by mailing the Complaint to the above-mentioned address. (Kawasaki is a Japanese corporation organized and operating under the laws of Japan.)
On April 9,1997, Defendant filed preliminary objections pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) and (2) for improper form of service and non-conformity with the law or rule of court. The Preliminary Objection has been overruled by this Court.
Trail Court Opinion, pp. 1-2. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Kawasaki was liable as the designer, manufacturer, and seller of the subway cars involved in the accident injuring Plaintiff’s decedent.
The basis for Kawasaki’s preliminary objections was that Plaintiff’s service of a complaint in English by mail upon a Japanese corporation was not in accordance with Rule 404(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.C.P. No. 404(4) and “The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,” 20 U.S.T. 361, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4, Note, commonly known as the Hague Convention. Rule 404(4) provides that original service оf process served outside the Commonwealth shall be effected within ninety days of the issuance of the writ or the filing of the complaint in the manner provided by treaty. The Hague Convention governs the manner in which procеss should be served upon Kawasaki.
Kawasaki argued that Articles 2 through 5 of the Hague Convention prohibited service upon Japanese defendants directly by mail, but instead required service by delivery of a translated cоmplaint upon Japan’s designated “Central Authority” as defined in the Hague Convention. The trial court, however, concluded that Kawasaki was properly served by mail pursuant to the terms of Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention as interpreted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Sandoval v. Honda Motor Co.,
This Court’s scope of review of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary objections is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Delaware County v. City of Philadelphia,
The Hague Convention has spawned two lines of cases in courts of the United States that have come to conflicting interpretations regarding service upon Japanese defendants. One line of cases takes the position Kawasaki urges this Court to adopt, namely that Articles 2 through 5 of the Hague Convention require that service upon a Japanese corporation be made by serving a Japanese-translated complaint upon Japan’s designated Central Authority, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who in turn would forward the complaint to the defendant.
See Golub v. Isuzu Motors,
The Superior Court in Sandoval clearly, and we believe persuasively, sets forth the analysis that supports the determination that a Japanese defendant may be served by mail:
The Hague Convention has been ratified by over twenty countries, including the United States and Japan. It provides for several alternative means of service of process. The section of central importance tо this action is as follows:
' Article X of the Convention states: Provided the state of designation does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with—
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the state of designation,
(c)the fi*eedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of designation.
Japan has declared that it objects to the methods of service specified in 10(b) and (c). Because Japаn has not objected to Article 10(a), that section provides a permissible means of service upon Japanese corporations.
See Shoei Kako v. Superior Court,
It has been argued that Article 10(a) does not apply to the ‘service’ of judicial documents because it uses the term, ‘send’ instead of the word, ‘service.’ However, it has been documented that the drafters meant ‘service’ and the discrepancy resulted from careless drafting. Ristau,
Handbook, supra.
At 165-67;
Shoei Kako,
The reference to the freedom to ‘send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroadf] would be superfluous unless it was related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of service.
That is so because the mañs are open tо everyone. Persons do not need an international convention on the service of judicial documents to give them the right to ‘send’ mail.
Id.,
*153
Kawasaki argues simply that
Sandoval
is incorrect, that it is not binding precedent on this Court, and that this Court is free to adopt reasoning that we might find more persuasive.
See Commonwealth v. Harris,
We do not, however, find this reasoning more persuasive than that articulated by the Superior Court in Sandoval and those courts in accord with Sandoval First, there is nothing illogical for a treaty to provide for alternative methods of servicе, and Article 10 does so provide by its plain language. It is therefore not illogical for the Hague Convention to provide for direct service by mail when it has also developed a process for service upon a designated Central Authority. See, e.g., Section 5323 of Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5323, which provides for service upon persons outside of the Commonwealth by a number of methods, including service by “any form of mail addressed to the pеrson to be served and requiring a signed receipt.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a)(3).
Second, we note that much of Kawasaki’s argument, as well as that of the cases it cites for support, focuses upon Japan’s “intent” in not objecting to Articlе 10(a), thus bringing the argument beyond the language of the Hague Convention itself. This argument assumes that Japan intended that service from abroad upon its citizens could only be by the most “restrictive” or “formal” means possible under the Convention. We have no basis to leap to this conclusion, or to discount the possibility that Japan may have had reasons of its own for not objecting to Article 10(a) and permitting service by mail. Further, Kawasaki has advanсed no argument that would seriously support our discounting the Superior Court’s documentation that the drafters of the Hague Convention intended Article 10(a) to include service by mail in favor of a presumed Japanese “intеnt” or understanding that Article 10(a) did not refer to service of judicial documents.
Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning that we find persuasive: the reasoning articulated by our Superior Court in Sandoval. Plaintiff has made service upon Kаwasaki in accordance with the provisions of Pa. R.C.P. No. 404(4) and the Hague Convention. The trial court is therefore affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of March, 1998, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter, dated June 2,1997 and May 19,1997, are hereby affirmed; and this case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for further proceedings.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. This order directed Plaintiff to comply with other relief requеsted by Kawasaki in its preliminary objections but did not specifically rule upon the request to dismiss the complaint.
. Article 5 of the Hague Convention provides that the Central Authority designated by a State "may” require that a judicial document be translated into the official language(s) of that State. The Sandoval court determined that this provision is inapplicable to service under Article 10 *153 because Article 10 does not involve service upon a Central Authority.