75 Va. 442 | Va. | 1881
delivered the opinion of the court.
In August, 1859, John Miller, Benjamin F. Miller, East-ham Jordan, and James F. Brown formed a partnership for purchasing in the west on speculation stock cattle, and bringing them to Virginia, and after supplying themselves respectively with such as they wanted for grazing—they were all graziers and kinsmen—the remainder they would sell at a profit.
Their purchases were made mainly by John Miller and James F. Brown, in the State of Tennessee, and amounted to 3,399 head. They probably calculated on being able to make quick sales in their neighborhoods for cash, and in that way to raise money to pay for them; and they seem to have engaged in the venture without providing any capital for the purpose, probably calculating upon raising the means necessary so certainly in the way indicated; and they hoped to sell off their stock for cash, pay for it, and to wind up the business in a little while, perhaps in the course of two or three months. But they were doomed to disappointment. Their cattle cost them, as appears from an account taken in this cause, the sum of $64,090.07, and they found the price of stock cattle ruling low, not much demand for them, hard to sell any way, difficult to get pasturage and subsistence for them; that they were a burden on their hands; that to sell at all they would have to sell to a great extent on long time; that the members of the
The accounts were taken and the amount of the several debts still due by the company and of the assets of the company, which consisted mainly of a debt due from East-ham Jordan of an inconsiderable amount, and the amount which each of the three solvent partners would have to contribute for the payment of said debts, which would absorb the entire interest of each of them in the concern, and leave nothing due to either of them. And the amount which each of them should contribute for -the payment of the debts being ascertained, the court rendered a decree . against them severally for their pro rata share of the debts so ascertained, to be paid to E. T. Jones, who was appointed . a receiver for collecting the same.
From this decree Eastham Jordan obtained an appeal to this court.
He assigns as error, first, the overruling of his plea of the ■statute of limitations. The court is opinion that there is
. There never has been a formal dissolution of the firm of Brown, Miller & Co. On the 10th of August, 1871, the debts of the firm, unpaid and outstanding, amounted to $5,960.74, with interest on $4,214.78 till paid. That is, amount due on judgment of Davis & Williams, $650.87; Johnson & Hall, $1,914.30, and John T. Fletcher, $3,395.57—aggregating the above sum of $5,960.74, which is exclusive of amounts due to members of the firm. At the same time there appears to have been due the firm from Eastham Jordan $244.28, a valid debt, and from G. J. Browning $2,625.33, which was secured by a deed of trust on real estate, which is now believed to be of little or no value. The whole sum due the firm and unpaid on the 10th of August, 1871, as reported, is $16,265.33, with interest on $9,600, part thereof, the most of which is lost. This suit was brought on the 20th of January, 1874, and the foregoing credits, in favor of, to the extent that they were valid claims, and debts against the firm, being unpaid and outstanding within the five years next preceding the institution of the suit, upon the authority of the case above cited, which is supported by Marsteller v. Weaver’s Adm’r, 1 Gratt. 391, it is not barred by the statute of limitations. Hor has there been, in our opinion, such
The contract of partnership was by parol, but the court is of opinion that it does not fall within the provision of the statute which prohibits the bringing of an action upon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year, unless it be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or his agent. The agreements contemplated are such as by their terms have performance postponed beyond one year, and not such as may or may not chance to be performed within that period. 1. Minor’s Institutes, 189-190; 2 Parson son Contracts, 316.
The court is further of opinion, that the contracts of sale of cattle belonging to the firm, and which were acquired by the firm in this venture, made with a guaranty, were binding upon the firm, although all the members of the firm were not present participating in and sanctioning such sales, and this, although it was the original purpose of the co-partners in associating themselves together to purchase stock cattle, to supply themselves respectively as graziers, and to sell the remainder for a profit, and although they may have contemplated that they would be able to sell them for stock cattle. There does not appear to have been any stipulation in their contract of partnership as to the manner in which they would dispose of the cattle, except that each partner should take from the lot they purchased such of them as he desired to have for grazing, and that the balance should be sold at a profit. It does not appear that they imposed on themselves a restriction that they should not be sold with a guaranty, which seems not to have been an unusual mode of disposing of cattle amongst the graziers of their section, nor with the parties themselves to this contract. It seems that some of them at least, and the
But suppose it was the understanding of these parties when they formed this partnership association that after they supplied themselves respectively with cattle for grazing, they would sell the remainder for cash to the neighbors around them, and wind up the business in two or three months. What were they to do if they could not be sold ? Did not the obligation rest upon Jordan as much as upon the others, and could he withdraw and refuse to aid and co-operate in carrying out the plan, and hold his co-partners responsible to him for being unable to accomplish it ? Each partner is bound to contribute his skill and exertions to the common object. After the disposal of the 275 head in the way mentioned, there remained 320 head undisposed of, which would be utterly lost, as F. B. Miller testifies, unless the members of the firm would divide them among themselves, and it was proposed to divide them into four
In purchases and bargains relating to the partnership, the act of one is considered the act of all, and that each may contract as if he were the authorized agent of the rest, and bind all by dealing within the scope and nature of their business. Gow on Part. 71; Willet v. Chambers, Cowp. R. 814; Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns. R. 409. In extraordinary cases, an extraordinary use of power must be made. What is called the course of trade is not confined to what is called the most usual way of doing business, in the usual state of things. Tapscott v. Weaver, 9 Leigh, 424. In Anderson & Wilkins v. Thompkins, 1 Brock R. 456, Chief Justice Marshall said, “If the necessity be apparent, if the act be justified by its motives, if the mode of sale be such as the circumstances require, I cannot say that the partner has exceeded his power.”
We are of opinion that the sale of the 275 head of cattle with the guaranty, and the contingent obligation to take them back and pay for them, was not in excess of the powers of the partners who made the sales; that it was a partnership transaction, and that the execution of the bond for the amount assumed by three of the partners did not extinguish the partnership liability, or release Eastham Jordan, the appellant, from his liability' therefor. In Weaver v. Tapscott, 9 Leigh, 427, it was held that the liability of a partner was not extinguished by the execution of his co-partner. Judge Cabell said also that Weaver was equally liable if Tabscott at the time of the contract was ignorant of the fact that Weaver was a partner. Upon that holding it was immaterial whether J. T. Fletcher knew or not, at the time of the contract, that Eastham Jordan was a partner.
The court has been unable to discover that the account taken by the commissioner, upon which the decree is based, is not supported by the evidence; but is of opinion that it-is so supported. Upon the whole the court is of opinion that there is no error in the decree of the circuit court, and. that the same must be affirmed.
Decree aeeirmed.