OPINION
Opinion by
Aрpellant Niclas L. Jonsson filed an application and petition for entry of judgment on foreign judgment in Collin County. Appellees Rand Racing, L.L.C. and William Rand filed a motion to vacate judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to vacate because the California judgment is valid and enforceаble under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Specifically, he asserts the judgment is valid because appellees voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction in California despite their claims of lack of notice, and appel-lees’ forum-related activities establish min
Background
Appellant filed a claim with the California Labor Commission on September 5, 2003 alleging appellees owed him unpaid wages for car races and business expenses he incurred while employed as a professional race car driver for appellees. The record includes “certification of service by mail or certified mail” from the Commission executed on March 29, 2004 and states the Notice of Hearing, Complaint, and Answer was served “by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed as follows:” to appellees at 6533 Riverside Dr., Plano, Texas, 75024. The record also shows the two notices sent to the Plano address were returned and stamped “unclaimed.”
Appellees did not file an answer or any other document in regards to appellant’s claim. However, a docket entry alleges defendant called the day before the conference and left a message “disputing claim.” On June 24, 2004, the Commission awarded appellant $34,345.77, which included unpaid wages and expenses, interest, and penalties under the labor code.
Without further notice or hearing, the labor commissioner for Californiа filed a “Request That Clerk Enter Judgment in the Superior Court of the state of California, Orange County.” On that basis, a judgment was entered by the superior court in cause number 04CC01243 on August 4, 2004 in accordance with the award of the labor commissioner.
On September 14, 2007, appellant filed an application and petition for entry on foreign judgment in Collin County district court to recover the monеy awarded in California. Appellees assert they never received notice of appellant’s claim against them until they received the application and petition for entry of judgment on foreign judgment. Appellees then filed a motion to vacate judgment alleging they were never properly served with process or notice of the hearing regаrding the California proceedings and that California did not have jurisdiction over them to enter a judgment.
The trial court granted appellees’ motion to vacate and noted “the filing of the foreign judgment is of no consequence or effect” and therefore, appellant’s foreign judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit and was not enforceable in the State of Texas. Appellant appeals from this order.
Full Faith and Credit
Under the United States Constitution, a state must give the same force and effect to a judgment of a sister state that it would give to its own judgments.
See
U.S. Const, art. TV, § 1;
Karstetter v. Voss,
When a judgment creditor files an authenticated copy of a foreign judgment, he satisfies his burden to present a prima facie case for enforcement of the judgment.
Id.
§ 35.003(a), (b);
Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc.,
The judgment debtor may try to prove an affirmative defense to the judgment.
Karstetter,
The presumption of validity can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Mináis,
Standard of Review
A motion contesting enforcement of a foreign judgment operates as a motion for new trial.
Karstetter,
We apply the abuse of discretion standard recognizing the law required the trial court to give full faith and credit to the California judgment unless appel-lees established an exception. Id. The determination of whether they established an exception to full faith and credit generally involves a factual inquiry, not resolution of a question of law. Id. The trial court has no discretion in applying the law to the established facts. Therefore, we review the record to determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to thе established facts in concluding whether appellees established an exception to full faith and credit of enforcement of the California judgment. Id.
General Appearance
Appellees contend they may challenge the labor commissioner’s order because service of process was inadequate under California service of process rules. Appellant, howеver, contends appellees entered a general appearance, which cured any alleged defect in service.
See In re Marriage of Torres
(1998)
A party makes an “appearance” under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1014 when he “... answers, demurs, files a notice of motion to transfer pursuant to Section 369b, moves for reclassification pursuant to Section 403.040, gives the plaintiff written notice of appearance, or when an attorney gives notice of appearance for the defendant.” Cal.Civ. Proc.Code § 1014 (2007);
Sanchez v. Superior Court
(1988)
Under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that a notation on the docket sheet alleging appellee called the court the day before a conference “disputing claim” as evidence of a general appearance. Although appellant argues а general appearance need not be a formal, technical step or act, and therefore, the telephone call shows appellees’ acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction, we disagree. First, we cannot conclude leaving a message is an answer, demur or written notice of an appearance, or an аttorney’s notice of appearance as required by code of civil procedure 1014. The statement alone of “disputing claim” does not necessarily indicate that appellees recognized the court’s authority to proceed against him. Appellees could have been disputing appellant’s claim of jurisdiction against them in a Californiа court. Likewise, appellees did not seek any affirmative relief on the merits of the case from the court by leaving a message.
See Cal. Overseas Bank v. French Am. Banking Corp.
(1984)
In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellant’s argument that when the legislature enacted California Labor Code section 98(a) it determined there was no distinction between appearing or participating in a proceeding. Appellant specifically argues “the California legislature’s use of the alternative terms ‘appear nor participate’ expresses its appreciation of no real distinction between an appearance by ‘participating’ in a proceeding (through attendance) and to simply ‘appeаr’ by verbally expressing an intention to dispute the merits of the claim.” No where within section 98(a) does it say “appear or participate,” but rather in section 98(f) it does reference a defendant’s failure to “appear or answer.” As stated above, appellees did not file an answer or appear at the hearing, nor did the telephone cаll constitute an appearance. Thus, appellant’s argument is without merit.
Further, appellant contends we should not rely on the code of civil procedure because section 98(g) of the labor code states “all hearings conducted pursuant to this chapter are governed by the division and by the rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Labor Commissioner.” Cal. LaboR Code § 98(g) (2007). Therefore, because there is no reference to the code of civil procedure for purposes of determining appearances, we should not rely on it for our analysis. First, we note section 98(g) states “all hearings” are governed by the labor commissioner’s adopted rules, but does not specifically say it gov-
Having concluded appellees’ telephone call did not constitute a general appearance and therefore did not cure any possible defects in service, we must now determine whether appellees established by clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s service of process was inadequate under the California service of process rules.
Service of Process
Section 98(a) of the California Labor Code gives the labor commissioner authority to investigate employee complaints. Under labor code section 98(b), when a hеaring on a complaint is set, a copy of the complaint, together with a notice of time and place of the hearing, “shall be served on all parties, personally or by certified mail, or in the manner specified by Section 415.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Cal. LaboR Code § 98(b) (2007). Here, the commission did not serve appellees personally; however, the record shows it attempted to serve them by certified mail. But, the two notices were returned and stamped as “unclaimed” on the envelope. Further, appel-lees filed an affidavit with their motion to vacate judgment in which William Rand denied receiving any notice of the hearing. Thus, appellees rebutted any presumption that they received the notices.
See, e.g., Bear Creek Master Ass’n v. Edwards
(2005)
Under section 98(b), the only method' left for the commission to use was the requirements of code of civil procedure section 415.20. Id.
Section 415.20(a) states the following:
In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to a person to be served in Section 416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, at his or her usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.
Cal.Civ.PROC.Code § 415.20 (2007). The record is void of any attempts by the commission to serve a copy of the notice of hearing by leaving it at appellees’ office or usual mailing address. The record does indicate the commission sent notice by reg
Having reached this conclusion, we reject appellant’s argument that appellees were served under the general service by mail sections of the code of civil procedure. See Cal.Civ.PROC.Code §§ 1012, 1013 (2007). Labor code section 98(b) provides specific methods of service, and sections 1012 and 1013 are not included as service options under the statute. Therefore, any reliance on these sections to prove service is inapplicable.
After considering the evidence, we conclude appellees provided clear and convincing evidence to ovеrcome the presumption of validity that the California judgment should be given full faith and credit in Texas. Because appellees established an exception to the California court’s jurisdiction, specifically that service of process was inadequate under the California service of process rules, the trial court did not misapply the law to the established facts of this case. Thus, it properly granted appel-lees’ motion to vacate judgment, and we overrule appellant’s first issue.
Because his first issue is dispositive and establishes an exception to the court’s jurisdiction, we need not consider whether exercise of jurisdiction in California offends due process because of a lack of minimum contacts with thе state.
See Karstetter,
Finally, we note that in his reply brief appellant argues the right to administrative relief under labor code section 98(f) must be exercised and exhausted prior to seeking relief in Texas. Cal. LaboR Code § 98(f) (“No right to relief, including the claim that the findings or award of the Labor Commission or judgment entered thereon are void upon their face, shall accrue to the defendant in any court unless prior application is made to the Labor Commissioner in accordance with this chapter.”). Appellant failed to raise this argument to the trial court in his opposition to defendants’ motion to vacate judgment; therefore, we may not consider it on appeal.
Brown v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc.,
Notes
. Although we construe pro se pleadings liberally, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure.
Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn,