Richard S. Jones v. Dean Williams, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections
No. 18SA189
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
June 24, 2019
2019 CO 61
PER CURIAM
Appeal from the District Court, Fremont County District Court Case No. 18CV35, Honorable Robert Freeman, Magistrate
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 24, 2019
2019 CO 61
No. 18SA189, Jones v. Williams — Habeas Corpus — Statutory Interpretation — Jurisdiction.
In this habeas corpus appeal, the supreme court considers whether a district court may summarily dismiss a petition for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to include a warrant of commitment, which is required by
To the extent that Butler v. Zavaras, 924 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Colo. 1996), Evans v. District Court, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (Colo. 1977), Garrett v. Knight, 480 P.2d 569, 570–71 (Colo. 1971), and McNamara v. People, 410 P.2d 517, 517–18 (Colo. 1966) hold that noncompliance with the warrant requirement is jurisdictional, deprives the court of authority to act, and requires summary dismissal, the supreme court overrules these cases.
v.
Respondent-Appellee: Dean Williams, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
Judgment Reversed en banc June 24, 2019
Richard S. Jones, pro se Olney Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Alison Faryl Kyles, Assistant Solicitor General Denver, Colorado
PER CURIAM.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 Richard S. Jones filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court challenging the Department of Corrections’ (“DOC“) calculation of his parole eligibility date (“PED“). Jones asserted that the DOC used only his latest 2008 conviction to calculate his PED, but, to correctly calculate his PED, he believed that the DOC‘s calculation should include two earlier convictions from 1991. If his PED was calculated utilizing the 1991 convictions, Jones argued that he had passed his PED and was being unlawfully denied consideration
¶3 In response to Jones‘s petition, the DOC moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The DOC characterized Jones‘s failure to include all three of his mittimuses as a “jurisdictional failure which requires dismissal.” The district court granted the DOC‘s motion and dismissed the petition.
¶4 Jones appealed the district court‘s order to this court. See
¶5 Jones is representing himself. In his appellate briefs, he reasserts the merits of the claims he outlined in his habeas corpus petition. Pleadings by pro se litigants must be broadly construed to ensure that they are not denied review of important issues because of their inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer. See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 696-97 (Colo. 2010). Broadly construed, Jones argues that he was entitled to a ruling on the merits, and the district court should not have dismissed his petition.
¶6 Relying on this court‘s precedent, the DOC contends that the district court properly dismissed the petition because the district court lacked jurisdiction2 as a result of Jones‘s failure to provide all three of his mittimuses.3
II. Analysis
¶7 When, as here, the challenge to the court‘s jurisdiction involves no disputed facts and instead involves interpreting a statutory requirement, we review the district court‘s dismissal order de novo. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, ¶ 10, 395 P.3d 751, 754; Nowak, ¶ 17, 320 P.3d at 344. In interpreting a statutory requirement, we must give effect to the General Assembly‘s intent. Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer, 2018 CO 52M, ¶ 11, 420 P.3d 259, 262. To determine that intent, we look at the statute‘s plain language, apply the text as written, and read the words in context giving the words their ordinary meanings. Id.
¶8 To decide whether the warrant requirement of
A. Habeas Corpus Authority
¶9 The court‘s power to hear habeas corpus petitions derives from constitutional and statutory grants of authority. The Colorado Constitution grants the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus.
¶10 In addition to granting district courts authority to entertain habeas corpus cases, the Habeas Corpus Act sets out statutory requirements for habeas petitions. Petitions
shall be in writing and signed by the prisoner or some person on his behalf setting forth the facts concerning his imprisonment and in whose custody he is detained, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the warrant of commitment,
or an affidavit that the said copy has been demanded of the person in whose custody the prisoner is detained, and by him refused or neglected to be given.
¶11 The DOC asserts that the statutory warrant requirement is jurisdictional and that noncompliance deprives the court of the authority to act on the petition. To support its position, the DOC relies on Evans v. District Court, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (Colo. 1977). Evans is the fourth case in a line of cases discussing the warrant requirement. Over time, these cases evolved to equate the statutory requirement with a jurisdictional requirement.
¶12 We first considered the effect of noncompliance with the statutory warrant requirement in reviewing a district court‘s denial of a habeas corpus petition in 1961. A copy of the warrant of commitment was not included with the petition. See Wright v. Tinsley, 365 P.2d 691, 692 (Colo. 1961). We acknowledged the petitioner‘s failure to follow the statute and stated that “[t]he importance of this statutory provision is immediately apparent. In our consideration of this writ of error we have nothing but the allegations of the pleadings from which to determine the specific convictions upon which the commitment was made.” Id. But we went on to conclude that “[t]here is nothing shown to indicate that petitioner is being illegally incarcerated at this time or that he is entitled to immediate liberation, the relief sought by this habeas corpus proceeding[].” Id.
¶13 Five years later, we again reviewed a district court‘s denial of a habeas corpus petition which lacked a copy of the warrant of commitment. See McNamara v. People, 410 P.2d 517, 517 (Colo. 1966). This time, we did not reach the merits; we stated instead that a petition lacking a copy of the warrant of commitment “has no validity and cannot be
¶14 In 1971, borrowing the language from McNamara, we continued down this path and expressly described the warrant requirement as “jurisdictional.” See Garrett v. Knight, 480 P.2d 569, 571 (Colo. 1971). Knight, a juvenile, was convicted in municipal court without the assistance of counsel and sentenced to ninety days in jail. Id. at 570. Instead of appealing his conviction, he filed a habeas petition in the district court. Id. The petition failed to include the warrant of commitment. Id. The district court granted the habeas petition. Id. The city appealed and argued that the remedy of habeas corpus was not available to Knight because he could have appealed his municipal conviction; the city also argued that Knight did not procedurally comply with the habeas statute because he did not provide the warrant of commitment. Id. We reversed the judgment, agreeing with both points. Id. at 570–71. In discussing the warrant requirement, the opinion quoted the section of McNamara recited above, then added “[s]uch is a jurisdictional requirement.” Knight, 480 P.2d at 571.
¶15 Next, in 1977, the superintendent of the Colorado State Penitentiary (“CSP“) filed an original proceeding asking this court to prohibit a district court from taking further action on a habeas corpus petition. Evans, 572 P.2d at 812. The habeas petition there,
¶16 The conclusory statements about jurisdiction in these cases mischaracterize the precise effects of noncompliance with the statute. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that noncompliance with the warrant requirement does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. To the extent that McNamara, Knight, Evans, and Butler hold that noncompliance with the statutory requirement to provide a copy of the warrant of commitment is jurisdictional, deprives the court of authority to act on a habeas petition, and requires summary dismissal, we overrule them.
B. The Warrant Requirement Is Not Jurisdictional
¶17 The legislature can restrict the court‘s jurisdiction by making statutory requirements jurisdictional. See, e.g., State v. Borquez, 751 P.2d 639, 645 (Colo. 1988) (holding that statutory requirement to seek judicial review of a driver‘s license revocation
¶18 In the Habeas Corpus Act, we find no language expressly or by necessary implication limiting the court‘s jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases. See
¶19 Our decision to read the warrant requirement as a statutory procedural requirement, instead of a jurisdictional requirement, is supported by subsection (1) of
¶20 The subsection then goes on to instruct the district court how to proceed after receiving a petition: “The court to which the application is made shall forthwith award the writ of habeas corpus, unless it appears from the petition itself, or from the documents annexed, that the party can neither be discharged nor admitted to bail nor in any other manner relieved.”
¶21 Dismissal under these circumstances, however, is not the same as dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. We believe that the warrant requirement outlined in the statute should be treated in the same manner as the statutory requirement that the petition set out the grounds entitling the petitioner to relief. As we stated in Wright, the warrant requirement‘s purpose is obvious: the warrant of commitment provides important factual information to the habeas court to assist the court in assessing whether the petitioner is entitled to relief. Wright, 365 P.2d at 692. We now clarify that failure to include the warrant with the petition does not deprive the district court of authority to act on the petition and should not result in summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶22 Jones filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court. The petition alleged that he was being denied parole consideration because the DOC miscalculated his PED by using only his 2008 conviction and ignoring his 1991 convictions. He referenced his 1991 convictions and provided the mittimus for his 2008 conviction. These steps were sufficient to invoke the district court‘s jurisdiction over the petition. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the district court‘s order, and we remand the case to the district court to consider the merits of Jones‘s petition.
¶23 Jones‘s habeas claim is not an uncommon one. See, e.g., Exec. Dir. of Colo. Dep‘t of Corr. v. Fetzer, 2017 CO 77, ¶¶ 3–4, 396 P.3d 1108, 1109; Nowak, ¶¶ 5–7, 320 P.3d at 342-43. When, as here, the petitioner does not supply all the relevant warrants of commitment and the district court believes that all the warrants are necessary for fair resolution of the habeas petition, the district court should either ask the petitioner to provide the missing information or consider the petition based on the information provided.4
III. Conclusion
¶24 Because Jones‘s petition was sufficient to invoke the court‘s jurisdiction to act, we reverse the district court‘s order summarily dismissing the petition for lack of
PER CURIAM.