John Jordan sued his ex-wife, Mildred Jordan, and her divorce lawyer, Charles Joyner, contending that they fraudulently induced him to sign an unfair settlement agreement by promising to reallocate the marital assets after the divorce became final. After the settlement was incorporated into the final judgment and decree of divorce, he claimed, the defendants reneged on the deal. Mr. Jordan also sued Joyner for breach of fiduciary duty, contending Joyner’s prior representation of Jordan constituted a conflict of interest. In a detailed, thoughtful 15-page opinion, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Mr. Jordan appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal we review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact. Ford v. Bank of America Corp.,
So viewed, the record shows that the Jordans were married in 1978, and divorced in 2007. Joyner represented Mr. Jordan from 2002 to 2004 in unsuccessful litigation against a bankrupt debtor, and was also a neighbor. According to Joyner’s affidavit, Mr. Jordan approached him and asked him to represent Mrs. Jordan and handle the Jordans’ uncontested divorce. Joyner said he initially refused to represent Mrs. Jordan because of his professional relationship with Mr. Jordan, but ultimately agreed to do so on the condition that the divorce remain uncontested. According to Joyner, the Jordans had agreed on the terms of their settlement before he became involved. They came to his office, told him their terms, and he drafted the documents, he said. He saw them once more, when they returned to sign the paperwork. After the divorce complaint was filed, the Superior Court of Dawson County granted Mrs. Jordan’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings and issued a final judgment and decree incorporating the settlement agreement.
Mr. Jordan remembers his interactions with Joyner differently. According to Mr. Jordan, he learned of the settlement terms when Joyner presented him with a draft of an agreement, and he initially protested that it was not a fair division of marital assets. Under the terms of the agreement, which was ultimately incorporated into the
Mr. Jordan contends that Joyner told him the settlement agreement was just a “formality” necessary to prevent the lender from seizing marital assets for any deficiency due after the imminent foreclosure, and made an oral “side agreement” dividing the assets more equitably. When he asked if he should obtain his own lawyer, Mr. Jordan says, Joyner assured him he did not need to, so he signed the agreement. The lawyer obtained the final decree. When Mr. Jordan sent Joyner a fax outlining some terms of the oral “side agreement,” both Joyner and Mrs. Jordan denied ever discussing it.
Mr. Jordan sued Mrs. Jordan and Joyner for conspiracy and fraud, and also sued Joyner for breach of fiduciary duty, in the State Court of Forsyth County. Mrs. Jordan counterclaimed, contending that Mr. Jordan had failed to make the monthly payments due on a line of credit secured by the vacant lots to which she now holds title, forcing her to make monthly payments totaling $93,500 so the bank would not foreclose on the lots. Joyner and Mrs. Jordan both moved for summary judgment on Mr. Jordan’s claims against them, and Mrs. Jordan moved for summary judgment on her counterclaim.
The trial court denied summary judgment to Mrs. Jordan on her counterclaim for $95,000, holding that her affidavit alone was insufficient to establish the amount she had paid. Mrs. Jordan did not cross-appeal this ruling. The trial court also granted judgment to both defendants on Mr. Jordan’s claims, holding that the settlement agreement had been incorporated into a final divorce decree in another court, and thus could not be attacked separately. The trial court held that it, the State Court of Forsyth County, could not vacate a judgment of the Superior Court of Dawson County, which is the only court with jurisdiction to void the divorce decree.
The trial court also held that, even if it could consider the merits of the fraud claim against Joyner and Mrs. Jordan, the evidence
1. Mr. Jordan contends the state court erred in holding that he could not rescind the settlement agreement and sue in tort for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty without first having the final divorce decree set aside. He argues that because the “settlement agreement was not contingent on any divorce decree, . . . the divorce decree was irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of this purported agreement.” Our law is clear, however, that a party cannot collaterally attack the validity of a settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a final divorce decree. While Mr. Jordan is correct that a settlement agreement is a contract, that contract was incorporated into a final judgment and decree, and its merits can only be addressed by setting aside the final decree. Mahan v. Jackson,
Mr. Jordan’s cites to the contrary all involve settlement agreements that were not incorporated into final judgments of divorce, and therefore the usual rules of contract construction applied. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Guthrie,
2. Mr. Jordan further asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his claims are also barred because he entered into the settlement agreement with the purpose of defrauding his creditors. Mr. Jordan stated in an affidavit that Joyner told him “it was very important for me to transfer all of my assets to Mrs. Jordan” or the mortgage holder would take them, and further stated that he signed the settlement agreement because he thought “it was a mere formality” and would not be binding. An executed contract made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, however, “is valid and binding between parties.” Wofford v. Chambers Lumber Co.,
Pretermitting whether the court erred in finding that Mr. Jordan’s fraud claim was barred because he entered into a contract to defraud his creditors, however, we find no ground for reversal, because the grant of summary judgment was otherwise proper for the reasons addressed in Division 1. See DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente,
Judgment affirmed.