60 Ct. Cl. 552 | Ct. Cl. | 1925
delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff is a major in the Army. From January 1, 1923, until August 25, 1923, he was stationed at Fortress Monroe, Va. During this period he was assigned and occupied Government quarters in accord with his rank. On August 25, 1923, he was detached from duty at Fortress Monroe and detailed for duty in Washington, D. C. While in Washington, from August 25,1923, to December 31, 1923, there being no Government quarters available for his occupancy, he was paid and received $500 in cash as commutation of quarters. The plaintiff in making out his income-tax return for 1923 included, under protest, as an item of his
Section 213 of the revenue act of 1921 (42 Stat. 237) enumerates with precision the various modes of accumulation which constitute under the statute gross income. So far as pertinent to the present discussion it may be abbreviatively reproduced as follows:
“That for tin purposes of this title * * * the term cgross income’ (a) includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service (including in the case of the President of the United States, the judges of the Supreme and Inferior Courts of the United States, and all other officers and employees, whether elected or appointed, of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, the compensation received as such) of whatever kind and in whatever form paid * *
■ It is to be observed that the parenthetical clause of the foregoing section of the revenue law is susceptible to a construction that Congress intended to impose upon the Government officers mentioned an income tax on their “ compensation received as such.” Whether we assume, the words “ as such” intentionally modify compensation or officer, it is certain that they serve a purpose and were intended to make a distinction in dealing with the officers mentioned; otherwise they would not have been used. Jones v. Parker, 67 Tex. 76, 81.
The revenue acts prior to 1918 excluded from income taxation the compensation received by the President, Federal judges, and officers and employees of a State, except
“Provided-, That hereafter the pay proper of all officers and enlisted men serving in Porto Kico, Cuba, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, and in the Territory of Alaska, «ball be increased ten per centum for officers and twenty per centum for enlisted men over and above the rates of pay proper as fixed by law in time of peace.”
The act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 895, 903, enlarged the preceding law by providing as follows:
“Provided, That hereafter the pay proper of all officers and enlisted men serving beyond the limits of the States comprising the Union, and the Territories of the United States contiguous thereto, shall be increased ten per centum for officers and twenty per centum for enlisted men over and above the rates of pay proper as fixed by law for time of peace.”
More recently, section 12 of the act of September 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 746, legislation providing compensation for Government employees injured while in the performance of their duties, pointed out a method of computing pay, providing “ that in computing the monthly pay * * * sub
The first income tax act, passed in 1862, 12 Stat. 472, by express terms provided that “ there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all salaries of officers, or payments to persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States,” thereby expressly imposing a tax, not only upon the salaries of officers, but likewise upon “payments” to persons in the civil or military service of the Government, thus expressly recognizing the long-established distinction between compensation and allowances, and this language was repeated by Congress in the income tax law of 1894, 28 Stat. 509. As a matter of fact, legislation of this character is so pointedly illustrative of a recognized and long-established difference between compensation and allowances provided for under certain prescribed conditions, that multiplication of citations would serve no useful purpose.
Mr. Justice Brown, in United States v. Smith, 158 U. S. 346, clearly distinguished between allowances which form a part of compensation and those which serve to reimburse for expenditures made. In Sherburne's case, 16 C. Cls. 491, this court, quoting from Scott’s Military Dictionary, said:
“Pay is a fixed and direct amount given by law to persons in the military service in consideration of and as compensation for their personal service. Allowances, as they are called, or emoluments, as they were formerly termed, are indirect or contingent remuneration which may or may not be earned, and which is sometimes in the nature of compensation and sometimes in the nature of reimbursement.”
In United States v. Mills, 197 U. S. 223-227, the Supreme Court had before it the question of computation of longevity pay due an officer of the Army. In the course of the discussion this language was used: “ The words ‘ pay proper,’ we see no reason to think, are to be construed differently from the word ‘ pay.’ The term means compensation, which may
Federal District and Circuit judges receive an allowance of not to exceed ten dollars a day when absent holding court away from their homes. Allowances of this character are clearly intended as reimbursements and form no part of the judges’ compensation. Smith v. Jackson, 241 Fed. 747, 246 U. S. 388; Payne v. Reeves, 184 N. W. (S. D.) 993; Christopherson v. Reeves, id. 1015; State v. Weedon, 221 S. W. (Tenn.) 941; Macon Co. v. Williams, 224 S. W. (Mo.) 835; McCoy v. Handlin, 153 N. W. (S. D.) 361.
Congress annually appropriates certain sums for the executive department and likewise a travel allowance. Such appropriations have not been and are not charged against the President as compensation. Members of Congress receive certain allowances. This court determined with refer-erence to mileage that the allowance was no part of their compensation. Wilson v. United States, 44 C. Cls. 428. A vast number of Government employees receive traveling expenses and fixed sums in lieu of subsistence when away on Government affairs. Clearly such allowances are for purposes of reimbursement. Each member of the Cabinet is furnished means of transportation at Government expense. The Vice President is allowed a sum sufficient to procure and maintain an automobile. It is not even suggested that allowances of this character are compensation. In what respect, then, is the allowance of public quarters or commutation of quarters to an Army officer different in character from one intended as reimbursement? We are quite firmly convinced that not only are they not allowances of a compensatory character, but they are not income as well.
As long as we have had an Army, officers of the Army have not only been permitted but compelled to occupy public quarters when the same were available. This practice, custom, and requirement has prevailed for so long a time, both in this country and abroad, that it would be difficult to establish the date of its origin. The very first Army Regulations issued in the United States, after the organization of the Army, made provision for this identical thing, and without interruption as to essential features it has continued from that day to this. No question as to the discontinuance of the requirement has ever been the subject of agitation, and Congress without hesitation has made and continues to make available each year a sum of money sufficient to pay commutation of quarters and provide public quarters for officers and enlisted men of the Army as well. In the earlier periods of our history the allowance of quarters was provided for in Army Regulations. Officers were assigned a fixed number of rooms according to their rank; and if public quarters were not available at the post, fort, or station, suit
The origin and continuance of the Army custom, as well as the law of the Army itself, indicate beyond a doubt that public quarters for the housing of enlisted men and officers is as much a military necessity as the procurement of implements of warfare or the training of troops. Congress has appropriated vast sums of money to establish permanent military posts and stations throughout the country, and in not one but all Army appropriations provision is of course made for the erection of barracks, officers’ quarters, and every other necessary building to maintain, house, and properly care for the enlisted men and officers of the post or station. We need not assert that an officer’s duties require his physical presence at his post or station; his service is continuous day and night; his movements are governed by orders and commands, by military law; troops are to be trained, discipline is to be enforced, and more than one exigency of the military service requires the officer to live with his command. In addition to what has been said, many officers may be and are required to keep and render a variety of official reports, perform certain prescribed military duties during both day and night. All these and many more con
But we are told that if the Government did not furnish the officer quarters he would have to incur the expense of procuring the same. Such an argument is absolutely devoid of merit. The inherent organization of the Military Establishment of the United States refutes it. Imagine a military post uninhabited by officers. Speculation as to possibilities and conditions in the face of long recognized and firmly established status and organization of the' Army are indeed idle. An Army officer’s rights and privileges.under the law are not to be gauged by comparisons. The Supreme Court said, in United States v. Phisterer, 94 U. S. 224:
“ Quarters are expected to be furnished by the Government to its officers; when it can not thus furnish, it allows them to be obtained otherwise and pays a monetary compensation therefor called commutation. This upon the assumption, first, that the officers are actually engaged in the public service; and, second, that such quarters are necessary to the discharge of their duty.”
The policy of Congress has been and is to assimilate the pay of officers of the Army and Navy. Congress has consistently endeavored to equalize the pay of officers of the Army in keeping with'their rank and duties. (Sec. 13 of the Navy personnel act, 30 Stat. 1007, and succeeding legislation down to and including the act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 625.) The last-named statute readjusts the pay of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geo-
The defendant, in its brief, apparently predicates its argument upon the money received by the officer as commutation of quarters. Money, it is said, is the clearest form of income, and when the officer is allowed to receive and expend it free from Government control it is obviously compensation and income. In order to sustain the contention the defendant is put to the necessity of overruling certain decisions of the Supreme and this court. This is done by an ingenious analysis of the acts of 1922 and 1924. This court held in Jaegle v. United States, 28 C. Cls. 133, in an opinion by the late Chief Justice Nott, that—
“ Commutation in the military service is money paid in substitution of something to which an officer, sailor, or soldier is entitled by law or regulations or general orders of the commander in chief. The fact that the statute and the regulations of the Army and Navy prescribe the cases in which commutation may be allowed excludes the supposition of its being allowed by inferior authority. Commutation is not necessarily equal to the value of the thing for which it is a substitute, but is supposed to be, in the general average of cases, a fair equivalent.”
In Odell v. United States, 38 C. Cls. 194, 198, Judge Weldon said:
“ Reimbursement is primarily what the law contemplates; but when there is no expense, as in this case (the occupied quarters being a part of the Naval Establishment of the United States), there can be no reimbursement in fact, and therefore none allowed by law. If the claimant had occupied quarters not belonging to the United States and was otherwise entitled under the circumstances to quarters, the fact that he was not charged with the use of quarters would not be material and would not affect the right and obligation of the parties; but when, as in this case, the quarters occupied belonged to the defendant there is no legal right of recovery.” See also United States v. Mills, supra; United States v. Smith, supra; United States v. Phisterer, supra.
But, says the defendant, the acts of 1922 and 1924 revolutionized the subject of commutation of quarters. Congress,
Lastly, may such allowances be considered as income? In Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189), we find this expression: “Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” The defendant criticises the citation of the above case on the grounds of utter dissimilarity as to issue. There can be no doubt that as to issues involved the citation is inapposite. Nevertheless, the generalization of the definition is possible. In this case involving personal service it is comprehensive. The essential factor in the determination of the question lies not alone in the single element of gain, but gain derived from labor. In other words, as remuneration for the officer’s services is he not only paid a salary but in addition furnished a house to live in as part thereof? If so, income accrues; if not, no income accrues. The most conspicuous illustration of the differentiation is the Chief Executive of the Nation. Our Presidents occupy the White House. If in computing income tax the fair rental value of this most historic and pretentious house and grounds is to be the standard, the annual compensation of the President would indeed be substantially reduced. In the scheme of Government, just as in the Army, the White House becomes the Executive office of the Nation. It is an inseparable incident of the office itself, the one provision made by Congress
“ It appears to me that the case was decided in the court beloAv, as it has been argued at your Lordship’s bar, upon the true legal issue — namely, whether the appellant’s residence is income within the meaning of the statutes which must be valued and assessed for income taxes. * * * The appellant does no doubt reside in the building, but he does so as the servant of the bank and for the purpose of performing the duty which he owes his employers. His position does not differ in any respect from that of a caretaker or other servant, the nature of whose employment requires that he shall live in his master’s dwelling house or business premises instead of occupying a separate residence of his own * * *. In the present case the learned judges of the majority have assessed the value of the appellant’s residence at £50 upon the somewhat speculative footing that if his duty did not require him to reside in the bank he would be compelled to pay that sum for suitable accommodation for himself and family elsewhere. In that view the so-called benefit may in some instances prove a heavy burden as in the case of a bank agent who, but for the service required by his employers, could continue to reside, free of charge, in his parents’ house.”
Again, Judge Clayton, in Smith v. Jackson, 241 Fed. 747, said:
“I think it may be said, therefore, that an emolument is something positively and directly conferred, as compensation or gain, that the holder of an office receives, and not something necessarily, inseparably, and incidentally used by him in the discharge of his duty, a duty for which he is paid a fixed salary.”
We have heretofore cited a number of State cases. The line of demarcation runs parallel with the services one engages to perform. If the nature of the services require the furnishing of a house for their proper performance, and without it the service may not properly be rendered, the house so furnished is part of the maintenance of the general enterprise, an overhead expense, so to speak, and forms no part of the individual income of the laborer. The master
In the'determination of the issue we keep constantly to the fore the pertinent fact that we are dealing with a governmental institution, an organization whose internal affairs are regulated by military law and regulations, and that whatever gain accrues to the officer by reason of these particular allowances must be a gain derived from the particular services he renders for which remuneration is paid, and which the laws of the organization exact as quid fro quo. It is conceded that an officer, as part of his military duty, must reside at his post or station. No one would have the courage to assert that such was not the fact. Indeed, it is a primary necessity, the one thing within the intent and purpose of the law, both civil and military. If quarters are available the officer must live there. He has no choice. The extent, of quarters assigned him, the number of rooms essential for his needs, is fixed not by the officer, but by law. No matter how inconvenient, if adequate he must occupy them or lose the allowance and obtain permission otherwise. Nor does he have the choice of domicile. He may be in the East to-day and in the West tomorrow. When the nature of his duties does not require his personal presence the allowance does not follow. More than sixty-five per cent of the Army officers occupy public quarters.
There are additional instances in the regulations where the allowance is lost, and lost because not indispensable for the performance of the service required. While the mere character of the contingency may not irrevocably determine the nature of the allowance, it is a prime factor available as such in reaching a conclusion as to whether it is a gain derived from service. The officer may not rent the premises assigned and live away from them. He has no control
From what has been said we believe the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount claimed. It is so ordered.