24 Fla. 1 | Fla. | 1888
delivered the opinion of the court:
There are thirteen grounds of objection to the bill of complaint set up in the appellant’s demurrer. We shall confine our observations to the points made and the argument advanced in his solicitor’s brief, and treat any ground of demurrer not covered by them as abandoned. Southern Express Company vs. Van Meter, 17 Fla., 783. It is contended in the first place that the complainants’ right of action is barred, and this contention is based upon the idea that in this State the same period of time that bars an action of ejectment is a bar to a suit to foreclose a mortgage.
It is unnecessary to review the authorities discussed in the opinion and which support its conclusion, but we mm' remark of Lord vs. Morris, 18 Cal., 482, where it is held that the same period of limitation bars both an action on the note and one on the mortgage, that there is nothing in it inconsistent with the view that, had the statute of California prescribed a different (instead of the same) limitation to an action on a sealed instrument from that prescribed for an action on a written instrument not under seal, the decision of the court would have been to the effect that the limitation as to the sealed instrument controlled a suit to foreclose a mortgage. The view of the court was that the limitation of actions for recovery of real estate founded upon the title could not be adopted by analogy for the reason that a mortgage of itself gave, under the system in that State, no right of possession, either real or technical, and that the limitation pirescribed for “ a contract, obliga
The conclusion reached in Browne vs. Browne is sustained by the decisions of the courts of those States where the character of the statutes as to the limitation of remedies and as to mortgages is similar to those obtaining here.
We understand counsel for appellant not to dissent from the result reached in Browne vs. Browne, if it is considered in connection with the facts of that ease, it being a foreclosure suit with parties, as explained above, and there being in the mortgage, according to inference of counsel,, though we do not so understand from the report of the case, a distinct covenant to pay the debt, and bringing the case within the twenty-year provision for instruments of" writing under seal. As there is in the mortgage before us, as is substantially alleged in the bill of complaint, a covenant by the parties of the first part, “ for' themselves, their
In jurisdictions where the statute of limitations has applied only to legal remedies, equity has adopted in suits of foreclosure of mortgages the limitation prescribed for actions of ejectment or other actions founded upon title for the recovery of real estate instead of the limitation controlling a personal action against the mortgagor or debtor for the mere debt. Originally at common law a mortgage conveyed the legal estate to the mortgagee, and upon the mortgagor’s default in paying the debt at the time specified for such payment, the estate became vested absolutely in the mortgagee. Equity regarding the mortgage as security for a debt rather than a sale of the land, came to the relief of the mortgagor and permitted him to redeem by paying the debt, and as equity gave this relief, the right to it was called the equity of redemption. It also gave the mortgagee a remedy by foreclosure, through which a limit to the right of redemption might be fixed by decree, and if the redemption was not made as decreed, the mortgagor’s equity was extinguished and the estate was absolute in the mortgagee. This was called a strict foreclosure. This kind of foreclosure fell into disuse and the practice of decreeing a sale of the mortgaged property at public outcry to the highest bidder has long obtained. Goodenow vs. Ewer, 16 Cal., 461. In dealing with the question of limitation to the remedy of foreclosure and sale, equity re
In Florida a mortgage is not only in equity merely a lien, but under our statute it is nothing more than this at law. Berlack vs. Halle, 22 Fla., 236. It is not a conveyance of the legal title or estate, but only a lien upon it. It gives the mortgagee no right of possession. The theory of any such right, either actual or technical, existing in the mortgagee by virtue of the mortgage, is entirely antagonistic to both the spirit and letter of our statute. No decree giving the mortgagee, as such, possession, can be rendered in favor of the mortgagee simply upon the mortgage and the debt it secures. It is only as purchaser under a decree of foreclosure and sale, and not as mere mortgagee, that the assistance of the court can be obtained for giving him possession. This being the case we cannot see any basis for an analogy to legal actions for recovery of real property.
The fact that twenty years are allowed to enforce a mortgage lien, whereas only seven are given to recover possession on the legal title against an adverse holding, is not an anomaly in the statute. It allows twenty years for the enforcement of a common law judgment or simple money decree, which are, by our statutes, made also a lien on the interest of the defendant in any real estate. There is no more reason why the lien of a judgment should thus be preserved for twenty years than that of a mortgage. The record of either makes it, in law, notice to all the world, and whoever acquires the title of the mortgagor
The first transaction of Jordan in connection with any of the eighty feet of land covered by the mortgage is his purchase of the west fifty feet from Sayre. This purchase was made September 25, 1883, about four years and eight months after Sayre obtained from the master in chancery the deed pretending to convey to him the whole eighty feet, which deed was futile as a conveyance of the land, as the legal title to it was in Myers, who was not a party to the foreclosure proceedings instituted September 25,1879, and under which the master sold and conveyed. Berlack vs. Halle, 22 Fla., 236. The conveyance from Sayre was by deed with warranty of title and for the consideration of twelve hundred dollars. Warrock, the mortgagor, conveyed by warranty deed to Myers, March 20th, 1876, and at this time the mortgage was on .record and legal notice to Myers. On the 16th day of August, 1884, Myers, “ by deed of quit-claim, released his interest in said lot to Jordan,” who, says the bill, “ thereby claims to have become the owner in fee by means of said deed.” Of course Sayre’s deed to Jordan, whatever may be its effect for other purposes, does not affect the east thirty feet of the lot against which the foreclosure is now sought. The only interest in, or connection with, these thirty feet that Jordan has, so far as the pleadings advise us, is that which he has derived from Myers, and Myers’ interest was the ownership of the legal title subject to the mortgage, and of this mortgage Jordan, or any one else dealing with Myers, was charged with notice.
Had Warrock continued to hold the land, the statutory bar of the mortgage would not have run until the latter part of March, 1894. Neither Myers, who purchased from
The case of Benson vs. Stewart, 30 Miss., 49, is cited by counsel for appellant in support of his contention that the possession of Myers was adverse to the mortgage. In that State the period barring an entry at law is adopted by analogy as barring a foreclosure of the mortgage. In Nevitt vs. Bacon, 32 Miss., 227, where it is held that the statute' of limitations commences to run from the time the mortgagee’s right to file his bill accrues, it is said in the opinion of the court, delivered by Justice Handy, who delivered the opinion in Benson vs. Stewart, “ and here it may be' proper to remark that what is said in that ease (Benson vs. Stewart) with respect to adverse possession, had reference-to the party who purchased from the mortgagor, in whose behalf the statute was not a bar when the bill was filed and that party not being protected by an adverse possession under his purchase from the mortgagor for a sufficient length of time to be protected by the bar, he would occupy the position in which the mortgagor stood, in whose favor' the period of time necessary to constitute the bar had not run when the bill was filed against him.”
The fact that Warrock conveyed by warranty deed does-not change the rule, Heyer vs. Pruyn, 7 Paige, 465; Thayer vs. Cramer, 1 McCord’s Chan., 395; Lent vs. Morrell, 25 Cal., 492; Drayton vs. Marshall, Rice’s Reports, 373; Wright vs. Eaves, Rich. Eq., 81.
In Lent vs. Morrell, the mortgagor, Grover, conveyed by «deed of general warranty to Charles Morrell, and the latter to O. F. Morrell, who conveyed to Chambers. Chambers, when he purchased, did not know that the mortgagor had, before selling to O. F. Morrell, extended the time for payment of the note. A default was entered as to the mortgagor, who had failed to answer, but the other three defendants answered. It was held by the court that if the maker of a note secures the same by mortgage on land, and while still the
It is clear that as against the legal title, neither Benedict, Sayre nor Halle has ever had any other status than that of mortgagee, and no other limitation than that applicable to a mortgage, which is twenty years, applies to them. Of this period only a little over twelve years had passed at the filing of the present bill. Neither of them has at any time been in a positiou to maintain an action for the recovery of possession. If a suit for foreclosure can be called such an action, then the bar to it, viewed as such, is twenty years, for the right to such suit is founded upon the mortgage. Having, however, no other status than that of a mortgagee, the laches imputable to an ofituer of the legal title from the lapse of seven years without suit can not be attached to them. Had Sayre acquired the legal title by his purchase in chancery of December 5th, 1880, from the master, it would have terminated his relation of mortgagee and a different case would be presented, but he did not do so, and the result is that we have only to deal with him as mortgagee and against one holding under the title of the
II. It is contended that if the complainant is entitled to any relief, it can not be had in the method pursued here , and in support of this proposition the cases of Goodman vs. Ewer, 16 Cal., 461; Boggs vs. Fowler & Hargrave, Ib., 560; Abadie vs. Lobero, 36 Cal., 391, are cited.
In Goodenow vs. Ewer the facts were as follows : Downer and Morris were the owners, each of an undivided half of a town lot, Downer mortgaged his undivided half to plaintifts in May, 1857, to'secure $2,000, and the mortgage was duly recorded. In June following Downer and Morris •sold and conveyed to the defendant, Ewer, an undivided one-third of the entire property. The effect of this was that Downer, Morris atld Ewer, each held an undivided one-third interest in the property, and one-half Ewer’s interest (the one-sixth he had purchased from Downer) being subject to Downer’s mortgage to plaintifts. In December following the plaintiffs instituted a suit to foreclose their mortgage, making no one but Downer a defendant, and in January following obtained a decree for a sale of all the interest that Downer possessed in the land at the date of the mortgage. In February, 1858, defendant, Ewer, purchased the remaining interest of Morris, and in March the remaining interest of Downer, in the premises. At a sale made under the above decree in June, 1858, the plaintiffs became the purchasers, bidding the full amount due on their judgment, and in proper time received a deed of con
It was held that the decree and sale were of no effect as to Ewer’s title to the one-sixth interest which he had purchased from Downer before the institution of the foreclosure suit; that a mortgagor, or if he has disposed of his title, his grantee, is a necessary party -to a suit of foreclosure and sale ; that though the plaintiffs did not understand that it was necessary that Ewer should have been a party, but thought they were acquiring the entire half interest covered by Downer's mortgage, and the officer making the sale had stated, in accordance with the decree, that such half interest was offered for sale, they acquired only one undivided third of the whole land, and that the effect of the purchase thereof, for the full amount of the decree, satisfied the decree, and that the one-sixth interest sold by Downer to Ewer was thereby discharged from the lien of the mortgage; and that the mistake as to the extent of the interest in the land acquired at the sale, was one purely of law, and not such as equity would relieve against.
In Boggs vs. Fowler and Hargrave, there was a sale under a decree of foreclosure and sale, to which suit and decree the grantee of the mortgagor was not a party. The purchaser at such sale brought an action at law against the mortgagee to recover the money paid by him on his bid. He was aware when he made this bid that the mortgagor had sold the premises before the institution of the foreclosure suit; and there was no showing of any fraud in the sale. It was decided that although the doctrine of caveat emptor did not apply, the action would not lie ; that though the purchaser made a mistake as to the effect of the decree,
In Abadie vs. Lobero, it was held that a purchaser at a Sheriffs sale does not by such purchase acquire any interest in the judgment on which the execution or order of sale issued, or the debt or mortgage upon which the judgment was rendered, nor does a redemptioner, as such, or an assignee of the certificate of sale, acquire any interest in such judgment, debt or mortgage; and that neither of such parties, upon his own ex parte motion made in his own name, is entitled to have the judgment vacated and himself substituted as plaintiff in order that he may file a supplemental complaint to bring in other parties.
In the first of the above three cases it was said that upon proper application in the original foreclosure suit, the court would undoubtedly have released the plaintiffs from the purchase, set the sale aside, opened the decree, and allowed them to file a supplemental complaint bringing in Ewer and others interested, as parties; and in second case it was stated that the plaintiff must resort to the original suit and that upon his application there the court might order the sale to be set aside, the satisfaction of the decree to be cancelled, and authorize a supplemental bill for a resale of the premises to be filed and conducted in the name of the complainants in that suit for the plaintiffs’ benefit, and direct that the mortgagor’s grantee and others interested be brought in as a party ; and in the third case, the remark italicised is spoken of as a dictum, and being a proposition for which no authority had either been cited or fallen under the court’s observation.
The case before us is unlike either of these cases. Unlike Goodenow vs. Ewer, there was nothing acquired by Sayre by his purchase and deed under the decree against War-
In State Bank of Wisconsin vs. Abbott, 20 Wis., 599, it was held that when in the foreclosure of a mortgage the owner of the equity of redemption has, through mistake, not been made a party, the mortgagee who has purchased at a sale under the decree for the whole amount of the mortgage debt and costs may maintain a second action to-foreclose the equity of such owner and for a new sale to-mate the principal and interest due on the mortgage, but, not for costs of the former suit. It was said in the opinion by Dixon, C.-J., that even if the effect of the sale for the full amount of the decree was to extinguish all personal liability of the mortgagor, who was the defendant in the former suit, that this was all the effect that could be given the proceedings, and that in all other respects the plaintiff, who was the assignee of the mortgage and the note it secured, stood as if no proceedings whatever had been had. See also section 1679 of Jones on Mortgages, where the same rule is observed.
III. No lien, for any amount capable of adjudication under the allegations of the bill, it is urged, can be enforced exclusively against the east thirty feet. The reason given for this contention is that the mortgage contract did not put it there. The case of Mickler vs. Townsend, 18 N. Y., 578, is relied upon. This case, considering the facts of the one at bar, seems to be authority in favor of the complainants being estopped to enforce the mortgage against the west fifty feet held by Jordan under deeds from both Myers- and Sayre, but there is nothing in it considering the facts before us, to support the view with which it is urged. If it
Wilson vs. Troup, 2 Cowen, 195, cited as authority for the doctrine that a conveyance by the mortgagee of a part of the estate will not carry with it a corresponding part of the power to enforce the lien, and that there can be no foreclosure as to the east thirty feet involved here, is a case in which the owner of a mortgage having a power of sale, made conveyances of part of the land to several different persons, and afterwards sold all the land at public sale under the power, after due advertisement of the same, and became the purchaser thereof. It was held that the private sales did not affect the mortgagor’s right of redemption, nor the owner’s power to foreclose as against the mortgagor under the power of sale, but that as to the parcels sold previously, the foreclosure by sale pursuant to the power, and the purchase thereunder, operated for the benefit of the previous vendees, and that as to them the owner of the mortgage could never claim anything for himself under his foreclosure and purchase. Had the mortgagor, Wilson, previously conveyed or released his interest to the vendees of the owner of the mortgage, it is clear that there would have been in him no equity of redemption as to the parcels so conveyed, and the owner of the mortgage would have been estopped to enforce the mortgage as against the land so held by them by deeds from both himself and the mort
There is nothing in this case to the effect that a mortgage cannot be released either directly or indirectly as to part of the debt and part of the land, and enforced as to the balance.
It is true that an assignment simply of the mortgage or of the mortgagee’s interest in the land, without the debt, is held to be a nullity. In the case at bar, however, we have before us as complainants, both the assignor and the assignee, and upon the record, the assignment of both the balance of the debt and the lien as to the east thirty feet is admitted; and the terms of the deed as set forth in the bill are sufficient to carry the mortgage interest as to the land involved in this suit, and should be held to do so. Johnson vs. Leonards, 68 Maine, 237; Hunt vs. Hunt, 14 Pick., 374; 15 Pick., 83; Ruggles vs. Barton, 13 Gray, 506.
There is no error in the decree appealed from, and it will be affirmed.