316 Mass. 748 | Mass. | 1944
Jordan Marsh Company, claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the labor relations commission commanding it to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks International Protective Association, A. F. of L., as the certified exclusive bargaining representative of two groups of the company’s employees designated by the commission as "appropriate” bargaining units (G. L. c. 150A, § 5, inserted by St. 1938, c. 345, § 2, as amended by St. 1939, c. 318), filed its petition in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 150A, § 6 (f), inserted by St. 1938, c. 345, § 2, praying that the order of the commission be set aside on the ground that its designation of the bargaining units was against the evidence, arbitrary and. invalid. The commission filed a counter petition under § 6 (e) for enforcement of its order. The only question at issue is the validity of the commission’s designation of the bargaining units. The employer can raise that question upon a petition for review of a final order of the commission requiring it to act. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Commission, 312 Mass. 597. There was no evidence that the company was engaged in interstate commerce, and no contention to that effect has been made.
The Superior Court found that the designation of bargaining units by the commission was not supported by substantial evidence (see § 6 [e]); that the commission "was.
Jordan Marsh Company operates a large ¡department store in Boston, abutting on at least six streets and occupying from four to ten floors and the basements in each of five different buildings. It employs in all about fourteen hundred salespeople. Its selling activities are divided into two hundred seventy-one departments. The two bargaining units set up by the commission are these: “Unit A,” “All employees at the Company’s store who are regularly employed in fitting and selling men’s and boys’ clothing, including men’s sports clothing and military uniforms”; and “Unit B,” “All employees at the Company’s store who are regularly employed in selling furniture or bedding in the furniture and bedding departments located on the sixth and seventh floors of the store.” Persons employed in a supervisory capacity are excluded from both units. The petitions to the commission for certification of representatives for these units stated respectively, and the commission found, that there were about forty employees in “Unit A” and about twenty-one employees in “Unit B.” None of the others of the approximately fourteen hundred sales employees was included in either unit.
A wide field of inquiry is open to the commission in designating units appropriate for collective bargaining. See National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U. S. 111, 134. We cannot attempt to define or to enumerate the subjects proper for consideration. But it is clear that if collective bargaining by previously designated bargaining units is to achieve its purpose of promoting in
At the hearing before the commission nearly all the evidence tending to show the employment conditions and the relations of the members of the sales force to the company and to each other was introduced by the company. It was introduced through obviously intelligent witnesses whose positions in the company were such that they should be
The facts so appearing may be summarized as follows: In a retail department store the important qualities in a salesperson are selling ability and knowledge of the store’s system. These are the same in all departments, including those selling clothing, furniture and bedding. Familiarity with the stock carried in a department is necessary but is quickly acquired by any competent and efficient salesperson. Salespeople are not necessarily confined to one department. Frequently they are moved about from one department to another, and such interchange takes place among departments selling articles of entirely different characteristics. There are in the store “flying squadrons” of so called “contingent” salespeople who are not regularly assigned to any particular department, but who may be immediately thrown into any department in which a shortage of sales personnel develops. Temporary “extras” are also employed to go into departments at busy times especially at the Christmas season. They are assigned to different departments at different times. No employees are hired or discharged by the selling departments. All employing and discharging of salespeople are done by the “personnel department.” This “department” also handles such disciplinary matters as may be referred to it. It supplies training for all new sales
The evidence makes it plain that the only interests in collective bargaining which are shared in common by the members of the two proposed bargaining units respectively and not shared by other members of the sales force excluded from these units are such interests, if there are any, as may arise from the sale of men’s and boys’ clothing and of furniture and bedding as distinguished from the sale of other articles some of which must be closely analogous to men's
Indeed, the commission itself seems to have had some misgivings as to the appropriateness of the units, since it says that it is in accord with the theory that “the ideal unit ... is the store wide unit”; that it may well be that more effective bargaining could be done by a unit consisting
Moreover, in this case the same labor organization would have been available if a larger unit or units had been created and had voted to be represented by it. Indeed, it appeared that some of the sales force not included in the proposed bargaining units were members of this organization, and
We do not go so far as to rule as matter of law that the bargaining units for salespeople in department stores must always include the entire sales force (except those employed in a supervisory capacity), although it would seem that in most cases this would be the natural unit. Conceivably there might be reasons for separating out some departments or groups of related departments. But we do hold that the evidence in this case discloses no reasonable ground, either from the standpoint of employer organization or from the standpoint of convenient labor representation, for separating out the two small groups of salespeople which the commission has’ erected into “Unit A” and “Unit B.”
Decree affirmed.
We have not overlooked evidence that once in special circumstances the company made a contract with a group of shoe salesmen.
It is significant that the New York State labor relations board has repeatedly refused to create separate units composed of departments in retail stores, and that the national labor relations board has made decisions of a similar nature in comparable cases within its jurisdiction. Matter of Bergdorf & Goodman Co. 2 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 773. Matter of L. Kratter, Inc. 3 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 452. Matter of James McCreery & Co. 4 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 573. Matter of Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc. 4 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 844. Matter of Saks & Co. 4 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 879. Matter of John Wanamaker New York, 4 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 1059. Matter of Lima Kenton Grocery Co. 29 N. L. R. B. 85. Matter of Arlington Mills, 31 N. L. R. B. 21. Matter of Western Union Telegraph Co. 31 N. L. R. B. 653. Matter of National Sanitary Co. 31 N. L. R. B. 824. Matter of Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. 34 N. L. R. B. 40. Matter of Sears, Roebuck & Co. 35 N. L. R. B. 1036. Matter of National Vulcanized Fibre Co. 36 N. L. R. B. 46. Matter of Prentice-Hall, Inc. 39 N. L. R. B. 92. Matter of Triangle Publications, Inc. 40 N. L. R. B. 1330. Matter of Lane Bryant, Inc. 42 N. L. R. B. 218. In Matter of Franklin Simon & Co. Inc. 3 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 362, where a contrary result was reached, there was evidence tending to differentiate the unit from the remainder of the sales force, and this case has been distinguished in later decisions. See also Matter of Bonwit Tetter, Inc. 4 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 744.