19 La. 553 | La. | 1841
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is kn action by the endorsee of a promissory note 'against the maker.' The defendant pleads, that the note was given with others in part consideration of a tract of land, which he purchased of Stephen Tippett and others. That he has since been- evicted ’of the land fovr which the note was given, and that the consideration has failed. That these facts were Within the knowledge of the plaintiff, and he took them subject to all legal exceptions against the payee. That the transfer of t'he note by the payee was in fraud of his rights. That it was agreed and 'understood, that the note When given was to be immediately transferred to P. B. Martin, who held a prior mortgage on the land, so as to extinguish the mortgage to that extent, and give the-respondent a clear title. That the note Was transferred in violation of this agreement, well known to all the parties and especially to the plaintiff, and that the land has since been seized and sold under the mortgage of Martin.
The case was tried by a jury, who found a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment rendered thereon-.
It- appears from a bill of exceptions in. the record, that the plaintiff’s counsel, during the trial excepted too much of the testimony of Holt & Beaman, as related to any conversations between them and the defendant Young, or between them and Tippett, relative to the note sued on, unless such conversations were had in presence of plaintiff, or were communicated to him previously to the transfer of the note, and he particularly objected to evidence of any conversation between the witnesses and Tippett or Young, as to any application of the notes given by Young to the mortgage notes given by Tippett to Martin, unless such conversations were in presence of the plaintiff or communicated to him before he became the holder of the note. But the court admitted the testimony as set forth in the note of evidence, on the ground that the defendant might bring home knowledge of it to- the plaintiff afterwards in the progress of the trial; and if so, then the evidence was. good, otherwise not.
We are of opinion, the court did not err. It is well settled under our practice, that parties are not to be controlled in the r r order, in which their proofs are to be laid before the court or jury. In the present case, if the defendant failed during the trial to bring home to the plaintiff’s knowledge of the equitable circumstances, before he became holder of the note, the court might have been moved to instruct the jury, that the evidence of these statements out of his presence was not legal evidence against the plaintiff.
Upon the merits, it was shown, upon the trial, that the note was given for an. instalment of the price of a tract of land 3 . bought by the defendant of Tippett, of which he has been evicted in consequence of 'a previous mortgage in favor of Martin. Holt, sworn as a witness, testified, that Tippett told him he had agreed with Young, to whom he had sold a part of the land, that his notes should be transferred to Martin, to make the debt lighter or to extinguish so much of it. Tippett told him, that was his1 object in selling the land to Young. That was understood before the sale, and that Martin was to
The jury concluded from the evidence adduced on the trial. that the plaintiff could not recover, on the ground, that he was informed of the equitable defence of the defendant. We do not regal'h this as one °-f the cases, in which it is our duty to disregard its verdict. The jury knew the parties and the wit-.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed with costs.